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The EU as a Confederal Union 
of Sovereign Member Peoples: 
An introduction and overview
‘What is regarded as a distinctive and exclusive feature of a federal state may be achieved in a typical 
confederation of States’1
‘With the emergence of permanent multinational ‘communities,’ of which the European Community 
is the prime example, we are now witnessing a revival of confederal arrangements.’2
1 Introduction: Reconnecting the EU
This thesis reconnects the EU to two classic constructs of constitutional 
theory: confederalism and sovereignty. Two powerful but unfashion-
able constructs whose joint potential for European integration remains 
largely unexplored and undervalued.3 The primary instrument to explore 
this potential is comparative. The EU will be contrasted with the rather 
unknown but rich example of the American Articles of Confederation, and 
their evolution into the now famous American federate system. A compar-
ison with the confederal roots of the United States which is revealing for 
both confederalism and sovereignty, and illustrates the potential of linking 
both for a constructive constitutional theory of the EU. A theory which does 
not have to overcome history, but connects with it, and may thereby help to 
recapture the EU and the increasing authority it wields.
1 H. Lauterpacht, ‘Sovereignty and Federation in International Law’ in: E. Lauterpacht 
(ed.) International Law, Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, vol. 3 (CUP, 1977), 
21.
2 D.J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (University of Alabama Press 2006), 51.
3 For confederalism see M. Burgess, ‘Federalism’ in: A. Wiener and T. Diez (eds.), European 
Integration Theory (2nd edition, OUP, 2009), 30. Also see Elazar (2006), 9: ‘Western Europe 
is moving towards a new-style confederation of old states through the European Com-
munity (…).’, and R.L. Watts, ‘Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations’ 
1 Annual Review of Political Science (1998), 121-122: ‘(…) the European Union after Maas-
tricht, which is basically a confederation but (…) has some features of a federation.’ For 
sovereignty cf already N.Walker, ‘Preface’, in: N.Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition 
(Hart Publishing 2006), v.
2 An introduction and overview
As for confederalism, the proposed comparison traces where the EU has 
blended a traditional confederal set-up with some of the federate modifica-
tions that were key to the US evolution into a federate system. These federate 
modifications can then be isolated, and the effect of grafting them onto a con-
federal basis studied. An exercise from which the EU emerges as an inverted 
confederal system which has reinforced a confederal foundation with a feder-
ate superstructure, and relies heavily on a federate rule by law. Based on these 
findings the descriptive fit and normative appeal of confederalism for the EU 
can then be explored more generally. Can confederalism, for instance, help 
us to better understand the nature and functioning of the EU, including the 
constitutional root causes of its surprising strengths and weaknesses? Or can 
it assist normatively in creating the ideal picture needed to drive, guide and 
justify its further development? Here the inherent capacity of confederalism 
to combine a certain degree of constitutional order with a flexible and plural 
reality may be of value. Especially so because the EU seems to have found 
some ways to reduce the structural weaknesses also inherent in the tradition-
al confederal scheme. If so, this may bring confederalism, traditionally the 
ugly duckling of constitutional theory, back into play, and not just for the EU.
As for sovereignty, it will become apparent how the American transition to 
a federation relied on an evolution in the doctrine of internal and popular 
sovereignty. By relocating sovereignty in the people, public authority could 
be delegated to two separate governments. Emulating this evolution in the 
US, this thesis explores the possibility of a confederal conception of popular sov-
ereignty. One which allows multiple sovereign peoples to delegate part of 
their authority to one shared European government. An objective for which 
the American example will be complemented by a more general conceptual 
analysis of the flexible internal core of sovereignty itself.
Where the US spearheaded a federate evolution in sovereignty to 
support their new federate system, therefore, the EU may champion a 
confederal evolution in sovereignty to support its own updated form of 
confederalism. A confederal conception that would soften the false juxtapo-
sition between sovereignty and integration. Instead, it could conscript sov-
ereignty as part of the solution, allowing sovereignty to fill some vital gaps 
in the confederal model and demonstrating the potential that is unleashed 
when these two concepts are properly linked and allied. A linkage that could 
inter alia allow a confederal EU to directly ground itself on the sovereign 
member peoples, who appear the only source capable of carrying the ever-
increasing legitimacy demands of the EU. Most importantly, it could do so 
in a way that helps to rediscover these peoples as the ultimate locus of polit-
ical authority, at least at the conceptual constitutional level. As a result con-
federal sovereignty may also be of use in realigning the democratic process, 
both at the national and the EU level, with the polycentric realities of today. 
It may thereby release the member peoples from their increasing entrap-
ment within their states, and establish democratic control, albeit in a differ-
ent form, at those levels where it increasingly matters in a globalized world.
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2 The descriptive and normative objectives of a confederal 
approach
Jointly the comparative exploration of confederalism and sovereignty form 
the two key ingredients of the overarching conception of the EU as a con-
federal polity of sovereign member peoples examined in this thesis. A con-
stitutional system that is founded both on the popular sovereignty of its 
member peoples, and on the Member States that remain the primary bod-
ies through which these people organize themselves. An overarching con-
ception that would also fit our Neo-Westphalian world where states have 
surrendered their near monopoly on exercising public authority but nev-
ertheless remain of central importance.4 A world, therefore, where govern-
ment, and the mechanisms for democratic control, need to be realigned with 
the reality that needs governing. A world where the confederal form may 
finally come into its own.
This overarching aim must and will of course be deconstructed into mul-
tiple more specific aims along the way. Here, however, it is important to 
already indicate some of these specific aims, and especially to separate the 
analytical and descriptive from the normative claims, at least to the extent 
that the descriptive can be uncoupled from the normative in law and consti-
tutional theory.5
4 Cf also N.Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’, in: N. Walker (ed), Sove-
reignty in Transition, (Hart, 2006), 5. I prefer the term neo-Westphalian to his post-West-
phalian, as it better captures the continuity, as well as the enduring, if diminished role of 
the states. it also comes closer to his use of ‘late sovereignty’. It fully shares, therefore, the 
sentiment he expressed elsewhere that ‘(…) rather than signaling a break with the para-
digm of political modernity centered upon the modern state and its legal and constitu-
tional edifi ce, the EU refl ects and contributes to a variation in the form of political moder-
nity.’ N. Walker, ‘The Place of European Law’, in: G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), The 
Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP 2012), 57.
5 Cf the distinction as made by Rosenfeld and Sajó ‘From a descriptive standpoint, the 
scholar examines systematically the comparative constitutional work that participants 
undertake, performing a number of tasks ranging from classifi cation to critical assess-
ment. (…) Normative, or prescriptive scholarly work, on the other hand, concentrates on 
what the scholar deems desirable or feasible, depending on the latter’s empirical, ideo-
logical, or discipline based position.’ M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó, ‘Introduction’, in: 
M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law 
(OUP 2012), 10. At the same time this distinction is not to deny the inherent normative 
element in choosing the comparator, in this case confederalism, from amongst the multi-
ple other possible candidates for comparison. Cf N. Jansen, ‘Comparative Law and Com-
parative Knowledge’ in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (OUP 2006), 314.
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To begin with this thesis makes several descriptive, factual claims about 
confederalism, sovereignty and the EU. It is, for instance, claimed that the 
EU can be usefully understood as a modified confederal system.6 For the 
EU does combine several of the core characteristics of a confederation with 
some federate elements. Furthermore, approaching it as such contributes to 
a better understanding of its functioning and nature and may guide future 
modifications. Such modifications, after all, should build on the specific 
strengths of the modified confederal model, whilst avoiding the remain-
ing confederal pitfalls. Similarly, it is claimed that sovereignty is compat-
ible with far-reaching integration, if only we return to the more appropriate 
internal and popular strands within sovereignty. Strands that are inherently 
more amenable to sharing and dividing authority. Strands that are also con-
ceptually prior and more fundamental than the unsuitable external concep-
tions of sovereignty generally applied to the EU, and which lead to a false 
dichotomy between sovereignty and the EU. Equally the federate evolu-
tion in sovereignty that took place in the US is not a normative claim, but a 
descriptive fact, as is the inherent potential within sovereignty for a further 
confederal evolution.
Added to these descriptive claims, yet separable from them, are several nor-
mative claims. Chief amongst these is the claim that a conception of the EU 
as a confederal union of sovereign member peoples is attractive and desir-
able. A conception that should be pursued and further realized where pos-
sible.7 This, for instance, because of its tendency to respect and strengthen 
other desirable outcomes such as respect for autonomy, identity and diver-
sity, debate and cooperation. Crucial values in a world where we both need 
far-reaching cooperation and respect for local identities.8
In addition the confederal conception allows the EU to ally with other 
valuable normative constructs in constitutional theory, such as democracy, 
state, sovereignty and citizenship. Instead of having to oppose and over-
come them, and with them the national systems that rely on these con-
structs as well, the EU can be be allowed to build on these constructs in a 
symbiotic manner. Instead of radically rejecting them, therefore, the EU can 
6 See in this regard also the conclusion of Burgess that the EU is ‘an evolving, highly decen-
tralized, federal union of states and citizens with limited but signifi cant public duties, 
obligations and responsibilities that is built upon ‘unity in diversity’. And: ‘It is, in other 
words, a new kind of federal-confederal union that we can classify either as a ‘new confe-
deration’ or a new federal model.’ Burgess (2006), 238-239 (my italics).
7 This should not be mistaken, however, for a ‘missionary’ type of suggestion that confed-
eralism forms a panacea to all the problems of the world, which it certainly is not. Cf in 
this regard also M. Forsyth, Unions of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederation 
(Leicester University Press 1981), 9.
8 These outcomes also relate to the liberal and contractual nature of federalism itself. In the 
words of Burgess: ‘(…) –  a voluntary union, we are reminded, and one that is founded on 
liberal democratic principles that recognize, respect and tolerate differences and diversi-
ty.’ Burgess (2006), 236.
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better be made compatible with these traditional concepts, improving them 
where possible. One of the main advantages of a confederal focus in this 
regard may precisely be its capacity to provide updated conceptions of such 
classic constructs as sovereignty, also for the national level. Such updated 
notions may help national constitutions and democratic systems, on which 
a confederation must rely, to adapt to their new roles and functions in a 
globalizing reality, and hence to retain their relevance. In doing so they may 
also counter the simplistic notions now often used to hold constructive 
national debates hostage.9 In the long run, integration and cooperation are 
necessary to protect and improve traditional constructs such as democracy, 
identity state or sovereignty. For as always, survival lies in adaptation, not 
fossilization.
Lastly, and closely related, there is the normative claim that the ultimate 
basis of public authority should be the people, and not, for instance, the 
states. Even the state, after all, is there for the people. Yet the risk exists that 
the people are squeezed out of the equation in the clash between the EU and 
the Member States. Any solution to the relation between the states and the 
EU, therefore, should be found in rediscovering the people that should sup-
port and control both.
These normative claims build on the descriptive claims, but of course 
require additional normative justification: an Is cannot be transformed into 
an Ought that easily. Where necessary, such further normative justifica-
tion will therefore be provided, or at least the need for it acknowledged. As 
indicated, furthermore, these normative claims can be separated from the 
descriptive ones. One can agree that the EU can currently be described and 
understood as a confederal system, without agreeing that the confederal 
form is desirable, now or in the future. Even where one, for other normative 
reasons, rejects the confederal form, and for instance prefers a federate or 
purely intergovernmental telos for the EU, however, the descriptive reality 
of a confederal EU remains relevant and should be acknowledged. Both the 
transition to the desired form of the EU, as well as the normative justifica-
tions for that form, after all, must take into account the current confederal 
reality.
9 See typically T.H.P. Baudet, The signifi cance of borders: why representative government and the 
rule of law require nation states (Doctoral thesis Leiden University 2012).
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3 Three tests and challenges for a confederal approach
To further develop these descriptive and normative claims, the confederal 
framework will be tested against three challenges, selected to represent both 
theory and reality.
On the plane of theory, confederalism will be set against, or rath-
er between, the conflicting schools of statism and pluralism.10 Statist 
approaches attempt to fit the EU within the existing statal framework. 
Here states remain the ultimate, irreducible building blocks. Typically such 
approaches lead to an unavoidable but unconvincing choice: The EU either 
has to stay within the confines of an international organization, or it must 
become a (federal) state.
The opposite approach of pluralism starts from those novelties in the 
EU that seem to defy this statal framework. Building on these novelties the 
central tenets of statism are rejected, especially its assumption of a fixed 
hierarchy with the sovereign state at the top. Instead, we are invited to a 
plural reality where multiple centres of authority co-exist in civilized heter-
archy. Although such pluralist approaches often accurately describe reality 
within the EU, they also tend to deconstruct far more than they can recon-
struct. Once the statal framework has been scuttled, there is generally little 
stable or constructive theory left to replace it.
It will be examined whether these influential but opposing views of both 
schools may be partially reduced to a false juxtaposition between sovereign-
ty and integration, and whether their respective strong points may there-
fore be partially synthesized under a confederal approach. For this purpose 
the statist camp will be primarily championed by the German Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht and its forceful case law on European integration. As a primar-
ily academic school of thought, the pluralist camp will be represented by 
some of its leading scholars.
Second, linking theory and practice, this thesis explores how a confederal 
approach may assist in securing a more stable and legitimate basis for the 
EU. A major theoretical and practical challenge that will clearly not be set-
tled here, but does lead us to an analysis of a confederal evolution of the 
democratic process itself. Some highly tentative proposals will be made in 
this regard to better align national systems to their participation in an over-
arching confederal constitution, and to anchor the EU directly in the nation-
al constitutions of its Member States. The place where a confederal Union 
should logically be anchored.
10 See for a detailed discussion of both schools part II, chapter 8.
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Lastly, switching from theory to harsh reality, the confederal approach will 
be further tested against the EMU crisis. A challenge to any constructive 
account of the EU, it will be seen if the proposed ideas can assist, however 
tentatively, in better understanding the EMU crisis as a perfect confeder-
al storm. In addition, it is examined if a confederal analysis may also help 
in descrying a general direction for structural solutions to the crisis. Solu-
tions that both reinforce the EMU, without subsuming the Member States 
altogether in a European federation, and thereby overstepping the outer 
bounds of a confederal structure.
4 Method, approach and limitations
It is contested whether jurisprudence, let alone constitutional theory, can 
have a truly ‘scientific’ method.11 Acknowledging these limits, this thesis 
relies on several of the common methods that are available within jurispru-
dence. Considering the central role of the American Articles of Confedera-
tion constitutional comparison obviously forms one particularly important 
method. This comparative exercise is complemented by historical and con-
ceptual analysis, especially concerning sovereignty. Both are established 
methods which can rely on existing practice and on established categories, 
yet retain many pitfalls. Added to these key methods are the staple methods 
available to jurisprudence, such as the legal analysis of treaties, legislative 
acts and judicial rulings and the study of secondary literature. These meth-
ods will be introduced more thoroughly at later stages in this thesis where 
they can be linked directly to the research carried out. Together these meth-
ods provide structure and formalization, which, although not as strong as in 
physics or mathematics, may certainly support more modest claims.
11 This already because the objects of study are not immutable laws of nature. They are 
changing social realities, partially determined by our own social practices and under-
standing of them. Cf Walker (2006b), 16-17 or G. Frankenberg, ‘Comparing constitutions: 
Ideas, ideals, and ideology –  toward a layered narrative’, 4 International Journal of Consti-
tutional Law (2006), 444.
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4.1 Normalism v. exceptionalism
In addition to these methods this thesis is also based on a more general, 
underlying approach, or perhaps even perspective. It examines where the 
EU is not unique, but (comfortably) fits within existing categories.12 For 
though the EU is innovative on several points, it did not develop outside, 
or independent of, the realm of human knowledge and experience.13 Nor 
should its further development be based on the assumption that it ought 
to do so.14 This approach could be termed normalism, at least to contrast it 
with its opposite of exceptionalism, which predominantly focuses on those 
areas where the EU is presumed to be unique.
Normalism therefore searches for commonality rather than uniqueness. 
This because it assumes that understanding starts where it becomes clear 
how something is related to existing experience and knowledge, even if the 
object of study challenges and changes that existing knowledge.15 This does 
not reject exceptionalism as a useful paradigm. Nor does it deny, or wants 
to deny, the highly relevant differences that do exist between the EU and 
12 See already P. Hay, Federalism and Supranational Organisations (University of Illinois Press 
1966), 37 and 44 ‘the Sui Generis label ‘not only fails to analyze but in fact asserts that no 
analysis is possible or worthwhile, it is in fact an ‘unsatisfying shrug.’ For a more recent 
rejection of the Sui Generis approach, also see, B. de Witte, ‘The European Union as an 
international legal experiment’, in: G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler, The Worlds of European 
Constitutionalism (CUP 2012), 19 et seq., and also L. van Middelaar, De passage naar Europa, 
Geschiedenis van een begin, (Historische Uitgeverij 2009), 29 et seq.
13 Quite the opposite, in fact, as is illustrated by the key role that the experiences with pool-
ing of resources during WW I and II played in conceiving the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). Generally for the allies, but specifi cally for Monnet who had a cen-
tral place in this project, as well as a lead role in the settlement of the Saar region dispute 
under the League of Nations. With the benefi t of hindsight this was a clear precursor to 
the ECSC. See J. Monnet, Memoirs (Doubleday 1978), 85 et seq. and F. Duchêne, Jean Mon-
net, The First Statesman of Interdependence (W.W.Norton 1994), 41 et seq. On the negative 
focus of exceptionalist approaches and the Sui Generis qualifi cation, also see C. Schön-
berger, ‘Die Europäische Union als Bund: Zugleig ein Betrag zur Verabschiedung des 
Staatenbund-Bundesstaat-Schemas’ 129 AŐR (2004), 81.
14 ‘(…) rather than signaling a break with the paradigm of political modernity centered 
upon the modern state and its legal and constitutional edifi ce, the EU refl ects and con-
tributes to a variation in the form of political modernity.’ Walker (2012), 57.
15 Elazar (2006), 28 summarizes it nicely: ‘in this he follows the English conceit of rejecting 
political theory. As a result, he does not do much to advance our knowledge of the sub-
ject.’ Cf also A. Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Lib-
eral Intergovernmentalist Approach’ 31 JCMS (1993), 476, describing how in fact the 
excessive focus on the EU’s sui generis nature might also have been based on an implicit 
assumption that it would develop into a federation anyway, meaning what was of inter-
est was the process, not the current parallels with other forms of political organization.
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other polities.16 In the language of genetics, however, if the EU is indeed a 
Genetically Modified Constitution, which mixes different strands of consti-
tutional DNA, it is still relevant to identify which genes remain unaltered, 
which have mutated, and which of these mutations might contribute to spe-
cific characteristics of the EU. Only then can we isolate the unique modifi-
cations and understand their effect on the overall organism, instead of just 
qualifying the entire creature as unique. As changing less than two percent 
of DNA can make the difference between a human and a chimpanzee, fur-
thermore, the claim that the EU is unique and at the same time largely con-
sists of known constitutional building blocks are not mutually exclusive 
either. Excessive exceptionalism, however, only leads to the identification 
of infinite unique phenomena at the cost of the possibility of learning and 
knowledge.17
Although perhaps less spectacular than exceptionalism, furthermore, 
normalism also allows the comparative knife to cut both ways: where con-
federalism and sovereignty may help to understand the EU, the EU can be 
used to test and develop existing constitutional theory.18 Especially impor-
tant in this regard is that the EU might provide insights that help stabilize 
and improve the confederal form more generally.19
16 For an interesting example, and constructive interplay, of exceptionalism and ordinarism 
also see the debates on the US constitution at Philadelphia, with Hamilton, for instance, 
analyzing all former confederacies and basing proposals on British experience, and 
Pinkney rejecting such comparisons for: ‘The people of this country are not only very dif-
ferent inhabitants of any State we are acquainted with in the modern world; but I assert 
that their situation is distinct from either the people of Greece or Rome, or of any state we 
are acquainted with amongst the antients. …(…) I believe this observation will be found 
generally true: – that no two people are so exactly alike in their situation or circumstances 
as to admit the exercise of the same Government with equal benefi t: that a system must 
be suited to the habits & genius of the people it is to govern, and must grow out of them.’ 
(Charles Pinkney according to Madison’s notes on the convention, June 25, 1787). Cf also 
F. McDonald (ed.), Confederation and Constitution 1781-1789 (Harper & Row 1968), 146. 
For some clear normalism see Governor Morris, July 2nd ‘Thus it has been all the world 
over. So it will be among us. Reason tells us we are but men: and we are not to expect any 
particular interference of Heaven in our favor.’ (McDonald (1968), 157).
17 Which explicitly does not mean that the EU cannot be innovative, nor does it imply a 
Burkean sanctifi cation of tradition and experience. For a (strong) rejection of the  sui gene-
ris and exceptionalist approach to the EU also see R. Schütze, ‘On “Federal” Ground: the 
European Union as an (Inter)National Phenomenon’, 46 CMLRev (2009), 1090 or M. 
Kumm, ‘The Moral Point of Constitutional Pluralism. Defi ning the Domain of Legitimate 
Institutional Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Objection’ In: J. Dickson and P. 
Eleftheriadis (eds) Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (OUP 2012), 216.
18 B. de Witte, ‘Sovereignty and European Integration: the Weight of Legal Tradition’ Maas-
tricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (1995), 146.
19 A. Cuyvers, ‘The confederal come-back: Rediscovering the confederal form for a transna-
tional world’ 19 European Law Journal (2013), issue 6 (forthcoming).
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4.2 Caveats and limitations
Obviously the project outlined so far faces numerous pitfalls and has to 
acknowledge far-reaching limitations.20 For example it engages with several 
of the most complex and contested conceptions in constitutional theory. To 
make matters worse it tries to comparatively apply these concepts to mul-
tifaceted and shape shifting entities like the EU and the US.21 How to com-
pare two phenomena where no consensus seems to exist on either one of 
them, and where the practice of constitutional comparison itself is already 
heavily contested?
Many disciplines, and even more extremely insightful minds, fur-
thermore, have occupied themselves with the problems and questions 
underlying this thesis. The resulting corpus of knowledge makes selection 
unavoidable, and makes it impossible to explicitly engage with all relevant 
views and contributors.
In addition, the method chosen rather rigidly juxtaposes confederate and 
federate systems, even though the realities behind these labels is, of course, 
far less clear cut than such a categorisation implies. The risk of this method 
is acerbated by the exclusive focus on the US as a comparator, as other (con)
federal systems present different mixtures of confederal and federate ele-
ments. Even within the US, furthermore, the distinction between the con-
federate and the federate constitutions can be relativized. For example, 
some of the more federate elements, such as judicial review or the prohibi-
tion to secede, only established themselves well after formal federation.
Rigidly clinging to a theoretical distinction between confederalism 
and federation may, therefore, actually get into the way of understanding 
the reality of EU integration, especially where the crux of EU integration 
might lie in the way it blends the confederal and the federate, and hence 
escapes the (con)federal dichotomy. Acknowledging these risks, however, 
the dichotomy between confederal and federate is consciously developed 
and adhered to in this thesis with some rigor. Yet the rigidity of this frame-
work should not be mistaken for a denial of the mutability and variability 
of (con)federal systems. Let alone that it should be a mistaken for a rigid 
understanding of the EU. Quite the opposite: A relatively rigid analytical 
framework provides precisely the backdrop against which to better frame 
and understand the fluid reality of European integration, and explore the 
constitutional potential that lies in the middle ground between the confed-
eral and federate archetypes. Nevertheless, the risks and limits of the con-
20 For a detailed discussion of the methodology used see below chapter 1, section 3. For a 
very clear overview of the general problems facing comparative law, see C. Saunders, 
‘Towards a Global Constitutional Gene Pool’, 4 National Taiwan University Law Review 
(2009), 5-7.
21 A. Rosas and L. Armati, EU Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2010), 8 et seq.
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federal dichotomy as an analytical tool must be acknowledged already at 
this stage.
All of these limitations affect the strength and value of any conclusions 
reached. Many more restrictions and limitations could, furthermore, be enu-
merated, and will be throughout this thesis. Numerous reasons, in short, 
exist to despair and to reject the current enterprise as utmost hubris. Some 
reassurance may, however, be had from the fact that this thesis can also 
benefit from the valuable work that has already been done by others, both 
regarding the objects under study and the process of comparison itself. Per-
haps the most pressing reason to embark on the path proposed, however, is 
that we do not seem to have any choice. The EU is not a theoretical exercise, 
but a reality carrying immediate responsibilities to over five hundred mil-
lion citizens. As it appears current theory is not yet capable of fully address-
ing the challenges this raises, and a sustained, joined effort is needed to 
improve our response to them.
5 Structure and outline
Although a more detailed outline will be provided in each part, the general 
structure of this thesis is as follows. Part I (chapters 1-6) will compare the 
EU with the American confederation and its subsequent transformation into 
the US federation. To this end chapter 1 will first explain and justify our 
focus on (American) confederalism, and set out the specific methodology 
used for the comparison. Subsequently it will introduce the American con-
federation and develop a ‘comparative grid’ of sixteen key modifications 
that together constituted the American transition from a confederation to 
a federation. A grid which can then be used in chapter 2 to trace the rela-
tive position of the EU between the US confederation and the US federa-
tion via a point by point comparison on these sixteen points. Chapter 3 will 
then aggregate the results of this comparison into three central propositions 
on the modified confederal nature of the EU polity. Based on these prop-
ositions it subsequently examines in what ways these modifications have 
strengthened the constitutional system of the EU. Chapter 4 then takes the 
opposite tack and asks what the specific flaws and weaknesses are of the 
modified confederal system that has developed in the EU.
In chapter 5 attention shifts to the process of federating in the US: How 
did the US transform itself into a federate system? Some of the most inter-
esting factors driving and enabling that process, at least from the perspec-
tive of the EU, will be discussed. These include, inter alia, the typical elite 
structure in the US at the time, the anti-democratic aims and undertone of 
American federation, and some of the tools and tricks used to amend and 
ratify the federate constitution. Chapter 6 contains a sub conclusion of part I
on the potential of the confederal form to understand, guide and support 
the EU.
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Part II then focuses on sovereignty and its confederal potential to address 
the core weaknesses revealed in part I, including the need to strengthen the 
confederal foundation of the EU, and to realize the democratic potential of 
the confederal form (Chapters 8-11). To this end part II first introduces the 
idea of confederal sovereignty, the central aims and advantages of confed-
eral sovereignty, and the methodology used (chapter 7). Subsequently the 
statist and pluralist challenges to sovereignty are set out. Challenges that 
seemingly lead to an inevitable and fundamental contradiction between 
sovereignty and integration, and therefore a choice for either the sovereign 
state or a plural EU (chapter 8). We then return to the conceptual evolu-
tion of sovereignty itself to take a closer look at this apparent contradiction. 
Based on a historical and conceptual analysis of sovereignty, and inspired 
by the federal evolution of sovereignty in the US, it will be shown how the 
internal and external strands within sovereignty should be carefully sepa-
rated as two distinct concepts, which have become gradually confused over 
time. It is then demonstrated how the EU should be approached from the 
internal concept of sovereignty, instead of the external one as is usually 
done, and how such an internal conception of sovereignty does not inher-
ently conflict with integration but rather contains the potential for a further 
confederal evolution (chapter 9). This potential is then explored and applied 
in chapter 10, which illustrates the different advantages of confederal sov-
ereignty, including its capacity to provide a stronger confederal foundation 
for the EU, provide a partial synthesis between statism and pluralism, rec-
oncile the respective national and EU claims to primacy and help to cre-
ate a positive democratic narrative for the EU. Capacities that are especially 
important because they help address several of the confederal weaknesses 
and risks identified in part. I. Chapter 11 then provides a conclusion of part 
II, after which part III further applies the mutually reinforcing outcomes in 
part I and II to the two other challenges set: Outlining a confederal evolu-
tion of the democratic process (chapter 12) and understanding and weather-
ing the EMU crises (chapter 13). Lastly the main findings and suggestions 
are brought together in a final conclusion.
Part I
The Confederal 
Perspective

1 Introduction: A trip down constitutional memory lane
We now turn to the confederal form and its potential for the EU. Part I of 
this thesis will examine if confederalism, perhaps in an updated version, 
might advance our understanding of the EU, or at least of certain elements 
in its constitutional structure.1
To focus, ground, and limit the comparison between the EU and the con-
federal form, the EU will be positioned between two concrete examples. On 
the one side the EU will be compared with the first, and rather unknown, 
confederal constitution of the Unites States.2 For the ‘United States of Amer-
ica’ were created as just that, a confederation of independent and sovereign 
states, united in some common objectives under the ‘Articles of Confedera-
tion and Perpetual Union’ (the Articles).3 On the other side of the compari-
son will be the constitutional modifications that together transformed this 
brief, and far from successful, confederal pact into the now famous Ameri-
can federate constitution of 1787, which has been in force ever since.
The current chapter first deals with the why and how of the proposed com-
parison. Starting with the why, section 2 sets out the reasons that support 
a confederal comparison as well as the specific focus on US confederalism. 
Section 3 then outlines the central aims and hypotheses underlying this 
comparison. Switching to the how, section 4 sets out the methodology cho-
sen to structure the comparison between the EU and the US. In addition, 
it further recognizes some of the caveats and pitfalls that accompany this 
1 On the use of the term constitutional in this regard also see C.W.A. Timmermans, ‘The 
Constitutionalization of the European Union’ (2001-2002) 21 Yearbook of European Law, 1, 
as well as generally G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Worlds of European Constitu-
tionalism’ (CUP 2012). See for a detailed of the question why constitutionalism fi ts the 
EU chapter 10, section 7.
2 K. Lenaerts, ‘Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism’ 4 American Journal of 
Comparative Law (1990), 234 in note 124 alludes to it. Cf further L.C. Backer, ‘The Extra-
National State: American Confederate Federalism and the European Union’ 7 Columbia 
Journal of European Law (2001), 173 at 224 and J. Goldsworthy, ‘The Debate About Sover-
eignty in the United States: a Historical and Comparative perspective’, in: N. Walker (ed), 
Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2006), 426.
3 Cf. McDonald (1968), 2 ‘The Articles were in fact a treaty between thirteen powers, which 
explicitly reserved their sovereignty and independence.’
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comparative exercise. Section 5 then introduces the key terms and concepts 
for our discussion of confederalism, establishing some working definitions 
and key distinctions concerning federalism. Once the why and how have 
been established in this manner, we can make our acquaintance with the 
curious case of the American Confederation and its transformation into a 
federation in section 6. An overview which will allow us, in section 7 to 
develop the framework for a detailed and structured comparison between 
the EU and the US in chapter 3: a framework that will take the form of a 
comparative grid based on 16 key federate modifications.
2 Why (American) confederalism?
So why focus on confederalism within the plethora of alternative theo-
ries that exist? And why focus on American confederalism, instead of on 
Swiss or German confederalism, or the concept of confederalism in general? 
Before outlining the proposed comparison and its objectives, this section 
first explains and justifies these choices, starting with the choice for confed-
eralism in general.
2.1 Why confederalism?
Federalism aims to create a middle ground between unity and diversity.4 
Not surprisingly, therefore, applying federal theories to the EU is a long 
established project.5 Be it as an (implicit) finalité, a way to grasp the dynam-
ic process of integration, or a means to describe its multilevel legal system, 
the notion of federalism, in its plethora of meanings,6 has been part of the 
4 D.J. Elazar ‘Introduction’ in: D.J. Elazar (ed) Self-Rule/Shared Rule: Federal Solutions to the 
Middle East Confl ict (University Press of America 1984), 1, as well as the detailed discus-
sion of federalism below in chapter 1, section 5.
5 The Schuman declaration itself already spoke of the ECSC as ‘a fi rst step in the federation 
of Europe’. See further: P. Hay (1966), P. Pescatore, ‘International Law and Community 
Law –  A Comparative Analysis’ 7 CMLRev (1970), 167, M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe and 
J.H.H. Weiler (eds), Integration Through Law –  European and the American Federal Experi-
ence, Vol. I (De Gruyter 1986), Watts, (1998), 118, K. Lenaerts, ‘Federalism: Essential con-
cepts in evolution –  the Case of the European Union’, 21 Fordham International Law Jour-
nal (1998), 746, M. Burgess, Federalism and the European Union: The Building of Europe 1950 
–  2000 (Routledge 2000), A. von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Supranational 
Federation: A Conceptual Attempt in the Light of the Amsterdam Treaty’ 6 Columbia Jour-
nal of European Law (2000), 27.
6 For instance the EU is already federal in the sense that it is based on an actual constitu-
tional covenant, rather than historical, organic growth or conquest. Cf. Elazar (2006), 4. 
See further below chapter 1, section 5 for a further discussion and delineation of the dif-
ferent concepts used.
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debate on the EU from the very start.7 The federal project, furthermore, 
seems to be regaining its vitality and utility for EU discourse.8
Within this federal project, the added value of this thesis primarily lies in 
its focus on the confederal dimension. A dimension that, in the words of 
one prominent author in this field, has so far been ‘often either ignored or 
overlooked in the mainstream literature on the federal idea and European 
Integration.’9 Something he qualifies as a ‘mistake’ because ‘confedera-
tion is significant for a deeper understanding of what is meant by a federal 
Europe.’ In this regard Daniel Elazar, one of the most eminent thinkers on 
federalism, also noted in relation to the EU that ‘a proper theory of this new-
style confederation is still lacking, (…).’10
In part this relative neglect is due to the highly negative image of confed-
eralism.11 Generally confederalism is perceived as more of a theoretical 
category than a realistic option, the Jamaican bobsleighing team in constitu-
tional theory so to speak. Yet in fact confederal theory and the EU have a lot 
7 It was not just in the earliest beginnings, furthermore, that the term federation has been 
used. Besides the famous Humboldt speech of 12 May 2000 by Joschka Fischer titled 
‘From Confederacy to Federation’, Delors, for instance, openly spoke about the ‘future 
federation’ in his speech for the European Parliament in 1990 (‘The Commission's pro-
gramme for 1990’. Address by Jacques Delors, Strasbourg, 17 January 1990. Bulletin of the 
European Communities Supplement 1/90.) In 1970 Pescatore also stated that the Com-
munity had been taken to ‘the boundaries of federalism’ Pescatore (1970), 182.
8 See for instance A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional 
Law (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2010), 2: ‘Numerous congruities of EU primary law and 
national constitutions emerge in a functional comparison, particularly when viewed 
through the lens of comparative federalism.’, or R. Schütze, European Constitutional Law 
(CUP 2012), 78: ‘the European Union’s constitutionalism therefore must, in the future, be 
(re)constructed in federal terms.’. Further see Schütze, (2009), 1096, A. Dashwood, ‘The 
Relationship between the Member States and the European Union/ Community’, 41 
CMLRev (2004), 355, Schönberger (2004), 81, C. Schönberger, ‘European Citizenship as 
Federal Citizenship: Some Citizenship Lessons of Comparative Federalism.’ 19 European 
Review of Public Law (2007), 61, Burgess (2006), J. Baquero Cruz, ‘The Legacy of the Maas-
tricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement’ 14 European Law Journal (2008), 389, A.W. Hier-
inga and P. Kiiver, Constitutions Compared (Intersentia / Metro 2012), 53.
9 Burgess (2009), 30. Also see Elazar, (2006), 9: ‘Western Europe is moving towards a new-
style confederation of old states through the European Community (…).’, and Watts 
(1998), 121-122: ‘(…) the European Union after Maastricht, which is basically a confedera-
tion but (…) has some features of a federation.’ Generally see also D.J. Elazar, Constitutio-
nalizing Globalization: The Postmodern Revival of Confederal Arrangements (Rowman & Lit-
tlefi eld 1998).
10 Elazar (2006), 53-4. For a major early contribution exploring the confederal model and the 
EU see M. Forsyth (1981).
11 De Witte (2012), 50-51.
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to offer each other.12 Besides its descriptive ‘fit’,13 confederalism may also 
be normatively appealing for the EU.14 It allows a flexible form of voluntary 
constitutional union that both respects the authority and identity of its con-
stituent members whilst achieving a tolerable level of effectiveness.15 It does 
so, furthermore, whilst avoiding two of the most problematic requirements 
for full federation: a single European people and EU statehood.16 Although 
it certainly poses sufficient problems of its own, confederation, therefore, 
forms an interesting halfway point between independence (or complete het-
erarchy) and complete (federate) union.17 As a result the confederal form 
is a logical model to apply to the EU,18 an entity that seemingly straddles 
12 Cf supra Burgess, and Elazar (2006), 51: ‘With the emergence of permanent multinational 
‘communities,’ of which the European Community is the prime example, we are now 
witnessing a revival of confederal arrangements.’
13 A. Moravcsik, ‘Federalism in the European Union: Rhetoric and Reality’ in: K. Nicolaïdis 
and R. Howse (eds) The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United 
States and the European Union (OUP 2001), 165: ‘the confederal structure of the EU’ and p. 
176: ‘(…) in comparative perspective the EU polity appears more confederal than feder-
al’. Lenaerts (1990), 206 describes the EU as a confederation with centripetal forces.
14 Cf also Von Bogdandy (2000), 28 and 52. Especially pluralist values as tolerance are inher-
ent in the confederal system. Cf. J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Federalism and Constitutionalism: 
Europe’s Sonderweg’, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/00, Cambridge, Mass. 
(2000). A characteristic that also provides a logical fi t with art. 4(3) TEU.
15 See in this regard also the qualifi cation by Moravcsik of the EU as ‘an exceptionally weak 
federation’ which at the same time is ‘qualitatively different from existing federal sys-
tems’ and ‘a particular sort of limited, multilevel constitutional polity’. An updated con-
federal model could fi t this bill. Moravcsik (2001), 186-187.
16 See on these points below chapter 10 section six.
17 In this regard the insistence of Schütze to categorize confederal systems as international 
(also in the American debates on the federate constitution) is not correct. Confederations 
form constitutional systems, and stand in-between international organizations and feder-
ate states. This was also clearly perceived during the American Confederation, where the 
states, for instance, were excluded from having independent external relations and a cen-
tral army was created and placed under the control of the centre. Something clearly going 
beyond a mere international agreement. Since the Confederation does exist as a middle 
ground this also removes a large part of the urgency he claims for his dichotomy between 
the international and federate understanding of the EU. A dichotomy largely based on 
the statist views of Jellinek, which he himself qualifi es as legal ‘reasoning’ between quo-
tation marks. See Schütze (2012), 54 et seq.
18 Elazar (2006), 14: Confederalism ‘offers possibilities for linkages beyond the limits of the 
conventional nation-state’. Also see Lenaerts (1990), 262 and 247, who remarks on some 
elements of the EU as ‘characteristic of a confederal constitutional structure.’ Further see 
A.A.M. Kinneging, ‘United we stand, divided we fall, a Case for the United States of 
Europe’, in: A.A.M. Kinneging (ed) Rethinking Europe’s Constitution (Wolf Legal Publish-
ers 2007), 54. Generally see: F.K. Lister, The European Union, the United Nations and the 
Revival of Confederal Governance (Greenwood Press 1996).
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the national and the international, as well as the statist and the pluralist 
divide.19
In turn, the EU may force us to reconsider our assessment of confederalism 
in general.20 If the EU can be understood as confederal at some level or in 
some part, why has it not yet collapsed or developed into a federation, often 
seen as the only two options for the famously unstable confederal form? 
21 As will be examined, changing circumstances as well as constitutional 
innovations in the structure of the EU may have addressed many of the key 
weaknesses associated with the confederal form. The resulting confederal 
model may deserve to be freed of the ‘stigma of weakness and instabili-
ty which derives from the historical examples of confederations’. Rather a 
modern conception of confederalism may be precisely the tool we need to 
‘find a more specific concept that describes an organization such as the EU 
in positive terms (beyond the lame sui generis description)’, and more gen-
erally to conceptualize government in an age of globalization.22 In a time 
where authority is increasingly exercised at multiple levels and outside the 
framework of the state, the ugly duckling of constitutional theory may actu-
ally come into its own: It might be time for a confederal comeback.23
19 Rosas and Armati (2010), 3. Confederalism thereby further fi lls in Weiler’s remark, but 
takes away the mystery of the EU as a ‘middle creature’: ‘The European Community itself 
has no direct parallels in the international legal order. It is an entity which comes 
between, and in some respects straddles, the classical intergovernmental organization 
and federation. (J.H.H. Weiler, The External Legal Relations of Non-Unitary Actors: Mix-
ity and the Federal Principle’ in: J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: Do the New Clo-
thes have an Emperor? (CUP 1999), 130 et seq. Also compare the assessment by Stone Sweet 
and Sandholz: ‘different areas of Community power are located within a spectrum 
between pure Intergovernmentalism, where policy is located in the Member States on a 
classical confederation, and supranationalism, here the locus of policy shifts upward.’ 
(who mistakenly equate supranationalism with federalism) A. Stone Sweet and W. Sand-
holtz, ‘European Integration and Supranational Governance’ 4 Journal of European Public 
Policy (1997), 297. See on this distinction between the national and the international also 
part II chapter 9 explicating the distinction between internal and external sovereignty.
20 D. J. Elazar, ‘From statism to federalism: a paradigm shift’ 25(2) Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism (1995), 5 even claimed the EU as the new paradigm of federalism in the mod-
ern globalized world. Also see M. Burgess, ‘Comparative Federalism in Theory and Practice’ 
(Routledge 2006), also seeing the EU as a new federal model.
21 As the dinosaurs of constitutionalism, Confederations did not seem able to survive the 
arrival of nationalism and nation-states. Confederations as the Holy Roman Empire or 
the weak confederation that followed it, the leagues between Italian and German cities, 
the United Provinces or the Helvetic Confederation either fell apart or became more cen-
tralized states.
22 De Witte (2012), 50-51.
23 See in this regard also his positive evaluation of Dashwoods term ‘constitutional order of 
states’, which comes remarkably close to a confederation: a link between states that 
remain independent states, but also bring them under a constitutional framework that 
exceeds the international. In traditional confederations, however, this constitutional sta-
tus was more obvious as the confederation traditionally took over the external represen-
tation of the collective.
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Even if not sufficient in itself, furthermore, confederal theory may play a 
constructive role in larger ‘hybrid’ theories, which approach the EU as a 
mixture of existing forms of government. For example there is the concep-
tion of the EU as a ‘hybrid’24 between a confederation and a federation,25 or 
related notions such as a ‘Federative
Association’,26 a ‘Union of States and Peoples’,27 a ‘federation of sov-
ereign States’,28 a ‘decentralised system of multilevel governance’,29 ‘a 
federation of States’,30 a ‘polity of States and Peoples’,31 a ‘Supranational 
Federation’,32 or the idea of a ‘Staatenverbund’ as suggested by Kirchhof33 
and later adopted by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht.34 The notion of 
confederalism may also be of special interests for notions of constitutional 
pluralism,35 seeing how a confederal system logically entails multiple cen-
tres of constitutional authority.36 All of these attempts try to pinpoint the EU 
in the conceptual space between existing forms of government. As such they 
may all benefit from a more developed confederal understanding of the EU. 
24 Cf already F.E. Dowrick, ‘A Model of the European Communities' Legal System’, 3(1) 
Yearbook of European Law (1983), 169.
25 Cf. for instance R.L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (McGill-Queens University Press 
1999), 69: ‘(…) the European Union, itself a hybrid which is predominantly confederal in 
character but has some of the characteristics of a federation (…).’ Or on p. 18 ‘(…) the 
most signifi cant contemporary confederation, the European Union’.
26 A. Rosas, The European Union as a Federative Association, Durham European Law Institute 
European Law Lecture 2003, available at their website.
27 A. Arnull et al. (eds), A Constitutional Order of States?: Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan 
Dashwood (Hart Publishing 2011).
28 A. Dashwood, ‘The Relationship between the Member States and the European Union/ 
Community’, 41 CMLRev (2004), 355.
29 Rosas and Armati (2010), 91.
30 Schütze (2009), 1105 and Schütze (2012), 49.
31 W. van Gerven, The European Union, A Polity of States and Peoples (Hart Publishing 2005).
32 Von Bogdandy (2000), 27.
33 P. Kirchhof, ‘Der deutsche Staat im Prozeß der europäischen Integration’, in: J. Isensee 
and P. Kirchhof (eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, VII (CF Müller 1993), 879 et seq.
34 BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993) Maastricht Urteil paras 183, 229 and 231. Also see D. Thym, ‘In the 
Name of Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon Judgment of the Ger-
man Constitutional Court’, 46 CMLRev (2009), 1799.
35 See, for instance, N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, 65 The Modern Law 
Review (2002), 317, M. Kumm, ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: 
Three Conceptions of the Relationship Between the German Federal Constitutional Court 
and the European Court of Justice’, 36 CMLRev (1999), 351 or M. Maduro, ‘Contrapunc-
tual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in: N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in 
Transition (Hart Publishing 2006), 501.
36 It especially fi ts with notions of multilayered constitutionalism as developed for instance 
by Pernice who borrows the term ‘Constitutional federation’ from Eijsbouts and Thym. I. 
Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: Constitution-Mak-
ing Revisited?’, 36 CMLRev (1999), 703 or I. Pernice, ‘Multilevel constitutionalism in the 
European Union’ 27 European Law Review (2002), 511, and W.T. Eijsbouts ‘Classical and 
baroque constitutionalism in the face of change (Review essay)’ 37 CMLRev (2000), 218.
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Alternatively, some may even be unmasked as more fashionable labels for 
the unpopular brand of confederalism.37
2.2 Why the American Confederation?
Yet why, within confederalism, focus on the confederal roots of the US? For 
clearly there are several other comparators of great interest such as Switzer-
land, Germany or Canada.38 And clearly rather significant differences exist 
between the EU and an 18th century American confederation.
At the same time, and in addition to the simple necessity of demarca-
tion in itself, the Articles are one of the most significant, typical and recent 
examples of a confederal system.39 What is more, the American example 
contains several points of specific, and even unique, comparative interest 
to the EU. Five of these points must be briefly set out, as these also underlie 
the approach taken.
First, there are clear similarities in treaty provisions and constitutional struc-
ture. In this regard Burgess even states that: ‘We have shown that as a fed-
eral union of states and citizens [the EU] stands conceptually in a long line 
of descent stretching back at least to the 1781 Articles of Confederation in 
the USA, but we have also suggested that it is the harbinger of a distinctly 
new category of confederal-type unions.’40 A detailed comparison between 
the two may therefore help to identify the precise modifications from the 
classic to this modified confederal model.
In fact, when studying the Articles of Confederation it is hard not to 
immediately appreciate these similarities. Although the Articles will be 
introduced in more detail below, two examples suffice to illustrate this 
point. To begin with there is the second paragraph of the Articles:
‘Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdic-
tion, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, 
in Congress assembled.’
37 De Witte (2012). Especially as Lisbon only seems to have ‘increased the federal complexi-
ties and ambiguities’ of the EU framework, see P. Dann, ‘The Political Institutions’, in: A. 
Von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn., Hart 
Publishing 2010), 273.
38 Especially the Restored Swiss Confederation (1815-1848) is interesting in this regard, as it 
aimed to combine the original, organic and grass-roots Swiss confederal system with 
some of the rationalization later imposed by Napoleon in the ‘Mediation Constitution’, 
but the United Provinces of the Netherlands or the German Bund of 1815 also provide 
interesting comparators.
39 Forsyth (1981), 71.
40 Burgess (2006), 247.
22 Chapter 1
A provision which bases the Confederation on the same principle of attribu-
tion so central to the nature of the EU.41 In addition, remarkable similarities 
exist regarding the four freedoms and citizenship, often proclaimed to con-
stitute the heart of the EU acquis:
‘To better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of 
the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vaga-
bonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free 
citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall free ingress and regress to and 
from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to 
the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, (…).’42
Replace paupers, vagabonds and fugitives with the more politically correct 
(and broader) ‘economically inactive people’, and one has the original free 
movement rights of the EU. The general right of equal treatment for all free 
inhabitants even approaches the notion of a Union citizen.43 Partially as a 
result of these similarities in underlying logic and structure, the Confedera-
tion was also plagued by some of the same structural problems as the EU is 
today. Key weaknesses in, for instance, decision-making, enforcement or the 
capacity to adapt the confederal system itself to increasingly apparent flaws 
thereby form interesting material for comparison.
Second, finding solutions to these confederal problems became the subject 
of profound contemporary analysis by some of the great minds of the time 
such as Madison, Hamilton, King, Dickinson, Patterson, and Franklin. 
Analysis that retains much of value today. Besides some deep reflections on 
confederal rule in general, many interesting proposals were developed to 
improve the system. Some of these intended to ‘fix’ the problems inherent 
in the confederal system. Others aimed to devise a new scheme to replace 
the confederation altogether. Both are of interest to students of the EU. Sev-
eral will look rather familiar.44
Third, the Articles, and the constitutional theory they inspired, helped 
shape the federate constitution that eventually replaced the American Con-
federation. A federate constitution that was to a large extent designed to 
41 See art. 4 and 5 TEU.
42 Art. IV Articles of Confederation.
43 Cf art. 9 TEU, art. 18-22 and 26 TFEU, as well as the classic description of this ‘fundamen-
tal status’ in case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193.
44 See especially the Randolph (or Virginia) Plan, the Patterson Plan and the Hamilton Plan, 
in McDonald (1968), 121, 130 and 139, or the plan by Rufus King which proposed a ‘US of 
two speeds’ for a sub-confederation that could move forward, where for instance Rhode 
Island was blocking progress. (Jensen (1970), 406).
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correct the confederal weaknesses.45 It is no coincidence that many of the 
federate innovations are direct opposites of their confederal predecessors.46
As a result, the story of the American confederation provides us not 
just with one, but with two comparative reference points to situate the EU 
between: the confederation on the one hand, and its federate replacement 
on the other. Two elaborate and relatively recent specimens which also 
help us to delineate, however tentatively, the conceptual spectrum between 
confederal and federal forms of government more generally.47 In turn, this 
enables us to plot the trajectory of the EU’s evolutionary development along 
this spectrum: is the EU, for instance, gradually evolving in a federate or 
confederate direction (or both at the same time), what is driving any such 
evolution, is it desirable, and if not can it be corrected? A dynamic object 
like the EU, after all, requires a dynamic understanding as well as concep-
tual space to develop in the future.
Fourth, comparisons with the current federate system in the US are popular, 
and often used to support or attack a wide range of positions on the EU.48 
A better understanding of the confederate background may serve to better 
inform and evaluate such comparisons with the US federation, seeing how 
the current system is inextricably bound up with its confederal roots.49
45 A.C. McLaughlin, ‘The Background of American federalism’ 12 The American Political Sci-
ence Review (1918), 239.
46 This is not to claim that the federate constitution was a coherent, analytical unity rather 
than a compromise between political and ideological rivals. Franklin provides a clear and 
apt warning in this regard advising us not to understand the formation of the constitu-
tion ‘like a game of chess, methodically and consciously played.’ It was more like a game 
of dice, with so many players, ‘their ideas so different, their prejudices so strong and so 
various, and their particular interests, independent of the general, seeming so opposite, 
that not a move can be made that is not contested.’ Similarly, Madison, arguing against 
the national bank during the fi rst Congress stated: ‘It is not pretended that every inser-
tion or omission in the Constitution is the effect of systemic attention. This is not the 
character of any human work, particularly the work of a body of men’ (2 Annals of Con-
gress 1899 (1791). In general on the coherence also see Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the 
American Republic (University of North Carolina Press 1969), 593. Nevertheless, even if a 
compromise, a single system was created, and the aim of this compromise still was to 
remedy the weaknesses of the Articles without fully unifying.
47 For the benefi ts of such spectra over static defi nitions see N. Jansen, ‘Comparative Law 
and Comparative Knowledge’ in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006), 317.
48 Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler (1986), Burgess, (2009), 26, Lenaerts (1990).
49 Also for those rejecting the standard comparison to the current US system as ‘a sort of 
paradigm towards which (…) the rest of civilized mankind are forced to march with 
unresting feet.’ (D.A.O. Edward, ‘What kind of Law Does Europe Need? The Role of Law, 
Lawyers and Judges in Contemporary European Integration’, 5 Columbia Journal of Euro-
pean Law (1998), 2). Backtracking the American marching route actually opens up refresh-
ing side paths not taken in the US. In any case a comparison can act more modestly, in the 
words of G.S. Wood, ‘to get some perspective on (…) society and to criticize it’. c) Wood 
(1969), viii.
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Fifth, and last, the example of the Articles also covers the process of moving 
from confederation to federation.50 It provides us with rare experience of a 
voluntary, designed, and well-documented transition between a confederal 
and a federate system.51 What and who drove this remarkable constitution-
al innovation, and how was it achieved? Procedural experience that again 
pertains to the dynamic of EU integration itself: does the EU, for example, 
contain some of the elements which instigated, shaped and enabled federa-
tion in the US?52 And if not, what conclusions may be drawn from this?
In sum, sufficient reasons exist to justify an expedition to the rather obscure 
confederal roots of the United States. The Articles provide us with ample 
knowledge and ideas for an EU trying to discover what it is and should 
be.53 Knowledge, furthermore, that should be equally of interest to those 
who support a federal future of the EU, and to those who reject such a fed-
eral solution and are looking for alternative answers.54
3 Specific aims and hypotheses
As already indicated in the introduction, the general comparative aim of 
this thesis will be further deconstructed and specified along the way. At this 
point it should first be stressed that the aim of the proposed comparison 
is emphatically not to propose a straightforward, exclusive qualification of 
the EU as a classic confederation. This already because attaching a single 
label and then defending its exclusive relevance simply is not a constructive 
approach for a complex and moving target like the EU.55
50 Especially since the EU, as the US, enjoys the historically rather rare luxury of rationally 
designing its own constitution, making the comparison with (con)federalism as ‘a system 
of government based on choice and design rather than accident or force’ of additional 
interest. (Elazar, (2006). Xv).
51 J. Madison, A. Hamilton and J. Jay, The Federalist Papers (originally published between 
1887 and 1788, Penguin 1987), No. 1: ‘for the fi rst time in history, society can determine its 
own organization based on deliberation and choice, rather than the accidents of history.’
52 A distinction must here be made between the notion, or element, of process inherent in 
federalism and the more singular process meant here, namely that of shifting from a con-
federate to a federate polity. This shift may be partially caused by the processes inherent 
in federal systems, but does form a separate, more signifi cant step.
53 The open fi nality of the EU, noted by Fisher in his 2000 Humboldt speech, is far from 
settled, as has again been illustrated by the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the 
paranoia that a fl ag could evoke.
54 See the discussion of the pluralist approach to the EU below in chapter 8 section 5.
55 Such an approach furthermore would amount to a form of methodical exceptionalism, 
directly violating the essence of ordinarism itself. See chapter 1 section 4. For the intimate 
connection between typologies and the general aim of a study also see D. Grimm, ‘Types 
of Constitutions’, in: M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law (OUP 2012), 99.
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The confederate prism aims to be just that: a lens that offers one instruc-
tive perspective and conceptual toolkit to approach the EU with.56 The 
immediate aim, therefore, is to use the Articles as a contrast fluid, high-
lighting the degree to which the EU shares in the core characteristics of the 
American confederation, and where the EU deviates from them, primarily 
by incorporating the US federal modifications.57
Such an exercise does not reject the possibility that, at another level of 
analysis, the EU can be usefully understood as a unique polity, for instance 
by combining elements of different forms of political organization. Factu-
ally delineating where the EU incorporates confederal or federal elements, 
where it blends the two, and which effects this may give rise to, in fact fully 
fits with such a view. Even if the EU is to be understood as such a unique 
blend, after all, it is still instructive to isolate the different single-malts, so to 
speak, that make it up, and see if and how they go together.
In line with these aims the central, descriptive hypothesis of part I is that the 
EU has combined a confederal basis with several of the key federate modi-
fications underlying the US transition from a confederation to a federation. 
As a consequence it can be usefully understood as an modified confederal sys-
tem.58
If this hypothesis is confirmed, several further questions become per-
tinent. First, the explanatory potential of the confederal prism. Second, what 
are the possibilities and limitations of such a – modified – confederal system? 
Are there any specific weaknesses, for instance, that restrict its ‘carrying 
potential’? Vice versa are there perhaps specific strengths that should be 
exploited? These questions, all of a descriptive nature, lead to a third cat-
egory of more forward looking questions which combine descriptive and 
normative elements: is a (partially) confederal form sustainable and desirable? 
Can it, for instance, support the increasing demands of deepening integra-
tion? This especially for a Union now asked to deal with challenges as the 
sovereign debt crisis, or the cocktail of nationalism, populism and immigra-
tion-issues facing the EU through its Member States?
56 Lenaerts (1990), 206, who describes American constitutional history as a ‘conceptual ref-
erence’. Also see Burgess (2009), 27: ‘Indeed the sheer pace of European Integration since 
the ratifi cation of the Single European Act in 1987 has unquestionably revived the for-
tunes of the federal idea.’
57 As such this thesis must respectfully but forcefully disagree with those holding that ‘one 
can eliminate any comparison with the US as inherently futile exercises in comparing the 
incomparable.’ (Lord Mackenzie Stewart, ‘Problems of the European Community – 
Transatlantic Parallels’, 36 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1987), 183.
58 Cf in this regard also Van Middelaar (2009), 17 and the three ‘language games’ he 
describes.
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Regarding these further questions the aim of this thesis must be even 
more modest than with the actual comparison itself. The goal is solely to 
tentatively explore them, and to illustrate how a confederal approach may 
be of use in making such fundamental questions more intelligible, and may 
ultimately contribute to a framework to coherently address them.
After discussing the confederal form in this way, part I will then engage the 
equally informative yet challenging comparison of the process via which the 
US made the transition from a confederal to a federal constitution. Why and 
how did the US make this constitutional leap of faith, and what insights 
could be gleamed from this experience for the ‘ever closer union’ today? 
Seeing how this procedural comparison faces even larger obstacles than the 
substantive one, the sole aim here is to selectively highlight some elements 
that may be informative for the EU, fully acknowledging the high context-
dependence of individual process-elements.
4 Comparative methodology: Comparing apples and I-pads?
As indicated, part I of this thesis is based on a double comparison between 
the EU, the American Confederation, and its evolution into a federation. 
A comparison that first establishes the key modifications that jointly trans-
formed the American Confederation into a federation, and subsequently 
compares the EU against these key modifications. An approach that primar-
ily relies on the method of (constitutional) comparison. A method that has 
proven it can provide new and constructive insights, but also one that faces 
significant challenges and needs to be handled with care. Let us start with 
these challenges, before we turn to the general methodology of constitution-
al comparison and the specific comparative design of this thesis that aim to 
address them.
4.1 Caveats and limitations: The inherent hubris of comparison
For clearly the project outlined above faces considerable challenges, which 
need to be avoided, addressed or at least recognized.59 Challenges that to 
a large extent are inherent in any attempt at comparison.60 Chief amongst 
these is the problem of comparability itself. Is constitutional comparison not 
impossible due to the unbridgeable historical, contextual and intellectual 
59 See also Introduction, section 4.2. above.
60 See for an overview V. C. Jackson, ‘Methodological Challenges in Comparative Constitu-
tional Law’ 28 Penn State International Law Review (2010), 319, C. Saunders, ‘Towards a 
Global Constitutional Gene Pool’, 4 National Taiwan University Law Review (2009), 5-12, G. 
Frankenberg, ‘Comparing constitutions: Ideas, ideals, and ideology –  toward a layered 
narrative’, International Journal of Constitutional Law (2006), 439, and classically O. Kahn-
Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’, 37 Modern Law Review (1974), 1.
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chasms that divide systems?61 A challenge that rises to glaring proportions 
for the proposed comparison. Differences between the EU and a short-lived 
18th century American Confederation are deep, abundant and usually high-
ly significant.62 Why compare the EU to a union of (former) British colo-
nies forged in the middle of a war for independence? A union struggling to 
survive63 in a world very different to our own in vital terms such as social 
organization, politics, technology, economy, geography, or public beliefs.64 
Establishing the relevance of apparent similarities or differences is, to put it 
mildly, complicated by such disparities.
Secondly, such disparities become especially problematic in light of the 
high context-dependence of constitutional systems.65 Constitutions do not 
exist in a vacuum but are intimately connected to the context in which they 
need to function.66 Studying them in isolation might then be compared to 
trying to study fire without oxygen. The problem of context-dependence 
is especially acute for a comparative analysis which focuses on constitu-
tional design and institutions.67 Even assuming that such a focus has inde-
pendent value,68 it may lead one to loose sight of the vital importance of 
context that determines the functioning and meaning of constitutions in the 
actual world.69 Causality may, for instance, be too easily assumed between 
a constitutional element and historical outcomes, or informal rules and 
61 See amongst the many scholars that caution against these risks, or even perceive them to 
be insurmountable, G. Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative 
Law’ 26 Harvard International Law Journal (1985), 411 or P. Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of 
“Legal Transplants”’ 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (1997), 111.
62 J. Habermas, ‘So Why Does Europe Need a Constitution?’ (Hamburg lecture of 26 June 2001). 
3. Also see J. Habermas, ‘Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s “Does Europe Need a Constitu-
tion”’ 1 European Law Journal (1995), 303.
63 A difference that nevertheless raises a question on a potential similarity: could emerging 
and declining nation-states have similar constitutional (overarching authority) needs?
64 See for an overview, also for the differences per State, R.R. Beeman, The Varieties of political 
Experience in Eigtheenth-Centrury America (University of Pennsylvania Press 2006). For the 
classis assessment of the US shortly after independence through the eyes and mind of 
Tocqueville see A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (translation H.C. Mansfi eld and 
D. Winthrop, University of Chicago Press 2002). For a further description of the Confed-
eration and the confederate period also see section 5 below.
65 See for instance Jansen, (2006), 306.
66 On the special status of constitutions also see A. Harding and P. Leyland, ‘Comparative 
Law in Constitutional Contexts’, in: E. Örücu and D. Nelken, Comparative Law (Hart Pub-
lishing 2007), 319-322.
67 For a clear warning on constitutional comparison see for instance J.H.H. Weiler and J.P. 
Trachtman, ‘European Constitutionalism and Its Discontents’, 17 Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business (1996-1997), 355.
68 See on this importance, for instance, M. Loughlin, ‘Ten Tenets of Sovereignty’ in N. Walk-
er (ed) Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2006), 62-63.
69 For this reason some authors, such as Legrand, would rather see comparative attempts as 
a risk, only obscuring real knowledge which should look at the deeper underlying cul-
ture. P. Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’, 45 International and Com-
parative Law Quarterly (1965), 52, 56.
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conventions that influence and complement the formal constitution may 
be missed.70 A hazard that is especially relevant for the proposed compari-
son because of the importance of non-structural components in federalism, 
which cannot be reduced to a set of institutions alone.71 On the other hand, 
the proposed comparison has the benefit that one of its legs, the compari-
son between the US Confederation and its transformation to a federation, 
stands within the same American society and context, at least to a very large 
extent. As indicated earlier, this also allows us to establish and study the 
constitutional modifications that together effected this transformation more 
purely. Nevertheless the chosen approach must take care to remain sensi-
tive enough to non-institutional factors that can nevertheless have a tre-
mendous impact, such as social conventions, economic circumstances, the 
influence of specific individuals such as Monnet, Washington, Beyen, Madi-
son, De Gaulle, Jefferson or Delors, or let alone the unpredictable effects of 
‘events’.72
The challenges of incomparability and context are, furthermore, aggra-
vated by the historical dimension of the comparison and the non-statal 
nature of the EU. As to the historical dimension, it is difficult enough to 
agree on what actually happened, let alone on what past events contain in 
the way of general truths or lessons. 73 The non-statal nature of the EU fur-
ther complicates matters as much of the American constitutional discourse, 
as well as constitutional theory in general, did develop in a statal context. 
Although this challenge is less relevant to a confederal approach, which 
concerns itself with a constitutional bond between states, the relevance of 
other statal constitutions and constitutional discourse can, therefore, not 
automatically be presumed.74
70 S.E. Finer, V. Bogdandor and B. Rudden, Comparing Constitutions (Clarendon Press 1995), 
2-5.
71 Elazar (2006), 67. Even Wheare, within his more institutional approach, also analyzed the 
‘prerequisites of Federal Government.’ (K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, (4th edn., OUP 
1964) chapter 3. Livingston even claimed that ‘The essence of federalism lies not in the 
constitutional or institutional structure but in the society itself.’ W.S. Livingston, Federa-
lism and Constitutional Change (Clarendon Press 1956), 2.
72 Cf. Macmillan’s famous answer when asked what represents the greatest challenge for a 
statesman: 'Events, my dear boy, events’. More contemporaneously, the economic crisis is 
leading European integration into venues that were hardly imaginable a short while ago. 
See in detail chapter 13.
73 Cf. Gordon S. Wood, The Purpose of the Past (Penguin 2008), 196 et seq. and 293 et seq.
74 Cf the challenge raised by Gunther Teubner: ‘Is constitutional theory able to generalize 
the ideas it developed for the nation state and to re-specify them for today’s problems?’ 
G. Teubner, ‘Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism beyond the Nation 
State’, in: P. Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP 2010), 
328. On the use of constitutional discourse for the EU further see: G. de Búrca and J.H.H. 
Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP 2012).
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Thirdly, the issues concerned are covered by a broad range of disciplines 
and sub-disciplines, such as legal history, economic history, political science, 
comparative constitutional law, European law and constitutional theory, to 
only name some central ones. For reality is not divided into disciplines, even 
if human knowledge must increasingly be. The comparison also includes dif-
ferent legal systems, traditions and social contexts. Yet true bilingualism, let 
alone bilegalism and biculturalism, must largely remains an aspiration. It is 
important, therefore, to be aware of the limits and myopic tendencies of ones 
own discipline and background, professionally, culturally and socially.75
Lastly, there is the problem of selection and generalization of results. As 
already noted, the US example is only one amongst many other instructive 
and relevant federal systems.76 Canada, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, or 
the United Provinces of the Netherlands, to name but some, also provide 
useful insights, or have even directly served as models during the develop-
ment of the EU.77 Even within the US example, furthermore, the proposed 
comparison focuses on one specific period in time within the long and 
dynamic existence of the US federal system.78 Consequently the comparison 
proposed can never claim anything approaching exclusivity, completeness 
or comprehensiveness. Equally this specific focus also affects the potential 
to draw more general conclusions based on any outcomes found.
These limits, and more can easily be further specified, affect the potential 
scope and value of the proposed comparison. At the very least any appar-
ent similarities found must be assessed with care.79 Nevertheless it is still 
claimed that useful comparison is possible, and that the US example is 
75 Very critical of the possibilities for an ‘outsider’ to grasp the necessary perspective of an 
‘insider’, see P. Legrand, ‘Comparative Legal Studies and the Matter of Authenticity’, 1 
Journal of Comparative Law (2008), 365.
76 Especially considering the, to some extent, separate or distinct European tradition of fed-
eral theory. See for an overview of this distinction generally M. Burgess and A-G Gagnon 
(eds), Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and Future Directions 
(Harvester Wheatsheaf 1993). This more European strand, for instance, is more con-
cerned with the notion of subsidiarity. (R.L. Watts, (1998), 120.
77 T. Börzel and T. Risse, ‘Who is afraid of a European Federation? How to constitutionalise 
a Multi-Level Governance System’ Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, no. 7/00, T. Börzel 
and M. Hosli, ‘Brussels Between Berne and Berlin: Comparative Federalism Meets the 
European Union’ 16 Governance (2003), 179 et seq, 13, or C. Church and P. Dardanelli ‘The 
Dynamics of Confederalism and Federalism: Comparing Switzerland and the EU’, 15 
Regional and Federal Studies (2005), 163.
78 See amongst the many analyses on the development of the US system: J.F. Zimmerman, 
Contemporary American Federalism: The Growth of National Power (Leicester University 
Press 1992), D.J. Elazar, The American Mosaic: The Impact of Space, Time and Culture on Ame-
rican Politics (Westview 1994), or D.B. Walker, The Rebirth of Federalism: Slouching towards 
Washington (Chatham House 1995).
79 Watts (1999), 2, and M. Tushnet, ‘The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law’ 
108 Yale Law Journal (1999), 1307.
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especially relevant and instructive in this regard.80 A claim based on the rel-
evance of the American experience set out above, as well as on the estab-
lished methodology and practice of constitutional comparison, to which we 
must now briefly turn.
4.2 The practice and methodology of constitutional comparison
For despite its challenges, constitutional comparison is an established 
sub-field of comparative law and constitutional theory, as is comparative 
federalism.81 At least dating back to Aristotle’s comparative analysis of 
constitutions,82 and despite long periods of relative inactivity,83 constitu-
tional comparison even forms a ‘newly energized field in the 21st century’. 
84 One that has much to offer in general to a globalizing and interdepen-
dent world in need of restructuring and reconceptualization. In the words 
of Heringa and Kiiver it may even be ‘crucial in the particular context of the 
creation and development of international organizations.’85 Van Bogdandy 
equally finds that ‘New dimensions open up for comparative constitutional 
scholarship due to European Integration (…).86
80 See also Watts (1999), 21-22. Not only is it the most ‘enduring’ federation, but ’Virtually 
all subsequently attempted federations have taken some account of the constitutional 
design and operation of the United States (…)’ which makes it an ‘important example’ 
and ‘an important reference point in any comparative study of federalism.’
81 See for constitutional comparison in general, amongst others, Hieringa and Kiiver (2012), 
, M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law 
(OUP 2012), T. Ginsburg and R. Dixon, Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar 
2011) or Finer, Bogdandor and Rudden (1995). For Federalism see, for instance, E.A. Free-
man, History of federal government in Greece and Italy (Macmillan, 1893, 2nd ed, as reprinted 
by BiblioLife from the original in 2012), Burgess (2006), L. Thorlakson ‘Comparing feder-
al institutions: Power and representation in six federations’, 26 West European Politics 
(2003), 1, as well as the more detailed discussion below.
82 Who even then dared to state that: ‘Let us remember that we should not disregard the 
experience of ages; in the multitude of years these things, if they were good, would cer-
tainly not have been unknown; for almost everything has been found out, although 
sometimes they are not put together…’ Aristotle, ‘The Politics’, (CUP 2002) Book II, 5. 
42-4, p. 37-38. For a further application of his theory to the EU see also A. Cuyvers, ‘The 
Aristocratic Surplus’, in: A.A.M. Kinneging (ed), Rethinking Europe's Constitution, (Wolf 
Legal Publishers 2007), 117. Tushnet locates the advent of modern comparative constitu-
tionalism at the drafting of the American federate constitution. M. Tushnet, ‘Comparative 
Constitutional Law’, in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (OUP 2006), 1226.
83 Comparative constitutional law, distinct from comparative private law, was basically 
only revived in the 1980’s, largely due to Canadian developments and the need to draft 
new constitutions in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in South Africa.
84 Ginsburg and Dixon (2011). 1, Rosenfeld and Sajó (2012), 1.
85 Hieringa and Kiiver (2012), 1.
86 A. von Bogdandy, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law: A Contested Domain’, in: M. Rosen-
feld and A. Sajó (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2012), 
26.
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Fortunately this new relevance and opportunity can build on past experi-
ence and at least some established methodology to deal with the inherent 
methodological and even epistemological, problems of constitutional com-
parison.87 At the same time there obviously is no single methodology for 
all things comparative, nor is any methodology uncontested or without 
flaws.88 Rather it is already part of comparative methodology to first estab-
lish what kind of comparison is desired and for what purpose, as this will 
determine how such a comparison should be designed, and how to address 
the comparative flaws as best as possible. Let us first, therefore, distinguish 
the kind of comparison envisioned here, or in other words to what end the 
confederal comparison is being made, before we look in more detail at the 
specific methodology and design of the comparison itself.
4.2.1 The epistemic interest: To what end are we comparing?
The term ‘epistemic interest’ is gratefully borrowed from Nils Jansen, as it 
usefully distinguishes between the aim of a comparison and its method.89 It 
clarifies that the underlying decision on why it is interesting to place the EU 
on a spectrum between confederation and federation, on why ‘this matters’, 
is not methodological. It is based on the assumptions and expectations set 
out above on the usefulness of confederalism for the EU.
Our epistemic interest here, and therefore the end of our comparison, is 
to improve our understanding of the constitutional nature and functioning 
of the EU, and more specifically to establish to what extent the confederate-
federate dimension may be of use in this regard.90 The comparison between 
the American Confederation and Federation, and the subsequent compari-
son of the EU against the differences between these two systems, thereby 
forms a kind of heuristic tool. One that helps both to better understand the 
spectrum between confederate and federate systems and the place the EU 
occupies on this spectrum.
87 On this point the object of this thesis is not to directly contribute to this methodological 
debate, or to offer specifi c methodological solutions, but rather to illustrate how the pro-
posed comparison is based on existing methods and practice.
88 Grimm (2012), 99. Typical of the methodological diffi culties of comparison is the impres-
sive discussion, dismantling and attempted reconstruction of functionalism by Michaels. 
In this contribution he incidentally but emblematically notes on two other contributions 
how they contain ‘brilliant critiques’ on existing methods, but then become ‘much weak-
er’ when they try to come up with alternatives. In comparison as well it is easier to be a 
food critic than a master chef. R. Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’, 
in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP, 
2006), 353.
89 Jansen (2006), 313, 317-18.
90 An objective that admittedly is based already on several assumptions about confederal-
ism and its usefulness, including normative ones. Cf. Jansen, (2006), 313.
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It is towards this epistemic aim that the comparison must therefore be tai-
lored. Now on one level this means the comparison is used here as the clas-
sic method to take an external perspective on one’s ‘own’ system, and to 
perceive it as less unique and less logical than one might otherwise do.91 
At the same time the proposed comparison also aims to make more general 
claims about (con)federalism and the EU. Certainly to this end it must rely 
on the existing comparative methodology to ensure that the comparison is 
actually capable of achieving these ends. Methodology that, especially in 
the field of comparative constitutional law, is still under construction, but 
at least does offer several different approaches, the two strongest and most 
suitable of which will be utilized here to the extent possible.
4.2.2 Five approaches to constitutional comparison
Generally speaking five ‘broad classes of methodological approach’ can be 
distinguished in comparative constitutional scholarship: classificatory, his-
torical, universalist, functional and contextual.92 Let us start with what our 
comparison is not.
Firstly the confederal comparison proposed is not historical. It is not inter-
ested in examining any ‘genetic’ or ‘genealogical’ connections between the 
EU and the American comparators.93 In other words, it does not examine, 
nor claim, that the EU developed out of American confederalism or was 
directly shaped by it. Nor does it examine or claim an explicit or even acci-
dental ‘migration’ of American elements into the EU system.94 The aim is to 
establish similarities and differences between the systems and to study their 
explanatory value, not to trace any similarities back to the US experience.
Equally the proposed comparison is not normative universalist. It does not 
aim to establish universal ‘principles of ordered liberty’ or ‘theories of a just 
society.’95 Although it aims to establish some general insights into modern 
confederalism and the EU, it does not purport to provide universal guide-
lines on how all constitutions should be organized, or to suggest a Kantian-
like ideal for world order.96 Even though the findings on confederalism may 
potentially be of use for the discourse on global constitutionalism, they do 
91 V.C. Jackson and M. Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law (Foundation Press 1999), 
145-146.
92 Here we follow the recent, and of course not exclusive, categorization provided by V.C. 
Jackson ‘Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies’, in: M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2012), 54-55.
93 Idem, 58.
94 Cf. S. Choudry, ‘Migration As a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law’, in: 
S. Choudry (ed) The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (CUP 2006), 13.
95 A.E.D. Howard, ‘A Traveler From an Antique Land: The Modern Renaissance of Com-
parative Constitutionalism’ 50 Virginia Journal of International Law (2009), 41.
96 See also Burgess (2006), ch. 1 for a discussion of this universalist normative trend specifi -
cally within comparative federalism.
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not claim any intrinsic necessity or superiority of the confederal form.97 
Rather, the aim of the comparison is explicitly also to explore the limits of 
the confederal form, and to asses the necessary prerequisites for a stable and 
effective confederal polity.98
Lastly, our primary focus is also not contextual. As described by Jackson 
‘scholarship in this vein does emphasize either the ways in which partic-
ular institutional contexts may limit the ability to draw conclusions from 
the practices of other systems, or the expressive functions of constitutions 
or constitutional law within particular national contexts.’99 As will be clear 
from the ‘normalist’ approach underlying this thesis, the proposed compar-
ison is precisely aimed towards establishing points of useful comparison, 
not towards further ballooning the sui generis ego of the EU.100 Whilst trying 
to remain sensitive to the context and its obvious relevance, the main focus 
will therefore be on relevant similarities and differences in the constitutional 
systems compared, and not on their unique contexts. A focus which also 
brings us to the two related approaches to constitutional comparison that 
this thesis does belong to: classificatory and functional.
4.2.3 A classificatory and functional approach
Classificatory comparisons generally focus on ‘large structural issues’, and 
primarily aim to classify their objects of study into more general categories 
such as presidential versus parliamentary systems, or federal versus non-
federal systems.101 As Jackson also notes: ‘some classificatory studies iden-
tify new and emerging categories of constitutional systems or phenomena. 
The literature on European constitutionalism has some of these characteris-
tics (…).’102 In line with this comparative approach this thesis precisely aims 
to establish a structural comparative framework along the confederal-fed-
erate axis, and to classify the EU within this framework. A descriptive and 
classificatory objective, which subsequently shares elements of the closely 
related form of a functional comparison.
97 Cf. R. MacDonald and D. Johnston (eds), Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the 
Legal Ordering of the World Community (Martinus Nijhoff 2005) or J. Dunoff and Joel 
Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World?: International Law, Global Governance, Constitutionalism 
(CUP 2009).
98 Cuyvers (2012).
99 V.C. Jackson (2012), 67.
100 See Introduction, section 4.1.
101 V.C. Jackson (2012), 57.
102 Idem.
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Functionalist approaches currently form the dominant method within 
(constitutional) comparative research.103 In the words of Tushnet, another 
leading authority, ‘Functionalism claims that particular constitutional pro-
visions create arrangements that serve particular functions in a system of 
governance. Comparative constitutional study can help identify those 
functions and show how different constitutional provisions serve the same 
function in different constitutional systems.104 The current research primar-
ily resembles one specific functionalist ‘technique’ that can be labelled as 
conceptual functionalism. This is ‘a form of analysis that overlaps with the 
classificatory category: scholars hypothesize about why and how constitu-
tional institutions or doctrines function as they do, and what categories or 
criteria capture and explain these functions, drawing examples from some 
discrete number of systems to conceptualize in ways that generate compar-
ative insights or working hypotheses (…).’105 Conceptual functionalism is 
an established method, as Jackson adds: ‘some of the best work in compara-
tive constitutional law is done in this vein.’106
In line with this methodology, the confederal comparison developed 
here draws examples from two systems to establish criteria and categories 
to understand and analyse the nature and functioning of the EU: How does 
the EU compare with our confederate and federate baselines, and can its 
position on this spectrum help explain its peculiar evolution and charac-
teristics? Can we develop some general hypotheses on the strengths and 
weaknesses of such mixtures of confederate and federate elements?107 
A comparison which focuses on the function of these constitutional structures,
especially in the federal function of combining and balancing shared central 
rule and autonomy of the subparts,108 but is also a-typical of functionalism 
in its rather broad and general scope, as opposed to a more narrow focus on 
more limited functions and case law.109
103 Idem, 62.Cf however also R. Michaels who describes it as ‘both the mantra and the bête 
noir of comparative law.’ He rightly points out the many tensions and problems within 
the overarching concept of functionalism. (Michaels (2006), 340.)
104 Tushnet (1999), 1228. For a detailed analysis of several sub-forms (rightly or wrongly) 
brought under the umbrella of functionalism, and some of which the current comparison 
also admits to blending, see Michaels (2006), 345 et seq.
105 Jackson (2012), 63.
106 Idem.
107 At the same time this very limited number of comparators is also a limit to the functional 
nature of the comparison, partially bringing it within the category of a detailed case 
study. See strongly on this point Tushnet (1999), 1266. To a certain extent this limited 
focus, and the diffi culties this provides for formulating general conclusions, however, is 
counterbalanced by the already established and well-developed functional framework of 
federalism and the clear value of the American experience for its development.
108 Cf A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, 
Hart Publishing 2010), 2: ‘Numerous congruities of EU primary law and national consti-
tutions emerge in a functional comparison, particularly when viewed through the lens of 
comparative federalism.’
109 Michaels (2006), 342.
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Conceptual functionalism explicitly embraces both descriptive and nor-
mative objectives. As outlined above the confederal comparison indeed con-
tains both. It explores descriptive questions on the qualification of the EU, 
but also more normative ones, for instance whether a confederal EU indeed 
contributes to certain outcomes or objectives deemed normatively desirable, 
or whether it should be seen as viable and desirable in the longer run.
Although clearly not forming ideal types of the methodologies, the confed-
eral comparison developed here, therefore, primarily follows a classifica-
tory and conceptual functionalist approach. Established, though far from 
perfect, methods that focus on constitutional structure, institutions and gen-
eral categories and doctrines to compare constitutional systems.110 Before 
moving on to the question of how to structure and design our specific com-
parison, however, it is first necessary to explicate and justify three of the 
core assumptions and instruments that underlie and enable a classificatory 
and functional comparative approach: the assumption of comparability, the 
existence of general categories for such comparability, and the independent 
value of institutions and constitutional structures. Elements which also play 
an important role precisely in designing the actual comparison.
4.2.4 Core assumptions: The possibility of comparison and overarching categories
The most fundamental assumption underlying classificatory and functional 
comparison, and perhaps even all knowledge, is the comparability of differ-
ent objects. Individual examples may be brought under more general and 
abstract categories (or tertium comparationis) in which they share to a suffi-
cient degree or intensity, and may hence be compared, classified and in that 
sense ‘known’.111 Instead of sixty-four unique entities, each creating unique 
oscillations of pressure through molecules and standing on billions of 
unique small objects we observe a herd of cows contently mooing on a field 
of grass and a farmer yelling. With Hayek it may perhaps be argued that 
such forms of abstract knowledge are in a sense ‘less’ than comprehending 
each particle of the universe in its own uniqueness. They may be necessary 
short-cuts for the highly limited human mind.112 At the same time this does 
not remove the use or feasibility of creating such more overarching and 
abstract categories, and using them to compare individual objects.
Of course from comparing cows to comparing constitutional systems is 
quite a leap. Yet the fundamental challenge is the same: are constitutional 
systems not so unique so as to prevent comparison? Is comparing the one 
to the other not as comparing being male to being female, or comparing 
110 G. Frankenberg, ‘Comparing constitutions: Ideas, ideals, and ideology –  toward a layered 
narrative’, 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2006), 445-446.
111 N. Jansen (2006), 310.
112 F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge 1960), especially chapters 2 and 3.
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the famous apples and oranges? Are they not, in fact, incommensurables 
and therefore incomparables?113 It is precisely to overcome such difficul-
ties, and therefore allow comparison, that the methodology of comparison 
entails creating and applying general concepts and frameworks. For even 
if not removing the underlying epistemological problem of incommensu-
rability, the problems facing comparison may be drastically reduced by 
specifying the particular focus of a comparison, thereby connecting it to 
an overarching yardstick, or what Chang calls a ‘covering value’ to which 
both can relate.114 Put more simply, once a covering value is taken, say vita-
min content, comparing apples and oranges is no longer a problem. We 
can conclude that ‘comparison is no longer elusive (…) oranges are better 
than apples with respect to preventing scurvy.’115 Equally the comparison 
between being male or female looses its mystery when specified to repro-
ductive capacities or the average age at which the prefrontal lobes reach full 
maturity. Comparisons which no one who has ever witnessed the miracle of 
birth or taught a group of first year students will have difficulty in making.
As Glenn, also referring to Chang, indicates therefore: comparison is pos-
sible whenever items can be situated on a continuum of information.’ 
And: ‘Making comparisons therefore requires a search for the appropriate 
enabling information, to overcome initial incommensurability or ignorance. 
How this search is conducted will depend on the circumstances.’116
The proposed comparison takes place precisely on such a ‘continuum 
of information’, namely the federal principle and the continuum between 
confederation and federation.117 Federalism focuses on the specific func-
tion of combining ‘self-rule with shared rule.’118 As such it provides 
abstract, general insights on compound constitutional systems, explicitly 
113 For a general exposition on incommensurability see J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (Clar-
endon Press, 1998), ch. 13. For a discussion concerning comparative law see H.P. Glenn, 
‘Are Legal Traditions Incommensurable?’ 49 The American Journal of Comparative Law 
(2001), 133.
114 R. Chang, ‘Introduction’, in: R. Chang (ed), Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practi-
cal Reason (Harvard University Press 1997), 6.
115 Idem.
116 Glenn (2001), 143.
117 Federalism is a standard category in comparative constitutional research. In addition to 
the literature already cited above, especially the work of Burgess, Elazar, and Watts, see 
for instance D. Halberstam, ‘Federalism: Theory, Policy, Law’, in: M. Rosenfeld and A. 
Sajó (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2012), ch. 27, Gins-
burg and Dixon (2011), ch. 20, T.O. Hueglin and A.Fenna, Comparative Federalism (Univer-
sity of Toronto Press 2010), Jackson and Tushnet (1999) ch. VIII, or N. Dorsen et. al., Com-
parative Constitutionalism (Thomson West 2003), ch. 4.
118 D.J. Elazar (ed) Self-Rule/Shared Rule: Federal Solutions to the Middle East Confl ict (Univer-
sity Press of America 1984).
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aiming to transcend specific specimens.119 Insights that are valuable for 
studying other, per definition not identical, systems.120
In this way the federal principle also illustrates a second key instrument for 
functional comparison: a selection of general principles, categories and doc-
trines which has been developed over time. Categories such as presidential-
ism, parliamentarism, bicameralism, devolution, monarchy, citizenship, or 
judicial review which allow us on the one hand to trace and delimit compa-
rable elements in different constitutions, and on the other to further develop 
such categories and with them our general understanding and knowledge 
of constitutional structures.121
Even within a federal focus, furthermore, comparisons can build on a 
further set of general functional categories developed to classify and ana-
lyze constitutional systems.122 These are categories as the executive, leg-
islative or judicial function, rules of adoption, amendment, accession or 
secession, representative systems, or the locus of sovereignty or delegation 
of authority.123 Again we can sensibly compare how different constitutions 
functionally organize change, how they structure the legislature, or where 
sovereignty is formally located.124
Lastly, and in addition to the assumption of comparability via overarching 
concepts and categories, functionalist comparisons also rely on the inde-
pendent relevance of institutions such as constitutional structures or law 
itself.125 Without separating constitutional structures from their context, 
it is assumed that they can be usefully studied separately.126 An assump-
119 In this sense federalism might precisely be so interesting for comparison because it some-
what approaches the idea of ‘epistemological functionalism’, allowing for a less essential-
ist and teleological approach which is also more sensitive to the differences within mul-
tiple forms and solutions within federalism and the different problems they address. See 
Michaels (2006), 355.
120 For a convincing comparative application of US federalism to the EU in this regard see 
Lenaerts, (1990), 220.
121 Obviously it is not claimed that these categories are uncontested or unproblematic, only 
that they provide some relatively shared framework for comparison. See for an overview 
of the problems attached to such categorization Saunders (2009), 7.
122 Tushnet (2006), 1240. At the same time, warning against the risk of ‘fi ctitious neutrality’ 
of such categories see Frankenberg (1985), 411.
123 See amongst many others, Hieringa and Kiiver (2012) or Finer, Bogdandor and Rudden 
(1995). Cf also Frankenberg (2006), 442, 457: ‘A careful tracing of the constitutional struc-
tures—notably human rights and organizational provisions— contained in the global 
repertoire comes fi rst and comes easily, since what you will fi nd appears in virtually any 
constitutional document.’
124 See for instance R. Dixon, ‘Constitutional amendment rules: a comparative perspective’, 
in: T. Ginsburg and R. Dixon (ed), Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar 2011), 96 
and F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (CUP 1986), 126 et seq.
125 Michaels (2006), 365.
126 Watts (1999), 15.
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tion that seems justified by previous research as well as by plain reality.127 
The American example, for instance, provides one clear illustration of this 
independent relevance and impact of institutions: the American context and 
society did not change overnight in 1789, yet the American constitution did. 
A constitutional and institutional change, therefore, that had an indepen-
dent impact, even before the civil war.
4.3 Designing the confederal comparison
The proposed comparison between the EU and the confederal origins of 
the US can, therefore, rely on existing methods, concepts and categories. 
Within these methods, however, a comparison must of course be careful-
ly designed. Crucially, the vast comparative field between the EU and the 
US must be further delineated and structured to allow for an ordered and 
systematic comparison. At the same time this structuring must be based on 
objective criteria, so as to avoid, even inadvertently, a subjective focus on 
those elements that support a specific outcome.
For these reasons the confederal comparison will be structured around 
sixteen specific modifications deemed fundamental by key founding fathers 
at the time for transforming the confederation into a federation. Modifi-
cations, which included the supremacy of federal law, the establishment 
of one sovereign people underlying all public authority, the creation of a 
strong federal executive with the capacity to physically enforce the national 
will. Together these modifications, which fall within established functional 
categories for comparison and have been selected on the basis of an objec-
tive criterion, form a structured comparative grid, allowing us to systemati-
cally compare the different systems.
The sixteen key modifications will, furthermore, be intentionally con-
sidered at the actual moment of transition. Although later developments 
in the US federate system can sometimes be taken into account, the aim is 
to look at the US experiences and debates at this transitional Sternstunde, 
still unaffected by the particular developments in the US federate system 
since.128 This to preserve as clear and pure as possible the transition from 
the confederal to the federate system, and to reduce to a certain extent the 
127 See J. March and J. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, The Organizational Basis of Politics 
(Free Press 1989), for instance at 17 or P. Craig, ‘The Nature of the Community: Integra-
tion, Democracy, and Legitimacy’, in: P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU 
Law (OUP 1999), 41.
128 Such as the Civil war, the development and dominance of political parties, industrializa-
tion, and the birth of the bureaucratic welfare state, to name some of the most central 
ones (I thank professor M. Shapiro of Berkeley Law School for a highly illuminating dis-
cussion on these elements in the development of the US system). The fl ip side, of course, 
is also that it robs our model of having been tested and adapted to these important devel-
opments for a constitutional system.
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distorting influence of the unique American context influencing constitu-
tional development since.
Focussing on these sixteen key modifications also allows the analytical 
knife to cut both ways; we simultaneously examine where the EU retains 
some of the structural weaknesses plaguing the Articles, and to what extent 
it has already incorporated some of the key solutions to them underlying 
the US federation. As such this allows us to simultaneously situate the EU 
between, or outside, the confederal and the federate poles of our spectrum. 
The outcome of this point by point analysis will then be subsumed into 
three central propositions on the EU constitutional order, after which the 
explanatory power and consequences of these propositions for the strengths 
and weaknesses of the EU will be analysed and tested against both the the-
ory and reality of the EU.
All in all this methodological framework aims to structure and design the 
confederal comparison, to the extent possible, so as to avoid the major 
pitfalls comparison inherently faces, and to preserve the value and valid-
ity of any conclusions reached. As such it knowingly accepts the limits of 
comparison, both in light of its potential rewards and in light of the lack of 
alternatives. Equally it accepts, and perhaps even hopes, that some of its 
contributions may come from bricolage rather than structured functional 
comparison.129 The ideas and concepts to understand and shape our new 
reality must come from somewhere. A sentiment nicely captured by a Ron-
ald Watts, a leading comparative scholar, where he states that: ‘as long as 
these cautions are kept in mind, there is a genuine value in undertaking 
comparative analyses. Indeed, many of the problems we face in Canada are 
common to virtually all federations. Comparisons may therefore help us in 
several ways. They may help to identify options that might otherwise be 
overlooked. Thy may allow us to foresee more clearly he consequences of 
particular arrangements advocated. Through identifying similarities and 
differences they may draw attention to certain features of own arrange-
ments whose significance might otherwise be underestimated. Further-
more, comparisons may suggest both positive an negative lessons; we can 
learn not only from the successes but also from the failures of other fed-
erations and the of mechanisms and processes they have employed to deal 
with problems’130
129 Tushnet (1999), 1229, 1285-1303. A ‘method’ he describes as the ‘assembly of something 
new from whatever materials the constructor discovered.’ Even though Tushnet primar-
ily had constitutional interpretation in mind, the concept seems relevant to structural 
comparison as well, especially in the refreshing way it ‘brings the historical contingency 
of all human action to the fore.’ Even the drafting of the US Constitution, after all, hardly 
met strict methodological requirements, yet choices had to be made.
130 Watts, (1999), 2.
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Before we start to explore the American confederation and its comparative 
value, however, one more preparatory step is in order to further structure 
and inform this comparison, which is to outline the key concepts and termi-
nology used throughout this thesis.
5 Concepts and terminology: Specific and general concepts used
The notions of federalism, federation and confederation play a central role 
in the proposed comparison. Before progressing any further it is useful, 
therefore, to establish some working definitions of these concepts.
Considering the comparative aim and method of this thesis the terms con-
federal and federate will often have a clear and specific meaning. As long 
as we are engaged in directly comparing the EU against the US example the 
term ‘confederal’ refers to the system under the Articles. Similarly, whilst 
comparing, the term ‘federate’ refers to constitution of 1787 and the specific 
modifications it introduced.
Both the Articles and the 1787 constitution are clear and uncontested 
specimens of a confederation and a federation. 131 They do, of course, not 
exclusively or exhaustively represent these categories. A fact that must 
be taken into account when extrapolating any conclusion to the concepts 
of federalism more generally. In addition, this also makes it necessary to 
describe up front which general conceptions of federalism will be used. This 
not just to prevent confusion where these terms are used more generally, 
but also to allow us to frame the outcomes of our specific comparative exer-
cise, and to relate its outcomes to these concepts more generally.
5.1 Terminology: General conceptions used
Establishing such general definitions is, of course, complicated by the con-
flicts and confusion surrounding these concepts. Federalism deals with 
multifaceted questions of political organization, has many normative impli-
cations, and represents a long and rich past.132 As a consequence its con-
cepts are as complex and contested as they are interesting and useful.133 
131 Watts (1998), 121 .Cf also the entry on Federalism in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Phi-
losophy ‘Thus many would count as confederations the North American states during 
1776-1787, Switzerland 1291-1847 and the present European Union – though it has sev-
eral elements typical of federations.’
132 See, for instance, R. Davis, The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in Quest of a 
Meaning (University of California Press 1978).
133 Vague here meant in the technical sense of second-order vagueness, preventing one to 
even clearly delineate the area of vagueness, and therewith the ultimate extension of the 
concept itself. See T. Endicott, ‘Vagueness and Legal theory’ 3 Legal Theory (1997), 37.
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Perhaps not surprisingly the terminology of federalism has therefore been 
used and abused in many different ways in discussions on the EU, often 
regrettably blurring debates as to whether the EU is, or should become, 
‘federal’.134
Fortunately, despite the conflicts and confusion, some rather convention-
al definitions exist that are commonly accepted for general use. That is, a 
rather general consensus seems to exist on at least several of the core ele-
ments constituting these concepts. The scope and strength of this consen-
sus, furthermore, seems sufficient for our comparative purposes, especially 
as it reinforces and specifies these definitions by building on two concrete 
examples. When generally discussing (con)federalism, therefore, this chap-
ter refers to these generally accepted and uncontroversial conceptions or 
descriptions of federalism, without implying that any ‘watertight compart-
ments’ exist between them.135
In line with this orthodoxy, and following prominent authorities such as 
King136 and Elazar,137 the conceptual framework used first makes a distinc-
tion between federalism generally, and specific forms of federal polities such 
as a federation or a confederation.138
Federalism thereby relates to the overarching theory, or set of politi-
cal principles, underlying federal polities. Perhaps such federalism is best 
grasped through its aim: allowing ‘people and polities to unite for common 
purposes yet remain separate to preserve their respective integrities.’139 
In Elazars well-known shorthand it thus tries to combine self-rule with 
shared rule. As he puts it more casually whilst capturing the tension inherent 
in this aim, federalism entails ‘wanting to have one’s cake and eat it too.’140 
134 See for example the famous, but highly vague notions of confederalism and federalism in 
Fischers 2000 Humboldt speech, and the responses usually assuming a full federation.
135 Burgess (2006), 24-25.
136 P. King, Federalism and Federation (Johns Hopkins University Press 1982).
137 Elazar (1995) and (2006).
138 A further distinction could be made based on whether one sees federalism as a normative 
notion advocating federal principles, or as a genus term, describing all specifi c forms of 
federal government. If one accepts the fi rst, normative, term it becomes useful to intro-
duce a further concept, that of federal political systems. This concept would then be the 
descriptive, general category of all political systems utilizing federal principles. For our 
purpose, however, this distinction seems superfl uous, as it can be fully accepted that the 
notion of federalism has both a normative and a descriptive function. For the distinction 
see: R.L. Watts, ‘Contemporary views on federalism’, in: B. de Villiers (ed), Evaluating 
Federal Systems (Martinus Nijhoff 1994), 1 et seq.
139 Elazar (2006), 33.
140 For his famous shorthand formula of self-rule and shared rule also see Elazar (1984).
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As such it implies both centralizing authority to allow (more) effec-
tive government at the central level, whilst constitutionally safeguarding a 
certain amount of autonomy for the constitutive parts.141 This entrenched 
authority and autonomy of the parts, furthermore, cannot derive from 
the central government but has to flow from a higher source. Otherwise it 
would be reclaimable by the centre, which would undermine the federal 
nature of the system.142 As we shall see in part II this is one of the elements 
that creates such an interesting relation between federalisms and sovereign-
ty.
Deriving from the Latin word for covenant ‘foedus’, federalism, further-
more, has the additional dimension of political organization based on cov-
enant: government willingly and consciously agreed upon between several 
entities. In contrast to theories emphasizing organic growth or conquest, it 
is a model of constitutional choice.
5.1.1 Federation
The term ‘federal’ subsequently refers to any polity conforming to ‘federal-
ism’ in this general sense. The terms federation (or federate) and confedera-
tion (or confederate) refer to specific forms of federal polities. 143 Regarding 
the notion of a federation Elazars definition provides a useful starting point 
as a relatively uncontested lowest common denominator: ‘A federation is a 
polity compounded of strong constituent entities and a strong general gov-
ernment, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people and empow-
ered to deal directly with the citizenry in the exercise of those powers’.144
This definition contains most of the key element generally used in defi-
nitions of federations. It can be made more selective, without introducing 
much more controversy, by combining it with several of the definitions giv-
en by other main authorities whilst leaving out the outlying criteria these 
might contain.145 Taken together in such a way the following elements are 
then customarily given as constitutive of a federation: (1) A compound pol-
ity consisting of a central government and several constituent entities, (2) 
which are both constitutionally enshrined as they both (3) posses powers 
141 Cf also the typical regional powers listed by Heringa and Kiiver (2012), 49-50.
142 See in this regard also chapter 9 section 5 on the notion of sovereignty and its relation to 
federalism.
143 To complicate things several sub-species, especially of federations, can be distinguished, 
and different ways to categorize these sub-species are possible as well. Cf for instance 
R.P. Nathan, ‘Defi ning modern federalism’, in: H.N. Scheiber (ed.), North American and 
Comparative Federalism: Essays for the 1990s (University of California Press 1992), 89 et seq, 
or Watts (1998), 124. For our purposes the generic category of federations and confedera-
tions, however, suffi ces, as they all share in the core components our comparison focuses 
on.
144 Elazar (2006), 7. Also see the discussion on popular sovereignty in this light in chapter 2 
section 2.1. and chapter 8 section 5.
145 Watts (1998), for instance, requires the powers to tax directly, which is not required by 
most other defi nitions.
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delegated to them directly by the people, and consequently (4) can both act 
directly on those people.146 Implicit in most definitions, but explicit in, for 
instance, that of King, is that (5) the combined whole takes the form of a 
sovereign state.147 Lastly, as it divides the power and safeguards the auton-
omy of the different governments, (6) a central role is played by a written, 
supreme constitution, and therefore usually also by the court (7) that may 
interpret it.148 It is to this slightly extended definition of Elazar, or at least 
collection of definitional elements, that this chapter refers when speaking 
about federation outside a specific comparative context.
5.1.2 Confederation
A confederation also forms a compound entity under a common government, 
albeit a far less integrated one, where the constituent parts remain prima-
ry and no single people underlies the different governments. In the brief 
definition of Forsyth a confederation is ‘a union of states in a body politic’ 
as such it represents ‘the intermediary stage between the interstate and the 
intrastate worlds (…).149 The key characteristic is that the different parts are 
not subsumed in, or brought under, a single superior or sovereign authority. 
Instead, the central authority remains dependant on the constituent parts.150 
Where this chapter generally uses the term confederation outside of a spe-
cific comparative context, it therefore refers to the following core elements: 
(1) a constitutionally structured union (2) between states151 (3) in which these 
states transfer the exercise of significant public authority wholly or par-
tially to a central authority,152 (4) without taking away the core of the enti-
146 King (1982), 77, Elazar (2006), 7, Watts (1998), 121, 124, Lenaerts (1990) 253.
147 King (1982), 77; ‘an institutional arrangement, taking the form of a sovereign state, and 
distinguished from other such states solely by the fact that its central government incor-
porates regional units in its decision procedures on some constitutionally entrenched 
basis’ Burgess (2009), 29, also includes the requirement of statehood: ‘all federations are 
composite states that constitute a single people’, as implicitly does Elazar (2006), 40.
148 Watts (1999), 7.
149 This in contrast to a federation which is a ‘union of individuals in a body politic’. Forsyth 
(1981), 7 (my italics).
150 Elazar (2006), 7, who defi nes a confederation as a polity whereby ‘several pre-existing 
polities joined together to form a common government for strictly limited purposes, usu-
ally foreign affairs and defence, which remained dependent upon it constituent polities.’
151 Cf also Elazar (2006), 40 ‘the relatively loose linkage of polities that retain their sover-
eignty within a permanent league’.
152 See in this regard already Pufendorfs insight that the difference between a confederation 
and a mere treaty bond is that in a confederation the parties ‘make the exercise of certain 
parts of the supreme sovereignty depend upon the mutual consent of their associates.’ As 
translated in Forsyth (1981), 82.
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ties’ individual sovereign status.153 The result is a polycentric constitutional 
framework, without a central nucleus of supreme authority or sovereign-
ty.154 This does not mean, of course, that the confederal centre cannot have 
significant powers or overrule the constituting parts in one or more areas.155
The boundary between a federation and a confederation is obviously not as 
clear as such exercises in definition imply.156 At the same time the concepts 
do seem to capture a very real and qualitative difference, also historically, 
between the two forms. The boundaries between the two, or perhaps even 
the possibility of hybrid forms, therefore raise interesting questions, espe-
cially for a borderline case as the EU. Questions on these boundaries there-
fore explicitly underlie the proposed comparison. Exactly by placing the EU 
between two examples we might get a better grasp of such boundaries, and 
thereby improve our understanding of the EU whilst perhaps simultane-
ously helping to further develop the general consensus on these contested 
concepts.
5.1.3 Member people
Unrelated to the distinction between federation and confederation, it is nev-
ertheless useful to also clarify the concept of a member people that figures 
prominently in this thesis. As both the concept of membership and that of 
a people can have strong normative connotations it is important to stress 
that the notion of a member people is used here in a very thin sense. The 
idea of membership solely relates to the question of EU membership as 
determined by the EU Treaties.157 In line with our confederal approach, fur-
thermore, and with the secondary nature of EU citizenship, the definition of 
who belongs to ‘the people’ in a Member State is wholly left to the national 
153 Cf also article 1 of the pact constituting the restored Swiss confederation of 1815: ‘Les 
XXII cantons souverains de la Suisse, (…) se réunissent, par le présent Pacte fédéral, pour 
leur sûreté commune, pour la conservation de leur liberté et de leur indépendance contre 
toute attaque de la part de l'étranger, ainsi que pour le maintien de l'ordre et de la tran-
quillité dans l'intérieur’. Or art. 1 of the Wiener Schlussakte (1820) fi nalizing the German 
Bund: ‘Der deutsche Bund ist ein völkerrechtlicher Verein der deutschen souverainen Für-
sten und freien Städte, zur Bewahrung der Unabhängigkeit und Unverletzbarkeit ihrer im 
Bunde begriffenen Staaten, und zur Erhaltung der innern und äußern Sicherheit Deutsch-
lands.’ in Cf also M. Jensen, The Articles of Confederation (University of Wisconsin Press 
1970), XIX, 109 and chapter VII: key issue was ‘the location of ultimate political authority, 
the problem of sovereignty.’ (p. 161). Also see Lenaerts (1990), 256, note 224 and 262-263. 
For a detailed discussion of sovereignty and its relation to a confederal set up see part II 
of this thesis.
154 The essential effect of this locus of sovereignty for the nature of the organization was also 
felt by politicians after the American Revolution. They saw a choice between: ‘a sover-
eign state, or a number of confederated sovereign states” (John Adams to Patrick Henry, 
June 3 1776, in Burnett, letters, 1: 471).
155 See in this regard the discussion in chapter 10, section 8 on confederal supremacy.
156 Burgess (2009), 30.
157 Cf art. 1, 49 and 50 TEU.
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level.158 As a result the concept of a ‘member people’ as used in this thesis 
refers to those same people that have been hailed and recognized since the 
Treaty of Rome, and elevates these entities to the place promised to them by 
the (almost) every treaty since.159
5.2 Terminological shifts and traps
Some last terminological warnings are in place before we engage with our 
comparison proper. Most importantly for our comparison are some shifts in 
the use of the terms federal and confederal over time.
First, the terms ‘federal’ and ‘confederal’ were only truly separated 
conceptually in the 19th century, long after the adoption of the second US 
constitution.160 Before this time, the entire continuum from confederal to 
federal was customarily seen as one concept, and both words were used 
interchangeably.161 The Articles of Confederation, for instance, were 
described as a federal system by contemporaries. One result of this is the 
enduring double use of the term federal to indicate both a federal system 
in the strict sense (a federation), and the complete range of non-unitary sys-
tems.162
Second, in the context of the American debate on the confederation and 
its replacement the use of terminology is even more specific – and confus-
ing. Originally, the term ‘federal’ was used to signify the confederal system of 
the Articles. Federalists, therefore, were initially the supporters of full state 
sovereignty, which they saw as the essence of the confederation. They gen-
erally opposed any strengthening of the central power, and regarded the 
new constitution as a coup that would destroy the freedom of the states 
158 Art. 9 TEU and art. 20 TFEU.
159 The preamble of the Rome treaty already spoke of ‘an ever-closer union among the peo-
ples of Europe.’ Even more interestingly the second paragraph of the preamble refers to 
the Member States as ‘their countries’, i.e. the countries of the member peoples, whereas 
art. 137 EEC held that the Assembly would ‘consist of representatives of the peoples of 
the States brought together in the Community (…).’ The preamble of the Single European 
Act talks of ‘the democratic peoples of Europe’, and that of the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union of deepening ‘the solidarity between their peoples while respecting 
their history, their culture and their traditions’ as well as repeating the desire to ‘to con-
tinue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.’ Amster-
dam also consistently speaks of the ‘peoples’ in the European Union. Nice does not men-
tion the people at all. Even the Constitutional Treaty, perhaps the most unifying in its 
aims and understanding of the EU (see for instance art. 1 speaking of ‘the will of the citi-
zens and States of Europe’), retains its basis in multiple peoples. Its preamble, for 
instance, still speaks of ‘the peoples of Europe’. See for instance art. I-3 or III-280.
160 Kinneging (2007), 40. Of course what we now term confederal government, and the anal-
ysis of those governments, long predates this separation. See for instance Elazar (2006), 
51 or Forsyth (1981), 82.
161 Madison, for instance, in his preface to the notes on debates in the Convention uses both 
the terms federal and confederal to describe the Articles of Confederation.
162 A confusion that underlies part of the disagreement over whether the EU is already ‘fed-
eral’ or not.
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under the Articles.163 Those which advocated a stronger centre, and later 
supported the new constitution, were originally called nationalists. In fact, at 
the beginning of the Philadelphia Convention the proponents of centraliza-
tion openly described themselves and their proposals as nationalist.164
During the Convention, but especially during the public debate following 
it, however, the ‘nationalists’ confiscated the term ‘federal’. In a clever and 
a historically phenomenally successful example of terminology theft, they 
attached this label permanently to the new and fundamentally different sys-
tem devised by them.165 Although quantification is impossible, this move 
increased the legitimacy of the proposed constitution and was of great use 
in the intense debate over the constitution, where the former federalists 
were now forced to operate as ‘anti-federalists’.166 Clearly the new usage of 
‘federal’ stuck, and was eventually enriched by the term of confederation, to 
again appropriately separate the two concepts. When dealing with contem-
porary sources, however, it is important to keep the original meaning and 
entanglement of these two terms and concepts in mind.
With these methodological and terminological preliminaries behind us, we 
can now start the actual exercise of delving into the confederal roots of the 
United States. So let us now meet the black sheep of American constitution-
al history.
6 The confederal cradle
This section will develop the comparative grid introduced above, and there-
by lay the groundwork for the more specific comparison in chapter 3. For 
that purpose it introduces some background as well as the structural ele-
ments necessary for that comparison. It starts with the sequence of events 
leading up to the Confederation (5.1) and the status of the colonies after 
163 See chapter 2 section 2.1 below. A view strongly linked to the radical ideology underlying 
the revolution itself. This ideology demanded democracy as close to the citizen as possi-
ble, and generally was highly distrustful of any authority. See for an overview: Gordon S. 
Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (Random House 1991).
164 Jensen (1970), 14. As Randolph put it during the Philadelphia Convention: ‘The true 
question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan, or introduce the national plan.’ 
Where the ‘federal plan’ was the existing confederation. (Madison Notes on the Conven-
tion Saturday June 16th in Committee of the Whole, 1787). Also see McDonald (1968), 138.
165 A tactic that proved very effective. See M. Diamond, ‘What the Framers Meant by Feder-
alism’, in: R.A. Goldwin (ed), A Nation of States (2nd edn. Rand McNally 1974). Perhaps 
the proponents of a stronger EU should start calling themselves nationalists.
166 The ‘Federalist’ papers naturally provide a key example of the success of this approach. A 
similar trick seems to be taking place with populists claiming terms as freedom, liberal-
ism and free speech and by supposedly protecting the Christian, non-Muslim roots of our 
western civilization by banning forms of religion and speech disagreeable to it.
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independence (5.2). Subsequently a short summary of the Articles will be 
given (5.3) followed by a brief overview of the main challenges facing the 
Confederation, its success and failures in meeting these challenges, and 
the difficulties in assessing that record (5.4). Lastly, the key innovations 
devised in Philadelphia will be set out and clustered. These innovations 
were deemed essential to remedy the weaknesses of the Confederation, and 
ended up transforming the US into what we have since learned to call a 
federal system (5.5).
6.1 The road to confederation
After years of increased tension and ever more open rebellion, the colonies 
declared independence from Great Britain in 1776. 167 Actual fighting was 
over in 1782,168 and the final treaty of peace, acknowledging independence 
signed in 1783.169 Already before declaring independence, however, the 
American states170 considered some form of collective political framework 
necessary,171 and work on such a framework was started.172 As a result, the 
167 See for the well known events such as the tax disputes, the intolerable acts, the tea par-
ties, and the, Boston Massacre, which lead up to the Declaration of Independence as well 
as for their actual relevance and context: Wood (1991) as well as Gordon S. Wood, The 
American Revolution (The Modern Library 2003).
168 On 19 October 1781 British General Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown. This was the 
last major battle, but fi ghting continued on a lesser and decreasing scale until 1782.
169 On 3 September 1983 the Treaty was signed in Paris. This formally ended the war and 
determined the (vast) lands hence formally belonging to the former colonies. It some-
what euphemistically stated that ‘It having pleased the Divine Providence to dispose the 
Hearts of the most Serene and most Potent Prince George the Third, by the Grace of God, 
King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, Duke of Brunswick and 
Lunebourg, Arch-Treasurer and Prince Elector of the Holy Roman Empire etc.. and of the 
United States of America, to forget all past Misunderstandings and Differences that have 
unhappily interrupted the good Correspondence and Friendship which they mutually 
wish to restore;’ For the US, to end the unhappy misunderstanding, John Adams, Benja-
min Franklin and John Jay were present. The Treaty of Paris was ratifi ed by Congress on 
14 January 1784. Separate treaties were signed with Spain and France, and more provi-
sionally with the Netherlands as well.
170 I.e. New Hampshire, Massachusetts-bay Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Con-
necticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.
171 As in Europe, many plans for some sort of Union between the Colonies had been pro-
posed earlier. These started with the plan of William Penn in 1698, but especially 
increased after the beginning of the eighteenth century. None of these plans, however, 
had much impact. Also, there had been a brief New England Confederation, which also 
proved of limited consequence. (Jensen (1970), 107). These earlier plans before the Decla-
ration of Independence were also different in the sense that they all included a continu-
ing link with Great Britain. Of these especially the Franklin draft, based on the Albany 
convention of 1754 is of interest, as it formed some sort of proto-confederation under 
British authority. The plan was, however, fi rmly rejected by the British crown. History 
might otherwise have looked very different…
172 The Dickinson Committee had already been established on June 12, 1776.
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declaration of independence was accompanied by a resolution that a con-
federation should be formed.173 A first draft for a confederal constitution 
was presented by the Dickinson-committee on July the 12th of 1776; 8 days 
after the declaration of independence had been signed. The draft ran into 
problems,174 however, and only on 15 November 1777 was a revised text 
sent to the thirteen states for ratification.175 In true confederal style, all states 
needed to ratify before the Articles would enter into force.176 Maryland, 
however, for several reasons only ratified on 1 March 1781. Considering the 
fact that most states ratified much earlier, and the rather significant chal-
lenges facing the new nation, the confederation already de facto functioned 
well before this last ratification, albeit through the institutional framework 
of the Continental Congress developed during the revolution. As of March 
first, 1781, however, the United States formally became a confederation of 
thirteen sovereign177 states.178
6.2 The Sovereign States
The sovereign status and self-image of the states must be emphasised since 
it is important for the constitutional development in the period and its 
comparability to the EU. To the states their mutual sovereignty was self-
173 Also, most states, when allowing their delegates in the Continental Congress to vote for 
declaring independence, also allowed them at the same time to vote for the formation of 
a confederation.
174 NB Dickinson was the leader of the conservatives already during the Continental Con-
gresses, which convened before in 1774 and 1775. The drafting Committee also had a 
strong conservative majority general. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Dickinson draft was 
more in line with conservative preferences for a stronger, more centralized government. 
It was subsequently ‘radicalized’ by Congress to better suit more radical sentiments and 
respect full state sovereignty. Jensen, (1970), 82, 127.
175 A second draft, amended by Congress, had been on the table from August 20, 1776.
176 The later federate constitution, on the other hand, only needed 9 out of the thirteen states 
to ratify to enter into force, albeit it only between the signatories.
177 Later efforts to deny this fact in support of a pro-centre interpretation of the federate con-
stitution aside. See especially H. van Tyne: ‘“Sovereignty in the American Revolution” An 
Historical Study’ 12 American Historical Review (1907), 529, 539 et seq, who concludes that: 
‘facts, too numerous to be gainsaid, can be cited to show the opinion of state legislatures, 
state conventions, and individuals in the states as to the actual political independence and 
sovereignty of the state.’ His analysis is supported by both Jensen and Wood, two leading 
authorities on the period. Jensen (1970), 162, and Wood (1969), 58, 356. Cf also Madison in 
his preface to the debates in the Convention, ‘A Sketch never Finished nor Applied’, p. 4, 
who also italicized the term ‘independent states’ when describing the 13 colonies.
178 Even though the States were quite small by current standards. Estimates of population 
differ (and the states were not even sure on this point themselves), yet the following 
rough estimates can be given for 1775: New Hampshire, 100.000; Massachusetts, 350.000; 
Rhode Island, 58.000; Connecticut, 200.000; New York, 200.000; New Jersey, 130.000; 
Pennsylvania, 300.000; Delaware, 30.000; Maryland, 250.000; Virginia, 400.000; North 
Carolina. 200.000, South Carolina, 200.000, Georgia, 25.000. (E.B. Greene and V. D. Har-
rington, American Population before the Federal Census of 1790 (Columbia University Press 
1981), 7 et seq.
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evident,179 and the Articles explicitly confirmed it.180 It is, therefore, thor-
oughly mistaken to understand the ‘United States’ at that time as anything 
close to a the relatively centralized entity it is today. Myths about virtually 
identical colonies,181 guided by a pre-existing image of an American repub-
lic, emerging from their struggle against Britain as a unified whole are 
utterly anachronistic.182 In 1776 most colonies had already existed for a long 
time. Virginia, for instance, went back 169 years, more than many an EU 
Member State. During this time the states had developed clear, individual 
identities.183 After independence the former colonies remained independent 
political entities,184 nationalistic in spirit, jealous of their sovereignty,185 and 
led by elites dependent on their local power base.186 Significant conflicts of 
interest, furthermore, existed between the states on issues such as slavery, 
trade, agriculture, and claims to the vast stretches of ‘empty’ land to name 
but a few central ones.187 The British had even stopped some armed con-
flicts between the states, and the prevention of future warfare was a very 
real objective of the Articles.188 The states also differed significantly in size, 
179 Whether they really were sovereign naturally depends on ones defi nition of sovereignty, 
and the application of this defi nition to the historical situation. On this point see exten-
sively section II.
180 Article II of the Articles of Confederation.
181 Wood (1969), 58, 356 et seq. Although naturally there were several ties that bound them 
together, especially the link with Great Britain. Perhaps the awkward statement of John 
Adams captures it, who said that the colonies ‘differed in Religion, Laws, Customs and 
Manners, yet in the great Essentials of Society and Government, they are al alike’, unfor-
tunately leaving out which ‘great Essentials’ are left once all those mentioned are taken 
away. (Adams to Abigail Adams, July 10, 1776 in L.H. Butterfi eld (ed), Adams Family Cor-
respondence vol. II (Belknap Press Harvard 1963).
182 Jefferson himself, for instance, stated: ‘we are so impressed by the diversity that union 
seems almost beyond the verge of possibility’ A.C. McLaughlin, The Confederation and the 
Constitution (Collier-MacMillan 1971), 42.
183 The fi rst colony, Virginia, was established already in 1607, the youngest one, Georgia, in 
1733. By 1776 many states were even older than the actual European nation-states when 
concluding the Treaty of Rome, although these nation-states obviously contained territo-
ry and peoples with a much longer history.
184 Seven of the thirteen states, for instance, enacted the declaration of independence as nati-
onal legislation so as to ensure its legal effect. (Wood (1969), 356). Also, the level of com-
munication between the states should not be overestimated. For example, the declaration 
of independence was known in Paris, almost as soon as in Charleston, and even a man as 
informed as Madison wrote to Jefferson in 1786: ‘Of affairs in Georgia I know as little as 
of those in Kamkatska.’ McLaughlin (1971), 41-2.
185 Van Tyne (1907), 531 et seq.
186 Jensen, (1970), 56. ‘in spite of social, racial and economic affi nities and the cohesive force 
of the British connection, they [the colonies] had become practically independent politi-
cal entities. Each delegate thought of his own colony as his country, as an independent 
nation in its dealings with England and with its neighbours, with whom relations were 
often as not unfriendly.’
187 McLaughlin (1971), 119 et seq. Naturally, many of these issues eventually contributed to 
the outbreak of the Civil War.
188 Jensen (1970), 56, 91, 117, 163, and especially 333-336.
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population and wealth, Virginia being leading in all categories, especially 
over small states like Rhode Island.
At the time of independence ideas of a unified American republic were, 
therefore, not just considered by most as contrary to the nature of a republic 
itself,189 but as factually impossible.190 Claims that Europe cannot be com-
pared to the American experience because, unlike the US, Europe forms 
such a diverse group of polities must, therefore, fall victim to the anachro-
nistic assumption underlying it.
6.3 Brief overview of the Articles
The sovereign status of the states also permeated the institutional set-up of 
the Articles. The central organ of the Confederation was Congress, in which 
each state had an equal vote, but could send between two and seven del-
egates to exercise that vote. Congress decided most issues by a qualified 
majority of nine states, including even the decision to go to war. For some 
decisions, such as amending the Articles, unanimity was required. There 
was no distinct executive, yet a ‘Committee’ sat during recess to oversee 
implementation. No judiciary was created, although Congress could play 
a semi-judicial role in some cases. The bureaucratic body of the Confedera-
tion was minimal.
The three main objectives of the Articles were the ‘common defence’, 
safeguarding the ‘liberties’ and republican form of government in all the 
states, and the ‘mutual and general welfare’, which required an internal 
market and trade agreements.191 These objectives matched the main com-
mon concerns of the states at the time. Foremost amongst these was of 
course keeping at bay the ‘evil empire’.192 Related to this was the aim of 
receiving recognition on the international scene, allowing the states to gar-
ner political, military and financial support abroad, and finding new trad-
ing partners.193 Internally, furthermore, the relations between the states 
189 Wood (1991), A.C. McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United States (Appleton-
Century 1936), 91 et seq.
190 In fact Gordon Wood, one of the central authorities on the creation of the United States 
actually concludes that ‘what is truly remarkable about the Confederation is the degree 
of Union that was achieved.’ Wood (1969), 359.
191 Art. III of the Articles of Confederation. Also see the circular letter accompanying the 
draft articles to the States on this point.
192 Although many of the leading individuals had tried to prevent a fi nal break with Great 
Britain, only becoming revolutionaries where this turned out to be inevitable, and even 
then not excluding a reunion with Great Britain after it would have seen the error of its 
ways. Van Tyne (1907), 538 et seq.
193 And then especially in trade and fi nance: in the densely regulated economy of those 
times, free trade being virtually non existent, the US very much needed trade rights with 
for instance France, Holland and Spain, but also with Great Britain who remained the 
largest trade partner.
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needed to be regulated now that the overarching framework of British 
authority had been removed. Within the states as well, an important layer of 
government had disappeared.
To achieve its aims the Confederation was given specific competences. The 
most far-reaching concerned warfare and external relations. Congress was, 
amongst other things, allowed to declare war, maintain an army and a navy, 
and conduct the waging of war. It could also conclude all forms of trea-
ties, for instance on trade. In addition, internal barriers to trade were not 
allowed and Congress could bindingly requisition money from the states. 
Congress nevertheless did not have the power to tax or to regulate internal 
trade. A very strict doctrine of attribution was followed, not allowing for 
implied competences. Although the States were bound by the Articles there 
was neither an explicit supremacy clause nor general direct effect.
6.4 A successful failure: Challenges and difficulties of assessment
The Articles did not have a long, and most certainly not a very glorious life. 
Formally entering into force in 1781, they were replaced already on March 
4th, 1789 by the federal constitution.194 During this brief existence, the Con-
federation was often professed to be a failure, and dysfunctional as a con-
stitutional framework. Its rather unfortunate role in subsequent US history 
primarily showcased it as the necessary evil out of which the immaculate 
perfection of the constitution could grow. This simplistic role of the consti-
tutional ugly duckling stuck, and has prevented the constitutional period 
from being fully appreciated and utilized.195
Only judging the Articles by evolutionary standards, they were indeed 
a complete failure. Not even making the ten year mark is rather unimpres-
sive for a constitution.196 For a proper appreciation of the Articles, and to 
isolate the comparative lessons in confederate organization they entail, it is, 
however, necessary to unbundle the different type of failures and their sepa-
rate causes. This unbundling needs to distinguish several layers.
194 See on the precise date of transition (and the questions surrounding it) V. Kesavan, ‘When 
did the Articles of Confederation Cease to be Law’ 78 Notre Dame Law Review (2002), 35, 
and G. Lawson and G. Seidman, ‘When did the Constitution Become Law? Boston Univer-
sity School of Law Working Paper Series on Public Law and Legal Theory (2001) No. 01-07.
195 This is not to deny the many shortcomings. Cf McDonald (1968), 3-5: by 1783 Congress 
‘had fallen into disgrace’ yet equally: ‘There was no general discontent with the state of 
things – certainly not as much as partisan propaganda and long-cherished myth depict-
ed.’
196 Even though some constitutions have won some renown and infl uence without ever hav-
ing entered into force, such as the remarkable French Montagnard constitution of 1793, 
which was ratifi ed but never entered into force. On average furthermore, constitutions 
only ‘endure’ 19 years. See T. Ginsburg, ‘Constitutional Endurance’, in: T. Ginsburg and 
R. Dixon, Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), 112 et seq.
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First, politics and propaganda must be separated from actual analysis of the 
functioning of the Confederation. As most losers, the confederation is large-
ly known through the eyes of its victors. History has commonly embraced 
the horror picture of the Confederation that was so effective in promoting 
the switch to a more centralized system. This is not to say that there is no 
truth in those accounts, which there is abundantly, or that the eventually 
victorious federate system was not ingenious, which it is. When dealing 
with these accounts, however, it should be taken into account that these 
now revered ‘founding fathers’ were also active and very eloquent politi-
cians on a mission.197
Second, evaluating the Confederation requires agreeing on the relevant 
standard for judging, a step often ignored. The bad reputation of confedera-
tions certainly has a lot to owe to the fact that they have commonly been 
judged by the same standards as centralized states. Obviously confedera-
tions will have difficulties achieving equal levels of effectiveness. Yet such 
a high standard seems unwarranted and unfair, particularly because the 
advantages of the confederal form, such as its respect for the autonomy of 
its members and its flexibility, need to be factored in as well. The calculus 
between these confederal advantages and weaknesses must be made for 
each different context individually, and in certain circumstances may lead to 
a different overall evaluation.
Third, and as far as possible, intrinsic and ‘external’ causes need to be 
unbundled. Due regard should be given to the challenging context in which 
the Articles were required to function when judging the intrinsic strength 
and functioning of the Confederation. Challenges that remained formi-
dable, even after the defeat of the most powerful empire in existence. To 
begin with a new nation had to be constructed after a combination of rebel-
lion and civil war.198 A task that had to be achieved with very little revenue, 
huge war debts, and a forced economic adjustment to existence outside 
the British trade system.199 Internally there were major conflicts of interest 
between often radical and unstable states, no longer checked by the frame-
197 Jensen (1970), 1, Wood (1969), 562-3. For a more radical, and heavily criticized, focus on 
the less glorious interests of the Founding Fathers also see C.A. Beard, An Economic Inter-
pretation of the Constitution of the United States (The Free Press 1986).
198 McLaughlin rightly emphasizes this element: it should not be forgotten that more than a 
third of the population in America supported the British. These were strongly loyalist, 
often fi ghting alongside the forces of the Empire. Furthermore, a large part was largely 
neutral, not caring very much for independence either. The direct ending of the war, 
therefore, saw a large out fl ux of, usually wealthy, qualifi ed and sorely needed, loyalists, 
and many of those problems common after a civil war like lingering hatred and returning 
refugees. McLaughlin (1936) and (1971).
199 Although the depth of the recession and economic problems are disputed. Some research 
actually suggest quite an increase of wealth, even though there was a major shortage of 
specie and other monetary problems were rife as well. Jensen (1970), 225 et seq.
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work of the empire. Added to this was an unpaid and disgruntled army, at 
points coming close to a coup.200 Externally the Confederation was finan-
cially dependant on France and the Netherlands, whilst its lands and trade 
interests were covetously ogled by Great Britain and Spain.201
Complicating matters even further was the radical revolutionary ideol-
ogy that had taken root in many states.202 Generally this rejected centralized 
power, whilst strongly promoting as direct and unlimited democracy as 
could be conceived. As theory was put into practice an increasing number 
of states became unbalanced, some of them to the point of civil uprising. 
Such states not only hindered the functioning of the Confederation, but also 
blocked necessary amendments to the Articles, as they refused to increase 
central power.203
Circumstances, in short, that would form a challenge to any constitutional 
system, let alone to one still inventing itself. During its time, however, the 
Confederation did function, and managed several vital feats. It ended the 
war with Britain on very favourable terms,204 prevented the states from 
‘going it alone’, and settled several land disputes over the vast western 
lands that the United States had acquired with independence.205 Disputes 
that could well have lead to civil war and disintegration on the entire conti-
200 R.R. Beeman, Plain, Honest Men: The Making of the American Constitution (Random House 
2010), ch. 1, R.H. Kohn, ‘The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and 
the Coup d’Etat’, 27 William and Mary Quarterly (1970), 187.
201 There were signifi cant quarrels, for instance, concerning navigation rights on the Missis-
sippi with the Spanish, trade rights dispute with the British, including disputes concern-
ing Canada and the manning of border forts, as well as a dispute over trapping and sell-
ing of fur, an important source of income.
202 Van Tyne (1907), 532.
203 See especially the fate of amendments to increase the revenues of Congress discussed in 
chapter 2, section 2.3. The parallel to the recent US Congress refusing to increase taxes by 
one cent despite a looming credit default obviously comes to mind, certainly considering 
the role played by the Tea Party republicans. In a sense these are indeed returning to the 
early days of American Union, although these were not as glorious as they seem to 
think…
204 Even though many of these successes were to a large extent due to superb individual 
performances of men like Franklin and Jay, and were more often than not achieved by 
violating their mandates (!), these diplomatic successes were achieved for the Confedera-
tion.
205 See for a good overview P.S. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordi-
nance (Indiana University Press 1987), especially 44 et seq.
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nent.206 Also, contrary to earlier beliefs, for American citizens the Confeder-
ate period was generally an optimistic one, marked by increasing prosperity 
and rising confidence.207
Another success, easy to overlook with the current prominence of the US, is 
the remarkable success in ‘branding’ the ‘United States’. At the time there 
was no such entity in the minds of its own inhabitants or in that of other 
nations. The Confederation seized the opportunity to project an image of 
one United States both internally and abroad. Assisted by anti-British senti-
ment, the new nation was quickly recognized by major powers of the time, 
and was able to create a place at the table internationally.208 The external 
existence and recognition of the US in turn assisted the internal understand-
ing of one American republic as well. Importantly this allowed the federalist 
to frame the debate within the US as one over why the confederal constitu-
tion was failing the United States, instead of why there should be a United 
States. One could wonder, after all, why a failing cooperation should lead 
to a more far-reaching one, instead of the states going their own separate 
ways. For many failures there were under the Articles as well, and these did 
overshadow the successes.209
6.5 ‘The failure of this our current government’
The most thorough and analytical contemporary overview of these weak-
nesses was Madison’s ‘Vices of the Political System of the United States’.210 
Madison wrote his overview in preparation for the Philadelphia conven-
tion. It was based on a general analysis of confederal government, and tried 
to isolate the reasons behind the recurring failures of confederations.
206 This issue long divided the Confederation, fi rst blocking ratifi cation, and then its further 
development. The settlement reached truly paved the way for the development of the US 
and the federate constitution as well: all titles to the unsettled lands were given to Con-
gress. These lands were to be surveyed and sold by the Confederation in a suitable way, 
allowing for new states to be created on them. This compromise achieved three crucial 
goals with one blow. First a dangerous bone of contention was removed. Second, new 
states could be created on an equal footing with the original ones and no one state would 
become so big as to overshadow the others. Third, the sale of western lands provided the 
United States with an independent source of income. The benefi t of this compromise was 
largely reaped by the Federation, but the hard compromise was reached during the Con-
federation. By 1786, Congress had full title to almost all disputed lands.
207 Wood (1969), 48, supporting Jensen on this point: M. Jensen, The New Nation: A History of 
the United States During the Confederation – 1781-1789 (Vintage Books 1965), 347 et seq.
208 An interesting contextual difference with the EU, where the Member States were already 
recognized and represented externally.
209 Kinneging (2007), 44-45.
210 J. Madison, ‘Vices of the Political System of the United States’ (1787).
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The resulting overview was instrumental in drafting the ‘Virginia plan’ 
for the Philadelphia convention, which in turn had a direct and significant 
influence on the constitution eventually adopted. Besides this direct impact, 
the views expressed in the analysis informed the debates at Philadelphia 
more generally, as its conclusions were apparently shared by the majority 
of delegates who signed the new constitution. In addition to its analytical 
strength, therefore, the overview also represents a more widely shared view 
on the weaknesses of the Articles, and the federal modifications deemed 
necessary to remedy them. As such it forms a very instructive tool to struc-
ture and focus the proposed comparison between the two systems. For that 
reason the more detailed comparison below will focus on those weaknesses 
deemed key to the ‘failure’ of the Articles, and the solutions adopted to rem-
edy them.
Madison noted eleven different ‘vices’, which for our purposes can be sum-
marized in the following core weaknesses.211
First, there was a general lack of power in the centre and a matching lack 
of compliance in the states. Second, partially as result of non-compliance, 
and due to its inability to tax or lay imposts, the finances of the Confed-
eration were deplorable, further debilitating the Confederation.212 Congress 
thus lacked sufficient ‘energy’<I> <XI>to define and promote a common inter-
est, and create any ‘output’ legitimacy.213 Third, after independence many 
211 Madison named the following eleven vices: 1. Failure of the States to comply with the 
Constitutional requisitions; 2. Encroachments by the States on the federal authority; 3. 
Violations of the law of nations and of treaties; 4. Trespasses of the States on the rights of 
each other; 5. Want of concert in matters where common interest requires it; 6. Want of 
Guaranty to the States of their Constitutions and laws against internal violence; 7. Want 
of sanction to the laws, and of coercion in the Government of the Confederacy; 8. Want of 
ratifi cation by the people of the articles of the Confederation; 9. Multiplicity of laws in the 
several States; 10. Mutability of the laws of the States; 11. Injustice of the laws of the 
States.
212 At one point, secretary of fi nances Morris even declared that the system was at the very 
brink of fi nancial disaster (1783 letter of Morris) and Washington had to shorten marches 
of the army because they literally had no shoes, and sometimes no clothes either. In 1786, 
for instance, after New York had refused yet another amendment designed to improve 
the fi nancial powers of Congress, a Committee of Congress in a public letter to New York 
fl atly described ‘present critical and embarrassed situation of the fi nances of the United 
States(…)’ (McDonald (1968), 49) and Member of Congress Rufus King stated in a letter 
that ‘You, my dear friend, must know our Situation, as fully as I do, who am a daily wit-
ness of the humiliating condition of the Union. You may depend on it, that the Treasury 
now is literally without a penny.’ (Rufus King to Lebridge Gerry, New York, June 18, 1786 
(McDonald (1968), 46).
213 Madison (Vices), 5, 8.
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states became increasingly radicalized214 and unstable.215 Congress was not 
able to counterbalance them, or to protect the different elites threatened by 
this radicalization.216 Fourth, the lack of competences to regulate trade was 
preventing an efficient internal market, and thwarted the external powers of 
the Confederation.217 Lastly, and crucially, all attempts to reduce these flaws 
by empowering the centre had stranded on distrust, state interests, and the 
requirement of unanimity.218 The effect of these accumulated problems was 
significant, and in the words of one of the foremost students of the period 
‘by the middle eighties Congress had virtually collapsed.’219
Interestingly the perceived scale of this failure allowed the Articles a last 
great achievement: by accumulating responsibility for near all the problems 
of the time, the Articles provided an enormous impetus and direction for 
214 This even though almost all of the new state constitutions provided for a senate, explicit-
ly in recognition of the need for an aristocratic element in Government so the ‘contempla-
tive and well informed’ and the ‘wise and learned’ could check he people of which ‘few 
[are] much read in the history, laws or politics’. An aristocratic hope already evident from 
the choice for the title of ‘senate’). Wood (1969), 209. In most states, however, these upper 
houses were to weak to really balance the more directly democratic lower houses. Cf on 
this point Jefferson in his ‘Notes on Virginia’. W. Peden (ed), Notes on the State of Virginia 
(University of North Carolina Press 1955), 119-120.
215 Madison (4, 6, 9, 10, 11). Wood (1969), 467: It was ‘the corruption and mutability of the 
Legislative Councils of the States’, the ‘evils operation in the States’ that actually led to 
the overhaul of the central government in 1787.
216 McDonald (1968), 5. As Madison commented on his discovery of popular despotism ‘It is 
much more to be dreaded that few will be unnecessarily sacrifi ced to the many.’ (Madi-
son to Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, Boyd (ed), The Papers of Thomas Jefferson XIV (Princeton 
University Press 1950).
217 Madison (1, 2, 3, 7). Cf already Washington in his Circular letter to the Governors of the 
States of June 8, 1783: ‘That unless the States will suffer Congress to exercise those pre-
rogatives, they are undoubtedly invested with by the Constitution, every thing must very 
rapidly tend to Anarchy and confusion. (…) That there must be a faithful and pointed 
compliance on the part of every State, with the late proposals and demands of Congress, 
or the most fatal consequences will ensue.’ (Note that in the US the Treaty nature of the 
Articles was in no way a problem for calling it a constitution.) See also McDonald (1968), 
40 and 73. Further see Lenaerts (1990), 234. who also compares with Switzerland, where 
lack of powers over trade was a central problem. He quotes Justice Joseph Story in 1833 
on the functioning of the Confederation: ‘(The) want of any power in Congress to regu-
late foreign or domestic commerce deemed a leading defect in the Confederation. This 
evil was felt in a comparatively slight degree during the war. But when the return to 
peace restored the country to its ordinary commercial relations, the want of some uni-
form system to regulate them was early perceived.’
218 So great even was this sentiment that Rhode Island refused to grant more powers to Con-
gress lest it become tyrannical whilst that same Congress was still in the middle of the 
war of independence against Great Britain! Indeed in some states, Rode Island being a 
good example, revolutionary ideology was threatening to take itself to a – presumed log-
ical – extreme, bordering on naïve anarchism.
219 Wood, (1969), 464.
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constitutional change.220 The key question became how to remedy the prob-
lems underlying the Confederation. This provided a focus and limited the 
bandwidth of the debate to a point that allowed agreement on a more cen-
tralised constitution. The Articles thereby played a key role both in the pro-
cess and substance of the ‘miracle at Philadelphia’,221 in what perhaps could 
be called the Phiddipides syndrome of confederations.
7 Reversing confederalism: The federal modifications
As mentioned above the essence of federalism is contested. Our specific 
purpose here, however, is to highlight those modifications in the constitu-
tional structure of the US that by contemporary consensus were deemed 
essential for remedying the failures of the Confederation. These modifi-
cations had to serve the seemingly incompatible objectives of creating an 
effective centre and respecting the autonomy of the states. As a result they 
brought forth the current American Constitution, and with it the modern 
federate system. As such they are relevant for the understanding of federal-
ism and especially interesting for a ‘supranational’ entity in constitutional 
dubio like the EU. Several of the federate modifications, furthermore, will 
look rather familiar to students of EU law.222 Here only a brief outline of 
these modifications is given, detailed discussion is reserved for the dis-
cussion per modification in the next chapter, so as to prevent tedious rep-
etition. It is thereby instructive to distinguish four – obviously interrelated 
– clusters of modifications: 1) modifications of the foundations of the polity, 
2) modifications relating to competences, 3) structural modifications, and 4) 
institutional modifications, including representational ones.223 This catego-
220 See also below chapter 5 for a more detailed overview of the procedural road to federa-
tion.
221 The representatives saw it as their task to remedy the problems under the Confederation, 
see J. Madison, A Sketch Never Finished or Applied (1830-1836), as included in Madison’s 
Preface to The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, 13 ‘a hope that so select a Body 
would devise an adequate remedy for the existing and prospective evils so impressively 
demanding it’ and p. 16 ‘Such were the defects, the deformities, the diseases and the omi-
nous prospects for which the Convention were to provide a remedy, and which ought never 
to be overlooked in expounding & appreciating the Constitutional Charter the remedy that was 
provided’
222 It should also be noted that many of these modifi cations obviously resulted from com-
promise, and were assembled from several more ‘pure’ plans. Pure plans that hold much 
interest of themselves such as the Dickinson draft, the Randolph plan, the Pinkney plan 
or the Hamilton plan proposing a unitary state. The Jefferson plan, and above all the Pat-
terson plan are especially interesting for the present comparison as they suggested a 
stronger confederal union instead of federation. All these plans, and their different ver-
sions, are available via: http://avalon.law.yale.edu.
223 Cf also Schütze (2009), 1077 for a similar subdivision, though the division here predates 
this publication.
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rization does not claim any form of necessity or exclusivity, yet does assist 
in structuring our analysis and comparison.
7.1 Fundamental modifications
The first cluster contains the most fundamental, truly foundational modifi-
cations, which directly affected the nature of the polity. First and foremost 
amongst these was the creation of one American people in which all sovereign-
ty ultimately resided. The constitution contained and conveyed the will of 
this supreme entity. From this one sovereign source, power could then be 
distributed to the different governments.
The second fundamental shift empowered the central government to 
use force against the states when necessary. Although it could not be the 
standard method of enforcement, the possibility of force was seen as neces-
sary to ensure compliance, and thereby to ensure that federal rules would 
truly have the character of law. In addition to this quest for effectiveness, the 
right to use force also normatively underscored the authority of the whole 
over the parts. Especially considering the fear of tyranny and the radical 
democratic ideology of the time, this certainly was a fundamental change. It 
altered the nature of the relation between the states and the central govern-
ment.
Third, and observing American politics today probably more far-
reaching than the right to send in the National Guard, was the right to tax. 
Removing the financial dependence of the centre on the states, the federal 
government was given the power to directly tax US citizens, as well as the 
right lay imposts. A power that again confirmed the fact that there was one 
American people, which directly owed civic duties towards the federal gov-
ernment, and did so independent of the state they happened to belong to.
Fourth, constitutional amendment became possible by a qualified 
majority. This effectively took away state control over the compact binding 
them, further subsuming them into one political community. A majority of 
other states could now change even the most fundamental rules of the game 
against the will of one or more other states.224
Lastly, and related to the rules for amendment, the constitution intro-
duced a crucial system for the accession of new, fully equal, states that 
would be formed in the future, and contained, albeit implicitly, a rejection of 
secession, which was later determined through civil war.
Together these modifications fundamentally altered the nature of the polity 
constituted. They also underpinned the further modifications made, includ-
ing the second cluster of what can be labelled structural modifications, see-
ing how they affected the structure of government and governing.
224 Except for the interesting exception that each state would retain two senators, see art. V 
US Const.
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7.2 Structural modifications
As a first structural modification, the central government was to generally 
act directly on the citizens, and no longer primarily through the states. The 
central government, furthermore, was to be a fully separate government, no 
longer working trough the states alone, but possessing its own organs and 
institutional capacity.
Second, and following from the creation of one supreme people, the 
Constitution, all central legislation and all treaties became the ‘supreme law 
of the land’. Their force would no longer rely on a good faith obligation of 
the States to uphold them, as it did under the Confederation.225 This reli-
ance on supremacy also reflected a far greater reliance on the use of law as 
the cornerstone of political organization. Although the capability of using 
force was deemed necessary, as we saw above, at the same time the insight 
was embraced that repeated use of force cannot support a stable polity, cer-
tainly not in a compound entity. In times of normalcy law and not force 
should be the instrument of government.
This central role for law is also evident in the second fundamental 
function of supremacy: the supremacy of the Constitution over the cen-
tral government itself. Such complete supremacy of a legal document over 
a democratic government was a major innovation.226 It is important to 
appreciate this double role of the law, which both fitted the ideology of the 
enlightened revolution, but also provided a necessary building block for a 
federate system and tempered the radical preference for direct democracy.
7.3 Increased competences and implied powers
The third cluster of modifications increased the competences of the federal 
government.227 Not surprising, considering the core weakness of the Confed-
eration on this point, the most important new power concerned the regula-
tion of commerce. The federal government received the, by now infamous, 
power to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.’228 The federal government at the same 
time retained its exclusive external and war competences.
225 Obviously an indirect dependence remained to the extent that the statal governments 
need to implement or uphold federate law.
226 In 1777, for instance, the parliaments of New Jersey, Georgia and South Carolina auto-
matically assumed that they could change their state constitutions through ordinary leg-
islation. (Wood (1969), 274).
227 See Art. I sec. 8 Us Const. The power to tax was of course also an increase in powers, yet 
due to the fundamental shift this entailed is has been placed in the cluster of foundational 
modifi cations. No fi ndings or conclusions of this chapter, however, rest on this qualifi ca-
tion.
228 Art. I sec. 8 Us Const.
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Crucially, furthermore, a much broader doctrine of implied powers was 
explicitly introduced via the ‘necessary and proper clause’, vastly expand-
ing the competences of Congress by linking objectives and competences.229 
Although the principle of attributed power was maintained, it was, there-
fore, significantly softened, again removing one of the central causes of 
paralysis in the Confederation.
7.4. Institutional modifications and the system of representation
The changes in foundation, structure and powers obviously required institu-
tional modifications. At the same time the cluster of institutional modifica-
tions adopted also strengthened and consolidated the other modifications.
Obviously, a full institutional comparison, including a detailed analysis 
of how each institution was set up, their place within the larger institutional 
framework, and how they functioned in practice, is beyond the scope of the 
current research. In line with our overall approach, this section will focus on 
three key institutional modifications to the confederal system deemed vital 
to remedy its failures and allow a federate system to come into existence 
and function.
The first modification concerns the representational scheme, and how this was 
translated into the composition and operation of the legislature. This branch 
was made permanent and based in Washington. It would no longer be state 
politicians travelling to participate in the central government. In addition it 
became bicameral. The House of Representatives directly and proportional-
ly represented the people at the federal level. A modification that anchored 
the assumption of one sovereign American people into the political and leg-
islative process. Counterbalancing this shift, the Senate, especially before 
the 17th amendment, represented the states. Reflecting their former sover-
eignty, and providing political and institutional protection for the states, 
each state was guaranteed an equal number of two senators.
Second, and in a complete reversal of the confederal model, a very strong 
central executive was created with the office of the President. Besides the 
President’s role in checking and balancing the other branches, this office 
was intended to guarantee effective execution and implementation. The 
introduction of such a strong personal executive head was a remarkable 
development in light of the radical fear of tyranny and the recent ousting of 
the British monarchy.
229 Idem, Congress was empowered: ‘To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Offi cer 
thereof.’
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Last, but certainly not least, a federal Supreme Court was established. Aimed 
to remedy the general lack of compliance, and mirroring the central role 
envisioned for the rule of law, this court should ensure compliance both 
from the states and the centre. Crucially, however, this also meant that con-
flicts between the centre and the states, for instance on the limit of compe-
tences conferred, would therefore be decided by a court belonging to the 
federate centre. This created a typical judicial kompetenz-kompetenz at the fed-
erate level, and further strengthened the legal component in the federate 
system.230
7.5 A comparative grid
These modifications, especially when put together, transformed the con-
stitutional system of the US. Jointly they secured the central aims of guar-
anteeing sufficient power and energy in the centre to govern, ensuring 
compliance from the states, yet preserving some level of statal autonomy.231 
Furthermore, even the short overview given above clearly indicates to those 
familiar with the EU system the many parallels with the EU, which has 
already incorporated several of these elements wholly or partially. The cen-
tral role of supremacy and direct effect, and their interplay with a supreme 
court are the obvious case in point.
The next chapter will go into a more detailed, point by point, analysis of 
these sixteen federal modifications highlighted for comparison. A compara-
tive exercise that forms the raw comparative material for the further analy-
sis and propositions on the constitutional nature and functioning of the EU 
provided in chapter 4.
230 J. H. Choper, R. H. Fallon, Yale Kamisar and S. H. Shiffrin, Constitutional Law (10th edn. 
Thomson 2006), 15 et seq.
231 Federalist Papers No. 10.

1 Introduction: A point by point comparison
With the groundwork in place, this chapter carries out a detailed compari-
son. Per key modification, the EU will be set against the confederal system 
of the Articles on the one hand and the federate counterpart that replaced 
it on the other. In this way, the EU will be located between, or outside, the 
spectrum that lies between these two poles.
The chosen approach contains one imbalance, which must be addressed 
here before we engage with the comparison proper. In our comparison the 
US is represented by two points, capturing the dynamic development of 
this polity from a confederation to a federation. The EU, on the other hand, 
is presented as a single point, even though it has experienced several trans-
formations itself.1
Acknowledging this limitation it is nevertheless believed justified to 
take the EU as it stands at the time of writing as the default point of com-
parison. It is this current EU which we most want to comprehend. In addi-
tion, some of the points being compared have remained relatively stable 
over the course of the EU’s development. Even so, partially to compensate 
for this imbalance, and to prevent working from too one-dimensional an 
understanding of the EU, relevant developments within the EU will also 
be included in some of the individual points of comparison. This especially 
where essential evolutions of the EU along the confederal –  federal spec-
trum would otherwise go unnoticed. The relative increase in the federate 
structural elements of the EU, for instance, forms one such essential evolu-
tion.
In terms of order this comparison follows the four clusters of modifications 
defined above. It first looks at the fundamental modifications, then to the 
structural ones, followed by the modifications to competences and the key 
institutional changes. Based on this concrete, systematic comparison, chap-
ter four will then assemble these specific findings into three more general 
comparative propositions, and explore their explanatory power for the EU.
1 See classically J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ 100 Yale Law Journal (1991), 
2403. For a more recent overview: P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law 
(2nd ed. OUP 2011).
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Before we set out on this substantial comparative exercise, however, an 
additional note to the reader is in order. The following chapter provides a 
highly structured, point by point comparison. For those specifically interest-
ed in this detailed comparison this chapter hopefully holds much of interest. 
For those who are primarily interested in the overall picture that emerges 
from the comparison, the exercise ahead may be less elating. The rigorous 
structure followed, furthermore, although required to support the validity 
of the comparison itself, may risk evoking a certain longueur. Where such 
symptoms are indeed likely to occur, difficult as it may be to believe, the 
reader is referred to the general summary in section six of this chapter. This 
summary has consciously been written so as to allow, to the extent possible, 
such a reading strategy, as have the following chapters. Alternatively, the 
modular design of this chapter also allows for a cherry picking approach.
2 Foundations: Fundamentals of the constitutional systems 
compared
Five key foundational modifications were highlighted above. Scoring the 
EU against these five modifications is especially important to establish how 
the EU compares to our confederate and federate baselines on the level of 
constitutional fundamentals. This subsection therefore compares the EU 
with these baselines on the issues of ultimate foundation of authority, use of 
force, taxation, amendment, secession and enlargement.
2.1 Foundations: Ultimate foundation of authority
Our first, and most fundamental, modification concerns the ultimate foun-
dation of authority. Where is such authority located, and how does it ‘flow’ 
throughout the constitutional orders compared?
2.1.1 We the peoples
The Articles expressly respected the sovereignty of its Member States. Even 
though the Union was to be ‘permanent’, the states were not to be dissolved 
into the new entity, but remained the primary body politics,2 and loci of 
original authority.3 They did not transfer ownership of sovereign powers, so 
2 Wood (1969), 355, the Confederation was not even seen as a threat in this regard.
3 A fact bewailed by more nationalist proponents in complaints that could be copied ver-
bally by proponents of a stronger European political integration. Compare the Federalist 
Fisher Ames: ‘Government is too far of to gain the affections of the people. What we want 
is not a change in forms. We have paper enough blotted with theories of government. The 
habits of thinking are to be reformed. Instead of feeling as a Nation, a State is our country. 
We look with indifference, often with hatred, fear and aversion to the other States’ (Fisher 
Ames to George Minot, February 16, 1792 in Works of Fisher Ames, Seth Ames (ed.) Boston 
1854, 1: 113).
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to speak, but only delegated a limited right of use.4 The Articles were explic-
itly concluded by the ‘Delegates of the States’ and “between the states of New 
Hampshire (…) and Georgia.’ They were, therefore, not based on one over-
arching authority, and respected the autonomy of the states as well as their 
normative superiority. No single American people was assumed or created.
Within the states, furthermore, ultimate authority remained located in the 
separate peoples. Popular sovereignty and rather direct democracy were, 
in fact, two of the major shifts brought about by the American Revolution. 
Authority no longer originated in a king or a state – where the people could 
be granted some representational rights as a class – but in the people, who 
could then delegate it. An understanding that has since become almost 
automatic, if not without its complications, yet truly was a revolution at the 
time.5
In the Confederation, moreover, this idea was linked to a revolutionary 
variant of the republican ideal. This ideal stressed the importance of small 
political communities, and very direct participation by the citizens in poli-
tics. Consequently it challenged the situation under the British Empire, and 
resisted the creation of a large, central and distant authority within the US 
that would take the place of London. In no way, therefore, did the Confed-
eration, claim to create anything like one American people. In line with the 
ideals of the revolution, the Confederation was there to protect the freshly 
conquered sovereignty of the peoples, not to threaten their self-government 
or ultimate authority.
As a result, the flow of authority within the Confederation was very clear as 
well. The People had delegated powers to the states, and the states had del-
egated some of these powers to the Confederation. The explicit retention of 
state sovereignty therefore should also be understood as an explicit reten-
tion of the people’s sovereignty.
4 For the conceptual problem underlying this question –  is it a division of sovereignty – 
see further below and especially part II on sovereignty.
5 The ultra-dominance of the legislature in many state constitutions of the time was a direct 
application of this philosophy, for what could ever restrain the will of the sovereign peo-
ple? For a further discussion and overview of the prominence of popular sovereignty in 
EU Member States see further below chapter 7 section 2 and chapter 10 section 6.
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2.1.2 We the People
In a truly fundamental shift, the federal Constitution relocated ultimate 
public authority in the, newly ‘created’, American People.6 A shift captured 
by the rightly famous ‘We the People’. 7
This shift developed and confirmed the notion of popular sovereignty 
developed during the revolution and the Confederation. The people should 
be the fons et origio of all public authority.8 That sovereignty, however, was 
now placed in a single people.9 The many sovereign peoples of the Confed-
eration were merged into one sovereign entity.10 In return, the previously 
6 Cf Van Middelaar (2009), 126, also quoting Patrick Henry, one of the great anti-federalists: 
‘Who authorised them to speak the language of, We, the people, instead of Whe, the States? 
(…) The people gave them no power to use their name.’ Patrick Henry, speech of 4 June 
1988 during the Virginia ratifying convention, in: B. Bailyn (ed) The debate on the Constitu-
tion. Federalists and Antifederalists speeches, articles and letters during the struggle over the 
ratifi cation (New York 1993), 595-597.
7 Even if this was a non existent entity at the time, see below chapter 9 section 5. Also, not 
too much stock should be put in the language itself: until very last days of the convention 
the text still was ‘we delegates of the states’ until a last minute change by the Committee 
of style. Nevertheless it rightly captures one of the key shifts brought about by the Con-
stitution.
8 See also E.S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and 
America (Norton 1988), for instance on 281, and Burgess (2006), 11.
9 This is an essential element of a federation, Burgess (2009), 29: ‘Diversity notwithstand-
ing, all federations are composite states that constitute a single people’. Of course one 
could argue that de facto this single sovereign only became a certain reality after the civil 
war, yet this does not alter the normative and constitutional claim of the US federation 
that it was based on one sovereign. Interestingly, however, before the civil war the term 
confederacy was also still in use to describe the US. (Cf. Forsyth (1981), 4, 41).
10 Wood (1969), 473. Madison also found it ‘a fundamental point that an individual inde-
pendence of the States is utterly irreconcilable with the idea of an aggregate sovereignty’. 
S.J. Boom, ‘The European Union After the Maastricht Decision: Will Germany Be the Vir-
ginia of Europe?’ 43 American Journal of Comparative Law (1995), 208. Judicially, see, for 
instance, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 296 (1936) (‘[T]he Constitution itself is in 
every real sense a law—the lawmakers being the people themselves, in whom under our 
system all political power and sovereignty primarily resides, and through whom such 
power and sovereignty primarily speaks. It is by that law, and not otherwise, that the 
legislative, executive, and judicial agencies which it created exercise such political 
authority as they have been permitted to possess. The Constitution speaks for itself in 
terms so plain that to misunderstand their import is not rationally possible. 'We the Peo-
ple of the United States,' it says, 'do ordain and establish this Constitution.' Ordain and 
establish! These are defi nite words of enactment, and without more would stamp what 
follows with the dignity and character of law.’); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 
(1886) (‘Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of 
law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of govern-
ment, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government 
exists and acts.’ (emphasis added)); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) 
(‘That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such 
principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on 
which the whole American fabric has been erected. . . . The principles . . . so established 
are deemed fundamental. . . . This original and supreme will organizes the government, 
and assigns to different departments their respective powers.’ (emphases added)).
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sovereign peoples of the states received a constitutionally protected ‘semi-
sovereign’ status, inter alia protecting the democratic process within their 
respective states.11
Two important further consequences flowed from this modification. First, 
the flow of authority was reversed. Authority now flowed top-down, from 
the people directly to both the federal and the state governments.12 The 
federal government, therefore, also came to rest directly on the people.13 
It received a separate and independent authority, no longer relying on an 
intermediate authority and legitimacy via the states.14 Second, and even 
more far-reaching, this federal authority normatively trumped the author-
ity of the states. The federal Government, after all, represented the whole 
American people.15 The states only represented one sub-part of this supreme 
11 CF Madison (Sketch), 16 describing this shift where the Peoples of the states ‘acting in 
their original & sovereign Character’ were to be brought together in one people. At this 
point, therefore, I disagree with Schütze, who solely focuses on the fact that ratifi cation of 
the US constitution rested on the separate peoples in the states. Yet he ignores that, fi rst, it 
were the peoples directly who ratifi ed via special delegates, and second, that these peo-
ples were to be subsumed into one entity after ratifi cation. In fact, therefore, he describes 
the confederal reality before ratifi cation, not the federate one willingly accepted by the 
people after ratifi cation. Schütze (2009), 1077.
12 D.J. Elazar, ‘Federalism v. Decentralization: The Drift from Authenticity’, in: J.L. Mayer 
(ed) ‘Dialogues on Decentralization’ 6 Publius (1976), 9-19, Elazar (2006), 41, ‘(…) Ameri-
cans understood sovereignty to be vested in the People. The various units of government 
–  federal, state, or local –  could exercise only delegated powers. Thus it was possible for 
the sovereign people to delegate powers to the general and constituent governments 
without running into the problem of which possesses sovereignty except in matters of 
international matters or the like. In matters of internal or domestic governance it was 
possible to avoid the issue except when political capital could be made out of it. (…) By 
creating a strong overarching government, it was possible to aspire to the same goals of 
political unifi cation and integration as the Jacobin state, but by removing sovereignty 
from the state as such, and lodging it with the people, it was possible to arrange for pow-
er sharing and to set limits on governmental authority. Out of these two shifts there were 
developed what we have come to know as modern federalism.’
13 I disagree therefore with those holding that the sovereignty of the single American people 
was not clearly presumed in the Constitution, but who argue alternative sovereignty 
arrangements. For instance, some defend that sovereignty was divided between the peo-
ple of the nation as a whole and the separate peoples of the states. See in this vein for 
example J. Goldsworthy (2006), 427, who at the same time also recognizes himself that 
‘most of Madison’s contemporaries did not agree that the Constitution divided sovereign-
ty. It was widely believed that ‘the people’ , who had supposedly enacted it, retained ulti-
mate sovereignty and superintending authority over the all organs of government.’ (424).
14 Elazar (2006), 35.
15 Wood (1969), 532: ‘Madison saw clearly that the new national government, if it were to be 
truly independent of the states, must obtain ‘not merely the assent of the Legislatures, but 
the ratifi cation of the people themselves’ for ‘only a higher sanction than the Legislative 
authority could render the laws of the federal government paramount to the acts of its 
members.’
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entity, even if these sub-parts enjoyed some special constitutional protection 
under the Constitution due to their former sovereign status and history.16
The shift from multiple peoples to one sovereign American people was 
considered vital for the transition from a confederation to a federation, and 
formed the normative basis for many of the further modifications discussed 
below.17
2.1.3 We the peoples and/or states?
The question which foundation EU authority has, can have, or should have 
is greatly contested.18 At the same its does seem common ground that the 
EU is currently not based on a single European People.19 As the Preamble 
famously declares, the Treaties aim to ‘continue the process of creating an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.’20 Under article 4(2), further-
more, the Union is obligated to respect the equality of all Member States, as 
well as their national identities.21 Independent statehood, moreover, is a for-
16 Please not that this does not deny the identity and independent political existence of the 
states and their peoples. It is only that they no longer form the ultimate sovereign bodies. 
See for a very sharp discussion of this distinction, as well as the ‘dualism of political exis-
tence’ that forms the ‘essence’ of a federation, C. Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (trans. J. 
Seitzer, Duke University Press 2008), 388 et seq.
17 Patrick Henry at the Virginia ratifying convention ‘The question turns, sire, on that poor 
little thing – the expression, We, the people, instead of the states, of America.” (…) States 
are the characteristics and the soul of a confederation. If the states be not the agents of this 
pact, it must be one great, consolidated, national government of the people of al the 
states’ (Wood (1969), 526).
18 See for further discussion and suggestions chapter 10, section 6 below.
19 See also R. Schütze (2009), 1079, and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Prologue: Global and pluralist consti-
tutionalism –  some doubts’, in: G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), The Worlds of Euro-
pean Constitutionalism (CUP 2012), 13.
20 Also see the preamble of the TFEU, which consistently refers to ‘peoples’, as well as art. 1 
TEU par. 2 and art. 3(1), which make it the aim of the EU to ‘promote peace, its values and 
the well-being of its peoples.’ Also, although it represents ‘the Union’s citizens’, the Euro-
pean parliament seats are divided per Member State (art. 14(2)) TEU). The importance of 
this fact is evidenced by the strong resistance to the limited ‘Europeanization’ of this sys-
tem proposed under the Duff plan, which would create several ‘pan-European’ MEP’s. 
See the Proposal for a modifi cation of the Act concerning the election of the Members of 
the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976, 
INI/2009/2134.
21 It is also interesting in that regard that art. 2 TEU proclaims that the EU is founded on sev-
eral principles common to the different peoples, not so much on these peoples themselves. 
Art. 1 TFEU thereby founds the Union on the Treaties, i.e. the agreement or reciprocal 
promises, of the different constituent parts.
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mal requirement for membership,22 and the EU remains, at least formally, 
based on several international treaties concluded by its Member States.23
EU citizenship perhaps best captures the secondary normative claim of the 
EU on the individual and the member peoples as a whole: ‘Citizenship of 
the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.’24 The 
EU, therefore, not just refrains from claiming a single people; it explicitly 
embraces the contrary aim of protecting the plurality of its peoples.25 The 
Treaties have also been very consistent in respecting such individuality.26 
Despite the increasing authority and reach of the EU, the successive trea-
ties have always recognized diversity as one of the key values of European 
integration.27
22 Art. 49 TEU.
23 This of course not to deny the potential of creating a statal constitution by means of a 
treaty, such as for instance in Germany. Yet it is in this sense at least that the Member 
States remain Masters of the Treaties, a title given much more content and weight by the 
German Constitutional Court, see especially its Maastricht Urteil of 12 October 1993, 
BVerfGE 89, 155 and its Lissabon Urteil of 30 June 2009, BVerfGE, 2 BvE 2/08 paras. 231 
and 298. On these German cases see extensively chapter 9, section 4.4.
24 Art. 9 TEU. Also see art. 20 TFEU. Even though ‘destined to be the fundamental status’, it 
remains subordinated to citizenship of a Member State. See case C-184/99 Grzelczyk 
[2001] ECR I-6193, par. 31.
25 Also, under its own core values and principles, including democracy and the right to self-
determination, the EU is bound to respect these different peoples, unless they themselves 
voluntarily decide to merge into one European people. Also see art. 1 and 4(3) TEU, 
requiring respect for national identities, and the reference to the UN charter, which in 
turn refers to the right to self-determination of a people. See further below chapter 10, 
section 3.2.
26 Cf however, the proposals made during the Convention to have a European wide refer-
endum as part of the ratifi cation of the Constitutional Treaty. A clear attempt to base the 
EU directly on some form of a European collectivity, which logically was rejected. An 
interesting intermediate suggestion was not to have one European ratifi cation, but to 
have the different national ratifi cations on one day. (See the proposal made orally by Aus-
trian representative Farnleiter during the debates in Convention of 25 April 2005).
27 The preamble of the Rome Treaty already spoke of ‘an ever-closer union among the peo-
ples of Europe’, whereas art. 137 EEC held that the Assembly would ‘consist of represen-
tatives of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community (…).’ The pream-
ble of the Single European Act spoke of ‘the democratic peoples of Europe’, and that of 
Maastricht of deepening ‘the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their his-
tory, their culture and their traditions’ as well as repeating the desire to ‘to continue the 
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.’ Article B of Maas-
tricht, furthermore, also confi rmed the primary status of Member State nationality, as did 
the duty to ‘respect the national identities of its Member States’ in article F. the Treaty of 
Amsterdam also consistently speaks of the ‘peoples’ in the European Union. Nice does 
not mention the people at all. Even the Constitutional Treaty, perhaps the most unifying 
in its aims and understanding of the EU (see for instance art. 1 speaking of ‘the will of the 
citizens and States of Europe’), retains its basis in multiple peoples. The preamble, for 
instance, still speaks of ‘the peoples of Europe’. See, for further examples, also art. I-3 or 
III-280.
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The absence of a single people is further evidenced by the apparent need for 
alternative foundations for EU authority: as no single people are available, 
and the existing ones must be respected, the question logically becomes 
how to base a polity on multiple demoi.28 Conversely more cynical accounts 
can simply point out that either the EU has to create a single people, or 
should abandon any aspirations of becoming democratic and legitimate.
The conclusion that the EU is not based on one European people does not 
deny existing interconnections between the peoples such as shared history, 
values or long term interests. Nor does it claim anything about the future 
potential for the development of a European people. Similarly the conclu-
sion that the EU is not based on a single people does not deny the increas-
ingly direct connection between the EU and the individual.29 Even though 
it remains a secondary status,30 EU citizenship has developed spectacularly, 
and increasing rights accrue to this ‘primary status’. 31 Different attempts 
have also been made to increase the direct political involvement of EU citi-
zens, from a directly elected European Parliament to a citizens’ initiative.32 
Most fundamentally the lack of a single European people does not deny the 
possibility of a stable, popular, and democratic foundation for the EU. As 
part II of this thesis will develop, a confederal model can contribute precise-
ly to constructing such a basis for the EU from multiple demoi, and through 
a secondary though direct link with these multiple peoples.
The limited claim at this point, however, is only that currently no single 
EU demos exists. Nor, furthermore, does the EU even claim such a basis.33 
Consequently, the EU has not incorporated this most fundamental federate 
modification, which underlies the entire US federate system. On this point 
it remains in the confederal hemisphere, based as it is on the delegation of 
28 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘European democracy and its critics: polity and system’, and ‘To be a Euro-
pean citizen: Eros and civilization’, in: J.H.H. Weiler The Constitution of Europe: Do the New 
Clothes have an Emperor? (CUP 1999), 264, 324, and especially 344 et seq.
29 See also chapter 10 section 3 and chapter 12 on this confederal link between the EU and 
the individual.
30 See however cases C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4239 and C-135/08) Rottmann [2010] 
ECR I-1449 on the limits imposed by EU citizenship on the rights of Member States to 
grant or especially to remove national citizenship, and thereby EU citizenship.
31 See for a spectacular recent example the judgment in Zambrano where to protect citizen-
ship rights even the scope of EU law was broadened, at least arguably so, to include a 
purely internal situation. See cases C-34/09 Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177, as well as its 
rapid containment in cases C-434/09 McCarthy nyr. and C-256/11 Dereci and others nyr.
32 See for a further discussion chapter 10 section 3 and 6.
33 An important fact also for those pointing out that the ‘American People’ were a fi ction at 
the time the federal constitution was adopted. Even if true, this still leaves the vital differ-
ence that the EU does not even make the same normative claim, the obvious factual ques-
tion aside if it would be realistic, or desirable, for it to do so in the foreseeable future.
71The Confederal Comparison
powers by separate, distinct, and normatively superior entities.34 Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, just as the Articles, the consecutive Treaties have always 
been concluded by national delegates, and between the states, and never by 
‘We the people.’
2.2 Foundations: The use of force against the States?
Our second foundational modification concerns the use of force against 
Member States: may the centre use force where necessary to ensure compli-
ance by unruly states?
2.2.1 The use of force under the Articles
Although the Articles granted far-reaching military powers to Congress, 
these were only to be used for the ‘common defence’ of the states against 
external aggression.35 In line with the enduring sovereignty and norma-
tive superiority of the states, the Confederation had no power to use force 
against disobedient states.36 Even though Congress could appoint many of 
the highest officers, one could furthermore doubt whether any of the mili-
tias that formed the US Army at the time would have intervened in another 
state against the will of that state, let alone that militias would have turned 
against their own state.37 Something that of course remained a factor for a 
long time even under the federal constitution.38
34 A conclusion that is not affected by the direct involvement of the people at the EU level, 
for instance via the European Parliament. This involvement does not change the founda-
tion of EU authority, nor does it cross any confederal lines.
35 Art. III of the Articles of Confederation.
36 Cf. also art. II of the Articles of Confederation. Nor, it should be added, did it have the 
capacity. Even during Shays rebellion, which was felt and reported as a real threat, the 
Confederation could not act. Rather, it had to rely on a private force of 4.400 men assem-
bled by Massachusetts governor James Bowdoin, and paid for with 20.000 dollars he had 
managed to raise from private donors. A rather embarrassing episode which greatly 
alarmed those desiring a stronger central government. See for a particularly energetic 
description of Shays rebellion, which formed a real catalyst for further centralization, 
Beeman (2010), 18.
37 Van Tyne (1907), 540. On the other hand in the German Bund the Diet did have the power 
to intervene militarily in a Member State to restore peace and order, and as an ultimate 
remedy to enforce confederal rules. A power which it effectively used several times. See 
art. 26 and 31of the Wiener Schlussakte, but also contributed to the end of the Bund in the 
Austro-Prussian war of 1866. It should also be noted that such enforcement was easier 
against smaller members in the Bund because of the overwhelming relative power of two 
of its members: Austria and Prussia.
38 Famously Robert E. Lee in 1861 rejected command of the Union army after Virginia had 
declared its independence by stating that he was ‘a Virginian fi rst’. As he later wrote to 
his sister in a letter of 20 April, 1861: ‘With all my devotion to the Union and the feeling of 
loyalty and duty of an American citizen, I have not been able to make up my mind to 
raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home. I have therefore resigned my 
commission in the Army, and save in defence of my native State, with the sincere hope 
that my poor services may never be needed, I hope I may never be called on to draw my 
sword.’
72 Chapter 2
2.2.2 Force as a necessary federate backbone
In another fundamental modification the federate government was given 
precisely the power to enforce federal law, if need be by ‘(…) calling forth the 
Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel 
Invasions.’
This power was deemed vital by men like Hamilton, who believed that 
ultimately there could be no law without the backing of force. To create a 
system based on law, therefore, the use of force needed to remain a very 
real option. The right of the centre to use force against the States also under-
scored the normative superiority of the federate government and of the 
whole over the parts. 39 It illustrated that even the militias, who were (and 
as the National Guard are) organized at State level, owe a higher duty of 
loyalty to the whole.40 Consequently, even though force was not intended 
to be frequently used, granting a right to use force significantly impacted on 
the nature of the political union.
2.2.3 The use of force in the EU
It is at this point not even imaginable that the EU would be able to ‘call 
forth’ the British army, or even the légion étrangère, where a Member State 
violates EU law, even though some EU officials might undoubtedly desire it 
at times. The EU clearly does not have the competence, the capacity, nor the 
authority to use force against Member States.41 It has to make do with an 
expeditionary force of lawyers, judges and civil servants.42
As a result, EU enforcement depends heavily on general obedience to 
law and the Member States’ own apparatus for enforcement. Even when 
itself enforcing, the EU either acts through another legal act (be it a decision 
or a judgment), or relies on a Member State.
39 During the Convention Madison even proposed and defended a plan that entailed the 
creation of a unitary state, fully obliterating the states. In his view ‘The general power, 
whatever be its form if its preserves itself, must swallow up the state powers. Otherwise 
it will be swallowed up by them. …two Sovereignties can not co-exist within the same 
limits.’ Considering the development of the central government in the US one could say 
he was not completely wrong. (McDonald (1968), 141).
40 A claim obviously challenged, and defeated, during the civil war.
41 See, however, the failed European Defense Community Treaty, which would have 
brought all troops, with some minor exceptions, under supranational control (art. 1, 8, 9 
and 10), whilst wearing European uniforms! Art. 38 of the EDC, furthermore, also envi-
sioned the development of a political counterpart to the army which would be able to 
constitute ‘(…) one of the elements of an ultimate Federal or confederal structure, based 
upon the principle of the separation of powers and including, particularly, a bicameral 
representative system.’ (my italics). Cf further below chapter 4 section 2.1. on this failed 
experiment, which was nevertheless signed by six, and ratifi ed by four Member States!
42 As will be discussed below, this type of force might also be more effective and suitable for 
the purposes of the EU. See chapter 4 section 4 and chapter 13 section 3 for the particular 
challenge of the EMU crisis in this regard.
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One interesting, and increasingly important, exception to this image of 
EU enforcement concerns the financial power which the Commission, and 
the EU more generally, have gathered through managing large financial 
schemes. Although still dependent on Member States to reclaim or repay any 
sums paid, the Commission, either solely or jointly with other institutions, 
can have the power to grant or not to grant any subsidies or to cancel pay-
ment of any sums due. This financial power is an interesting addition to the 
institutional power of enforcement, and increases in importance alongside 
the financial clout of the EU.43 The 2012 conflict between the Commission 
and Hungary over the amendment of the Hungarian constitution provides 
a clear example. In that conflict cancelling subsidies seemed to have more 
(direct) effect than, for instance, infraction procedures or the distant threat 
of an article 7 TEU procedure.44 Similarly the financial dependence of, for 
instance, Greece or Ireland, or any Member State that will have to rely on 
EU or EU related multilateral aid, greatly increases the leverage of the EU.45 
Interestingly, this financial power has also been an important means for the 
US federate government to increase its power. It can use financial incentives, 
for instance, to influence state actions, even where under the federate scheme 
it is not allowed to intervene directly through legislation or executive com-
mands. Such ‘enforcement through subsidies’ was, on the other hand, not an 
option for the Confederation because it lacked sufficient resources.
Despite this added financial control, however, it must be concluded that, 
as far as the internal use of force is concerned, the EU clearly falls within 
the confederal camp as well. The consequences of this difference between 
confederate and federate organization of force are not that visible in the 
day to day functioning of polities. The federate government, as hoped by 
the founders, almost never has to use force.46 EU law as well is generally 
obeyed even without a credible threat of force. The consequences for the 
ultimate nature and functioning of the polity, however, are significant, and 
will be further discussed below in our general discussion of the comparison 
in chapter five.47
43 See in this regard however section 2.3. below on the relatively small budget of the EU. 
Equally political institutions that are dominated by the Member States, such as the Euro-
pean Council or the Council, may be reluctant to use, or normalize, such forms of pres-
sure.
44 Press release IP/12/24 of 17/01/2012, and the very rapid fi nding of a violation by the 
ECJ in C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary [2012] nyr.
45 Or whoever de facto controls the award of aid and the formulation of the precise condi-
tions. See for a detailed discussion below chapter 13 on the EMU crisis.
46 At least not against the states. Also, federate force has been used at some crucial junc-
tions, most obviously during the civil war, but for instance also during the desegregation 
where the national guard was nationalized.
47 The absence of the right to use force also forms a key reason why the EU cannot be seen 
as a state. Cf for the vital role of force in this regard, including his references to Max 
Weber, Von Bogdandy (2000), 37.
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2.3 Foundations: Taxation and the generation of revenue
The third foundational modification concerns the right to tax or to other-
wise generate independent revenue. A vital power as it empowers the 
centre financially, and creates a direct link between the individual and the 
centre on a key political issue: money.
2.3.1 The problem of revenue under the Articles
The Confederation was not allowed to levy taxes or lay imposts. All such 
direct sources of revenue remained the exclusive domain of the states. 
Congress was allowed, however, to requisition money from the states or 
to borrow sums externally, including by issuing bonds.48 These methods, 
however, proved completely inadequate.49 At one point, secretary of finance 
Morris declared that the system was at the very brink of financial disaster, 
and Washington had to shorten marches because the soldiers literally had 
no shoes. 50
First and foremost this financial failure was caused by the states’ persistent 
refusals to comply with the (binding) requisitions, despite ever more des-
perate and even emotional entreaties from Congress. The States did pay 
some money, but always far less then needed, and just enough to keep the 
48 These confederal bonds might provide one interesting argument on the potential intro-
duction of Eurobonds, also in light of the case law of the BVG.
49 In 1786, for example, Congress only received approximately $371.000, whereas on 1 Janu-
ary 1787 $577.000 was due in interest on outstanding loans alone! As was stated in Con-
gress this was even too little ‘for the bare maintenance of the federal government on the 
most economical establishment, and in times of profound peace.’ In 1789 only the foreign 
debt exceeded $10.000.000, whereas the arrears of interest on the total debt exceeded 
$11.000.000.000. McLaughlin (1971), 65. Madison (Sketch), 8 talks about a ‘calamity’ and 
impending ‘catastrophe’.
50 Morris, previously Superintendent of Finance of the Confederation, informed Congress 
that: ‘all the money now at our command, and which we may expect from the States for 
this two months to come, will not do more than satisfy the various engagements which 
will by that time have fallen due. (…) we can have no right to hope, much less to expect 
the aid of others, while we show so much unwillingness to help ourselves. It can no lon-
ger be a doubt to Congress that our public credit is gone. It was very easy to foresee that 
this would be the case, and it was my particular duty to predict it. This has been done 
repeatedly. I claim no merit from the prediction, because a man must be naturally or wil-
fully blind who could not see that credit can not long be supported without funds.’ (Rob-
ert Morris to Congress, 17 March 1783, in F. Wharton, (ed), The Revolutionary Diplomatic 
Correspondence of the United States (US Government Printing Offi ce 1889), 6:309-310.
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system from collapsing.51 In this way the system of requisitioning, although 
perhaps not inherently flawed, failed to function.52
In turn, the lack of internal revenue frustrated the only other source of 
‘income’ of Congress: borrowing. The new republic received massive finan-
cial support from France and the Netherlands, and issued many bonds. 
Soon, however, it was unable to pay the interest, let alone the principle. 
Since there was no alternative, Congress nevertheless ordered representa-
tives abroad to keep on borrowing, without any foreseeable revenues to pay 
for such loans. It was largely French aid, and afterwards the trust of Dutch 
bankers in the long term solvency of the United States, that kept Congress 
afloat.53
Repeated attempts were made to address this financial weakness in the 
Articles. Despite passionate and skilled arguments from figures as Ham-
ilton, Madison and King, 54 – arguments that could, and sometimes even 
have been used almost verbatim by the European Court of Justice – these 
proposals were all rejected.55 The solution most often proposed, which must 
sound rather familiar to the EU lawyer, was to allow Congress to lay a 5% 
impost to generate its own stable income. At one point this proposal almost 
51 In 1786, for instance, after New York had refused yet another amendment designed 
improve the fi nancial powers of Congress, a Committee of Congress in a public letter to 
New York fl atly described ‘present critical and embarrassed situation of the fi nances of 
the United States (…). Rufus King, a delegate to Congress, stated in a letter that ‘You, my 
dear friend, must know our Situation, ad fully as I do, who am a daily witness of the 
humiliating condition of the Union. You may depend on it, that the Treasury now is liter-
ally without a penny.” (Rufus King to Lebridge Gerry, New York, June 18, 1786 (McDon-
ald, 1968, 46, 49).
52 Especially see E.J. Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 
1776-1790 (University of North Carolina Press 1961), 1-69.
53 The Dutch bankers at one point started buying all US debt they could fi nd, and continued 
credit where no interest had been paid in quite some while. In the last fi ve years Dutch 
bankers, for instance, lend a total sum of $2.296.000 to Congress. A gamble on the even-
tual success of the American enterprise that in the end paid off. McLaughlin (1971), 65.
54 Wood (1969), 111, Jensen (1970), 128 and 174.
55 Preventing expansion of powers via ‘interpretation’ was, on the other hand exactly the 
aim of radicals. A sentiment that might not be unfamiliar to those rejecting the ‘revolu-
tion by interpretation’ of the ECJ was worded by Drayton, when he insisted on a clause in 
the Articles ensuring literal interpretation, so that no one could use the so called ‘spirit of 
the law’ to expand powers of Congress. For when people start looking for the spirit of the 
law, what they fi nd is ‘the result of their good or bad logic; and this will depend on their 
good or bad digestion; on the violence of their passions; on the rank and conditions of the 
parties, or on their connections with Congress; and on all those little circumstances which 
change the appearance of objects in the fl uctuating mind of man.’ The central role of legal 
interpretation both under the later US constitution and in the EU proves the correctness 
of this power of the ‘spirit’ but unfortunately for those who reject it, also its necessity if 
constitutional systems are to function. (Jensen (1970),186).
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made it, yet was sunk by Rhode Island, which feared a ‘tyrant’ were Con-
gress to be given an independent income.56
As Cicero already remarked, however, ‘the veins of war are infinite money’. 
Within that analogy, Congress was forced to fight the entire British Empire 
with severe thrombosis. As a result, the army was not paid for dangerously 
long periods, a coup d’état not far away at some points.57 The most dramatic 
moment in this regard undoubtedly was the ‘Newburgh Conspiracy’ where 
it seems that to a large extent it was only the personal authority and cha-
risma of General Washington that prevented a military coup or rebellion. 
The history of the U.S. would probably have looked very different had he 
followed the encouragement of some, including later founding fathers, to 
use his control of the army to establish a more effective central government 
by force.58
With no money to even pay the army during a war Congress clearly lacked 
the resources to effectively perform other tasks. The weak financial posi-
tion of the Confederation logically became a major source of frustration and 
discontent, and a strong argument against the Confederation and the con-
federal model.
2.3.2 Taxation and revenue in the Federation
Again the federate modifications led to a complete reversal. In addition to 
the powers already found in the Articles, the federate government received 
broad competences to raise revenue. These included the right to establish 
direct taxes.59
“The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, (…); 
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;”60
Considering the importance attached to taxation – the rejection of taxation 
without representation had played an important role in justifying the revo-
lution – this new, general competence of the federation again underscored 
the more centralized nature of the polity created.
56 Rhode Island was then joined by Virginia which retracted its support, since it was afraid 
the proposal would benefi t the North at its detriment. Even such limited proposals as 
giving Congress an income for 25 years only failed as well, as did attempts to give a 
broader interpretation to the existing competences under the Articles.
57 Beeman (2010), 20 et seq.
58 Kohn (1970), 187 and R.H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the 
Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (Free Press 1975), 17-39.
59 L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2nd edn. The Foundation Press 1988), 318.
60 Choper, Fallon, Kamisar and Shiffrin (2006), 112 et seq.
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2.3.3 The generation of revenue in the EU
The EU does not have the power to tax its citizens directly. It does, how-
ever, have ‘financial autonomy’ in the sense that it has ‘own resources’. 61 
By far the largest part of EU income, however, comes from a direct levy on 
the Gross National Income (GNI) of Member States.62 Not surprisingly, seeing 
that money is directly concerned, even this limited autonomous financial 
position of the EU did not come easy, but is the outcome of several battles.
The ECSC had financial autonomy from the start, as it could raise levies 
under article 49 ECSC. With the Merger Treaty this autonomy was partially 
lost. The EEC was primarily financed by contributions from the Member 
States.63 In 1971 the first ‘Own Resources Decision’ entered into force.64 
This reintroduced three primary means for the EU to generate its ‘own’ 
resources: customs duties, agricultural levies and 1% of the VAT levied by 
the Member States.65 Parallel to these own resources the Member States also 
contributed directly to balance the budget, the EU not being allowed to run 
a deficit.66
61 Art. 311 TFEU. See for the current system: Council Decision 2007/436 on the system of 
the European Communities’ own resources, OJ (2007) L 163/17. In line with the funda-
mental importance of the system for generating revenue, these decisions must be 
approved by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements.
62 GNI is defi ned as ‘Gross (or net) national income (at market prices) represents total pri-
mary income receivable by resident institutional units: compensation of employees, taxes 
on production and imports less subsidies, property income (receivable less payable), 
(gross or net) operating surplus and (gross or net) mixed income. Gross national income 
(at market prices) equals GDP minus primary income payable by resident units to non-
resident units plus primary income receivable by resident units from the rest of the 
world. See Council Regulation 2223/96 on the European system of national and regional 
accounts in the Community OJ (1996) L 310/1, point 8.94.
63 Art. 20 EEC. Also see P.J.G. Kapteyn, A.M. McDonnell, K.J.M. Mortelmans and C.W.A. 
Timmermans (eds), The Law of the European Union and the European Communities (4th 
revised edn, Kluwer Law International 2008), 350.
64 Council Decision 70/243 OJ (1970) L 94/19.
65 Additional revenue is generated via fi nes or the income tax on EU offi cials. This accounts 
for less than 1% of the EU budget.
66 Now see art. 310(1) TEU.
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Due to several circumstances, especially the exploding costs of compul-
sory agricultural spending, this system, as well as an expanded version 
under the second Own Resources Decision of 1985, did not yield sufficient 
revenue.67 To close this gap the Delors I Package was adopted in 1988.68 
Embedding the EU’s finances in medium-term financial frameworks of five 
to seven years, this package also modified the system for generating the 
EU’s own resources.69 For instance, the ceiling for financial resources was 
set by a fixed percentage of the EU’s GNI.70 Most importantly, a vital new 
resource was adopted, namely a direct levy on each Member State based on 
its GNI.71 For 2010, for example, the EU budget was €141.5 billion. 12% of 
this money came from customs and sugar levies, 11% from VAT, and 76% 
out of direct contributions72 based on GNI.73
Despite its significant development, therefore, the EU is still overwhelm-
ingly financed by direct contributions from the Member States, even if these 
are now called ‘own resources’. The additional elements of the EU’s own 
resources, furthermore, are collected by the Member States, albeit as agents 
of the Union.74 In a sense the term ‘own resources’ can be confusing in this 
regard. From the constitutional perspective it is better understood as ‘legal-
ly owed to’ the EU in the sense that from the moment the EU’s financial 
claim has been determined the EU is entitled to these funds, and any tinker-
ing with them violates the EU’s rights and financial interests.75
67 Council Decision 85/257 OJ (1985) L 128/15. In addition the system created too big an 
imbalance between Member States that mostly imported agricultural products, and those 
that had a large agricultural sector which profi ted from EU subsidies. This discrepancy, 
for instance, led to the infamous British refund. (See for the fi rst application art. 3 of 
Council Decision 85/257 OJ (1985) L 128/15.
68 See Commission communications ‘The Single European Act: A New Frontier for Europe 
(COM (87)100 Final), and Report on the Financing of the Community Budget (COM (87)101 
Final). See also L. Kolte, ‘The Community Budget: New Principles for Finance, Expendi-
ture Planning and Budget Discipline’ 25 CMLRev (1988), 487.
69 These frameworks are now explicitly mentioned in art. 312 TFEU.
70 Until 2013 this percentage is 1.24%, see art. 3 of Council Decision 2007/436 .In addition 
the maximum contribution of VAT-based own resources has been reduced from 1.4% to 
0.3%, and Member States were allowed to keep 25% of the relevant levies as collection 
costs.
71 Art. 2(1)(c) and 2(5) of Council Decision 2007/436.
72 For comparison, in 1988 the direct contributions accounted for 11% of revenue.
73 For those counting, the other 1% came, as mentioned above, from other sources such as 
fi nes on undertakings for violating EU competition rules, and an income tax on EU civil 
servants. The EU budget is available via: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/biblio/publica-
tions/publications_en.cfm#budget.
74 C.-D Ehlermann, ‘The Financing of the Community: The Distinction between Financial 
Contributions and Own Resources’ 19 CMLRev (1982), 571 et seq.
75 See for instance case C-96/89 Commission v. Netherlands [1991] ECR I-2461.
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Revenue generation of the EU, therefore, comes much closer to that of the 
Confederation than that of the federate government. It largely depends on 
direct contributions and collection efforts from the Member States, whereas 
the EU is not allowed to levy direct taxes, except on its own staff.76 Interest-
ingly a part of EU income is even generated exactly along the lines origi-
nally envisioned by Dickinson, as well as by later proposals to safeguard 
revenue for the American Confederation: via a percentage of imposts sup-
plemented by direct levies. As in the Confederation the EU, therefore, is 
ultimately dependent on the Member States for its income. Consequently, it 
also is threatened by national interest maximization, especially in times of 
recession, and has to deal with – recurrent – political battles over who needs 
to pay how much.77
Nonetheless the financial situation of the EU is far better than that of 
Congress. This is only the case, however, because, unlike under the Articles, 
the EU Member States by and large comply with their financial obligations. 
The EU has, in that regard, not so much modified the confederal system, but 
has managed to make the confederal system work. Obviously it should be 
noted that the system is not without its problems, and more importantly that 
the EU has not had to carry the financial burden of fighting the most power-
ful empire in the world. As a result the EU budget ‘only’ accounts for 1.13% 
of the combined GNI of the Member States. Compared to the percentage 
of GDP that the average western welfare state controls, this is marginal.78 
Either significant increases in the expenditure of the EU, for instance due to 
incorporation of stability mechanisms or increased military costs, or any lon-
76 Proposals have of course been made to grant such a right, for instance during the negotia-
tions on the Maastricht Treaty (Kapteyn & Verloren van Themaat (2008), 366), or by the 
Commission (‘Financing the European Union, Commission report on the operation of the 
own resources system, (COM (2004)505 Final). On 9 August 2010, furthermore, Commis-
sioner Janusz Lewandowski stated to the German Financial Times that he thought the 
time might be ripe for a direct EU tax, for instance on aviation or fi nancial transactions. A 
plan for a fi nancial transaction, or Tobin, tax has already circulated for a while and gained 
momentum in the European Parliament in the beginning of 2011. (non-legislative report 
on ‘Innovative fi nancing’ by Greek Socialist Anni Podimata which was backed by Parlia-
ment's Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee in 1 February 2011and the European 
Parliament resolution of 10 March 2010 on fi nancial transaction taxes (P7_TA(2010)0056). 
None of these plans seems likely to lead to concrete results however. On EU taxes already 
see furthermore S.R.F. Plasschaert, ‘Towards an Own Tax Resource for the European 
Union? Why? How? And When? European Taxation (2004), 470 and P. Cattoir, Tax-Based 
EU Own Resources: An Assessment, European Commission, Taxation Papers Working Paper 
no. 1/2004) (Luxembourg, Offi ce for Offi cial Publications of the European Communities, 
2004), as well as the discussion on EMU in chapter 13 section 3 and 4.
77 The British ‘rebate’ and the Dutch demands are cases in point, see Art. 3-5 of Council 
Decision 2007/436.
78 J. Habermas, The Post-national Constellation (MIT Press 2001), 58 et seq.
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ger period of concerted non-cooperation and non-payment by the Member 
States could seriously undermine the financial functioning of the EU.79
2.4 Foundations: Amendment
The fourth foundational modification concerns the process for amendment. 
Another fundamental issue as it determines how the rules of the game itself 
may be changed, and who needs to agree.
2.4.1 Unanimous amendment of the Articles
As a ‘league’ between sovereign states the Articles could only be amended 
by unanimity. No amendment was valid ‘unless such alteration be agreed to 
in a congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the leg-
islatures of every State.’80 This arrangement reflected the sovereign equality 
of the states. It also ensured that, though they had delegated certain pow-
ers, these powers still rested on their sovereign consent, and could only be 
altered with that same consent. The blocking power this provided to states 
was, furthermore, freely used. The small state of Maryland, for instance, 
blocked several proposed amendments to the Articles even where all other 
states supported them. Rhode Island, not a major power either, felt free to 
do the same.81 The situation of the states thereby resembled that of individ-
uals bound by a contract: they are bound by their promise, but their consent 
is required to alter the terms of the contract. A requirement that both pro-
tects them against one-sided changes by the other parties, yet also ‘traps’ all 
parties into the terms of the agreement unless a change can be unanimously 
decided. 82
79 If such a situation would occur, furthermore, the EU would probably not be able to, like 
the Confederation, to borrow large sums internationally, also seeing how it needs to bal-
ance the budget. Although no explicit competence exists for the EU to borrow funds, 
however, the EU has borrowed before, mainly in relation to the facility to help Member 
States with balance of payment diffi culties (Reg. 332/2002) and the Ortoli facility (see last 
Council Decision 87/182 (OJ (1987) L 71/34), which has not been used after 1991. All of 
these measures were based on art. 352 TFEU, which therefore might also offer possibili-
ties for further activities in this direction. For a discussion of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) and its predecessors, via which Member States underwrite fi nancial 
obligations to collectively raise funds via the market, see chapter 13, section 2.
80 Art. XIII of the Articles of Confederation.
81 Madison (Sketch), 11.
82 On the need for fl exibility and the ‘healing faculty’ of amendment see also Wood (1969), 
34, 533 and 613.
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2.4.2 A federate process for amendment by majority
Article V of the federate constitution significantly modified the rules for 
amendment, again reflecting the move from multiple peoples to one Ameri-
can people:
‘The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 
amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of 
the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, 
shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the 
legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the 
one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided that no amend-
ment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in 
any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and 
that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.’83
The States are constitutionally protected by a requirement of superma-
jority and by some substantive limitations on amendment. Yet only three 
fourths of the States need to ratify in order to amend the Constitution. As 
a result the basic rules of the Union can be altered against the explicit will 
of a State or its population.84 Even more far-reaching, Congress can choose 
for an amendment process via public conventions. In this way Congress can 
sidestep the state legislatures completely, and rely directly on the American 
People, albeit that for this purpose the people are still divided per state. The 
next step, i.e. amendment where three fourths of the people as a whole sup-
port such amendment, was not taken.
Once part of the federate whole, therefore, a State no longer resembles a 
party to a civil contract. Rather it resembles an individual who has become 
a citizen of a single polity: it has rights and privileges within that polity, yet 
the basic rules of that polity can be altered against its will. In this important 
sense they have become subject to a polity and within the limits of the con-
stitution to the majority which may change the basic rules.85 In a way this 
involves the truly political surrender of liberty in the pre-political sense in 
order to become part of a political community.86
83 Especially note the interesting power given to Congress to opt for a ratifi cation by the 
people directly via conventions in each State. An option which further underscores the 
direct basis of the federate government in the people. At the same time this principle was 
not taken so far as to allow Constitutional amendment by three-fourths of the People as a 
whole, indicating the tension between respecting the states, and the concept of one Amer-
ican people.
84 Wood (1969), 532.
85 As Madison noted: ‘the true difference between a league of treaty, and a Constitution’ 
was the difference between ‘a system founded on the legislatures only, and one founded 
in the people’ (Wood, 1969), 533.
86 See on this point more specifi cally the discussion of Rousseau and the federalist logic 
below in chapter 9, section 5.
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In this sense also, the amendment process can be said to form a litmus test 
for political organizations. Obviously formal rules should not overshadow 
the political and social realities in which such amendment rules function. 
Yet a non-unanimous amendment procedure does entail a fundamental 
acceptance by each member of the polity, be they states or individuals, that 
the basic rules of the polity may be altered against their will.87 By accept-
ing amendment by some form of majority a distinct body politic is created, 
one that can act and transform without consent of each party concerned. By 
entering into the Federation, the states, and their sovereign peoples, made 
this fundamental step, and, in return for certain safeguards and influence in 
the political process, subjected themselves to a new, mutable body politic.88
2.4.3 Amending the EU Treaties
Even though the Lisbon Treaty contained some interesting nibbles around 
the edges, the fundamental requirement of unanimity for treaty amendment 
still stands.89 Just as in the previous Treaties the members of the EU have 
not been willing to subject the basic rules of the polity to the will of the 
majority. 90
After Lisbon, five types of Treaty change must be distinguished. Art. 48 
TEU retains the traditional procedure requiring unanimity and ratification 
by each Member State. To this provision Lisbon has added, in principle, the 
standard use of a convention method.91
Art. 48(6) adds a ‘simplified’ procedure, only applicable to part three 
of the Treaty.92 Yet this procedure still requires unanimous ratification by 
all the Member States. Thirdly, modelled after article 48(6) TEU, there are 
some specific simplified amendments, or powers that could be equated 
87 Cf for the EU De Witte (1995), 145.
88 Also see chapter 9 section 5 below.
89 See art. 48 TEU. Also see De Witte (2012), 34-35, including footnote 38.
90 M.P. Maduro, ‘The importance of being called a constitution: Constitutional authority 
and the authority of constitutionalism’ 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2005), 
348. Cf also the discussion by Van Middelaar (2009), 170 et seq, tracing how attempts dur-
ing the European Convention to achieve amendment by some form on majority failed, 
though he also indicates the less visible, and highly modest, shifts towards more ‘collec-
tive’ amendment.
91 Very different from US conventions, these are based on the model of the convention for 
the drafting of the EU constitution, and are concerned with the drafting, not the ratifi ca-
tion of the amendments. See further below chapter 5 on the process of federation.
92 See for an interesting interpretation on the scope of art. 48(6) TEU and the concept of 
expanding competences the judgment by the full court in case C-370/12 Pringle [2013] 
nyr. One could wonder whether a less formal understanding of competence enhance-
ment might not have been in order here.
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with amendment.93 Again, however, almost all of these require unanimity.94 
Several, especially when they entail an increase in competences, also require 
ratification by the Member States.
Fourthly there are the general bridging procedures of art. 48(7) TEU, 
which have a form of reversed ratification as any national parliament may 
object and stop the amendment.
Fifthly, there are the specific bridging procedures. These should be sepa-
rated into procedures where national parliaments have a blocking power95 
and those where they have no such power.96
Lastly, there is the ever-intriguing article 352 TFEU. This provision 
allows the adoption of measures that prove necessary to attain one of the 
objectives of the Treaty, yet for which the (rest) of the Treaties have not pro-
vided the necessary powers. Such measures also require unanimity in the 
Council, but no ratification in the Member States. Now formally art. 352 
TFEU does not provide an amendment procedure. It forms part of the exist-
ing system of delegation of powers, and grants a competence to the EU 
where its conditions are met. At the same time art. 352 TFEU does introduce 
a further measure of ‘open-endedness’ to the competences of the Union. 
After all it provides a competence precisely in those cases where the Treaty, 
or at least all other parts of the Treaty, do not provide for one. As such it 
93 Being art, 42.2 TEU (defence), art. 25.2 TFEU (Extension rights citizen Union), art. 64 (3) 
TFEU (Reducing Acquis capital), art. 77(3)TFEU, Art. 83(1), art. 86 (4) (which is a very 
interesting one as true amendment seems involved), Art. 98 and 107 TFEU allowing to 
scrap an article, Art. 126(14) TFEU protocol on excessive defi cit to be replaced by unani-
mous Council decision, art. 129(3-4) (Protocol on Statute of ECB, parts may be amended 
via ordinary procedure), art. 218.8 TFEU (Accession ECHR), art. 223.1 (Uniform proce-
dure election EP), art. 262 TFEU (IP rights), art. 281 (Statute of the Court of Justice, proto-
col changed by ordinary procedure), art. 308 TFEU (statute of the European investment 
bank, which is a protocol, may be amended by the Council), art. 311 TFEU (own resourc-
es of EU). Some converse situations exist as well, where a piece of secondary legislation is 
given Constitutional protection. See art. 346(2) TFEU and art. 355(6) TFEU where the ter-
ritorial scope may be changed with regards some of the external territories.
94 Except for art. 129(3) and (4) TFEU, and art. 281 TFEU.
95 Art. (31(3) TEU (CFSP), art. 81(3) TFEU (special procedure family law may be trans-
formed into ordinary legislative procedure).
96 Art. 153(b) TFEU, (special procedure may be changed to ordinary procedure by unani-
mous Council decision), art. 192 (2) (Environment, the Council may, unanimously and on 
a proposal from the Commission, declare the ordinary legislative procedure applicable), 
art. 312(2) TFEU (the European Council may change the unanimity requirement for the 
multi-annual framework to QMV), art. 333 TFEU (where the treaty normally requires 
unanimity, the Council may unanimously decide that in case of closer cooperation only 
QMV is required).
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treated by some, including the Bundesverfassungsgericht, as a limited form of 
amendment as well.97
Over its development the EU has, therefore, introduced some flexibility 
in its rules for amendment.98 Especially some ‘procedural’ steps, such as a 
transition to QMV in certain prescribed fields of competence, can now be 
taken without a full amendment process. Unanimity is, nevertheless, virtu-
ally always required for any amendment, whereas more substantial Treaty 
reform will always require unanimous ratification by all Member States as 
well. It should also not be forgotten that all ‘lighter’ procedures for amend-
ment, such as the bridging procedures, are based on formal, unanimous and 
ratified Treaty amendments themselves, and are quite specific.
As such, it should be wondered why a two-stage procedure for shift-
ing to QMV, – ‘only’ requiring a unanimous decision of the Council in the 
second stage but based on an ordinary Treaty amendment in the first stage 
– protects the powers of the Member States any less than a one-stage proce-
dure where the decision to switch to QMV is made directly. As long as the 
simplified procedures only concern very specifically delineated steps, and 
do not provide a more open-ended power to change the Treaty and increase 
competences, such simplified procedures do not fundamentally alter the 
requirement of unanimity for changes to the constitutional foundation of 
the Union. In fact one could say that all these ‘lighter procedures are in fact 
more stringent and arduous forms of two-tier amendment, requiring first 
a full and formal Treaty amendment, and then, in addition, a unanimous 
Council decision.
On the whole, therefore, the EU has maintained a requirement of unanim-
ity for amendment. A situation that also matches the absence of a single 
and supreme European body politic, such as a European people, to justify 
amendment against the will of a Member State or a member people.99 As 
long as that body politic is not assumed or created, simplification of amend-
97 See especially its Lissabon Urteil of 30 June 2009, BVerfGE, 2 BvE 2/08. On the other hand 
also see Opinion 2/94 Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights [2006] ECR 
I-929, and the limits imposed by the Court of Justice therein. Further see Weiler (1999), 
54-55.: ‘No sphere of the material competence could be excluded from the Community 
acting under art. 235.’
98 Such variation in the rules for amendment are quire common in federal systems, espe-
cially where different rules apply to changes that affect the federal division of power and 
changes that do not and therefore have a lesser impact on the overall system. See for 
instance the fi ve different procedures for amendment in the Canadian Constitution Act 
1982 (sections 38 to 49).
99 Maduro (2005), 348 and p. 353. See also A. von Bogdandy, ‘The Preamble’, in: B. de Witte 
(ed), Ten refl ections on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe (Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies 2003), 4 and 6.
85The Confederal Comparison
ment procedures can only work around the edges of unanimity, but never 
cross the Rubicon of amendment by qualified majority.100
Consequently it can only be concluded that on the point of amendment 
the EU again falls more into the confederate camp, although modifications 
have been made.101 As a result the process of Treaty change can be particu-
larly burdensome, and seems to have become ever more so as the Union 
expanded.102 The recent Lisbon Saga is a stark reminder. Time wise it took 
more than a decade, especially if on sees Nice as the de facto starting point. 
In terms of legitimacy and popularity the cost might have been even more 
impressive.103 In a Union with so many members, the ‘protection’ that una-
nimity supposedly grants to the Member States demands an increasing toll 
in the form of deadlock, compromise and decreased legitimacy.104
Nevertheless, the overall effects of this principally confederal system for 
amendment seem to have been far less restrictive for the development of the 
EU than they were for the American Confederation. Over the past years the 
EU has developed impressively, adapting far better than the Articles to new 
challenges and developments. As will be discussed further below, it seems 
that several other modifications to the EU system, on a less fundamental 
level, may have ‘compensated’ in this regard. Elements such as the broad 
doctrine of implied powers, including the use of article 352 TFEU and its 
predecessors, as well as the role of the Court of Justice with its teleological 
interpretation of the Treaties.105 The American Confederation lacked most 
of these compensatory mechanisms. Clearly this raises interesting ques-
tions on, amongst other things, the necessity of more flexible amendment 
procedures, the viability and legitimacy of modified confederal system, or 
whether the federate rule of modification by majority is actually as pivotal 
for practice as it is for theory and self-perception.
100 On the fl ip side, this of course also means that amendment by majority, if ever adopted, 
would be a fundamental step. It would imply the existence of some European polity, 
some body politic with suffi cient authority over the different member peoples to change 
the basics of political organization against their will. A point that should be taken into 
consideration by those who all too easily wanted to circumvent the Irish no by pointing 
to the overwhelming majority of EU citizens that ‘supported’ Lisbon (or had not had a 
chance to express opposition).
101 Also see Van Middelaar (2009), 148 et seq. for the role of the middle space in this regard.
102 Cf the ‘joint decision trap’ in F. Scharpf, ‘The Joint Decision-Trap: Lessons from German 
Federalism and European Integration’, 66 Public Administration (1998), 238.
103 M. Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, not Hearts’ 45 CMLRev (2008), 
617.
104 On the limited protection unanimity offers see further below, chapter 12 section 2.
105 Cf Watts (1999), 102-104 on the common role played by federal courts in this regard.
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2.5 Foundations: Secession
Two specific forms of amendment form the last two foundational points to 
be discussed, being the possibility of secession and the rules for enlarge-
ment. The comparison will first look at secession: can a state secede from 
the compact formed, or has it fully and irreversibly merged with a larger 
body politic, granting a right to the larger body to refuse any part the right 
to secede?
2.5.1 The possibility of secession under the Articles
The Articles did not discuss secession. On the one hand, therefore, one 
could argue that secession was hence allowed, especially as art. II of the 
Articles held that each state retained ‘(…) every power, jurisdiction, and 
right,’ which was not ‘expressly delegated’. A right of exit would also fit 
with the sovereign status of the states.
On the other hand, the Articles were titled the ‘Articles of Confedera-
tion and Perpetual Union’, and art. XIII of the Articles determined that ‘(…) 
the Union shall be perpetual (…)’, supporting the argument that secession 
was not allowed.106
No state, however, tried to secede, so we have no legal or political determi-
nation to authoritatively settle this question. On the other hand there was 
the related legal question whether a group of states could leave the Confed-
eration to jointly form a federation, and if they could do so even where not 
all states ratified the new constitution. Subsuming yourself in a new Union, 
the obligations of which are incompatible with the obligations under the 
Articles, should after all be qualified as a form of secession. In Philadelphia 
it was agreed that the new federate constitution could indeed come into 
force after ratification by nine states only. A rule which implicitly assumed 
the right of these nine states to secede, and indicates that, at least for this 
purpose and for this majority, secession was deemed possible. A conclusion 
that is especially noteworthy because the Articles expressly prohibited the 
states to join other Unions. 107
106 In the last section, describing the ratifi cation by the states, the word perpetual is repeated 
three times. Two times because the full name of the Articles are repeated, one time reaf-
fi rming the language of art. XIII of the Articles.
107 Of course one could read the draft Constitution as already constituting a treaty between 
the states. Alternatively one could construe the rules for amendment agreed in the draft 
Constitution as a separate agreement in parallel to the draft constitution. This separate 
agreement would than have granted a right of secession which did not exist before, and 
for the limited purpose of forming a federation only. These are both, however, rather 
unlikely readings, also because the states were only formally bound by the Philadelphia 
draft, or any part thereof, after ratifi cation, and hence accession to the new Union. The 
delegates at Philadelphia also did not have any formal power to conclude such a ‘side 
agreement’ on accession.
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The majority transition to a federation, together with the emphasis on state 
sovereignty in the Articles and the fact that in the latter days of the Con-
federation many states no longer sent delegates and violated the Articles at 
will therefore suggest that ultimately little could or would have been done 
if a state had chosen to secede. As with amendment, furthermore, there was 
no higher body politic to prohibit secession, or to legitimate the use force 
to prevent a state from seceding. Taking into account both the Articles and 
the context in which they functioned, it would therefore seem reasonable to 
assume that secession was legally possible, even though the political conse-
quences that actual secession would have entailed are difficult to ascertain.
2.5.2 The eventual impossibility of secession under the federate Constitution
Instead of secession all states ultimately ratified the federal constitution. As 
such they all, reciprocally, ended their membership of the Confederation to 
become part of the United States.108 The new constitution did not expressly 
deal with secession either. Nor did it, in fact, declare itself to be perpetual, 
as the Articles did.109 A far stronger and more centralized Union was cre-
ated, however. One which was no longer based on the states but on one 
sovereign American people.
As the will of this sovereign people, furthermore, the Constitution was 
the supreme law of the land. Art. IV, s. 3 thereby prohibited the creation of 
new states within existing states, as well as states joining together into one 
new state without consent of Congress. This indicates that Congress at least 
had the exclusive competence to decide in cases of splitting or merging of 
states. Section 4 of article IV, furthermore, stated that:
‘The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican 
form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and 
on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature 
cannot be convened) against domestic violence.’
A provision that gives direct power to intervene, even militarily, in the inter-
nal organization of a state where ‘republican’ government was threatened, 
or in any event the central government considered it to be. In addition, Art. 
V required all members of the state legislatures, as well as all state execu-
tive and judicial officers to be bound by oath or affirmation to the federal 
constitution, underscoring that their loyalty to the whole surpassed that to 
the part.
108 Kesavan (2002), 35, and Lawson and Seidman (2001).
109 Although it is directed at ‘posterity’ as well, indicating a long term intention.
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Without presuming in any way to settle this heatedly debated issue,110 on 
balance these provisions seem to suggest that a right to secession was not 
expressly envisioned under the Constitution. As is well known, however, 
this question was ultimately decided by force.111 With the southern States’ 
claim to secession defeated, a national understanding of the constitution tri-
umphed. Incidental claims and hopes aside, it is now clear that states can-
not legally secede, or at least that the United States, representing a unified 
American people, have the right to prevent any one part of separating from 
the whole.112
2.5.3 Secession from the EU
Since Lisbon the right of a Member State to secede is explicitly acknowl-
edged in art. 50 TEU:
‘1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its 
intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union 
shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements 
for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the 
Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Trea-
ty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the 
Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force 
of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to 
in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State con-
cerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.’113
110 See for a highpoint, both theoretically and rhetorically, the debate between D. Webster 
and J.C. Calhoun. Here Calhoun provided a highly refi ned defense for a confederal read-
ing of the Constitution, even though in the end the more federate understanding of Web-
ster better refl ected and informed reality, and also seemed to require less legal and con-
ceptual creativity. See for the arguments of Webster: E. Everett (ed), The Works of Daniel 
Webster (Little, Brown and company 1853), especially p. 328-346 and 464-486. For Cal-
houn see R.K. Crallé (ed), John C. Calhoun: Works (Appleton and Co 1968), especially 1-36 
and 113-138.
111 For the later legal assessment by the US Supreme Court that the States indeed did no 
have the right to secede see the judgment in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869).
112 Tribe (1988), 5 et seq.
113 One interesting, admittedly theoretical, question here is what the effects would be of a 
national court fi nding the accession itself in violation of the national constitution an 
annulling that act of accession.
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Not only is this right unequivocal, it is ultimately unilateral: even where no 
agreement is reached, a Member State can secede. The remaining Member 
States cannot prevent withdrawal by endlessly blocking a secession-trea-
ty.114
It is of course accepted that any such immediate withdrawal is unlike-
ly. Most fundamentally continued membership cannot and does not rest 
on legal obligation alone. It must primarily rests on the many benefits that 
membership brings and the costs that an exit would entail. Even where a 
Member State would like to secede, furthermore, it would have every inter-
est in carefully negotiating its post-secession relation to the EU and its mar-
ket. Lastly one should also not underestimate the sheer legal complexity of 
secession.115 At the same time this does not take away the ultimate author-
ity of the individual Member States to unilaterally secede where they are 
willing to assume the costs and risks. Even the period of two years required 
by Article 50 TEU can be relativized in that regard; the EU will simply have 
very little options where a Member State announces its immediate with-
drawal. It would have to fall back on the traditional instruments of interna-
tional law to sanction any perceived violation of Article 50 TEU.
What is more, Article 50 TEU only formalizes and details the already 
existing right to secede under the previous Treaties.116 Even though the 
Treaty did not mention it, and though the EU has also been established for 
an unlimited period,117 it would have been inconceivable for the EU to keep 
a Member State inside the Union against its will, let alone to use force to 
prevent secession.118 Lack of army, police and legitimacy aside, such action 
114 See for further arguments on the – ultimately – unilateral nature of this right also J. 
Herbst, ‘Observation on the Right to Withdraw from the European Union: Who are the 
‘Masters of the Treaties’?’ 6 German Law Journal (2005), 1755 and A.F. Tatham, ‘“Don’t 
Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!’: EU Accession and Withdrawal after Lisbon’, 
in: A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout and S. Ripley (eds), EU Law After Lisbon (OUP 2012), 128, espe-
cially on 152. For a more limited, but also less convincing, reading of Article 50 TEU see 
A. Lazowski, ‘Withdrawal from the European Union and alternatives to membership’, 37 
European Law Review (2012), 527, who does seem to rely on unilateral withdrawal as an 
intended and necessary threat to prevent secession negotiations from stalling, yet then 
rejects the possibility of such unilateral withdrawal. The simple fact remains that Article 
50 TEU does provide for a two year period, which period looses all relevance and mean-
ing under the interpretation suggested by Lazowski.
115 See for an overview and discussion of these many diffi culties Lazowski (2012), 523.
116 A right of exit was also assumed in paragraph 55 of the Maastricht Urteil of the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht (BVerfGE 89, 155). Equally Greenland was allowed to leave the European 
Community after it acquired home rule from Denmark. See F. Weiss, ‘Greenland’s With-
drawal from the European Communities’ 10 European Law Review (1985), 173. Further see 
supra note 366.
117 Art. 53 TEU.
118 Note however, that an explicit provision for secession was discussed for the Treaty or 
Rome, but rejected. See Van Middelaar (2009), 226.
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would directly violate the EU’s own foundation in the right to self-determi-
nation and the prevention of war.119
On the possibility of secession, therefore, the EU again conforms to a con-
federal set up. It grants an explicit right to secede, which is a right no fed-
eration explicitly recognizes, let alone in such a unilateral way.120 As the 
Confederation, therefore, the EU does not form a united body politic, supe-
rior to the Member States. The basic rules of association may not be altered 
except by unanimity, and the whole does not have the power to keep the 
parts within the Union against their will. The EU is not supreme over the 
Member States when it comes to fundamental political authority. This also 
leaves the Member States with one form of ‘ultimate authority’: leaving the 
EU. Practically limited and unappealing as this may be, it is important for 
the ultimate nature of the polity.121
2.6 Foundations: Expanding the Union
The last foundational modification in our comparative grid concerns the 
accession of new members to the Union. Interestingly, all three polities 
under comparison here envisioned some form of enlargement. They did not 
consider their geographical scope at the time of creation as permanent, but 
aimed to expand, albeit of course under very different circumstances and 
with different aims.
2.6.1 Accession under the Articles
Art. XI of the Articles provided for the accession of new states to the Con-
federation:
119 Art. 2 and 3(5) TEU. On the other hand an interesting (if theoretical) conundrum would 
perhaps occur where the decision by a Member State to withdraw would go against the 
explicit desire of a majority of its own citizens (and still European citizens). In that regard 
one could even wonder if such a violation of their EU citizenship rights could trigger an 
art. 7 TEU procedure, taking away that states right perhaps to exercise its right under art. 
50 TEU, at least under EU law, a Rottmann case writ rather large so to speak, perhaps 
linked to the independent ‘substance’ of EU citizenship recognized in Zambrano (see cas-
es C-135/08 Rottmann and C-34/09 Zambrano). This question closely relates to the under-
lying question on the relation between the Member State and it people, as will be further 
discussed in part II on confederal sovereignty.
120 Watts (1999), 108. In 1998, however, the Canadian Supreme Court did recognize a ‘right’ 
for Quebec to secede, albeit not unilaterally, and leaving the precise requirements rather 
vague.
121 As the example of Czechoslovakia shows, furthermore, despite its unique context, is the 
rapidity with which decisions to separate can be taken. Cf. Watts (1999), 31-32. The 
increasing discussion on a ‘stay or go’ referendum in the UK also underscores the politi-
cal relevance and energy of this option. An energy that, as in Czechoslovakia, may be 
hard to contain once released. See on the increasing role of such referenda as a symptom 
of the confederal system developed in the EU further below part III.
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‘Canada acceding to this confederation, and adjoining in the measures of the United States, 
shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony 
shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States.’
Canada, still a British Colony at the time by the way, received an open invi-
tation, which it never accepted. All other applicants needed the support of 
at least nine existing states. This clause especially envisioned new states 
that would be formed on the vast unsettled lands. Once settlements would 
have reached a sufficient size, they could apply for statehood and member-
ship.122 A possibility that relates to one of the most crucial achievements of 
the Confederation, the land ordinance.123 In this ordinance it was decided 
that all western lands were transferred to the central government, and could 
be developed into new states.124 This required a significant sacrifice from 
‘landed’ states such as Virginia that had claims stretching all the way to the 
West Coast. It enabled the development of the United States as we know 
it, with a multitude of states, none of which, furthermore, has become so 
dominant as to upset the federal functioning of the Union.125 Even so no 
new states were formed during the life of the Confederation.
2.6.2 Accession under the Federation
The land ordinance also formed the basis for the federate rules on accession. 
Article IV s.3. determined that Congress could allow new states into the 
Union. This clause specifically envisioned new states being constituted by 
settlers of the western lands that had been ceded by the states to the central 
government under the Confederation. It was a fundamental step to allow 
these territories to develop into full and equal States, and not as some type 
of federate lands under the ultimate control of the original thirteen states.126
Congress only needed a normal majority to allow a new state into the 
Union, and no ratification by the existing States was needed at all. Acces-
sion thereby became easier by eliminating the QMV requirement under the 
Articles. It also became an exclusive competence of the central government, 
with only the Senate representing the States, even though the accession of 
122 P. S. Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States 
1775-1787 (University of Pennsylvania Press 1983).
123 McDonald (1968), 76.
124 Cf in this regard also the importance of shared and co-governed lands for the stability of 
the old Swiss Confederation and the United Provinces of the Netherlands, as discussed in 
Forsyth (1981), 21, 30.
125 Although the differences between states in terms of economy, size, and population can be 
enormous, for instance looking at the difference between California and Wyoming.
126 The political consequences, and the future importance and political power of the West 
that this entailed were perceived and accepted. One could draw a tentative, comparison 
here with the accession of new states into the EU, and the attempt to include permanent 
safeguard clauses, de facto violating some of the core principles underlying the polity 
itself. Cf. C. Hillion, You cannot have your cake and eat it!: the limits to Member States' discre-
tion in EU enlargement negotiations (Inaugural lecture Leiden University 2006).
92 Chapter 2
new States would obviously impact on the position and power of existing 
States within the Union.127 The possibility for accession has been actively 
used, Hawaii becoming the fiftieth state on August 20th, 1959.
2.6.3 Accession to the EU
As for the EU, the consecutive Treaties have always envisaged the acces-
sion of new members.128 An option that has been intensively used, and has 
had a major impact on the nature and development of the EU.129 It has now 
grown from six to twenty-seven members, Croatia probably soon to be the 
28th.130
‘Unsettled’ lands being in rather short supply these days, accession always 
concerns an existing, established state.131 Any state that wishes to join may 
request membership from the Council.132 The Council must then decide 
by unanimity on such a request, consult the Commission, and receive the 
assent of an ordinary majority of the European Parliament. If these require-
ments are met, an accession agreement will be negotiated with the applicant, 
the Commission usually taking the lead in these negotiations. Any agree-
ment reached needs to be ratified unanimously by all the Member States.133 
Consequently, membership requires a unanimous Council decision,
127 Further strengthening the federate nature of accession, as well as affi rming accession as a 
process covered by the Constitution and under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, see 
Coyle v Smith, (1911) 221 US 559, as discussed in Hillion (2011), 214.
128 Art. 237 of the Treaty of Rome already held that ‘any European state may apply to become 
a member of the Community’. It is interesting though that this option might have been 
included an a rather accidental, or at least casual, manner. On drafting the Schuman dec-
laration Monnet remarks ‘For a time, undoubtedly, I thought that the fi rst step towards a 
European federation would be union between these two countries only [France and Ger-
many], and that the others would join later. Finally, that evening, I wrote on this fi rst ver-
sion that the Authority would be ‘open to the participation of the other countries of 
Europe.’ (Monnet (1978), 296.
129 See for an overview and analysis, including of the ‘enlargement fatigue’ the may have 
arisen by now, C. Hillion, ‘EU Enlargement’, in: P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds): The Evolu-
tion of EU Law (2nd edn,. OUP 2011), 187 et seq.
130 On 30 June 2011 accession negotiations with Croatia were closed, on 7 November 2011 the 
accession Treaty was signed and accession is foreseen for 1 July 2013.
131 Statehood actually being one of the requirements for membership. Interestingly, howev-
er, the EU does try to exert a similar infl uence on the acceding state to acquire a ‘republi-
can’ government through the criteria for accession and the monitoring by the Commis-
sion of inter alia rule of law demands. On the effectiveness however see: D. Kochenov, EU 
enlargement and the failure of conditionality: pre-accession conditionality in the fi elds of demo-
cracy and the Rule of Law (Kluwer Law International 2008).
132 See, reaffi rming this notion even in the face of impressive enlargement to the East, the 
1992 European Council Conclusions (EC Bulletin 6-1992,1.4.) together with the conditions 
established for such accession in Copenhagen the next year. See also K.E. Smith, ‘The 
Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality’, in: M. Cremona (ed), The 
enlargement of the European Union (OUP 2003), 105 et seq.
133 Art. 49 TEU.
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a majority of the European Parliament, and unanimous ratification of the 
accession treaty by all the Member States. Increasingly, furthermore, pro-
posals are made in several Member States to require a (binding) national 
referendum in the case of enlargement.
Even though interesting and important changes have been made to the 
process for accession since Rome, including the inclusion of the European 
Parliament, the expansion of the role of the European Commission and the 
addition of more substantive criteria for membership including the devel-
opment of an entire pre-accession strategy and accession-partnerships, the 
process for accession has always required unanimous agreement at the EU 
level, and subsequent ratification by all Member States.134 A far heavier pro-
cess than under the Confederation and the Federation, and clearly not as 
centralized as accession to the Federation.135 Even though the Treaty mech-
anism for accession only forms the tip of a procedural iceberg, and even 
though the institutions are heavily involved, accession ultimately remains 
a process dominated by the Member States,136 each one having a veto at 
numerous stages in the procedure.137
134 Cf art. 237 of the Treaty of Rome (EEC), as well as art. 205 of the EAEC.
135 Here one may even note a certain imbalance in the process. From the perspective of the 
acceding state the process may well seem more federate. It is expected to meet a wide 
range of far-reaching and relatively non-negotionable criteria. Equally it must undergo at 
least some form of submission to the process of accession set by the EU that could be per-
ceived as federate in nature. In any event the process of accession is somewhat removed 
from a ‘normal’ negotiation between formally equal sovereign parties. At the same time 
the existing Member States retain their confederal right to block accession even after the 
federate process has been accepted and completed by the candidate state. There is no 
federate central authority that can guarantee membership. In a sense the existing Mem-
ber States thereby have the best of both worlds: a near federate procedural submission of 
the candidate, and a confederal control over accession to boot. An imbalance that of 
course also refl ects the power imbalance between a unifi ed block of states and a single 
candidate.
136 Hillion (2011), 199 et seq, 208.
137 For example, accession is now subdivided into 35 separate chapters. Both the opening 
and the closing of each chapter requires unanimity. In addition, Member States now also 
need to unanimously approve the relevant benchmarks for negotiations on each chapter, 
and need to unanimously evaluate their fulfi llment. These decisions alone, therefore, 
already provide over 140 individual points, depending on the specifi c number of bench-
marks, in the accession negotiation where each Member State can block any accession. 
For further examples see Hillion (2001), 206 et seq. Note however, that accession to the 
ECSC was less burdensome than accession to the E(EC) or EU, albeit still more burden-
some than acceding to the the Confederation. Article 98 ECSC ‘only’ required a unani-
mous vote from the Council with the consent of the High Authority. Equally Article 
116(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Political Community also did not require 
separate agreement of the Member States, but only their unanimous consenst within the 
Council of National Ministers, as well as a proposal from the European Executive Coun-
cil and the Parliament of the Community. A more federate and centralized procedure for 
enlargement that matched the political ambition of this failed treaty.
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All the same, the Confederation, the Federation and the EU all had an 
explicit goal to peacefully expand on ‘their’ continent by incorporating 
additional polities, something not often seen in ‘normal’ states.138 Although 
it no longer seems to wish to expand, the Federal constitution of the US has 
the least burdensome and most centralized procedure, requiring no consent 
from its States. This again underlines the fundamental shift to one nation 
and one body politic. New members give up their own sovereignty and are 
subsumed in the larger whole. Something exemplified, for instance, by the 
accession of California and Texas. Both gave up independent statehood, and 
became part of the American polity, and the American People. The Confed-
eration showed a reverse picture: principal authority resided in the states, 
which pooled this authority to a limited extent in the central government. 
As such the states, via their representatives in Congress, decided on enlarge-
ment, with a more stringent requirement of QMV applying.
In the EU, the procedure for accession is even more burdensome than 
under the Confederation. Member States have a far greater influence with a 
score of veto’s along the way. EU institutions are equally capable of block-
ing accession, although their independent role within accession also forms 
one more federal element in the entire process.139 As with amendment 
and secession, therefore, on this fundamental point the EU predominantly 
remains in the confederal side of the spectrum. Since accession forms an 
amendment of the Treaty, often changing the position of each Member State 
and the overall balance within the EU, it is not surprising that the same 
basic rules apply to enlargement as to amendment.140 Nevertheless this pro-
cedure for accession again underscores that there is no unified body politic, 
and that the Member States remain the primary repositories of the Member 
People’s sovereignty.141
138 Even though the US currently no longer have real intentions of expanding, and the EU is 
discussing, and perhaps, approaching, its ultimate limits as well.
139 Also note in this regard what Hillion has termed a ‘creeping (re)nationalization of the 
procedure’ of enlargement, and the different ways in which the ‘state-centrism’ of the 
enlargement process ‘as enshrined in the Treaty’ has further been ‘infl ated in practice.’ 
Hillion (2011), 187-188.
140 Although the role of the institutions is now much more pronounced and elaborate in the 
context of accession than it is in the context of amendment.
141 As new members will not be subsumed into an overarching and primary federate Union, 
but be included in a confederal Union that might be signifi cantly altered by that acces-
sion, such more stringent procedures might also be expected On the possible impact of 
accession to the EU in this regard see G. Majone, ‘Unity in Diversity: European Integra-
tion and the Enlargement Process’ 22 European Law Review (2008), 457, who for instance 
goes into the possibility of subgroups developing (470 et seq).
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2.7 Sub-conclusion foundational modifications
Combining the individual comparisons on these foundational modifica-
tions one clear conclusion can be drawn: on the fundamentals the EU scores 
much closer to the confederal system under the Articles than to the US fed-
erate system. It lacks the ultimate normative authority of one people as it is 
based on the consent of multiple peoples and their states. It does not have 
the right to use force, tax, or amend its own constitutional charter by majori-
ty. On the points of secession and enlargement it is even more state-oriented 
than the US Confederation was, albeit that especially in the context of acces-
sion EU institutions have assumed a central position as well.142 Clearly no 
federate leap has yet been taken on these foundational points.
3 Structural elements and modifications: Direct, separate and 
supreme government
The second category to be compared concerns those modifications grouped 
here as ‘structural’. Continuing the format established above, the EU will 
be compared against three such structural modifications relating to legal 
supremacy, direct effect and separate government. Considering their interrela-
tion, supremacy and direct effect will be discussed together. As will be seen, 
on these structural points, which of course carry fundamental implications, 
the EU has gone much further in incorporating the federate modifications.
3.1 Structure: Legal supremacy and direct effect
The first structural modifications concern the nature and effect of central 
laws. Can such laws be directly invoked within the legal orders of the states, 
and/or do they trump national laws when invoked? Questions that are not 
wholly unfamiliar to debates on EU law.
3.1.1 The lack of legal supremacy and limited direct effect in the Confederation
Confederal law lacked the attributes of general direct effect and absolute 
legal supremacy. Article XIII of the Articles did determine that:
‘Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress assembled, 
on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this 
Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State (…);’
142 This also in the context of pre-accession. This role has certainly added a federate element 
to these fi elds, for instance by empowering these institutions to actively engage with 
state building in candidate members, though it has not removed the ultimate, and resur-
gent, control of the Member States in these matters. Cf Hillion (20110), 193 et seq.
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Clearly the states were legally obligated to respect the Articles and the acts 
of Congress. The Articles did not however, grant general direct effect or 
legal supremacy to confederal law, nor was there was a central court that 
could do so.143 Attempts in Congress to establish general direct effect and 
supremacy, either through interpretation or amendment, failed. This despite 
the fact that the notions of supremacy and direct effect, even for an ‘external’ 
legal source, were known, and in some cases also applied. The Dickinson 
draft, for instance, had explicitly proposed to grant legal supremacy to the 
Articles.144 Some states, furthermore, did recognize the peace treaty with 
Great Britain as the ‘supreme law of the land.’145 The same status, however, 
was not to be accorded to the Articles.
It is important to note, however, that the absence of general direct effect and 
supremacy did not mean that the Articles never operated on the citizens 
directly, that the notion of direct effect was unknown, 146 or that the Confed-
eration never had the last word.147 Congress, for instance, was competent 
to establish ‘rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or water 
shall be legal and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the 
service of the United States shall be divided or appropriated.’148 In addition, 
Congress alone could grant ‘letters of marque and reprisal’, appoint ‘courts 
for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas’, and for 
‘receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures.’149 Con-
gress could also settle certain claims between individuals, determine the 
value of alloy and coin, harmonize standards of weights and measures and 
directly regulate for the armed forces.150 All measures that directly affected 
individual citizens.151
143 Interestingly the Union of Utrecht, underlying the United Provinces of the Netherlands, 
did allude to some form of supremacy where it declared in art. 23 that any act violating 
the confederal pact would be ‘null, void and invalid’ (Ende zoeverre yetwes by yemande ter 
contrarie gedaen ofte geattenteert worde, tzelve verclaren siluyden van nu alsdan nul, egeen ende 
van onweerden). In reality, however, and probably also related to the lack of a court and a 
suffi ciently strong rule of law, this supremacy did not develop. Cf also Forsyth (1981), 34.
144 Jensen (1970),174. The New Jersey plan later proposed by Patterson at Philadelphia also 
explicitly granted supremacy to what would remain Confederal Law, see further below.
145 Cf Jensen (1970), 279-281.
146 Wood (1969), 460.
147 Backer (2001), 224 (noting that even more ‘international” organizations than the EU have 
received the power to ‘directly affect an individual’, traditionally reserved to national 
sovereign powers.
148 Art. IX Articles of Confederation.
149 Art. XI Articles of Confederation.
150 Art. IX Articles of Confederation.
151 See for the explicit recognition of this direct effect also Federalist Paper no. 33.
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These forms of direct operation and directly applicable rules might be lim-
ited, but demonstrate that a confederal system is not incompatible with the 
concept of direct effect (or supremacy) as such. This possibility for direct 
effect and supremacy, hallmarks of supranationalism, in a confederal sys-
tem must be stressed. For, put differently, it shows how confederation and 
Intergovernmentalism do not coincide, nor are confederation and suprana-
tionalism mutually exclusive.152 The, often implicit, equation in EU discourse 
between federate and supranational, and confederal and intergovernmental 
is, therefore, wrong and misleading.153
Nevertheless these limited areas of direct effect under the Articles generally 
left implementation at the mercy of the states. Since many of these lacked 
efficient executives as well, and since the short term interests of the states 
often prevailed over more long term and shared interests of the Confed-
eration as a whole, the Articles suffered from a severe ‘compliance-gap’. 
This gap even existed where the Confederation could claim direct effect 
or supremacy based on an exclusive competence.154 As a result, state laws 
could, and did, violate confederal law without legal sanction in the state.155 
An effect aggravated by the absence of central or state courts upholding the 
obligation to ‘inviolably observe’ the Articles. The effects on the functioning 
of the Confederation were quite devastating, and, within the limited value 
of a historic counter-factual, rather support the reasoning of the European 
Court of Justice in its seminal cases on the European legal order.156
152 McDonald (1968), 135. The Patterson plan also proposed direct effect within a confederal 
US: ‘And according to this plan, it may be exerted on individuals as well (…).’ Patterson 
even saw the aristocratic advantages of such direct effect: ‘With proper powers Congress 
will act with more energy & wisdom than the proposed National Legislature; being fewer 
in number, and more secreted & refi ned by the mode of election’ (Debates on Saturday 
June 16 1776 in Committee of the whole).
153 Cf for instance Maduro (2006), 512.
154 Wood (1969), 356 remarks: ‘Congressional resolutions continued to be mere recommen-
dations which the states were left to enforce.’
155 Especially the very important peace treaty with Great Britain, providing British with the 
right to collect pre-war debts and protecting them from confi scation. See famously the 
Rutgers vs. Waddington case, where Hamilton himself acted as advocate.
156 Compare Lenaerts (1990), 254 quoting Holmes: ‘I do not think the United States would 
come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the 
Union would be imperilled I we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the 
several states.’ (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 295-296 (1920).
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3.1.2 The supreme law of the Federation
The lack of state-compliance and effectiveness were two of the major charg-
es against the Confederation.157 The federate constitution therefore provid-
ed for an absolute supremacy of federal law as well as direct effect.158 It 
made sure to leave little doubt on this point:
‘This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, 
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.’159
Federal law was to be ‘supreme’, invalidating any State laws that might con-
flict with it, and State judges were ‘bound’ to directly apply federal law.160 
No state constitution could alter this hierarchical relation, furthermore, as 
this supremacy was based on the authority of the people and the Constitu-
tion directly, and did not derive from the States.161 A fact again highlighting 
the superiority of the central constitution over the statal ones.162
Supremacy and direct effect also were two tools in the broader shift towards 
a reliance on law and courts as the primary mechanism for regulation and 
enforcement.163 Both during the Confederation and in the Convention, 
many had stated that the only way to ensure compliance from the States 
was by force and direct threat of force. This led to far-reaching and some-
157 See also Federalist Paper 15: ‘The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing 
Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in 
their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the 
INDIVIDUALS of which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the 
powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the effi cacy 
of the rest depends.’
158 Wood (1969), 547.
159 Art. VI. Cf also the supremacy clause in art. I-6 of the Constitutional treaty, legally appar-
ently as redundant as its deletion from Lisbon, if politically signifi cant in the sense that 
current practice apparently could not be made explicit, and needed to camoufl aged and 
hidden away in Protocol 17.
160 Also see art. III. Sec. 2 US Const. Further see J. E. Nowak and R.D. Rotunda, Constitutional 
Law (7th edn, Thomson 2004), 374 et seq. and Hamilton in Federalist Paper No. 15.
161 This does not mean, of course, that the principle was never challenged, or never had to be 
defended by the US Supreme Court. See for an explicit defense along lines of effective-
ness not unfamiliar to EU lawyers the 1816 case of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee 14 US (1 
Wheat) 304 (1816).
162 On the crucial importance of this constitutional supremacy in federations see Watts 
(1999), 99. Also see Boom (1995), 177.
163 Tribe (1988), 23. Cf also Hamilton in Federalist Paper No. 16: ‘(…) if it be possible at any 
rate to construct a federal government capable of regulating the common concerns and 
preserving the general tranquillity, (..) It must carry its agency to the persons of the citi-
zens. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislations; but must itself be empowered 
to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty 
of the national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice.’
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times draconic proposals to grant the central government extensive powers 
to use force.
Gradually, however, and despite the failure of the states to honour their 
legal obligation under the Articles, the conviction grew during the debates 
in Philadelphia that law, not force should be the primary means of enforce-
ment.164 A reliance on force as a standard tool of enforcement could never 
be stable in the long run. It would only antagonize states, and place the cen-
tral government in the same position as the British had been before. The 
solution, therefore, was more law, and law that would rule supremely and 
directly within the state legal orders.165
3.1.3 Legal supremacy and direct effect of EU law
Clearly supremacy and direct effect have become hallmarks of the EU legal 
order.166 Van Gend & Loos167 and Costa E.N.E.L168 have achieved near mythi-
cal status as the alpha and omega of the EU legal order. A status that befits 
their often circular logic.169 Generations of students across the globe have 
been united through their canonical formulae and their Baron von Munchau-
sen like role of lifting the EU legal order up by its own bootstraps. They 
have provided endless inspiration for scholars, lawyers and judges alike.170
164 Even though, as discussed above, the possibility to use force as a last resort was still 
deemed absolutely necessary.
165 Federalist paper No. 16, De Tocqueville (2002), 40. This approach was of course also 
inspired by the general experiment of subjecting government to law, which included cre-
ating a constitution which was itself superior to the federal government, and could be 
upheld by the courts. Once this step was taken, law ruling supreme over state govern-
ments was much less of a leap.
166 See for one among several classics B. de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature 
of the Legal Order’, in: P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 
1999), 209 et seq, or the updated version in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds), The Evolution of 
EU Law (2nd ed. OUP 2011), 324.
167 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1.
168 See Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 585.
169 Most centrally the need for direct effect and supremacy is derived from the independence 
and uniqueness of the EU legal order, yet this legal order is independent and unique pre-
cisely because it claims supremacy and direct effect. Equally a system of preliminary rul-
ings is perfectly compatible with a reality in which national courts only have an interna-
tional law obligation to respect EU law. For a more detailed discussion of supremacy in a 
confederal model see below chapter 10, section 8.
170 See for a very interesting selection of views and analyses of these cases the different con-
tributions in M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds) The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics 
of EU law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010), espe-
cially see P. Pescatore, ‘Van Gend en Loos, 3 February 1963 –  A View from Within’, 1, B. 
de Witte, ‘The Continuous Signifi cance of Van Gend en Loos’, 9, F.C. Mayer, ‘Van Gend en 
Loos: The Foundation of a Community of Law’, 16, and of course D. Halberstam, ‘Plural-
ism in Marbury and Van Gend’, 26, as well as N. Fennely, ‘The European Court of Justice 
and the Doctrine of Supremacy: Van Gend en Loos; Costa v. ENEL; Simmenthal’, 39, and I. 
Pernice, ‘Costa v. ENEL and Simmenthal: Primacy of European Law’, 47.
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At least from the internal perspective of EU law, or even more precisely, 
from the position formally adopted by the Court of Justice in its case law, 
EU law has absolute supremacy over all national law, including national 
constitutional law.171 A view that has been recently reaffirmed in Opinion 
1/2009:
‘It is apparent from the Court’s settled case-law that the founding treaties of the European 
Union, unlike ordinary international treaties, established a new legal order, possessing its 
own institutions, for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, in 
ever wider fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals. The essential characteristics of the European Union legal order thus constituted 
are in particular its primacy over the laws of the Member States and the direct effect of a 
whole series of provisions which are applicable to their nationals and to the Member States 
themselves.’172
Where the specific requirements are met, furthermore, EU law also applies 
directly.173 Consequently, a large part of EU law can be directly relied 
upon in national courts, and trumps all national law, up to and including 
entrenched constitutional norms. 174 In fact EU law even goes so far as to 
indirectly establish effective remedies at the national level,175 reversing 
national court hierarchy and setting aside res judicata of administrative deci-
sions.176
At the same time both the scope and the basis of supremacy is challenged by 
all national supreme or constitutional courts. Although supremacy is gener-
ally applied in day-today practice,177 absolute supremacy on EU terms is not 
171 See Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L., Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 
1125, Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629 or case C-213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR 
I-2433. See also J.H.H. Weiler (1991), 2413, claiming that the relation between national law 
and Community law is ‘indistinguishable from analogous relationships in constitutions 
of federal states.’
172 Opinion 1/09 [2011] ECR I-1137, par. 65.
173 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337, case 43/75 Defrenne 
[1976] ECR 455, case 152/84 Marshall I [1986] ECR 723, case C-91/92 Faccini Dori [1994] 
ECR I-3325, case C-201/02 Delena Wells [2004] ECR I-723, and case C-555/07 Seda Kücük-
deveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, [2010] ECR I-365. See S. Prechal, Directives in EC Law 
(OUP 2005), for an overview of the different regimes and requirements for direct effect. In 
comparative perspective to the US see Lenaerts (1990), 208, 212. et seq.
174 Case 106/77 Simmenthal, case C-213/07, Michaniki [2008] ECR I-9999.
175 See Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR I-1989, case 14/83 Von Colson [1984] ECR I-1891, case 
C-213/89 Factortame, and case C-271/91 Marshall II [1993] ECR I-4367.
176 Case C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz [2004] ECR I-837, case C-43/01 Gambelli [2003] ECR I-13031, 
and case C-234/04 Kapferer [2006] ECR 1-2585.
177 G. de Búrca, ‘Sovereignty and the Supremacy Doctrine of the European Court of Justice’, 
in: N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2006), 454.
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accepted.178 Estonia probably comes closest to such a position,179 followed 
by Belgium180 and The Netherlands.181 In all other states the courts general-
ly base primacy of EU law on the consent of the Member State.182 Primacy is 
subsequently limited to the scope of that consent, and therefore to the scope 
that the national constitution allows for consenting to EU supremacy.183 
A logic that leads to a protected status for the constitution itself,184 or at least 
its core provisions.185 For where the national constitution does not allow the 
178 Chalmers, Davies and Monti (2010), 190.
179 For Estonia see the conclusion of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of 
Estonia in the Euro Decision, Opinion No. 3-4-1-3-06 of 11 May 2006, par. 16, available in 
English translation at: http://www.nc.ee, as well as par. 1 of the Estonian Supplementing 
act that does formulate certain fundamental principles.
180 For Belgium see the famous early position of the Belgian Court de Cassation in Cour de 
Cassation (Belgium), 27 May 1971, S.A. Fromagerie franco-suisse ‘Le Ski’ (1971) RTD eur 
495, granting inherent supremacy to international law, and therefore EU law. A line it has 
held since then (Court de Cassation, 9 Nov. 2004, Pas., 2004, 1745 and Court de Cassation, 16 
Nov. 2004, Pas., 2004, 1802). This line has also been generally followed by a second Bel-
gian highest court, the Conseild’Etat, albeit with different reasoning (Conseil d’Etat Case 
62.922 of 5 November 1996 (Orfi nger). J.T., 1997, 254). Yet now a third court, the Belgian 
Cour Constitutionnelle, which developed out of the Courd’arbitrage in 2007, has chosen a 
different line. More in line with other constitutional courts it holds that ultimately the 
validity of EU law derives from the Belgian constitution, and can thus be limited by it. 
(Cour Constitutionnelle 16 October. 1991, No 26/91 and Cour Constitutionnelle, 3 February 
1994, No 12/94). A tension between highest courts that for now simply continues to exist.
181 For the Netherlands see Hoge Raad, 2 November 2011, LJN AR1797, R.O. 3.6, Hoge Raad 1 
October 2004, LJN AO8913 and Raad van State 7 July 1995, AB 1997, 117.
182 For an overview of the classic national case law see A. Oppenheimer (ed) The Relationship 
Between European Community Law and National Law: The Cases Vol I and II (CUP 1994 and 
2003).
183 From some recent examples see the Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 19/08, 26 Novem-
ber 2008 Lisbon I, and Pl. ÚS 29/09, 3 November 2009 Lisbon II, the Hungarian Constitu-
tional Court, Decision 143/2010 (VII. 14.) AB, of 12 July 2010 Lisbon Treaty, the German 
Bundesvefassungsgericht in BVerfGE, 2 BvE 123,267, 2 BvE 2/08 (2009) Lissabon Urteil, the 
Italian Corte Costituzionale, Decision No. 348 and No. 349, 24 of October 2007 confi rming 
the controlimiti doctrine, the Conseil constitutionnel, Decision 2004-2005 DC of 19 
November 2004, Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, Conseil constitutionnel, 
Decision 2600-540 DC of 27 July 2006, Loi transposant la directive sur le droit d’auteur, or the 
Spanish Constitutional Court Declaration 1/2004 of December 13 2004 on the Constitu-
tional Treaty, (BOE number 3 of 4 January 2005), See for a further discussion of suprema-
cy and a potential confederal solution to these confl icting claims below chapter 10, sec-
tion 8.
184 See for instance the ruling of the Polish Constitutional Court of 11 May 2005, K18/04 on 
Polish accession to the EU, or the Constitutional Court of Lithuania in joined cases No 
17/02, 24/02, 06/03 and 22/04, judgment of 14 March 2006.
185 De Witte (2011), 356, who adds: ‘Everywhere the national constitution remains at the 
apex of the hierarchy of norms, and EU law is to trump national law only under the con-
ditions, and within the limits, set by the national constitution.’ For a legislative expres-
sion of this logic see the new European Union Act of 2011, including its perhaps ineffec-
tive but highly symbolic ‘sovereignty clause’ in art. 18. See P. Craig, ‘The European Union 
Act 2011: Locks, limits and legality’ 48 CMLRev (2011), 1881.
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government to violate fundamental rights or to limit the democratic process, 
such powers can also not have been delegated to the EU.
Both sides are clearly trying hard to prevent a direct conflict, which in itself 
can be seen as something valuable.186 Nevertheless this ‘plural’ understand-
ing of supremacy itself, if we take the positive view, must be taken into 
account when comparing the supremacy and direct effect of EU law to the 
US experience.187
De Witte’s discussion of the ‘two dimensional’ character of supremacy 
in the EU captures this distinction. As the puts it, supremacy is ‘a legal real-
ity only to the extent that national courts accept their ‘mandate’. The prac-
tice shows that this acceptance, so far, is selective and generally based on 
the national courts’ own constitutional terms.
‘The latter fact continues to distinguish Community supremacy from analogues federal principles. 
In federal states, the relation between central and Member State law is a matter for federal constitu-
tional law. (…) the reason for this is the uncontested primacy of the federal constitution which allo-
cates the powers between the two levels. In contrast, the claim of the autonomous validity of Euro-
pean Community law is not (yet) widely accepted, and the EC Treaty is not undisputedly granted 
supreme legal authority by the courts and political institutions of the Member States.’188
Even though more than a decade old, this statement still captures the real-
ity within the EU today.189 A reality that ultimately goes back to the simple 
fact that the US Constitution has the normative authority to grant suprem-
acy, whereas the EU treaties have not.190 Although supremacy and direct 
effect are therefore accepted, and appear surprisingly effective in the day-
to day functioning of the legal order, they rest on a different basis, are not 
grounded in a federate judicial system, and are far less secure than in the 
186 See however the recent ultra vires ruling by the Czech Constitutional Court in Landtova, 
which does create an open confl ict with the ECJ: judgment of 31 January 2012, Landtova 
Pl. ÚS 5/12, with an insightful discussion by J. Komarek, ‘Czech Constitutional Court 
Playing with Matches: the Czech Constitutional Court Declares a Judgment of the Court 
of Justice of the EU Ultra Vires’ 8 European Constitutional Law Review (2012), 323.
187 In this regard the apparent need to remove the explicit recognition of supremacy from the 
Constitutional Treaty, and relocate it, in more technical terms, into a non-binding proto-
col 17 speaks volumes as well.
188 De Witte (1999), 209 et seq.
189 For a more recent defense see De Witte (2012), 45, also pointing to the lack of a system of 
separate federal courts in the EU, and the lack of a right of appeal against national judg-
ments for violation of EU law. It is suggested here, and will be further discussed below, 
that the doubts De Witte has in equating this EU primacy with ‘federal’ primacy precisely 
conforms to the confederal nature of this primacy, whereas De Witte implicitly takes into 
account federate states alone when discussing the ‘federal’ notion of supremacy.
190 See also S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Pearson 2002), 257.
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US federation.191 Declaration 17 of the Lisbon Treaty on the supremacy of 
EU law nicely captures this duplicity. On the one hand the case law of the 
Court of Justice on supremacy is expressly accepted. On the other hand this 
acceptance could not be retained in the Treaty itself, and had to be tucked 
away in a non-binding declaration and obfuscated by legal lingo to secure 
ratification.192
The apparent paradoxes surrounding supremacy, and the contribution that 
confederalism can make to unravelling them, will be discussed in more 
detail in part II. At this point it suffices to conclude that, despite the weaker 
basis of EU supremacy, the EU system far exceeds the confederate system 
under the Articles. The American Confederation did not come near the 
level of supremacy and direct effect the EU enjoys in practice, even though 
the notions of supremacy and direct effect as such are not fundamentally 
incompatible with a confederal set-up.
3.2 Structure: Separate versus merged government
Related to the issues of supremacy and direct effect was another crucial 
structural difference between the US Confederation and the Federation, 
namely that between separate versus merged government. Would the cen-
tral government be constructed from elements taken from the national sys-
tems, or would it receive a completely separate government at the federal 
level?
3.2.1 Merged government in the Confederation
The Confederation used a completely merged system: Congress consisted of 
representatives of the states, and only had a very limited institutional and 
bureaucratic capacity. As a result it governed through the states, forming 
one joined governmental structure. Again this institutional dependence on 
the states was seen as one of the key weaknesses of the Confederation: how 
can one control something one depends upon?
3.2.2 Separate government in the Federation
To address this structural weakness, the founding fathers decided to under-
pin federate supremacy and direct effect with an even more fundamental 
re-conceptualization of the political order. The central government would 
191 This leads De Witte to the claim that ‘the principles of direct effect and supremacy, as 
presently formulated and accepted, continue to confi rm the nature of EC law as that of a 
branch of international law, albeit a branch with some unusual, quasi-federal, blossoms.’ 
A statement that seems to skip the intermediate constitutional option of a confederal 
system.
192 Cf. art. I-6 of the Constitutional Treaty which simply stated that ‘The Constitution and 
law adopted by the institutions of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it 
shall have primacy over the law of the Member States.’
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become a completely separate and independent government instead of 
being grafted onto the State governments.193 The federate government was 
based on the people directly, and would act on them directly, without the 
States as intermediaries. The State and the centre were to be separate gov-
ernments, dealing with different issues, but over the same citizens.
In an impressive reversal of classic theory and traditional attempts to uni-
fy authority in one ruler, state or government, the citizen were made sub-
jects of two governments. In turn, both these governments were based on the 
ultimate sovereignty of those same citizens collectively.194 This American 
innovation in popular sovereignty and government will be extensively 
discussed in part II of this thesis where a potential further, and confederal, 
evolution of this merger between sovereignty and federalism is suggested. 
Here it suffices to establish that the state and federal governments could not 
be reduced to each other. An approach that rejected a straightforward hier-
archy between governments.195 Instead it took as its organizational principle 
co-equal governments, both directly governing the people, yet in different 
spheres of political activity.196
As a result, and as will be further discussed below, the federate government 
received an independent executive, its own Washington-based legislature, 
and a separate federate judiciary that would exist alongside the system of 
State courts. The federation thereby almost became the mirror-image of the 
system under the Articles, boasting a separate and not a merged government.
3.2.3 Separate or merged government in the EU?
Compared with these two examples the EU predominantly forms a merged 
system. Although it has stronger, more powerful and ‘separate’ institutions 
such as the European Parliament, the Commission, and the European Court 
of Justice, its overall character is more merged, especially when the quanti-
193 Despite this basic principle the governments of course collide and interact in practice.
194 The contemporary orthodoxy, which saw such multiplicity as a constitutional anathema, 
is nicely stated by Hutchinson in his case for unlimited and supreme authority of the Brit-
ish parliament over America: ‘It is impossible there should be two independent Legisla-
tures in the one and the same state’ (McLaughlin (1918), 234. Of course, as we saw above, 
the US system is not truly in this sense, as both legislatures answer to the one supreme 
authority of the people.
195 A question that, crucially, is distinct from that on supremacy of legal rules where the two 
orders overlap. Separatism structurally aims to prevent such overlaps in the fi rst place, 
primacy comes in since, especially in a modern system, preventing such overlap is sim-
ply impossible, no matter how one designs the functional lines.
196 See for example Ableman v. Booth, per C.J. Taney, 21 Howard 506, 516 (1859) emphasizing 
this separatism: ‘The powers of the general Government and of the Sate, although both 
exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct 
sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective 
spheres’. Further also see Lenaerts (1990), 207 who speaks of a dual constitutional struc-
ture.
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tative aspects and relative power of the different institutions are taken into 
account. The merged institutions of the European Council and the Council 
of Minsters, for instance, play a key role within the institutional framework 
of the EU.197 Also, the Union does not come close to the institutional and 
bureaucratic capacity of its Member States. The EU relies heavily on the 
Member States’ executive capabilities, where the federal government was 
deliberately given its own, powerful executive. Judicially speaking the sys-
tem is more merged as well. National courts take the brunt of European law 
cases,198 despite the existence of central European Courts.199 The prelimi-
nary question procedure epitomizes this merged approach.200 Direct Euro-
pean jurisdiction is far more limited, as stringent requirements for a direct 
appeal have been maintained,201 and no circuit of distinct EU courts exist.202
197 See J. Werts, The European Council (John Harper Publishing 2008). Cf also W.T. Eijsbouts, 
‘De Raad van Opperhoofden. Over het regeringsstelsel van de Unie’, in: A.K. Koekkoek 
(ed), Bijdragen aan een Europese Grondwet. (Tjeenk Willink 2000), 59.
198 See in this regard also Opinion 1/09, and the importance attached by the ECJ to its con-
nection with, and thereby control over, national courts in the interpretation of EU law.
199 With the introduction of direct effect the American system was, of course, de facto also 
merged judicially. In fact it was this judicial linking of the systems that provided the legal 
nexus and means of enforcement, with the separation more on the executive and legisla-
tive fi elds. The point here is that the EU is more merged than the US even on the judicial 
point.
200 The ECJ itself describes this as a cooperative arrangement with the national courts. For-
mally the ECJ can only give guidance on the interpretation of EU law, but is not allowed 
to decide the actual case at hand, which remains up to the referring court. It is true that in 
practice the ECJ can, and often does, practically indicates the desired outcome of a case 
by providing a very specifi c interpretation of EU law that is already fact-specifi c. Yet even 
when the ECJ does so, the national court always retains the last word in the actual case, 
which cannot be appealed outside the system of national remedies. The Gesualdo judg-
ment of the Italian supreme court nicely illustrated both these points: despite increasing-
ly clear hints from the ECJ that the Italian regulation of games of chance was below Euro-
pean par, the Italian supreme court merrily concluded the Italian legislation was justifi ed 
under EU law. See A. Cuyvers, Case note to: Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and 
C-360/04, Massimiliano Placanica, Christian Palazzese and Angelo Sorricchio, 45 CMLRev 
(2008), 515.
201 Case 25/62 Plaumann [1963] ECR 95, case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] 
ECR I-6677) and case C-263/02 P Jégo-Quéré [2004] ECR I-3425. Lisbon has broadened the 
standing of individuals, albeit in a very limited way. For instance art. 275 TFEU and 263 
TFEU fourth paragraph now also allows direct actions by non-privileged applicants 
against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implement-
ing measures. These improvements, however, certainly do not address the problems of 
limited standing as indicated by the General Court and AG Jacobs in UPA and Jégo-Quéré 
and academics more generally. For guidance on these additions now see case C-583/11 P 
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, nyr.
202 Of course State courts under the federate system also form a very important part of the 
federate judiciary since they are obligated to apply federal law as well. Direct effect and 
supremacy in this way undercut the notion of separatism as far as the judiciary is con-
cerned, yet it is diffi cult to see how this can be avoided without disintegration of the sys-
tem.
106 Chapter 2
The relatively merged nature of EU government is also visible in the EU 
legislative instruments, especially in the directive. Although it has certain 
separate elements, the European system is therefore usually depicted as a 
multilevel system of governance: it is one multilayered, merged system of 
interlinked governments rather than multiple separate ones.203 At the same 
time the EU has incorporated far more and far stronger elements of separate 
government than the American Confederation.
3.3 Sub-conclusion structural modifications
Looking at the structural modifications as a whole the EU has incorporated 
certain federate techniques, whilst retaining the confederal basics. The EU, 
for instance, has almost fully incorporated the daily reality of direct effect 
and supremacy, even though these lack the strong federate basis and are not 
intrinsically incompatible with a confederal set-up. The more fundamental 
federate foundation of a fully separate European government based directly 
on the people, however, has not been adopted. As a result the system oper-
ates directly on the people but is not directly based on them, nor backed by 
its own separate level of government. This is not a novel point of course, but 
an important one for understanding the structural strengths and limitations 
of the EU. After all, tension between foundation and structure can only be 
expected in such a situation, as will be further explored below.
4 The authority of the centre: Objectives, attribution and 
specific competences
A third cluster of modifications relates to the authority allotted to the cen-
tral government. Modifications which again played a central role in the US 
transformation into a federation as they aimed to remedy another of the key 
weaknesses of the Confederation: a lack of competence and authority at the 
central level. Three elements in this field were deemed central to ensuring 
an energetic federal government, and are therefore especially relevant for 
our comparative exercise. These were (1) the objectives for which powers 
were conferred, (2) the doctrine of attribution under which powers were con-
ferred, and (3) the specific competences granted to the central government. 
Two specific competences that were particularly important in the US transi-
tion will be focussed on here, being the external and war competences on 
the one hand, and the power to regulate commerce on the other.
203 See for instance Craig (1999), 16 et seq.
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4.1 The authority of the centre: Objectives
We first turn to the main objectives of the different unions. These objectives 
indicate the primary ends of the different unions: to what end were they 
established. In addition, it is important to establish the relation between 
these objectives and the actual authority granted to the centre to achieve 
them.
4.1.1 Objectives under the Confederation204
The Confederation had three main objectives.205 First and foremost there 
was the ‘common defence’. Primarily this objective concerned the struggle 
against Great Britain, yet there also were other actual or potential enemies 
such as the Indians, the Barbary States and the Spanish. The last were for-
mally allies as long as the war with Great Britain lasted As soon as Britain 
had been defeated, however, Spanish interests directly clashed with those of 
the United States in such areas as trade, navigation rights on the Mississippi 
or claims to land on the American continent.206
The second objective was to safeguard the ‘liberties’ and republican form 
of government of the states by preventing conflicts between the states or 
civil revolts. An objective that reflected the unease about the radicalization 
in several states, as well as the fact that, without overarching British control 
open conflict between the states had become a very realistic prospect.207
Third, and also very importantly, the Confederation served the objective 
of ‘mutual and general welfare’, meaning especially trade and economic 
development.208 After all, by separating from Great Britain the states had 
204 Obviously a rather formal understanding of ‘objectives’ is followed here, seeing how 
other even confl icting and non-explicit objectives will have been pursued by different 
relevant parties at different times. For the purpose of this constitutional comparison, 
however, the discussion of objectives will nevertheless focus on the formal objectives rec-
ognized by the constitutional arrangements themselves, accepting the limitation this 
implies.
205 Art. III Articles of Confederation. Also see the circular letter accompanying the draft Arti-
cles to the States on this point: ‘More than any other consideration, it will confound our 
foreign enemies, defeat the fl agitious practises of the disaffected, strengthen and confi rm 
our friends, support our public credit, restore the value of our money, enable us to main-
tain our fleets and armies, and add weight and respect to our councils at home and 
abroad.’
206 Jensen (1965), 154 et seq.
207 See above chapter 1, section 5. In this regard, one could also say that one implicit aim of 
the Confederation was to expand, and settle the western lands ceded to the US under the 
terms of the peace treaty. An aim that was later taken up by the federation as well. See 
Onuf (1987) and Jensen (1970), 211 et seq.
208 Note that these objectives are very similar to the ones in the preamble of the later federate 
Constitution, which was not so much concerned with changing the objectives, but the 
methods of guaranteeing these aims.
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broken with their biggest customer, and found themselves on the wrong 
side of the Empires global trading system. Considering the heavy regulation 
of international trade routes at the time, the states needed a united exter-
nal policy to acquire new trade rights internationally. They also needed to 
develop their internal market as much as possible. In light of these needs 
and objectives it is hard not to enjoy the similarities between article IV of the 
Articles, and the four freedoms so central to the acquis, as well as the func-
tionalist understanding between economic ties and peace it displays:
‘To better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the differ-
ent States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugi-
tives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the 
several States; and the people of each State shall free ingress and regress to and from any other State, 
and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, imposi-
tions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall 
not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State, of 
which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid 
by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them.’209
Update the ‘paupers, vagabonds and fugitives’ to whoever we want to 
exclude today, and one approaches an 18th century equivalent of the four 
freedoms and the concept of a Union citizen.210 Creating an internal Ameri-
can market to allow a free flow of the means of production was, therefore, 
one of the key aims of the Confederation. Not coincidentally Adam Smith 
had just published his ‘Wealth of Nations’, a theory the US elite was very 
much aware of.211
No specific clauses on positive integration were, however, included. Also, 
despite their wording, the Articles did not establish an effective customs 
union, or a full prohibition on statal tariffs and customs.212 To make mat-
ters worse the states found many ways to circumvent the rules in the 
Articles, actively trying to protect their own traders and manufacturers.213 
For, as outlined above, these prohibitions were not protected by notions of 
supremacy and direct effect, nor was there any central institution capable of 
effectively enforcing them. The creation of an internal market did, therefore, 
form one of the objectives of the Confederation, albeit an unsuccessful one 
and clearly secondary to the military objectives.
209 Art. IV of the Articles of Confederation.
210 Compare also art. IV sec 2 of the later federate Constitution, which is very similar, sup-
porting the assumption that the intention of the Confederation to create a an internal 
market was similar as well. As no signifi cant public entitlements existed at the time there 
was also no need to protect states from external burdens.
211 F. McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (University 
Press of Kansas 1985), 97 et seq.
212 Art. VI of the Articles of Confederation.
213 Wood (1969), 403 et seq.
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4.1.2 Objectives under the Federation
Interestingly the objectives of the federate constitution, concise as they are, 
largely resemble those of the Articles. The Preamble provides a summary:
‘We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, 
insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America.’
Generally the constitution aimed to form a more perfect Union, and one that 
would at least be better than the Confederation. The further aims of ‘domes-
tic Tranquillity’, ‘common defence’ and ‘general Welfare’ all match the 
objectives of the Articles. Indeed the central aims remained the same: keep 
the enemies at bay, stimulate the economy and prevent conflicts between 
the States.214 It were the constitutional instruments to achieve these aims 
that were changed. As the peace treaty with Great Britain had already been 
signed when the Federation was formed, however, the internal objectives 
had logically become more central as well, which may partially explain the 
further, more individual objectives that were added: establishing ‘Justice’ 
and ‘securing the Blessings of Liberty’.215
As the Confederation, furthermore, the Federation also had the more 
implicit objective of expanding. As discussed above, art. IV s. 3 provided 
an explicit procedure for accession, reflecting the clear will to expand by 
the creation of new, republican, states in the unsettled lands. Generally, 
therefore, the objectives of the federation did not differ that much from the 
objectives of the Confederation. It was actually because of the importance of 
those objectives that a more perfect Union had to be formed.
4.1.3 Objectives of the EU
The objectives of the EU are not as concisely formulated. Especially when 
one takes the preambles into account, as well as all Treaty articles that con-
tain or imply some form of programme or larger aim, a very long list of 
objectives takes form. Some of these objectives are rather general, such as 
the aim to ‘to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the 
world’, or to contribute to ‘peace, security, the sustainable development of 
the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, 
eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the 
214 See also art. IV s. 4 US Const. still guaranteeing a republican form of government and 
protecting the States against domestic violence.
215 Obviously these objectives also served other purposes, such as preventing some of the 
perceived injustices and tyranny by the masses during the Confederation or the rhetori-
cal purpose of convincing people that a large polity was actually conducive to individual 
liberty.
110 Chapter 2
rights of the child (…).’ Others are rather specific for a constitutional aim, 
such as striving for ‘price stability’ or promoting ‘tourism’.216
In general, however, it is possible to isolate several primary objectives to 
which all other, more secondary or instrumental objectives, contribute. 
These objectives have also remained relatively stable over time. Historical-
ly the two paramount – and functionally linked – objectives in this regard 
have been peace and prosperity.217 Increasing wealth and well-being in a 
Europe ravished by war through the progressive development of an inter-
nal market, and, partially by creating that market, prevent future conflicts 
from deteriorating into war. The internal market, therefore, formed one of 
the central, albeit instrumental, objectives of the EU, as it linked both the 
peace and the prosperity objectives.
By now it can be said that the focus on preventing (armed) conflicts between 
the Member States has gradually retreated, whereas economic objectives 
have become more central within the EU.218 At the same time other non-
instrumental aims have been increasingly embraced, such as the environ-
ment, the Area of Freedom Security and Justice, and increasingly the need 
to form one block externally.
Sometimes it seems the EU even tries to fully recast itself as a funda-
mental rights organization, usually when in search of increased legitimacy. 
The gradual introduction of the Charter can be seen in this light, just as the 
far-reaching reasoning and rhetoric of the Court of Justice in cases as Kadi, 
Zambrano or N.S.219 Optimistic scholarship can then try to build on both 
these developments, such as for instance through the probably intentionally 
wishful idea of a ‘reverse Solange’ check.220 Such approaches, however, pri-
marily tend to illustrate the significant tensions between such natural law 
like ambitions and visions of the EU and the more down to earth basis of the 
EU itself.221 Perhaps cynically so, but the fact that the text of the Charter had 
eventually to be removed from Lisbon, and replaced by a reference with the 
same legal effect, at least does not seem to bode very well for those relying 
on the legitimizing effect of fundamental rights for the EU. Of course in a 
216 Preamble TEU, art. 3(1) TEU and art. 195 TFEU.
217 Or in the words of art. 3(1) TEU: to ‘promote peace’ and ‘the well-being of its peoples.’ 
NB: The two World Wars are no longer directly referred to in preambles.
218 See more generally below chapter 3, section 2 on the internal focus of the EU.
219 Joined cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P Kadi I [2008] ECR I-6351, case C-34/09 Zambrano, 
and case C-411/10 N. S. and others nyr.
220 A. von Bogdandy, M. Kottmann, C. Antpöhler, J. Dickschen, S. Hentrei and M. Smrkolj, 
'Reverse Solange–Protecting the essence of fundamental rights against EU Member 
States', 49 CMLRev (2012), 489.
221 For a further discussion of this tension see A. Cuyvers, ‘The Kadi II judgment of the Gen-
eral Court: the ECJ's predicament and the consequences for Member States’ 7 European 
Constitutional Law Review, (2011), 481.
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less high-brow manner such human rights aims can also be seen as simply a 
broader, or better, understanding of ‘well-being’ but clearly they have a dif-
ferent undertone than the more economic objectives of old.222
Enlargement per se furthermore, is not mentioned as an explicit objective. 
Nor, however, is a clear limit established of how far EU enlargement should 
go. Obviously the possibility of further enlargement, as in the case of the 
US, does seem to imply at least an implicit desire to enlarge to a certain 
degree.
Comparing the objectives of the EU with our US examples, two main con-
clusions stand out. First, the EU objectives are developed in much more 
detail and at the same time include more far-reaching and even global aims. 
Second, looking at these objectives as a whole, the EU primarily focuses on 
two of the three aims pursued by both the US Confederation and the Fed-
eration: preventing conflicts between the states and increasing prosperity. 
Especially compared to the Confederation these internal aims are far more 
central. At the same time the EU clearly has external objectives, and even 
increasingly so. Achieving its internal objectives, furthermore, also contrib-
utes to its external relevance; the stronger Europe is internally, the more 
weight it will carry externally. Yet the EU does not have the external focus 
on military and defence that formed such a central objective of the Confed-
eration. As such the centre of gravity within the EU, as far as objectives are 
concerned, is far more internal.
Since the Federation in this regard also had an increased focus on the inter-
nal objectives one could be tempted to conclude that the EU is more ‘feder-
ate’ in its objectives. At the same time the federation combined the internal 
and the external, which should not be ignored. It took over the impressive 
external objectives and competences from the Confederation, and added a 
reinforced internal dimension to them.
For a more complete picture, however, it is necessary to also address 
the way in which the different systems attributed powers to the centre, or 
in other words how they enabled the centre to achieve its objectives. Before 
looking at specific competences it is therefore useful to first consider how 
the principle of attribution was and is applied in the three different constitu-
tional systems compared.
222 More complex is the question whether integration itself does, or should, form an objective 
of the EU. See in that regard the preamble to the TEU proclaiming the resolve to ‘continue 
the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ and ‘IN VIEW 
of further steps to be taken in order to advance European integration’. This does seem to 
imply that integration itself is an objective, although intentionally leaving open what in 
turn the objective or fi nalité of that integration itself should be.
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4.2 The authority of the centre: Attribution
None of the three systems compared granted a kompetenz-kompetenz to the 
central government. Rather they all relied on a form of attribution. The 
central government only has those powers attributed to it. As will be seen, 
however, the doctrines used to determine the powers attributed differ sig-
nificantly, and these differences have a considerable impact on the nature 
and functioning of the systems under comparison.
4.2.1 The narrow doctrine of attribution in the Confederation
In the Confederation Congress only had those powers attributed to it by the 
states. All other powers remained at the state level:
‘Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every 
Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly 
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.’223
Under the Articles, furthermore, the importance attached to the so recently 
acquired sovereignty translated into a very strict interpretation of power-
conferring provisions.224 Most importantly, any doctrine of implied powers 
was rejected as anathema to state power and the idea of attribution itself. 
Construing competences this strictly had a major structural impact on the 
Confederation. Not only did it limit its powers, it also prevented the Con-
federation from adapting to changing circumstances. Any deviation from 
the strict letter of the Articles required amendment, and hence unanimous 
consent.225 Unanimity that proved impossible to reach on all the important 
issues.226 The attempt to improve the finances of the Confederation pro-
vides an instructive example of this problem.227
In addition, there was no Court to authoritatively interpret the Articles, let 
alone to push the envelope where political deadlock occurred. The lack of a 
court, of course, also meant that Congress could have significantly expand-
ed its own powers without any check at the confederal level. Had Congress 
started to develop its own institutional interest and desire for increased 
power, this could have formed a risk for the states. Such a confederal ‘esprit 
de corps’ did not materialize, or at least was not strong enough to overcome 
223 Art. II of the Articles of Confederation.
224 McLaughlin (1971), 119 et seq.
225 Clearly this limited interpretation rested on the will of the states themselves: no organ in 
the Confederation could have stopped Congress from adopting legislation based on an 
implied powers doctrine. Such legislation, furthermore, would only have required the 
support nine states. No such majority did not exist, however, and if it had it is doubtful 
whether the other states would have accepted it.
226 See above section 2.4.1. on amendment under the Articles of Confederation.
227 See further below for a specifi c comparison on the point of income and fi nancing.
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direct state interests and the deeper unwillingness to empower Congress. 
Institutional safeguards such as the requirement that all delegates formed 
part of their own state legislature, and could not be continuously re-elected 
to Congress undoubtedly contributed to this situation.
As a result, even though the Confederation had objectives not unlike those 
of the Federation, the competences of Congress were severely limited by the 
restrictive, and almost hostile, theory of attribution applied. Competences 
were construed narrowly, and based on the text of the Articles alone, rather 
than on the objectives they were supposed to achieve. As objectives did not 
translate into powers, achieving those objectives, let alone adapting to new 
circumstances, became difficult.
4.2.2 A broad doctrine of attribution in the Federation
The federate constitution directly dealt with this confederal problem in two 
ways. First, as described above, the federate government was no longer 
based on the States, but on a direct delegation of authority from the sover-
eign people.228 The question no longer was if a power had been delegated, 
but to whom the people had delegated it.229 As a result, the states had no 
‘stronger’ claim to competences, even though residual power remained 
with the states.230
Second, and with hindsight crucially, article 1, section 8, last paragraph of 
the Constitution explicitly incorporated an implied powers doctrine. It pro-
vided that Congress would have the power:
‘to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the forego-
ing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the 
United States, or in any department or officer thereof.’231
Already at the time of drafting this addition was rightly considered to be 
vital for the success of the new constitution.232 Only a normal legislative 
majority would be required both to decide on the existence of a competence, 
and to exercise it. Any decision could of course be subject to scrutiny by 
the newly created Supreme Court, yet the existence of implied powers as 
228 Choper, Fallon, Kamisar and Shiffrin (2006), 55 et seq.
229 See on this important point amongst many others: B. Neuborne, ‘The Myth of Parity’ 90 
Harvard Law Review (1977), 1105, P.M. Bator, ‘The State Courts and Federal Constitutional 
Litigation’ 22 William and Mary Law Review (1981), 605, S.D. O’Connor, ‘Our Judicial Fed-
eralism’ 35 Case Western Reserve Law Review (1984), 1, M. Shapiro, ‘Jurisdiction and Dis-
cretion’ New York University Law Review (1985), 543, and Tribe (1988).
230 Watts (1999), 39.
231 Nowak and Rotunda (2004), 138 et seq.
232 Something acutely perceived by opponents and proponents of the clause. Hamilton 
therefore vehemently defended this clause during the Convention, and in Federalist 
Paper No. 44 Madison declared that the Constitution would be a dead letter without it.
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such could not be denied. What is more, such federate judicial scrutiny also 
meant that the ultimate decision on competence lay with the centre and not 
the states, and with a judicial instead of a political organ.233
In addition to any specific competences it received, therefore, the new fed-
eral government was above all allowed a broader interpretation of its com-
petences, and access to an implied powers logic to boot.234 As the later use 
of the commerce clause and the necessary and proper clause proves, this 
was a very significant change in the constitutional fabric, far outweighing 
most explicit additional powers granted.235
4.2.3 Attribution in the EU
Like the American Confederation the EU is based on the continuing author-
ity of its individual members, and only has those powers attributed to it by 
them.236 Articles 4(1) and 5 (1) and (2) TEU together provide the following 
formulation of the principle of attribution:
‘1. In accordance with Article 5, competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties 
remain with the Member States.
(…)
1.  The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of 
Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
2.  Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the compe-
tences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set 
out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States.’
Attributed powers are subdivided into three categories. They are either 
exclusive, shared, or complementary. Exclusive competences are the most 
far-reaching, and leave Member States with no residual competence. In 
areas of shared competence the Member States retain the right to act, albeit 
233 Choper, Fallon, et al. (2006), 15 et seq., Tribe (1988), 195 Also, transferring decisions on the 
scope of federal powers to a judicial and federal organ only seems to increase powers, 
especially implied ones. This because it takes the decision out of the political arena and 
into a legal one, which seems more amenable to central powers, and usually can only mar-
ginally check the federal legislative judgment that an (implied) powers exists. Competenc-
es are thus boosted by the margin of appreciation left by the judiciary to the legislator. 
Lastly, legal logic is also unlikely, on its own, to withdraw a competence once given.
234 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). Also see Tribe (1988), 298 et seq. and 
Federalist Paper No. 44.
235 Nowak and Rotunda (2004), 157 et seq. The crucial importance of implied powers was 
also described my Madison in 1800 ‘It must be wholly immaterial whether unlimited 
powers be exercised under the name of unlimited powers, or be exercised under the 
name of unlimited means of carrying into execution limited powers’ (James Madison, 
Report on the Alien and Sedition act, January 7, 1800 in: J. Rakove (ed) James Madison: 
Writings (Library of America 1999), 643.
236 D. Chalmers, European Union Law (CUP 2007), 140. Also see chapter 9, section 7on the 
notion of delegation and sovereignty in the EU.
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within the limits of pre-emption and Union loyalty. Complementary com-
petences, on the other hand, only give the EU a limited capacity to act, and 
especially leave Member State competences largely intact.237
Interestingly the Treaties directly place conferral in the context of subsidiar-
ity, proportionality and the objectives of the Treaties. The first two concepts, 
more typical for European than US federalism,238 aim to limit the use of 
conferred powers.239 At the same time, however, different from both the US 
Confederation and Federation, attribution is directly linked with the objec-
tives of the EU. This link between objectives and competences is further 
developed through art. 352 TFEU:
‘If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies 
defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties 
have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall 
adopt the appropriate measures. Where the measures in question are adopted by the 
Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, it shall also act unanimously on 
a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parlia-
ment.’
Besides an interesting legal and ontological conundrum,240 article 352 TFEU 
further links objectives with competences. It thereby creates a form of resid-
ual competence to ensure that objectives can be realized.241 As such it dis-
plays a far greater concern for effectiveness than the very strict principle of 
attribution applied under the Confederation. The EU system thereby comes 
much closer to the federate approach to attribution with its necessary and 
proper clause, as is underlined by the requirement in article 352 TFEU that 
the EU may act where this is ‘necessary’ to achieve one of its objectives.242 
237 R. Schütze, ‘The European Community’s Federal Order of Competences A Retrospective 
Analysis’, in: M. Dougan and S. Currie (eds), 50 Years of the European Treaties: Looking Back 
and Thinking Forward (Hart Publishing 2009), 63.
238 Watts (1999), Elazar (2006).
239 Obviously these are in themselves complex an contested concepts, and notoriously com-
plex to operationalise legally. Cf P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. VerLoren van Themaat, ‘Introduc-
tion to the Law of the European Communities’ (3rd edition, Kluwer 1998), 233 et seq.
240 It can be defended that the provision both contains a certain logic of implied powers, and 
rejects it, for if there truly is an inherent doctrine of implied powers, 352 TFEU is not nec-
essary. In that sense it straddles the Confederal – Federal divide by allowing the federate 
centre access to the instrument of implied powers, yet limiting this access by a confederal 
requirement of unanimity. Also, the provision claims to cover cases not provided for by 
the Treaty, yet is itself part of the Treaty.
241 A. Dashwood, ‘Article 308 as the Outer Limit of Expressly Conferred Community Com-
petence’, in: C. Barnard and O. Odudu (eds) The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Hart 
Publishing 2009), 35 et seq.
242 See however also the attempt to at least somewhat limit the potential this opens up in 
Declaration No. 41 on art. 352 TFEU. For example art. 352 TFEU is not to be used in rela-
tion to such lofty aims as ‘promoting peace’.
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Art. 352 TEU in fact even goes one step further, as the text of the necessary 
and proper clause only refers to the powers of the federal government, not 
the objectives.
Perhaps even more importantly, as in the US Federation, in the EU the scope 
of the attributed powers is determined by a central court. Similar to the 
US Supreme Court, the Court of Justice has here played a vital role. Often 
applying a strong teleological approach, and linking a logic of effectiveness 
with the objectives of the Treaty, its case law has generally resulted in broad 
competences for the Union.243
The Courts approach to article 114 TFEU, the old article 95 EC, provides 
a clear example. Considering the objective of creating an effective internal 
market, competence to regulate this market is already accepted by the Court 
where there is an actual or potential obstacle, now or in the future to any 
of the fundamental freedoms. A threshold that is not difficult to reach.244 
Under a similar logic the Court has found that external competence exists 
where this is necessary for the effectiveness of an internal competence, albe-
it under strict conditions.245 Further, in an area as sensitive as criminal law, 
the EU was allowed to demand criminal sanctions where this was ‘essential’ 
to ensure the effectiveness of EU rules, even where no explicit competenc-
es to do so existed at that time.246 Perhaps the best illustration of just how 
attuned the case law of the Court is towards effectiveness and achieving EU 
objectives, however, is provided by the Tobacco saga: The one tobacco judg-
ment where the Court ‘drew a line’, and not even a very strict one at that, 
became an instant classic. The eagerness with which this rather unimpres-
sive limit to EU competences was anointed into the EU hall of fame only 
underscores the expansive approach normally followed in determining EU 
243 Douglas-Scott (2002), 261.
244 Cf amongst many others Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453, par. 
60, case C-434/02 Arnold André [2004] ECR I-11825, par. 30, case C-210/03 Swedish Match 
[2004] ECR I-11893, par. 29, or joined cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural 
Health [2005] ECR I-6451, par.28. Measures are not allowed, however, on a ‘mere fi nding 
of disparity between national rules’.
245 See joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Kramer [1976] ECR 1279 as well as Opinion 1/76.
246 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council (Ship Source Pollution I) [2005] ECR I-7879. The EU is 
not competent, however, to determine the ‘type and level’ of criminal sanction. See case 
C-440/05 Ship Source Pollution II [2007] ECR I-9097 par. 70. After Lisbon the EU has, how-
ever, received further, and more explicit, competences in the fi eld of criminal law. See 
especially art. 82-86 TFEU.
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competences.247 A conclusion that does not involve a normative rejection 
of this approach, for it has probably been of vital importance for the effec-
tiveness and survival of the EU, but that does question the portrayal of the 
Tobacco case law as a serious limit to EU competences.
Another clear example of the Courts approach, and of the use of objec-
tives to determine competences, is provided by the Kadi-I saga.248 Here 
the question was whether the EU, under the pre-Lisbon situation, had the 
competence to implement sanctions against individuals not in any way 
related to a state government.249 The Advocate General supported a very 
broad interpretation of article 301 EC, reading into this provision a general 
competence to sanction individuals.250 The General Court took a different 
approach, allowing such individual sanctions jointly under articles 60, 301 
and 308 EC, whereby art 301 EC was used to ‘import’ an objective from 
the second pillar into the first pillar, which could then create a competence 
under article 308 EC (now article 352 TFEU).251 The Court of Justice did not 
agree with such importation. Instead it invented the notion of an ‘implicit 
underlying objective’: although article 301 EC did not provide the compe-
tence to sanction individuals, it did provide the implicit objective to do so. 
Via article 308 EC, now article 352 TFEU, this ‘implicit underlying objective 
could then become a competence.252
247 Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I [2000] ECR I-8419. The Court of justice annulled a 
directive on tobacco advertising, holding that it exceeded the competence of the EU 
under then art. 95 EC. The actual grounds for this fi nding, however, were quite specifi c. 
By removing some rather minor parts, such as the prohibition on ashtrays, the second 
tobacco advertising directive could be accepted in the second tobacco case (C-380/03 
Tobacco Advertising II [2006] ECR I-11573). At the same time that the Court established this 
‘limit, furthermore, it also accepted the far more important and sweeping rule that an EU 
measure may be wholly based on art. 114 TFEU if it pursues a certain minimum (or 
threshold) of market harmonization. This also where a very signifi cant, or even predomi-
nant, part of the measure concerns public health. A line of reasoning that clearly refl ects a 
primary concern on effectiveness, and thereby signifi cantly reduces the limiting effect of 
art. 165(5) TFEU).
248 For a further analysis of the legal basis discussion see A. Cuyvers, ‘Tussen Scylii en Cha-
rybdii: terrorisme, rechtsbescherming en de verhouding tussen rechtsordes in Kadi’, 58 
Ars Aequi (2009), 155.
249 The old art. 301 EC only mentioned sanctions against third countries, which could 
include sanctions against individuals linked to the government of those countries, but in 
at least the view of the General Court and the Court of Justice could not directly support 
sanctions against individuals generally. Case C-376/10 P Tay Za v. Council nyr.
250 See par. 13 and 16 of his opinion, fi nding that art. 60 and 301 EC jointly provide a suffi -
cient legal basis.
251 Especially see paras 120. 130 and 133 of the then Court of First Instance in case T-315/01 
Kadi I [2005] ECR II-3649.
252 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi I, par. 226. It should also be noted that after 
Lisbon formally we no longer have separate fi rst or second pillar objectives, widening the 
reach of art. 352 TFEU in a way that might not be wholly covered again by art. 352(4). See 
also Rosas and Armati (2010), 22.
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As these examples illustrate the principle of attribution in the EU, espe-
cially as developed by the Court of Justice, is far more conducive to central 
competences than the one used under the Articles. The combination of an 
effectiveness-driven interpretation of competences, an implied powers logic 
and general legal bases such as art. 114 or 352 TFEU bear a far higher resem-
blance to doctrine of attribution under the necessary and proper clause or 
the commerce clause, the engine behind so much federate development in 
the US.253
From our limited comparison, it results, therefore, that the EU has incor-
porated to a very high degree the federate modification of a more liberal 
theory of attribution. In any case it is far removed from the very strict doc-
trine of attribution that was applied under the Articles. One additionally 
interesting conclusion in that regard is that, especially in the EU, a more 
liberal theory of attribution can also bring objectives into play. As soon as 
a more teleological interpretation is followed, objectives start creating com-
petence. This sometimes even to the Kadi extreme where it seems a certain 
objective, together with a desire for effectiveness, means a competence will 
be found somewhere. Clearly these underlying theories of attribution must 
also be kept in mind when comparing the specific competences set out next.
4.3 The authority of the centre: Specific objectives
For having compared the objectives and the general doctrine of attribution 
used, we can now turn to two of the specific competences that played a cen-
tral role in the US transition from a Confederation to a Federation: the com-
petences concerning war and the regulation of commerce.
4.3.1 The Confederation and the war focus
To reach its objectives, and under the strict principle of attribution described 
above, the Articles delegated several competences to the Confederation. The 
most far-reaching were the war-related competences. Congress received the 
exclusive power of deciding on war and peace, 254 to build a navy, to deter-
mine the size of land forces and to make binding requisitions on the States 
to supply their share of these forces.255 In addition, the Confederation could 
253 Choper, Fallon, Kamisar and Shiffrin (2006), 87 and 91. Further see T. W. Merril, ‘Towards 
a Principled Interpretation of the Commerce Clause’, 22 Harvard Journal of Law and Public 
Policy (1998), 31, and D. McGimsey, ‘The Commerce Clause and Federalism after Lopez 
and Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element loophole’, 90, California 
Law Review (2002), 1675. Different from the US, however, the EU has less effective politi-
cal counterbalances.
254 Except in the case of self-defence against attack or immanent threat of attack, see art. VI 
Articles of Confederation.
255 The states were obligated to raise, cloth and equip these forces, but the costs these actions 
were borne by the United States jointly.
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regulate these forces, appoint all non-regimental officers in the army and 
the navy and all regimental officers over Colonel. Crucially Congress also 
directed the actual operations of these forces.256
Regarding the funding of the Confederation, the Articles determined that 
each of the states should carry a part of the confederal costs ‘in proportion 
to the value of all land within each State.’257 Congress was given the compe-
tence to set the mode of valuation of this land. As discussed above, however, 
Congress was not allowed to directly levy taxes or collect such moneys due. 
Determining the method of taxing, and collecting the revenue remained the 
exclusive competence of the states.258 Congress was, however, allowed to 
borrow money and issue bonds on the credit of the United States.
Both the war competences and the capacity to borrow funds were comple-
mented by significant exclusive competences in external relations more 
generally. Congress had the exclusive right of concluding treaties and of 
sending and receiving ambassadors. This right was supported by a com-
plete prohibition for the states to enter into any international agreements, 
or any treaties amongst themselves for that matter, without the express per-
mission of Congress.259 Formally, therefore, the States did not even have a 
shared external competence left, 260 even though these obligations were vio-
lated as well.261 Treaties concluded, at least those concerning the vital area 
of duties and imposts were binding on the states, and at least legally limited 
their internal competences.262
In line with their internal market objectives, the Articles gave Congress the 
exclusive power to regulate the ‘alloy and value’ of the coin struck by the 
Confederation or the States.263 Crucially, however, this did not cover the 
right of the states to emit paper money, one of the most contentious political 
issues of the time.264
256 Art. IX of the Articles of Confederation.
257 Art. VIII of the Articles of Confederation. This was an important point of contention dur-
ing the drafting of the Articles, the landed provinces preferred population or other sourc-
es of income to be included as well in the calculation, but eventually compromised on 
this point.
258 Art. VIII, s.2 of the Articles of Confederation.
259 Art. VI of the Articles of Confederation.
260 These extensive external competences did not lead to a kind of reversed ERTA logic: Con-
gress did not receive internal powers where external powers had been exercised or where 
these powers were necessary for the effectiveness of the external competence. The strict 
attribution doctrine prevented any such inroads into state powers, and there was no cen-
tral court to invent it.
261 Van Tyne (1970), 540.
262 Art. VI s. 3 Articles of Confederation. As indicated above, compliance was, however, low.
263 Art. IX Articles of Confederation.
264 See further below.
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The Confederation, therefore, received sweeping military and external com-
petences. Competences that match, and in some cases exceed, those given 
even too many modern-day federations. These competences were in line 
with the overriding need to win the war and establish the United States 
internationally. The internal competences of the Confederation, however, 
were very limited. They were not even really elaborated upon, even tak-
ing into account the concise writing of the time.265 From the revolutionaries’ 
perspective, however, even these limited internal competences of the Con-
federation were quite a leap already. Firstly, having just relieved themselves 
of one ‘tyrant’, there was little enthusiasm for creating a domestic one.266 
This sentiment was reinforced by the radical ideology of the revolution, 
which included a strong distrust of all central authority267 and near total 
faith in democracy as direct and close to the citizen as possible.268
Second, as indicated above, most States had enjoyed large degrees of 
freedom and self-rule under the Empire, and had developed very strong 
identities. The Confederation was there to protect and assist the States, not 
to replace them.
Thirdly, the States were deeply divided on many important issues, and 
significant conflicts of interest existed. Slavery, trade versus agriculture, 
and claims to the vast stretches of ‘empty’ land to name but a few central 
ones.269 Partially as a result, a deep distrust remained between several indi-
vidual states. A strong central government either required settling these 
issues, or trusting the new centre to settle them. Neither proved possible 
directly after independence. As a result, the confederate period and the 
transition to the federate constitution can largely be described as a struggle 
over these issues between different groups, and their eventual settlement in 
Philadelphia.270
265 To compare: The text of the US Constitution as adopted at Philadelphia has 4484 words. 
The table of contents of the consolidated EU Treaties already contains 2.439 words. After 
the Lisbon effort at simplifi cation the Treaties themselves, including protocols and decla-
rations an in the English language version, use 117.695 words.
266 Jensen (1970), 109 and 124. Linked to this general fear of centralized power, was also the 
fear that any central power would be dominated by Virginia, a.k.a. as the ‘big knife’ at 
that time, and by far the biggest state.
267 For a closer description of the roots and content of this ideology, as well as illustrative 
examples of it, see Wood (1969), for instance on. 18 et seq, as well Wood (1991). For a dis-
cussion of the ideas and ideologies in the states see Beeman (2006), especially ch. 6, 7 and 
8.
268 This was at least the ideology of those describing themselves as ‘patriots’ or ‘revolution-
aries’. As will be discussed below, many powerful elite groups in society, not strong sup-
porters of revolution to begin with, feared this ideology, and tried hard to temper it. The 
struggle between these camps is one of the central themes throughout the entire confed-
eral period, Jensen (1970), 16, 117, 161.
269 Naturally, many of these issues eventually contributed to the outbreak of the Civil War.
270 See further below chapter 5 on the process of federation.
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Fourth, it had been exactly the British regulation of commerce and the 
levying of taxes and imposts that lay at the heart of the Colonies’ public 
defence of rebellion; no taxation without representation.271 Giving the Con-
federation powers that had been deemed worthy of a revolt against Great 
Britain, so shortly after that very rebellion, was not a very popular option.
These limited competences of Congress did indeed safeguard the powers of 
the states. Yet they also severely limited the functioning of the Confedera-
tion, especially as there was no easy way to adapt or expand these powers 
where this proved necessary for effectiveness. Two key gaps in the com-
petences of the Confederation primarily contributed to the ‘deplorable’ 
functioning of the Confederation: The inability to regulate trade, and the 
inability to secure an independent and sufficient income.
For even though the Articles did prohibit certain restrictions to the inter-
nal market, they did not grant any positive powers to regulate trade, or 
to achieve ‘positive’ integration, to use EU lingo. The Dickinson draft of 
the Articles had included greater trade competences, but these hade been 
removed by supporters of a weaker confederation.272 Later on conserva-
tives also tried to grant further competences to Congress but failed.273
Combined with the general compliance deficit, this lack of competence 
meant the Confederation could not prevent increasing protectionist behav-
iour, which blocked the internal market and spawned conflicts between the 
states. At one point, for instance, Connecticut taxed imports from Massa-
chusetts at a higher rate than British products!274 In addition, the inability 
to regulate internally was seriously interfering with the capacity of the US 
to conclude and observe trade agreements externally. A problem that sig-
nificantly harmed the standing of the new polity internationally. Serious as 
these problems were, however, the financial situation of the Confederation, 
as described above, was even more problematic. Not surprisingly these two 
weaknesses were in the front of the founding fathers’ minds at Philadelphia.
271 This section will not even attempt to settle the question what the ‘real’ causes of the revo-
lution were, be they economic, ideological, class driven or a mix. Yet it is a fact that the 
public defence of the Colonies, as eventually formulated so powerfully in the Declaration 
of Independence, was based on inalienable rights, and the right of representation when 
taxed. See for different analyses or emphases on the ‘real’ causes: Beard (1969), R. Bee-
man, S. Botein and E. C. Carter II (eds), Beyond Confederation (University of North Caroli-
na Press 1987), McDonald (1985), or Wood (2003).
272 Jensen (1970), 139 and 178.
273 Jensen (1970), 111. 128 and 174.
274 Madison (Sketch), 14.
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4.3.2 The Federation: Combining the internal and the external
To create an efficient government, the power to regulate trade and to gener-
ate income were therefore deemed necessary for the federate government. 
The Virginia plan fully included these powers,275 and they became the two 
central modifications in the field of specific competences. The increased 
powers to tax and generate revenue were already discussed above in light 
of their fundamental importance.276 The power to regulate trade externally 
and internally was granted through the famous commerce clause:
‘To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes’277
These powers proved to be especially broad when combined with their 
extensive interpretation under the necessary and proper clause discussed 
above.278 The external and war competences of the Federation were extend-
ed as well, most importantly to maintain a standing army. The powers to 
declare war and to conclude treatises remained with the centre, and were 
vested in Congress, the President and the Senate respectively.
The central government, therefore, received a significant increase in specific 
competences, as well as more leeway to determine the ambit of these com-
petences.279 The greatest increase in competence, however, certainly with 
hindsight, concerned the power to regulate commerce internally. As a result 
the federation retained its dominant external powers, yet complemented 
these with more general internal powers.280
275 In fact, the fi rst draft of this plan went one signifi cant step further and gave a general 
legislative competence to the central government.
276 The increased income of the federal government thereby also had a further, indirect effect 
on its powers: it acquired enough revenue to engage in non-regulatory activities, i.e. mea-
sures directly concerned with redistribution and public spending. Something the EU can 
only do to a far lesser degree due to its relatively minor income. Compare in this regard 
the distinction made by Majone in G. Majone, Regulating Europe (Routledge 1996) as well 
as Craig (1999), 42.
277 Compared to the Articles, several other powers were also added, such as the powers to 
establish uniform rules for naturalization and bankruptcies, to promote the progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries, to constitute Tribunals infe-
rior to the supreme Court, and to fully legislate for the newly created District of Washing-
ton.
278 Choper, Fallon, Kamisar and Shiffrin (2006), 55, 65 et seq. See for instance the Lottery case 
(Champion v. AMES) 188 U.S., 23 S.Ct. 321, 47 L.Ed. 492 (1903) and Houston, East & West 
Texas RY, v. United States (Shreveport Case) 234 U.S. 342, 34 S.Ct. 833, 58 L.Ed 1341 (1914). 
Also see: R.L. Stern, ‘The Commerce clause and the national economy’, 1933-1946, 59 
Harvard Law Review (1946), 645 for the boost during the New Deal.
279 A development that the 10th amendment could not stop, weakly formulated as it is.
280 Cf on this internal shift from the external confederal tradition also Forsyth (1981), 68.
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4.3.3 The EU and the internal focus
How does the EU compare? To answer this question this section will not 
outline all of the competences of the EU in detail. This would require too 
much space and is not necessary for our comparative exercise. Rather the 
focus will be on comparing the EU against the overall picture concerning 
competences established above for the Confederation and the Federation. 
For this purpose it is especially useful to jointly consider the three key com-
petence modifications underlying the transition from the confederate to the 
federate constitution: the control of trade, the external and war competences 
and the way these were affected by the concept of attribution used.
4.3.3.1 The regulation of trade: A federal centre of gravity
The internal market lies at the heart of the EU. Even if not normatively, 
although even that could be defended, it does so at least in terms of compe-
tences, both qualitatively and quantitatively.281 It is the area where the EU 
has some of its most far-reaching powers. Many other fields, furthermore, 
come within the ambit of EU law via the link or logic of the internal market. 
As long as there is a potential effect on the internal market, after all, EU 
law kicks in either through negative integration or because legislative com-
petences are triggered.282 A process, for instance, via which many essential 
social services have been drawn into the internal market, such as energy, 
postal services, health care, social housing or public transport.283 Another 
clear example of the snowball of a genuine internal market is the free move-
ment of workers. Starting with the right to take up work, this eventually 
requires harmonization of diploma’s, social benefits, rights for family and 
dependents, access to social services and even the grant of political rights.284
In legislative terms the EU has received a very broad competence to regu-
late the internal market after the introduction of article 95 EC, now article 
114 TFEU by the Single European Act. As discussed above the threshold to 
trigger this competence is relatively low, and the Court is generally rather 
281 See below chapter 3 section 2 for a more detailed discussion of this claim.
282 For the legislative competence to be triggered all further criteria as laid out in the Courts 
case law must clearly be met as well. See Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I.
283 See, as typical examples for this dynamic case C-179/90 Porto di Genova [1991] ERC 
I-5889, case C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] ECR I-2533, case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner [2001] 
ECR I-8089, case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747, case C-83/01 P Chronopost [2003] 
ECR I-6993, joined cases C 264/01, C 306/01, C 354/01 and C 355/01 AOK-Bundesverband 
[2004] ECR I 2493, case C-567/07 Sint Servatius [2009] ECR I-9021, or the so called Golden 
Share cases: C-367/98 Commission v. Portugal [2002] ECR I-4731, C-483/99 Commission v. 
France [2002] ECR I-4781 and C-503/99 Commission v. Belgium [2002] ECR I-4809. For a 
further discussion of the dynamic intended see P.J. Slot, M. Park and A. Cuyvers, ‘Dien-
sten van algemeen (economisch) belang nader beschouwd’, Markt en Mededinging (2007), 
101-112.
284 See for a more detailed discussion and the case law chapter 3, section 2.
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willing to accept that a link with the internal market exists.285 The EU pos-
sesses several other market related regulatory and legislative competences 
as well, for instance on competition law, customs, EMU, and in special fields 
such as fisheries, agriculture, transport, consumer protection and energy. 
As discussed above, furthermore, these legal bases have been given a very 
wide interpretation as well, with the Commission and the Court of Justice 
focussing on the need to effectively achieve their underlying objectives.
As a result, the internal market competences of the EU resemble those of the 
Federation far more than those of the Confederation, even though the Con-
federation also had the explicit objective of establishing an internal market.286 
Especially the resemblance between the expansive interpretation of the com-
merce clause under the necessary and proper clause, and the very broad 
interpretation of article 114 TFEU under the ‘effectiveness’ approach of the 
ECJ is striking in that regard.287 Combined with the inherent broadness of 
concepts as trade or ‘the market’ – it is difficult to find something that will 
not potentially, now or in the future have an effect on trade – these compe-
tences have had a decisive effect on the overall competence of these entities. 
Both the structure of the competence, and the focus of this key EU compe-
tence, therefore strongly follow the federate modification on this point.
On the other hand, the internal market in the EU also relies heavily on nega-
tive integration, and thereby on the Court of Justice, as often no political 
consensus can be reached to support positive integration. This important 
role of negative integration forms an important confederal element, albeit 
one squarely within the field of the internal market. These strong and broad 
prohibitions maintain a certain minimal level of integration for which no 
political agreement is necessary, and which, more importantly, cannot be 
lowered via ordinary legislation. In that way, they show a lack of politi-
cal trust, a need to fall back to a legal structure where no political agree-
ment can be reached.288 These confederal elements are strengthened by the 
requirement of qualified majority for legislation and unanimity for Treaty 
amendment, emphasizing the importance of the Member States, and caus-
ing the fall back option of negative integration to be relied upon more often. 
Different from the Articles, however, these prohibitions underlying negative 
285 Case C-380/03 Tobacco Advertising II.
286 Von Bogdandy even went as far, already in 2000, to state that ‘In the context of the afore-
mentioned competencies, the Union can hardly be distinguished from the central level of 
a federal state.’ Von Bogdandy (2000), 33.
287 Clearly many differences can be identifi ed as well, yet the mechanism itself is very simi-
lar: the creation of an almost pseudo-kompetenz-kompetenz out of a trade power due to the 
fact that every subject matter can be made to relate to trade in some way or degree,
288 See below chapter 3, section 2.4.2. for a more detailed analysis of this function of negative 
integration in a confederal system.
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integration have actually functioned in the EU, largely due to the Court of 
Justice and the reception of its case law in the Member States.
Despite these limited confederal elements, the market related competences 
of the EU are significant, and on the whole certainly come much closer to 
the federate modifications than to the far more limited powers of the Con-
federation in this field. Something that cannot be said about the more lim-
ited external and military competences of the EU.
4.3.3.2 The relative absence of war and defence competences
The external dimension of the EU is rapidly expanding, and forms a chal-
lenging new frontier for EU law. The establishment of a President of the 
European Council with external responsibilities, a High Representative 
and the European External Action Service provide clear illustrations, even 
if they also show the sensitivity of this field and the desire of the Member 
States to retain control. 289 The external clout and status that a function-
ing internal market provides externally, furthermore, should also not be 
underestimated. In this sense the role that the EU may play in preserving 
or enhancing the external status, especially for some of the larger Member 
States, certainly forms one of the elements in promoting and supporting EU 
integration.
Nevertheless, the centre of gravity for EU competences remains internal and 
market orientated, especially if compared with our US examples. This inter-
nal focus stands out even more clearly in the area of defence. The EU does 
not come close to the military objectives or competences of the either the 
Confederation or the Federation.290 Be it due to the protective shield provid-
ed by that same US Federation and NATO, the different European attitude 
towards defence and the military, the method and path of European inte-
gration after two world wars, or to the many other reasons that might have 
contributed to its internal focus, the EU never did develop a strong military 
dimension.291 The different attempts to increase the level of military and 
289 See respectively art. 15(6), 18 and 27(3) TEU, as well as Council Decision 2010/427 of 26 
July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action 
Service, OJ [2010] L 201 p. 30. For a detailed overview and analysis of the EEAS see: S. 
Blockmans and C. Hillion (eds), EEAS 2.0 A legal commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/
EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service 
(SIEPS and EUI 2013), available at: http://jura.ku.dk/pdf/nyheder/2013/eeas20/.
290 Furthermore, even though art. 42(7) TEU contains an obligation of mutual assistance in 
the case of attack, this does not require direct military engagement, but only the duty to 
provide aid and assistance. The EU, on other words, does not even form a defensive mili-
tary alliance. See the House of Lords, European Union Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon: an 
impact assessment (London, HL, 10th Report, session 2007-08, 2008), points. 7.113-7.117.
291 Although, especially with today’s eyes, the European Defense Community, which was 
one ratifi cation away of becoming a reality, entailed an astonishing level of integration, 
including even European uniforms!
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defence integration faltered. The European Defence Community proposed 
by Pléven failed when the French National Assembly did not ratify it.292 
The WEU, which went back to the 1948 Brussels Treaty, never truly devel-
oped either and formally seized to exist on 30 June 2011.293
More military cooperation, partially replacing the WEU, is of course 
developing, partially due to the necessity of cutting military spending.294 
Lisbon also increased the capacity of the EU in this field, and, more impor-
tantly, envisions more far-reaching cooperation in the future. Amongst other 
things it points to a future ‘common Union defence policy’, which ‘will lead 
to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously so 
decides.295 The common security and defence policy further entails military 
cooperation whereby Member States make military capabilities available to 
the Union.296 In addition a European Defence Agency is to be set up, coordi-
nating the military capability and development of Member States.297
Despite these military competences, most of which depend on possible 
decisions in the future by the way, and the gradually increasing external 
competences of the Union, the EU does not come close to the total external 
and especially military competences of even the Confederation. Compe-
tences which included the power do declare war, raise an army and direct 
its operations. The Federation, as we saw, could even deploy these troops 
against unruly states. The EU does not have such powers, nor is it conceiv-
able that it would develop such powers anywhere in the foreseeable future.
292 See R. Dwan, ‘Jean Monnet and the Failure of the European Defence Community’ 1 Cold 
War History (2001), 141.
293 See the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-
Defence, signed in Brussels on 17 March 1948 by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, as well as the statement of the Presidency of the 
Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High Contracting Parties to the Modifi ed 
Brussels Treaty, Brussels, 31 March 2010.
294 In a letter of 2 September 2011, for instance, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, 
Italy, Poland and Spain asked High Representative Ashton to: ‘Examine all institutional 
and legal options available to Member States, including permanent structured co-opera-
tion, to develop critical CSDP capabilities, notably a permanent planning and conduct 
capability.’ The UK position is, however, diametrically opposed. UK foreign Minister 
Hague said, for instance: ‘I have made very clear that the United Kingdom will not agree 
to a permanent operational HQ. We will not agree to it now and we will not agree to it in 
the future. That is a red line.’ See http://euobserver.com/13/113569.
295 Art. 42(2) TEU. In that case the Council shall ‘recommend to the Member States the adop-
tion of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.’
296 Art. 42(3) TEU. See art. 43 and 44 TEU for further details on what type of missions are 
envisioned.
297 Art. 45 TEU.
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4.4 Sub-conclusion: An interesting mix of central authority
Assembling the larger picture on objectives, attribution and competences 
an interesting blend appears. At the structural level the EU has incorpo-
rated several important federate modifications. Most importantly its doc-
trine of attribution and the purposeful interpretation of competences by the 
ECJ come much closer to the Federation than to the Confederation. The EU 
utilizes an implied powers doctrine, combined with the extra possibilities 
that Article 352 TFEU offers. Through these channels its many objectives 
amplify its competences in a way that would have been completely unac-
ceptable in the Confederation. Not surprisingly, these modifications played 
an important role in the development of the EU. Just as in the US Federa-
tion, they allowed it to develop, achieve its objectives, and adapt far better 
than the Confederation.
The EU also comes much closer to the Federation as far as internal pow-
ers to regulate commerce are concerned. Even though the Confederation 
also had the explicit objective to create an internal market, and even con-
tained some prohibitions that resemble the four freedoms, it did not have 
any competences to achieve its internal economic objectives, nor an effective 
system to enforce them.
In its turn, however, the EU clearly does not come close to the external com-
petences of the Confederation, let alone to those of the Federation. The EU 
thereby emerges as something like a mirror-image of the Confederation: both 
cover one side of the competences awarded to the Federation. This is inter-
esting as confederal systems historically were generally more concerned 
with the external than with the internal dimension of government. This 
does not mean that the EU necessarily has more or less far-reaching powers 
than the US Confederation. After all the power to wage war is highly sig-
nificant. Yet it is so in a very different and less day-to-day manner than the 
competence to create and regulate an internal market.
In any event the EU has not been given the combination of internal and exter-
nal powers that were granted to the US Federation. Interestingly this also 
means that the development of the EU is to a certain extent the mirror-image 
of that of the Confederation as well. Supporters of the Confederation tried 
to expand the powers of Congress to regulate the economy, seeing how 
these internal powers were important to effectuate the external objectives 
and competences of the Confederation. The EU, on the other hand, is gradu-
ally seeking its way to more and more coherent powers externally, as these 
also relate to its internal objectives, and become increasingly important once 
a far-reaching internal cooperation has been established. As in the Confed-
eration, however, also granting the ‘other half’ of competences increasingly 
threatens the confederal nature of the polity, and the constitutional counter-
weight offered by the fact that Member States so far retained the ‘other half’ 
of competences.
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The consequences of this reversed focus of the EU as compared to the Con-
federation will be discussed further in the analysis below. Before we try to 
establish such consequences, however, it is important to also compare the 
institutional system within which these competences are to be exercised, 
and the degree to which the EU has incorporated federate modifications in 
the institutional dimension as well.
5 Institutional modifications
Having compared the key foundational, structural, and competence modi-
fications underlying American federation, this section will look at three key 
institutional modifications. First, the modifications concerning the repre-
sentational scheme, and how these were translated into the structure and 
functioning of the legislature. Second, the federate introduction of a pow-
erful central executive. Third and lastly, the creation of a supreme central 
court.298 Jointly these three modifications were instrumental in strengthen-
ing the institutional system of the American Federation. They addressed 
several vital weaknesses of the Confederation, and brought the institutional 
structure of the Federation in line with its new and strengthened founda-
tion.
5.1 Institutional modifications: Representation and the legislature
The first institutional modification concerns the representative scheme as 
institutionalized in the legislature. This was one of the main battlegrounds 
in Philadelphia. Any modification on this point was understandably seen as 
vital for the functioning and nature of the Union to be established.
5.1.1 Representation and the Confederal legislature
The institutional structure of the Confederation was limited. It reflected the 
revolutionary belief that centralized power, non-elected elites and especial-
ly executives were sources of tyranny.299 For these reasons the legislature 
should be predominant, and even that body should be kept on as short a 
popular leash as possible. In addition true republicanism required govern-
ment as close to the citizen as possible, meaning as much power as pos-
sible should remain with the states. Reflecting these views, the institutional 
structure of the Confederation was dominated by Congress, which in turn 
was dominated by the states.
298 As the Confederation did not have a central bank, and the Federation only established a 
central bank in 1791, the European Central Bank falls outside the scope of our compari-
son. This increasingly central institution will, however, be included in our overall assess-
ment, and especially in our discussion of the EMU crisis, and obviously forms an interest-
ing federate element in the EU.
299 Wood, (1991), Beeman (2006).
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The single chamber of Congress was made up of annually appointed ‘del-
egates’ from the states. Congress convened for several months per year 
starting the first Monday of each year, and elected its own president.300 As 
‘sovereign equals’ each State had one vote in Congress. The vote was cast 
by the majority of its delegates present. States could send between two and 
seven delegates, and each determined the way in which its own delegates 
were selected. No person, however, could serve as a delegate for more than 
three years in any period of six years, so as to prevent a tyrannical oligar-
chy from developing. Legislative proposals could be made by any delegate, 
only requiring one other delegate to second it.
Consequently, delegates really were representatives of their state, and not 
holders of a personal mandate. A position reaffirmed by the right of each 
state to replace any of its delegates whenever it so desired, and the practice 
of providing delegates with written instructions.301 John Adams described 
Congress as ‘not a legislative assembly, nor a representative assembly, but 
only a diplomatic assembly.’ Randolph for his part even stated that: ‘They 
have therefore no will of their own, they are a mere diplomatic body, and 
are always obsequious to the views of the states.’302
It should be noted, however, that despite their status as representa-
tives, it could matter greatly which individuals sat in Congress. The limited 
means for transportation and communication of the time, combined with 
the inherently limited hold of written instructions over a determined mind, 
meant that delegates did have considerable discretion.303 Also, the parlia-
mentary modus operandi of Congress – for instance the tradition of break-
ing up in smaller subcommittees to prepare proposals, which were then 
debated and amended in a plenary session – allowed for persuasion and 
the winning over other delegates. A fortiori one strong delegate could have a 
decisive influence within his own delegation.
300 Art. V Articles of Confederation.
301 A practise, however, that must also be appreciated against the quite general practise in 
the state assemblies of constituents providing their representatives with written instruc-
tions, which were generally considered binding. The North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and 
Vermont Constitutions, for instance, even explicitly allowed such binding instructions 
for their own members. Wood (1969), 190.
302 Van Tyne (1907), 542.
303 Especially where the delegate was a major figure in his home state, and where the 
instructions themselves sometimes left important decision up to the discretion of the rep-
resentative to get the best result possible. See for example the crucial debates on the set-
tlement of western lands, as described by Onuf (1987).
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One effective individual could therefore have a significant influence.304 
In this way, Congress was an interesting blend of a meeting of state represen-
tatives and a parliamentary assembly. Structurally it was more like the Coun-
cil of Ministers or COREPER, yet it often operated more as a Parliament.
Congress held the full legislative power vested in the Confederation. 
Despite the emphasis on sovereign equality, and contrary to common 
assumptions about confederations, most issues in Congress were decided either 
by normal majority or by a qualified majority of nine States.305 Even fundamen-
tal decisions such as engaging in war, concluding alliances, coining or bor-
rowing money, raising land and naval forces, appointing the Commander in 
Chief or appropriating money from the states could be taken by a majority 
of nine out of thirteen. The decision to admit new states only required a 
normal majority.306
Roughly 70% of the votes was, therefore, required to legislate on most core 
issues, whilst a blocking minority required at least five States. Consequently 
the confederate system in itself did not require too obstructive a majority 
for decision-making.307 Yet in practice it turned out that blocking minorities 
were (too) easily formed along different political lines such as North versus 
South, or landed versus unlanded factions.
5.1.2 The federate modifications to the legislature and the system of representation
In contrast to the Articles, the institutional framework of the Federation 
was more geared towards ensuring energy and effectiveness in the centre. 
Fear of tyranny and loss of State sovereignty were still influential forces at 
Philadelphia, but they were no longer as pervasive and all determining.308 
In addition, as discussed above, the federate government became a separate 
government, meaning it could no longer incorporate state institutions in its 
design. As a result the institutional framework of the Federation was much 
304 Burke, for instance, singlehandedly ensured the defeat of several proposals, and ensured 
that the second article of the Dickinson draft was altered to emphasize the sovereignty of 
the states.
305 Art. IX Articles of Confederation.
306 Art. XI Articles of Confederation.
307 Note that, for instance, the Swiss Diet under the Restored Swiss Confederation of 1815 
could also act via qualifi ed majority on multiple issues. The Inner Council of the Diet in 
the German Bund, a body which utilized a weighted voting system, could even decide on 
many issues by a simple majority. Decision making by majority can, therefore, not be 
seen as a federate element in itself. A conclusion which also further illustrates how con-
federalism is often supranational in character, and should not be mistaken for or con-
founded with Intergovernmentalism.
308 For the interesting mix of reasons underlying this shift, see chapter 5 below on the proce-
dural aspects underlying the US transition towards a federation.
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more elaborate and powerful.309 A choice that, in turn, shifted attention to 
the creation of controlling mechanisms at the federate level: checks and bal-
ances became necessary to prevent these powerful institutions from abus-
ing their newfound powers, and to provide some kind of safeguards for the 
states.
The institutional arrangements that were designed to achieve these aims, 
and their actual development over time, form a fascinating study by them-
selves. They have been analysed extensively, and unlike those of the Con-
federation, are very well known. As indicated earlier, the discussion here 
focuses on those elements most relevant for our comparison: the modifi-
cations to the representational scheme and the organization of the legisla-
ture. Both of these were seen as essential in remedying the weaknesses of 
the Confederation. At the same time these modifications had to safeguard a 
sufficient degree of autonomy for the states. The inherent tension between 
these aims formed one of the main bottlenecks at Philadelphia, and could 
well have sunk the entire undertaking. A Compromise was reached, how-
ever, incorporating some of the key balancing exercises underlying the fed-
erate legislative structure.
First, a bicameral Congress was established. Following one of the central 
compromises in Philadelphia, the lower house, called the House of Repre-
sentatives, was based on proportional representation: one man one vote. 
A system that greatly favoured the more populous states. Representatives 
were directly elected per congressional district for a term of two years. The 
purposely brief term would keep Representatives on a short popular leash 
to their district. A measure that was designed to safeguard a certain level of 
republicanism even in such a centralised government. At the same time the 
representation per district also undermined the capacity to make a coherent 
stand in the House as a state. Each state was effectively divided in multiple 
factions per district whose interests would not always overlap.310
In return, the smaller States,311 received recognition in the upper house, 
the Senate. Each state was guaranteed two senators regardless of popula-
tion.312 The compromise was more subtle than that however. The lower 
309 Tribe (1988), 209 et seq, as well as Federalist Papers, no. 48, and Works of Alexander 
Hamilton 76, 80-81 (Hamilton 1851).
310 Federalist Papers No. 10.
311 In coalition with proponents of a more aristocratic constitution: senates had been one of 
the central bulwarks in the states against radical democracy See below chapter 5, section 
3 on the ‘anti-democratic’ forces in Philadelphia, as well as McDonald, (1968).
312 This of course became one of the standard solutions to the inherent tension in federations 
between regional equality and individual equality. See generally P. King, ‘Federation and 
Representation’, in: M. Burgess and A-G Gagnon (eds), Comparative Federalism and Federa-
tion: Competing Traditions and Future Directions (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1993), 94 et. seq. 
The two senators per state not coincidentally is the one truly entrenched state right in the 
constitution.
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house, for instance, received more powers regarding the purse, re-tilting 
the balance of power somewhat again towards the more populous States. 
In turn the Senate was given important powers in the field of external rela-
tions. Senators, however, would not cast one vote per state as first proposed. 
Instead they would cast their vote individually and independently of each 
other, altering the state-focussed representational nature of this chamber, 
and of the senators. States were not to be indivisible entities that spoke with 
one voice.313
Senators, furthermore, were not to be direct representatives of the State 
administrations. They became elected officials with an independent man-
date, forming part of the separate federate government.314 To that end Sena-
tors were elected by their State legislatures for a period of six years. Besides 
their role of safeguarding the federate autonomy of the States, this long 
period of office also reflects a second function of the Senate. It was to serve 
as a more stable buffer against the politics of the day. As a more aristocratic 
chamber, with older, more experienced members, who by their longer term 
were more isolated from daily politics, the Senate would balance the per-
ceived democratic excesses of the confederal period.315
At the same time their long immersion in Washington, especially if they 
served more than one term, also meant that senators had time to become 
part of a truly federate elite. They could develop a certain loyalty to the cen-
tral government, also because their own powers and fortune were bound to 
it.
Congress became the central legislative organ. Except for budgetary issues 
both chambers received the right of initiative and amendment, and both 
needed to give their consent before any proposal could become law. Impor-
tantly, ordinary majority became the rule for most legislative decisions. 
With a separate direct government the requirement of a qualified majority 
was no longer seen as required or justified.
One further important modification was made by the inclusion of the exec-
utive in the legislative process. Congress was to be legislatively checked by 
the new institution of the President, who was given the power to veto any 
piece of legislation. A veto that could again be overturned by a two-thirds 
313 As well as – inadvertently – opening up the way for party politics in the senate. This fur-
ther affected the nature of the Senate by making it less of a state-representative organ, 
and more of a party political one with a strong state-focus. Imagine for instance two, or 
more, representatives in the Council of Ministers, where voting rights would be deter-
mined by national political weight multiplied by EU voting weight. A thought experi-
ment that also clearly highlights the difference between representing states and peoples.
314 Cf in this regard, however, also the Bundesrat system, which comes much closer to the EU 
system.
315 For a more detailed analysis of this aristocratic counter-coup in Philadelphia see chapter 
5, section 3 on the anti-democratic revolution.
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majority of Congress.316 A legislative modification related to the objective 
of creating a sufficiently effective executive that would not be completely 
dominated by the legislature.317
5.1.3 The EU legislature and system of representation
As with the institutional framework of the Federation, the rather special 
system of the EU has been the subject of much research.318 Again, our dis-
cussion here will be limited to those parts most relevant for the specific 
comparison made here.319
The EU does not have an institution comparable to the Confederal Con-
gress, nor does it have any institution approaching its dominant position. 
The legislative functions and powers of this organ have been spread over 
the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the European Com-
mission. Since Lisbon, furthermore, the European Council has, both formal-
ly and more dominantly, entered the legislative field in the broad sense.320 
The result might appear as rather clear parallel with the bicameral solution 
of the Federation, even including a legislative role for the executive. This 
parallel is, however, deceptive.321 Due to the way in which this split has 
been designed and has developed, the end result conforms much stronger 
to the confederal system.
316 In addition Congress was of course checked by the new Supreme Court, which could 
enforce the constitutional limits on the federal government. An innovation that refl ects 
another major shift away from the paradigm of the legislature as the unlimited source 
and holder of authority to that of a legally limited government.
317 Rakove (1996): ‘Having stripped executives of power during the Revolution and Confed-
eration period, the Constitution’s drafters struggled to reconstruct a suffi ciently energetic 
executive through painful steps, against opponents who continued to express suspicion 
of over powerful executives. As Rakove sees it, the only unifying ‘fi rst Principle’ was ‘the 
desire to enable the executive to resist legislative encroachments.’
318 Generally see Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat (2008), 181-311, Chalmers (2007), 
86-130, D. Curtin and T. Heukels (eds), The Institutional Dynamics of European Integration. 
Liber Amicorum Henry G. Schermers (Martinus Nijhoff 1994), J.H.H. Weiler, ‘European 
Models: Polity, People and System’, in: P. Craig and C. Harlow (eds), Lawmaking in the 
European Union (Kluwer 1998), ch. 1, M. Westlake, ‘“The Style and the Machinery”: The 
Role of the European Parliament in the EU’s Legislative Process’, in: P. Craig and C. Har-
low (eds), Lawmaking in the European Union (Kluwer 1998), ch. 5, F. Scharpf, P. Schmitter, 
and W. Streeck, Governance in the European Union (Sage 1996), P. Pierson, ‘The Path to 
European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis’ 29 Comparative Political Stu-
dies (1996), 123, R. Keohane and S. Hoffmann (eds), The New European Community: Decisi-
on-making and Institutional Change (Boulder1991).
319 This chapter will, therefore, also not set out the familiar system of the EU separately.
320 See for a clear assessment Editorial Comments ‘An ever Mighty European Council’ 46 
CMLRev (2009), 1383. Also see the detailed discussion of the EMU crisis in this regard 
below in chapter 13.
321 Although potentially instructive, this observation also does not intend to make any nor-
mative statement on whether the EU should copy the bicameral American solution.
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5.1.3.1 The Council of Ministers
To start with the Council of Ministers, the institution that might resemble 
the Senate in the sense that it represents the Member State interest, and 
counterbalances the more ‘European’ worldview of the European Par-
liament and the Commission.322 Although the Council shares these func-
tions with the Senate, its composition and nature are more confederal in 
nature.323 Very different from Senators, who – very intentionally – were 
made independent and integral parts of the national government for six 
years, ministers remain truly embedded in their national system.324 Clearly 
their national position differs, but all of them derive their power solely from 
their national office. In addition they tend to be firmly embedded in their 
national structures. For instance, ministers usually operate in some form 
of cabinet in their home state, depend on a national political party for re-
election or re-appointment, and are controlled by their national parliament, 
provided it manages the apparently difficult technique of controlling their 
executives’ Brussels operations.325 It will largely be their national media, 
furthermore, that shapes their image in these primary national arenas. Not 
only do they, therefore, have a professional obligation to represent the inter-
ests and viewpoints of their Member State,326 they also have strong political 
incentives to do so. The ties that bind overwhelmingly lie at the national 
level.327
In fact, ministers are even more closely bound to their Member State 
than the confederal delegates to Congress were, even taking smart pones 
out of the equation. Although delegates also sat in their state assemblies, 
received instructions, and could always be recalled from their part-time 
confederal function, they were elected for a year and often served consecu-
tive terms. As such, during sessions of Congress their primary status was 
322 Cf art. 16(2) TEU stating that the Council consists of one ‘representative’ per Member 
State, holding that the minister must be authorized to ‘commit the government’ and ‘cast 
its vote’. Also see Rosas and Armati (2010), 80.
323 Also in light of the heavy involvement of national bureaucracies in the sub-levels of the 
Council. For an overview of these groups see the list annexed to Council document 
5869/10 REV 1, of 11 February 2010, POLGEN 11, leading up to COREPER. See art. 16(7) 
TEU, and M. Westlake and D. Galloway, The Council of the European Union (3rd edn, Harp-
er Publishing, 2004), 201, stating that ‘COREPER is ‘one of the most powerful organs 
within the European Union’s institutional structure.’
324 In this sense the EU system comes much closer to the German federal solution in the Bun-
desrat. Also see chapter 12 on the necessary adaption of national constitutional roles to 
participation in the EU.
325 See however the House of Lords Select Committee as a noteworthy exception, providing 
scrutiny and analysis at a very high level. See for instance their thorough analysis of the 
Lisbon Treaty ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment (London, HL, 10th Report, ses-
sion 2007-08, 2008).
326 Schütze (2009), 1084.
327 In this regard COREPER provides an interesting, though relatively small, counterweight 
of individuals who, though depending on national mandates, are Brussels-based.
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that of a delegate.328 They were, for this period, part of a confederal institu-
tion.329 For ministers, their functioning in the Council is of a more secondary 
status, though increasing in terms of time and impact. Also the parliamen-
tary process of Congress differed strongly from the functioning of the Coun-
cil, which procedurally comes closer to a traditional negotiation between 
states, albeit within the framework of a supranational organization.330 An 
effect that is strengthened by the fact that there is only one representative 
per state, instead of the potential seven in Congress.331 Winning over the 
majority of a delegation is not a possible tactic in the Council. The form of 
Congress, therefore, to a certain degree controlled the functioning of the del-
egates, in a way that the Council does not.
The use of qualified majority voting (QMV) and weighted voting are two 
further institutional components that significantly impact on the nature of 
the Council, and thereby the EU. There has been a gradual increase in the 
use of QMV, up to the point where, with some important caveats, it could 
now be described as the default option.332 A development often cited as 
prove for the uniqueness of Europe, and the move away from intergov-
ernmentalism and confederalism. As we saw, however, QMV also was the 
norm in the Confederation, even for some extremely far-reaching decisions. 
Decisions that, if entrusted to the European level at all, would certainly 
carry a requirement of unanimity in the EU. The QMV requirement in the 
Council, furthermore, is far removed from the ordinary majority, which 
is the rule in both the House and the Senate, and even applied to sever-
328 For the signifi cant impact that this can have, also compare the development of Commis-
sioners, who even if Eurosceptic at arrival, tend to become more pro-integration during 
their term, if only already because their position and responsibilities requires them to. 
Not only where one sits, but also where one lives, listens and lunches determines where 
one stands.
329 COREPER forms an interesting exception to this rule, and the signifi cant power of this 
group can be seen as an important modifi cation to the confederal scheme. This body of 
permanently Brussels based representatives forms a powerful EU institution capable of 
making many decisions. On the bond that can develop between members, even represen-
tatives of national interests as in COREPER, from extended cooperation and the EU per-
spective, consider the parting speech of French Ambassador Boegner in 1972. A fi erce 
Gaullist, after 11 years in COREPER he stated ‘J'ai aimé ce Comité, M. le Président, com-
me nous l'aimons tous. Je dirai comme un marin aime son bateau, comme un paysan 
aime son champ ou sa vigne, comme quelque chose à laquelle nous sommes attachés de 
toutes nos fi bres et je dirai par notre nature même.’J-M. Boegner, 3 February 1972, acces-
sible via www.ena.lu. [last accessed April 1 2012].
330 Despite the formal requirement of QMV, for instance, the Council usually strives for con-
sensus. Dann (2010), 247.
331 This also is a very signifi cant difference with the US Senate. Having two ‘representatives’ 
per State, especially if these are elected by the people, opens the way for much more poli-
tics Also it should not be forgotten that in the US political parties were developed fi rst, 
and only then was the mode of election for Senators altered.
332 See art. 294 TFEU, now aptly called the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’, which requires 
QMV.
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al decisions under the Articles. Adding the requirement of unanimity on 
some points, the QMV element of the institutional framework more closely 
resembles the Confederation than the Federation. That is, one of the hall-
marks of supranationalism in fact corresponds more to a confederal, than a 
federal set-up.
The asymmetric voting weight in the Council, on the other hand, com-
plicates the picture and is one point where the EU deviates from the Articles 
and incorporates at least part of a federate modification.333 The Confedera-
tion clung to sovereign equality despite significant differences between its 
members. The federate compromise allowed for proportional representa-
tion in the House, but maintained parity between the States in the Senate. 
The EU, on the other hand, has introduced forms of proportional represen-
tation in both the Council and the European Parliament.334 This can be seen 
as both a federate and a confederal element: on the one hand it shows a 
larger degree of political surrender, so to speak, by the smaller states, some-
what resembling a federate bond. On the other hand, it shows a very high 
concern for the status and relative power of each state, more resembling a 
confederal logic. In a sense, one could say that the weighing makes the EU 
more federate for smaller states, and less federate for larger ones. An effect 
that is offset in part, by other institutional elements such as the requirement 
of unanimity for some decisions, and the more federate surrender by large 
states to the Commission and especially the European Court of Justice.
Except for the mixed effect of the asymmetrical voting, therefore, the Coun-
cil rather strongly resembles the Confederate model. A finding that is espe-
cially interesting in light of the rather strong position of the Council, and 
its subsequent effect on the EU as a whole. For the relative dominance of 
the state-oriented Council itself is another clear confederal element, one that 
only has been strengthened by the increased role of the European Coun-
cil.335 The new role for the European Council, and the strong way in which 
this role has been taken up so far, sometimes even seeming to reduce the 
Council of Ministers, the Commission and the European Parliament into 
mere executing authorities, has clearly increased the confederal element 
333 Art. 16 TEU.
334 Historically this also made sense: for a long time the Council of Ministers was clearly the 
dominant institution, so that more power in the European Parliament would never have 
compensated the larger states for the relative loss of power in the Council. The very pow-
erful position of the House, in other words, made the compromise possible in the US. 
This would imply that only where the European Parliament would become much stron-
ger, could a more Senate-like organization of the Council become acceptable to the Mem-
ber States.
335 Within the EU this dominance need hardly be explained. For a more detailed discussion 
of the power of the European Council see Werts (2008).
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in the EU institutional framework.336 More even than through its formal 
powers,337 the European Council can be seen as part of the EU legislator 
by the indirect control it has over the Council of Ministers,338 which is com-
posed of individuals that are generally under the control of the head of 
state, or at least the cabinet, nationally, and over the Commission through 
its agenda setting capabilities.339
5.1.3.2 The European Parliament
The European Parliament more resembles Congress in working methods 
and parliamentary nature.340 Though the primary status of MEP’s is linked 
to the centre, even stronger so than was the case for confederal delegates, 
clearly many differences exist as well.341 MEP’s, for instance, represent the 
people of their Member States,342 and not their governments.343 They are 
elected directly by the people, hold a personal mandate, cannot be recalled, 
and have one vote each.344 Most of all, the European Parliament is far from 
336 One could see this development as a conferral correction: the increased power of the 
European Parliament, once combined with the power of the European Commission and 
the increased scope and impact of European law itself, caused the Member States to intro-
duce a more powerful confederal institution, directly imbued with the political power of 
Heads of States. In the longer run, however, such a move may end up only increasing the 
federalization / central authority of the EU. For it also means that the Heads of State have 
themselves become parts of the EU framework. Especially where national parliaments are 
increasingly incorporated as well, and national courts already are, this means the EU is 
slowly incorporating more and more of the national institutional framework. The respon-
sibility shouldered by Merkel in the Euro crisis could be seen as an example of such a 
development. See also Dann (2010), 264-65, and Werts (2008), 197 et seq. The fact that the 
European Council now even has Rules of Procedure governing its operation further illus-
trates this development or assimilation, See European Council Decision 2009/882 of 
1 December 2009, OJ (2009) L 315/51.
337 See for instance art. 82(3) and 88(3) TEU directly involving the European Council in the 
legislative procedure.
338 Dann (2010), 263. See further below the detailed discussion of the EMU crisis in chapter 
13.
339 Rosas and Armati (2010), 76, who regard it as ‘neither a legislative body’ which at the 
same time has become ‘(…) the pinnacle of the framework it once eschewed.’
340 As Congress, for instance, the European Parliament also conducts much of its work in 
smaller committees. See R. Corbett, F. Jacobs and M. Shackleton (eds), The European Par-
liament (7th edn, John Harper Publishing 2007), 126 et seq.
341 Westlake (1998) and P. Craig, ‘Democracy and Rule-Making within the EC: An Empirical 
and Normative Assessment’ 3 European Law Journal (1997), 105.
342 Different see Schütze (2009), 1086, who does claim that the EP represents a European 
people as a whole.
343 Also see art. 2 and 3 of Decision 2005/684 on the single statute or MEP’s OJ (2005) 
L 262/1, holding that MEP’s ‘shall not be bound by any instructions.’
344 Art. 14 TEU. Granting each national group of MEPs a weighted vote for their nation 
would be one option: that would, however politicize the EU on a national level, and 
block the development of parties. Also it would lead to a winner takes it all system in the 
European Parliament, with the minority doing little, except perhaps campaign in their 
Member States for the next chance. This clearly is les ambitious politically and more con-
federal as a model, but comes closer the perception of representing the people.
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the dominant institution that Congress was, both due to limits in its own 
power and its encapsulation by powerful other institutions.345
As the House, the European Parliament is to a certain extent based on pro-
portional representation. Crucially, however, the European Parliament 
is degressively proportional, granting a minimum of six representatives 
to the smallest states and a maximum of ninety-six to even the largest.346 
As a result inhabitants of smaller states are significantly overrepresented 
when compared to inhabitants of the largest states. A lack of one-man-one 
vote that has attracted significant criticism, most notably from the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht.347 In any event the proportional representation in 
the European Parliament does not go as far as in the House, but retains a 
certain confederal, statal focus.
The European Parliament ordinarily votes by regular majority, giving one 
vote to each MEP and not to each state. The election of MEP’s is determined 
by the Member States, some following a district system, some using nation-
al lists. The House, however, is fully based on a district system, which has 
a significant impact on the nature and functioning of this institution. It fur-
ther weakens the statal focus, which is still far more prominent in the Euro-
pean Parliament. In addition, due to the two-year term its members are up 
for virtually constant re-election and are bound closely to their local inter-
ests.
The House, furthermore, has certain key institutional powers that the Euro-
pean Parliament lacks, such as the right of initiative, including in budget-
ary matters.348 Most importantly, however, Congress as a whole forms the 
whole legislative power only subject to a reversible veto by the executive. 
The legislative power in the EU is far more bound up with the other branch-
es. The European Parliament therefore does not compare with the House. 
And although there was no clear counterpart in the Confederation, this 
relatively weaker role of the European Parliament in the EU also adds to an 
overall confederal element in the legislature.
345 This is not to deny its signifi cant infl uence, especially compared to its days as a mere 
Assembly. Infl uence which might well exceed that of some national parliaments (Dann 
(2010), 255).
346 Art. 14 TEU.
347 For a detailed analysis of the BVG decisions on this point see below chapter 8, section 4.4.
348 Except on budgetary issues the Senate also has a right of initiative. Budget proposals may 
only come from the House, a deliberate limitation on the Senate that was a part of the 
Philadelphia Compromise. For the strengthened powers of the European Parliament on 
the budget, see art. 314 TFEU, especially 314(7)(d).
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5.1.3.3 The European Commission
The third institution in the legislative process is the Commission. At least 
in most fields of EU competence this institution is armed with an exclusive 
right of initiative.349 The Commission also holds some very limited direct 
legislative competence,350 and, in practice much more importantly, may be 
delegated (quasi-)legislative powers by the Council.351 It has also been giv-
en a role in the process for Treaty amendment.352
In its legislative capacity the European Commission has no confederal 
counterpart, since Congress had a full right of initiative.353 Under the fed-
erate set-up, however, the executive was also given a role in the legislative 
process, especially with the presidential veto. The Comparison does not go 
very far however, and it cannot be said that the EU incorporated this mod-
ification as such. The American executive was very differently composed 
with the one elected President who, with no right of initiative only received 
a limited veto.354 The Commission on the other hand received the exclusive 
right of initiative, which also removed this core legislative power from the 
Council and the European Parliament.355 The Commission was, therefore, 
largely given a role at the beginning of the legislative process. Although it 
can withdraw its proposal, it received no veto power at the end of the EU 
legislative process.356
The innovative nature of the Commission, at least in its legislative capacity, 
is therefore also born out by our current comparison.357 In addition, how-
ever, the confederal prism might explain and put into context that innova-
tion. With the rather strong confederal nature of the Council noted above, 
something of a counterpart was needed to control the Member States. Espe-
cially in the beginning with a very weak European Parliament which could 
349 Art. 17(2) TEU and 294(2) TFEU. The Commission may withdraw or amend its proposals 
during the legislative procedure, and the Council may only deviate from the text of the 
Commission proposal by unanimity. (art. 293 TFEU).
350 Art. 106(3) TFEU and art. 45(3)(d) TFEU.
351 Art. 290-291 TFEU. These power can be very broad, but may not concern the ‘essential 
elements of an area.’
352 Art. 48 TEU.
353 Even though the Committee of the States, as the European Commission, could be dele-
gated powers, including some legislative powers.
354 In practice the President can of course suggest legislation, or even have it introduced on 
the fl oor via through allied Members of Congress.
355 Although both the veto and the right of initiative can be seen as blocking powers: both 
can prevent any legislation from being adopted, but cannot ensure their adoption.
356 An interesting exception now exists to this general rule under Article 27(3) TEU, where 
the consent of the Commission is required for the Council to adopt its decision on the 
organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service.
357 Also see J. Temple Lang, ‘How Much do the Smaller Member States Need the European 
Commission/ The Role of the Commission in a Changing Europe’ 39 CMLRev (2002), 
315.
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not play the role of the House, and without knowing how the Court would 
assert itself. Since there could be no strong central executive either,358 a 
more federate element in the legislative process was needed to stabilize the 
constitutional structure.359 At the same time, this central element should not 
become too powerful. In a more confederal style it, therefore, only received 
a negative power, to withhold a proposal.360 Additionally it was to be com-
posed in a very confederal manner, with Commissioners being appointed 
by each state, and larger states even receiving more than one Commissioner 
in the beginning. Even though these Commissioners have to be ‘objective’ 
and independent this set-up is there for a reason.361
The Commission can, therefore, be usefully understood as an attempt 
to infuse a certain controlled amount of federate power into the overall 
structure, thereby counteracting the confederal elements. With the empow-
erment of the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, the 
European bureaucracy and the European Central Bank, the Commission 
may by now, however, seem one of many federalizing elements. This evo-
lution within the institutional structure and balance of power within the 
EU, and how it relates to the confederal –  federate spectrum, will be fur-
ther discussed below. For from the confederal perspective the simultaneous 
ascendancy of the European Council, the increasing powers of the EU, the 
strengthening of the European Parliament and the apparent squeeze on the 
role of the Commission might all be logically related.
On the whole, however, especially looking at the post-Lisbon situation, the 
EU forms a blend of confederal elements and federate modifications. The 
representational scheme remains largely in the confederal spectrum. Not 
just because there is no central people to represent at the EU level, but also 
because the representation of the Member States has not been incorporated 
into a separate, central institution as the Senate, and because the European 
Parliament, despite its direct election, still represents citizens per Member 
State. The requirement of QMV, furthermore, is no proof of federalization 
either. In fact it more resembles the situation under the Articles. At the same 
time, the legislative institutional framework far exceeds that under the Arti-
cles, and both the Commission and the European Parliament are permanent 
358 See section 5.2. below.
359 Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat (1998), 195 et seq.
360 With of course an additional steering power: it decides how the proposal will fi rst be for-
mulated and framed, all later amendments requiring political agreement between multi-
ple parties.
361 All attempts to reduce the Commission so far have therefore stumbled on the importance 
that Member States apparently place on ‘their’ Commissioner. An importance that, for 
that reason alone, should be taken seriously. See in this regard the attempts, from Nice to 
Lisbon, to reduce this to a more manageable number. Lastly, the reduction envisioned by 
art. 17 (5) TFEU was postponed by the European Council (Presidency Conclusions of 11 
and 12 December 2008, par. 2, EU Council 17271/08).
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Brussels-based institutions, providing a truly central input in the legislative 
process, with the Commission even representing the central interest.
5.2 Institutional modifications: The executive
Before we draw more general conclusions on the institutional qualification 
of the EU between our confederate and federate poles, however, we must 
also take into account the other two modifications concerning the executive 
and the judiciary. The next sections will compare the EU with the impres-
sive executive modifications that took place: From virtually no central exec-
utive the United States introduced what, to many contemporaries, must 
have resembled a republican king.
5.2.1 The weak executive under the Articles
The Articles intentionally did not create a strong, separate executive. The 
executive branch was still too strongly associated with monarchy and tyr-
anny. Reliance was placed on the states as the primary executive.362 Some 
form of administration had to take place, however, and, since Congress 
only convened for several months per year, the periods in between sessions 
needed to be covered as well.363
For these reasons, the Articles allowed Congress to set up a ‘Committee 
of the States’ (the Committee).364 Initially it would only sit during recess, 
but the Committee soon became permanent.365 It consisted of one delegate 
from each state, its president to be appointed by Congress. Congress could, 
and did, delegate far-reaching powers to the Committee, including making 
binding requisitions from the states in terms of money, troops and naval 
forces.366
Importantly, the Articles also allowed Congress to establish ‘such other 
committees and civil officers’ as it deemed necessary. Congress could then 
delegate part of its powers to these Committees and officers. Under this 
procedure a form of administration was created. The central offices were the 
362 As discussed above many of the states did not have separate executives either, or cer-
tainly not very strong ones.
363 Jensen (1970), 361-362.
364 The position of the executive had been better under the Dickinson draft, which had envi-
sioned a stronger and permanent Committee, more akin to the European Commission 
now.
365 Jensen (1970), 135-139.
366 See art. X of the Articles of Confederation. Those powers of Congress requiring a majority 
of 9 in Congress could not be delegated.
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Treasury, the State department and the War department.367 The Confedera-
tion did, therefore, have some form of an administration, and at least in law 
had the powers to develop it further. The administration created during the 
Confederation even formed the basis for that of the later Federation, which 
simply took over the existing people and structures.368
Clearly this administration was not nearly as elaborate as modern day 
bureaucracies – Treasury had 15 civil servants – but this should also be seen 
against the general background of government in those days.369 Compli-
ance was very limited however, and the weak executive power of the Con-
federation was seen as one of its core weaknesses.
5.2.2 The powerful executive in the Federation
The impressive arsenal of powers combined in the presidency more 
than illustrates the determination with which the executive flaws of the 
Confederation were addressed.370 As pointed out by opponents of the 
Constitution, and internally admitted by its proponents, the presidency cer-
tainly approached some monarchs in power, if not in nature. The President 
received an impressive array of competences indeed.371 Powers enhanced 
by the fact that the President became the head of a full-blown, and entirely 
separate federate government. The historical coincidence that the first presi-
dent to-be was already a given in the figure of Washington undoubtedly 
helped in establishing such a strong executive.
As a result of this executive upgrade, the federate government no longer 
had to rely solely on the States for execution. This not only isolated the fed-
erate government from any ill will, but also from incompetence in the states. 
For most state governments lacked efficient executives of their own, gen-
erally having been designed from forceful yet untested revolutionary first 
principles. It actually was the federate bureaucracy that would later form 
367 A development that is similar to that in the United Provinces, where the States-General 
could delegate powers to committees made up of one representative per Province, 
together with the Greffi er and the Counsellor Pensionary (Raadspensionaris). The primary 
committees established in this manner concerned foreign affairs, fi nance and the navy. In 
the United Provinces, however, the Council of State and the Stadtholder formed additional 
executive and governing bodies.
368 Jensen (1970), 348.
369 It may also be related to the experience under the British Empire, which had a tradition of 
governing its colonies with a remarkably low number of, usually very highly educated, 
elite civil servants.
370 Privately even strong nationalists/federalists admitted that there existed ‘a preposterous 
combination of powers in the President and the Senate’ (Edward Carrington to Jefferson, 
Oct. 23, 1787, Boyd (ed) Jefferson Papers XII, 255). At the same time the creation of a strong, 
personal, presidency was one of the major victories of the federalist during the conven-
tion.
371 See art. IV US Const.
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the model for improving the executive organization of many states. Besides 
circumventing national executives, the federate government therefore also 
played a part in creating an effective bureaucracy at the statal level, further 
improving the effectiveness of the overall system.
In the original design, the President was to be elected by an electoral col-
lege. A deliberate attempt to make him responsive to the people yet at the 
same time somewhat isolate him from too direct a democratic influence. 
Also, it was assumed that the general public would simply not know the 
relevant candidates. It would consequently be best for them to elect a mid-
dleman who did, and who could choose for them.372
His popular election also meant that the President did not depend on 
the states for legitimacy. His authority derives directly from the whole of the 
American People. In fact he is the only single elected official who is elected 
by the people as a whole, and therefore boasts a legitimacy that trumps that 
of any other elected official individually. The Federate institutional scheme 
thereby not only went from uni-polar to multi-polar, it also based the differ-
ent poles on different, yet fully representative footings.
Combining the separate federate government with the array of powers vest-
ed in the executive, the scene was also set for a large, permanent bureau-
cracy to be developed at the central level. As everywhere, with the advent 
of the modern state, this bureaucracy and the executive expanded signifi-
cantly.
5.2.3 The executive in the EU
The executive branch is the one where the EU has remained most visibly 
confederal.373 The structural similarities with the Confederation are espe-
cially strong and interesting here.
Firstly, and most importantly, as the Confederation, the EU has a rela-
tively weak executive. Its own executive capacity, except in the case of the 
CFSP, is largely located in the European Commission.374 As a watchdog 
372 Currently the delegates commonly pledge to follow the results of the general election, 
and in 30 states they are obliged by law to do so. The directness of the election is further 
tempered by the ‘winner takes all’ system applied in most States, which means that the 
majority of the voters in one State get to award all the electoral votes, in one way leaving 
the minority unrepresented.
373 For an analysis tracing the American and the German model of Executive Federalism in 
the EU, see R. Schütze, ‘From Rome to Lisbon: “Executive Federalism” in the (New) 
European Union’ 47 CMLRev (2010), 1385.
374 Some executive powers may be conferred on the Council. See art. 291 TFEU, as well as 
artt. 24 and 26 TEU. The Council also has the task of overseeing the Stability and Growth 
Pact, see art. 126 TFEU. In addition, special agencies and specialized bodies may be estab-
lished. In the area of the CFSP furthermore, one can see a certain ‘brussalization’ of the 
national executives, which can be seen as a sort of federal capacity building at the nation-
al level.
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of the acquis, the Commission acts as a first line enforcer, especially in the 
field of anti-trust.375 It also controls Member State compliance, assisted by 
complaints from concerned parties, and can start infringement procedures, 
potentially ending in a fine being imposed by the ECJ.376 In addition the 
Commission executes and oversees many EU programs, including impor-
tant subsidy schemes.
The Commission, however, has a very limited institutional capacity, certain-
ly considering the vast area that needs to be covered. In addition, the Com-
mission does not have a police, an army, or other means to actually enforce. 
It either acts through another legal act (be it a decision or a court case), or 
must rely on a Member State.377 Even this limited capacity, of course, far 
exceeds the extremely inadequate capacity of the Confederation, which 
approached zero. Yet overall the EU largely depends on the Member States 
for execution.378 The Member States have to execute and enforce the over-
whelming part of EU law. 379
Second, the composition of this main executive organ shows clear similari-
ties with the Confederation. As the Committee, the Commission consists of 
one member per state, and acts collectively as the executive to which further 
powers can be delegated.380 The Committee as found in the Articles, fur-
thermore, was a deliberately weakened version of the one envisioned by 
the original draft of the Articles. The Committee Dickinson originally envi-
sioned was stronger and even more comparable to the European Commis-
sion. His draft proposed a permanent Committee consisting of one delegate 
per state, which would decide by normal majority of seven. It would fore-
most be a type of war-department coordinating the war against Britain, but 
would also oversee regular execution and coordinate with the States.381
375 Art. 17(1) TEU, art. 101-107 TFEU.
376 art. 258-260 TFEU. Also see art. 7 TEU, where the Commission plays a role.
377 An interesting exception to this is the fi nancial power the Commission has gathered 
through managing large fi nancial schemes. Although still dependent on Member States 
to reclaim any sums paid, the Commission can have the power not to grant or pay out 
any more sums. This fi nancial power is an interesting addition to institutional power, one 
that is also used by the US federate government to gain infl uence where competences 
might fall short. The Confederation did not have this option because it lacked suffi cient 
resources.
378 Lenaerts (1990), 232, 237, and K. Lenaerts, ‘Regulating the Regulatory Process: ‘Delega-
tion of Powers’ in the European Community’, 18 European Law Review (1993), 27.
379 Chalmers, (2007), 348 et seq., D. Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union (OUP 2009), 
esp. chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6.
380 Art. 17(3) TFEU and art. 290 TFEU. These power can be very broad, but may not concern 
the ‘essential elements of an area.’
381 Art. XIX of the Dickinson draft.
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Obviously many important differences exist as well. The Committee, for 
instance, consisted of delegates, and not of individuals specifically selected 
as independent Commissioners. No requirement of independence existed 
for Committee-members. The Committee also did not have the general 
‘watchdog’ function in the way the Commission does, nor were the powers 
delegated to it as extensive. Furthermore, the Committee, being formed out 
of delegates, was not designed as clearly as a distinct institution, balancing 
out Congress, the way that the Commission does with the Council of Minis-
ters and the European Parliament.
Most of all, however, the Committee was not given the opportunity to 
really establish or proof itself.382 What is especially interesting, however, is 
that the Confederation had the internal capacity for institutional develop-
ment to support a more active confederal executive, and that his capacity 
was envisioned along the same structural lines as in the EU. Legally, noth-
ing prevented the Committee, with its subcommittees, to develop into a 
prototype of the European Commission. It lacked, however, certain key 
resources, such as supremacy and direct effect backed by a court, a stronger 
institutional position such as the exclusive right of initiative, an indepen-
dent term of 5 years, clearly pre-defined legal powers, and above all stron-
ger political support.
As a result, the European system, though similar in some regards, is far 
more effective and stable than the confederal one. One interesting, and 
largely confederal, innovation that should not be overlooked in this regard, 
furthermore, is the extensive use of committees and agencies.383 The execu-
tive capacity, and reality, of the EU is strongly determined by such forms 
of cooperation. In a sense these intermediate forms of executive powers 
could be seen as a confederal means of increasing executive power without 
needing to create a separate or fully central executive authority. Rather the 
executive capacity if the Member States is coordinated and somewhat con-
trolled. Despite the risks and weaknesses, this use of intermediate executive 
forms is very interesting, and could form one further tool in stabilizing the 
confederal form more generally. As such an analysis of these forms from the 
confederal perspective could be highly interesting, even though it can only 
be highlighted here.
At the same time the EU also strongly differs from the federate modifica-
tions. The EU executive simply cannot compare to the vast powers and 
separate government controlled by the executive in the US. No institutions 
equivalent to the US President exists in the EU. The newly created ‘President’
382 H.A. Johnson, ‘Towards a reappraisal of the Federal Government 1783-1789’ 8 American 
Journal of Legal History (1964), 316.
383 Curtin (2009), 105 et seq., Chalmers (2010), 117 et seq.
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of the European Council, for instance, does not even begin to compare to 
the powers of the US presidency,384 nor does the President of the Commis-
sion.385
The EU, therefore, has not incorporated the federate executive modifica-
tions. Structurally and institutionally the executive organization of the EU 
remains in the confederal spectrum. At the same time the EU is clearly more 
effective, also as far as enforcement is concerned, than the Confederation. 
Rather than incorporating a federate modification, it seems the EU has man-
aged to increase the effectiveness of a confederal set-up, partially through 
intermediate executive forms, of course acknowledging the many limits 
and weaknesses that remain. The EU has created mechanisms to coordinate 
and utilize the national systems in existence, rather than creating its own 
executive capacity, and ultimately supporting it with the right to use force. 
A system that obviously relies heavily on the effectiveness and compliance 
of national executive infrastructure, yet for a confederal system operates 
rather effectively.386 At the same time the effectiveness of EU law has obvi-
ously been greatly enhanced by one of the key federate modifications that 
was taken over: a central court.
5.3 Institutional modifications: The judiciary
The third and last key institutional modification compared here concerns 
the central judiciary. A modification again shows a radical shift from the 
confederate to the federate system, and one that has had a major impact on 
the functioning of the federate system. A modification also that is of obvious 
interest to the EU.
5.3.1 The (absent) judiciary in the Confederation
The Confederation all but lacked a judicial power. Congress did hold some 
limited judicial competences.387 It was the court of last resort in ‘all dis-
putes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between 
two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other causes 
whatever.’388 Importantly, this jurisdiction explicitly included disputes 
about land granted by two or more states to different individuals, a major 
384 Art. 15(6) TEU. Note in this regard that the Dutch version uses the term ‘voorzitter’ (chair-
men), which is useful as aversion had arisen to the idea the there would be an ‘EU Presi-
dent’.
385 Art. 17(6) TEU.
386 See in more detail below the analysis on the EU and rule by law in chapter 3 section 4.
387 This was in line with the radical ideology of the time, where more and more state legisla-
tures, as highest authorities and ‘voice of the people’, were taking over judicial tasks. 
Faith in direct republican rule and distrust of elites was outweighing fear of the legisla-
ture, and the need to control power via separation and checks.
388 Art. IX Articles of Confederation.
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source of disputes at the time.389 No separate confederal court, however, 
was established to oversee the interpretation of, or compliance with, con-
federal law.
The procedure for the judicial function of Congress, furthermore, was 
very construed, and rather resembled international arbitration. Each state 
could bring a case before Congress, which would then order the states to 
appoint ‘commissioners or judges (…) by joint consent.’ Where parties 
could not agree Congress would select three candidates from each of the 
states. Parties were then allowed to alternately strike out one name until 
thirteen names were left.390 Out of these thirteen, seven were then selected 
by lot. The tribunal thus constituted could then ‘finally determine’ the dis-
pute by a majority of at least five.391 A final and binding ruling could also 
be given in absentia. Judgements became part of Congress’ proceedings. This 
procedure was used, albeit not frequently, and was useful in preventing 
escalation in some very contentious cases.392
The absence of any further judicial institutions not only meant that there 
was no court to ensure compliance, but that there also was no organ outside 
of Congress to authoritatively interpret the Articles. This for instance where 
Congress itself disagreed over the scope of its own powers or the content 
of certain obligations. As a result there also was no authoritative guidance 
for state courts, or state political institutions on their obligations under the 
Articles. As is well known this situation was about to change quite dramati-
cally under the federate constitution.
5.3.2 The essential judiciary in the Federation
The creation of a Supreme Court was a crucial federate modification, cer-
tainly with hindsight. Obviously it is also one of particular interest for the 
EU. The lack of any supervision, as well as the lack of an institution that 
could authoritatively interpret the Articles, was seen as another major flaw 
of the Confederation. Together with the shift towards the notion of a gov-
ernment under the law, and the conception of a constitution as a legal bond 
on all public power, a Court was seen as a logical and necessary part of 
the federate government. Some proposals, especially Hamilton’s, had gone 
further and had wanted to give the centre and with it the Supreme Court, a 
negative on all State laws, but this was seen as unnecessary and as going to 
far.393
389 See Johnson (1964), 323 et seq.
390 Where one of the parties would not cooperate, the secretary of Congress would strike out 
the names for them, so the case could move forward.
391 N.B. the Articles say nothing about the law applicable to the dispute.
392 Jensen (1965), 327 et seq.
393 Proposals that were more in line with the British tradition of the House of Lords.
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The Supreme Court was the only federal court established directly by the 
Constitution. It derived its power and legitimacy directly from that consti-
tution. Going against republican practice in the States, the justices were to 
sit ‘during good behaviour’, and not to be re-elected at regular intervals. 
A significant step, especially when considered together with the enormous 
increase in authority of these justices. The justices, furthermore, were to be 
selected by the President. They were therefore selected by the central gov-
ernment and not by the States.394 The only State check was to require the 
consent of the Senate.395
That the Supreme Court, and the lower federal courts that were to be estab-
lished, would supervise the States and nullify any state laws that conflicted 
with the supreme federal law seems to have been intended. At least from 
the federate logic of a government under law exercising powers delegated 
by the people, the possibility of constitutional review seems to follow quite 
logically.396 Originally ‘intended’ or not, it hardly needs to be said that in 
the 1803 judgment in Marbury v. Madison constitutional review was adopt-
ed, and has played an important role in the American constitutional model 
ever since.397 Many significant changes and adaptations to the constitu-
tional model, for example, occurred via constitutional interpretation. The 
Court has also played an important part in the constantly shifting balance 
between state and federate powers. As such the Supreme Court has fulfilled 
a crucial role in providing, developing, ad guarding the legal framework so 
important for federate systems.398
5.3.3 The judiciary in the EU
The Judicial branch is clearly the branch where the EU has gone furthest in 
incorporating federate modifications. 399 A development that has been vital 
for the nature and functioning of the EU, and forms one of its key innova-
394 Tribe (1988), 244. A system that still, therefore, allowed for signifi cant political infl uence. 
An effect that only increased with the way the Court developed, and the introduction of 
the two party system, as the hearings of Bork and more recently justice Sotomayor attest.
395 Art. II, sec. 2 US Const.
396 Note, however, that the US Supreme Court did not have access to the debates in the Con-
vention until after the 1820’s when the notes by Yates were published. Only in 1840, fur-
thermore, were the reliable, notes by Madison published. All early cases were, therefore, 
necessarily decided on a very limited access to the ‘original understanding’ of the consti-
tution.
397 Nowak and Rotunda (2004), 6 et seq., Choper, Fallon, Kamisar, and Shiffrin (2006), 1 et 
seq.
398 Elazar (2006), Watts (1999).
399 ‘The Change in the status of the Court has been enormous, so that today it more closely 
resembles the equivalent institution of a fully fl edged federation (for example the United 
States Supreme Court or the German BundesVerfassungsGericht) than any other institu-
tion of the Community’ T.C. Hartley Constitutional Problems of the European Union (Hart 
Publishing 1999), 12. Cf also J. Rinze, ‘The Role of the European Court of Justice as a Fed-
eral Constitutional Court’, Public Law (1993), 426.
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tions compared to the standard confederal model.400 Historically confederal 
systems relied on forms more akin to arbitration and structured negotiation 
than adjudication: The old Swiss Confederation, the United Provinces and 
the early German confederation, for instance, all primarily relied on forms 
of arbitration rather than real adjudication.401
The European Court of Justice might not be a Supreme Court in the strict 
sense.402 It only has a very limited direct jurisdiction, and formally stands in 
a cooperative relation with the Member State courts. At the same time it is 
a very powerful central court, generally obeyed by national courts, control-
ling a body of law that, at least from its own perspective, trumps all national 
law.403
As we saw the Confederation completely lacked this judicial element, as 
well as an effective executive. This meant that the political process alone 
was responsible for compliance and interpretation. The flip side of this 
was that all conflicts or disagreements over the Articles became political. The 
question, for instance, whether Rhode Island had met its financial require-
ments was to be decided by Congress. A process that allowed for political 
bargaining, and brought the self-interest of other states who had failed to 
pay in full into play. This reliance on self-policing failed, and created free-
rider and prisoners-dilemma like incentives to violate obligations. The fate 
of the Stability and Growth Pact, or the application of article 7 TEU, form 
EU examples of this problematic confederal dynamic where no stronger 
mechanisms for compliance and interpretation exist. 404
400 Cf amongst many others, K.J. Alter, The European Court’s Political Power (OUP 2009), J. 
Komarek 'Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System –  Building Coherence in 
the Community Legal Order' 42 CMLRev (2005), 9, J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Least Dangerous 
Branch: a retrospective and prospective of the European Court of Justice in the arena of 
political integration’, in: J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: Do the new clothes have an 
emperor?, (CUP 1999), 188, A. Barav, ‘Omnipotent Courts’ in: D. Curtin and T. Heukels 
(eds), The Institutional Dynamics of European Integration. Liber Amicorum Henry G. Scher-
mers (Martinus Nijhoff 1994), 265, or J.H.H. Weiler, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The European 
Court of Justice and its Interlocutors’ 26 Comparative Political Studies (1994), 510.
401 Forsyth (1981), 44. The later courts that developed in the German Bund, furthermore, 
were rather ineffective as courts, as also noted by Madison in his analysis of confederal 
government.
402 Art. 19 TEU.
403 See in this regard also the more confi dent qualifi cation in A.M. Donner, ‘The Constitu-
tional Powers of the Court of Justice of the European Communities’, 11 CMLRev 
(1974),127.
404 See art. 126 TFEU, as well as further below chapter 13 for an application of the confederal 
approach to the EMU crisis.
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The ECJ therefore strongly resembles the federate modification, with the 
Member States not only legally binding themselves through a legal docu-
ment, but also granting a central institution the judicial kompetenz-kompetenz, 
so to speak, to authoritatively interpret that document. 405 Some confederal 
qualifications, however, need to be made.
First the Court does not have the same direct inherent jurisdiction as the 
US Supreme Court. The EU Treaties place specific limits on the jurisdiction 
of the Court. 406 Second, the composition of the Court shows some confed-
eral undertones. The right of each Member State to select its judges for the 
ECJ and the General Court, as well as the relatively short term for judges 
as opposed to their appointment for life in the US are clear confederal ele-
ments. Even if these elements are cancelled out by the professionalism of the 
judges and the micro-cosmos of the Court, they remain a clear reminder of 
the status of the Member States, and the importance of nationality.407 A fact 
the new selection committee cannot alter, although it can at least impose a 
quality threshold on national choices.408
Third, there is the privileged standing for Member States, including 
the right to intervene or request a grand chamber.409 Fourth, and lastly, the 
growing challenge, at least theoretically, to the supremacy of EU law by 
national supreme courts, and the resulting ‘dialogue’ between the ECJ and 
national courts, is a further confederal judicial element. As was discussed 
above, the supremacy claim of the EU does not have the same federate basis 
as the one of the US. The role of the ECJ, therefore also differs, and to an 
extent includes the assignment to convince the national courts to accept its 
lead, and to keep them on board so to speak. The dialogue that now exists 
between the ECJ and the national courts, after all, is difficult to imagine 
between a federate Supreme Court and state courts. Something that again 
reflects the fundamental confederal elements retained by the EU.410
405 Lenaerts (1990), 263 who sees giving a Court the power to umpire between federal units 
as a constituent part of federalism, just as Watts (1998). Further see P.R. Dubinsky, ‘The 
Essential Function of Federal Courts: The European Union and the United States Com-
pared’ 42 American Journal of Comparative Law (1994), 295.
406 Its jurisdiction is furthermore limited in some regards, such as by Art. 24(1) TEU, art. 269 
TFEU, art. 275 TFEU, 276 TFEU, as well as by the limited rights of standing for individuals.
407 Art. 19(2) TEU. See on the other hand relativizing the effect of this method of appoint-
ment F. Jacobs, ‘Advocates General and Judges in the European Court of Justice: Some 
Personal Refl ections’, in: D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), Judicial Review in European 
Union Law, Liber Amicorum Lord Slynn, vol. I (Kluwer Law International 2000).
408 Art. 255 TFEU. See also P. Kapteyn, ‘Refl ections on the Future of the Judicial System of 
the European Union after Nice’, 20 YBEL (2001), 188-189.
409 Art. 263 TFEU.
410 See further below chapter 10, section 8 for a more detailed analysis of supremacy from 
the perspective of confederalism and confederal popular sovereignty.
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In any event and despite these confederal elements, it is beyond doubt that 
the EU has almost fully incorporated the federate modification of a central, 
supreme judiciary. A modification that has had a major impact on its func-
tioning, and is generally seen as having been vital for its survival and devel-
opment.
5.4 Sub-conclusion institutional modifications
Even from the necessarily brief and selective overview provided above, it 
is obvious that the EU institutional scheme far exceeds that of the Confed-
eration.411 At least in complexity and elaborateness it more resembles the 
federate constitution, having multiple distinct institutions dividing and 
connecting branches and mutually checking each other. A conclusion is only 
strengthened when the increasingly central European Central bank and the 
federate Monetary Union it presides over is added to the equation.412
A closer comparison, however, shows that as far as the nature and focus 
of the institutions discussed are concerned, strong confederal elements still 
exist in between these significant federate elements.
The executive has remained most clearly confederal, though it has been 
empowered compared to the virtually absent executive of the Confedera-
tion. Despite retaining a fundamentally confederal nature, furthermore, the 
EU executive has managed to achieve a relatively high level of effectiveness. 
It was partly enabled to do so by the most federate branch of the EU insti-
tutional framework, the judiciary. With the European Court of Justice the 
EU has almost fully incorporated the federate judicial modification that also 
proved so crucial in the US itself.
411 See for instance G. de Búrca, ‘The Institutional Development of the EU: A Constitutional 
Analysis’, in: P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU law (OUP1999), 55 et seq. 
In fact historically confederations seem to have been generally underdeveloped institu-
tionally. Both the Swiss Confederation and the German Bund, for instance, only had one 
formal institution in the form of the Diet (general assembly). The high level of institution-
alization of the EU may, therefore, also be seen as a separate modifi cation in itself. Cf also 
Forsyth (1981) p. 32.
412 See on the federal nature of the monetary union already the language of the Werner rap-
port in 1969, para 30, explicitly calling the ECB federal ‘Considering the political struc-
ture of Community and the advantages of making existing central banks part of a new 
system, the domestic and international monetary policy-making of the Community 
should be organized in a federal form, in what might be called a European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB).’
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The modifications to the legislature discussed here show more of a blended 
system, which combines confederal and federate elements, especially in the 
European Parliament.413 Elements often quoted in support of the ‘federal’ 
nature of the EU, such as the use of QMV or the Council as an ‘EU Senate’, 
however, are not that federate at all. Rather these elements match the con-
federal scheme under the Articles.
Overall the legislative structure of the EU, and the representational 
scheme it contains, remains predominantly in the confederal sphere, also 
because there simply is no central people to federally represent at the EU level.
6 The Confederal Comparison: Overview and conclusions
Before further analyzing the results of our comparison it is useful to briefly 
combine and summarize our findings above. What is the combined conclu-
sion on the constitutional DNA of the EU when compared against our six-
teen (con)federate markers?
To begin with, none of the five fundamental modifications discussed were 
taken over. The EU is not based on a single people, and it may not use force 
or levy taxes. Amendment by majority it not possible, but secession is. Some 
other modifications have partially taken over the constitutional function of 
these foundational modifications, such as pseudo-amendment of the Treaty 
via judicial interpretation, or the effective levying of money from the Mem-
ber States. Nevertheless, as far as its foundation is concerned, the EU has 
remained fully in the confederal camp.
The structural modifications compared provide an almost reverse picture: 
supremacy and direct effect have been taken over, even if the character of 
supremacy is different in the EU than it is in the US Federation. These two 
elements form pillars of the EU legal order. They have also allowed the EU 
to embrace the rule of law as a key instrument just as in the US Federation. 
The more fundamental federate foundation of a fully separate European 
government based directly on the people, was however not adopted. Rather 
the EU relies on a merged system, and, therefore, on the Member States’ 
internal institutions to a very large degree.414 As a result the system oper-
ates directly on the people but is not directly based on them, nor backed by 
its own separate level of government. This is not a novel point of course, but 
an important one for understanding the structural limitations and problems 
413 Burgess (2009), 41: ‘(…) the existing institutional channels of the EU that represent the 
Member State governments, such as the Council of Ministers and the European Council 
that constitute the confederal dimension of the European project. The EU, we are remind-
ed, is a political, economic, social and legal hybrid that is characterized by a combination 
of federal, confederal, supranational and intergovernmental features.’
414 See for instance Craig (1999), 16 et seq.
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of the EU. After all, tension between foundation and structure can only be 
expected in such a situation, as will be further explored below.
The third cluster concerned the objectives and competences of the polities 
compared. Assembling the larger picture within this cluster, an interesting 
blend appears. First we saw that, as far as objectives were concerned, the 
EU differs from both the Articles and the US Federation through its domi-
nant focus on internal objectives, and its relative lack of external and mili-
tary ones. As it were especially these external and military competences that 
dominated the objectives of the Confederation, this leaves the EU, on bal-
ance, more on the federate side.
Second, and crucially the EU doctrine of attribution and the purpose-
ful interpretation of competences come much closer to the Federation than 
to the Confederation.415 The EU utilizes an implied powers doctrine, com-
bined with the extra possibilities that art 352 TFEU offers.416 Through these 
channels its many objectives amplify its competences in a way that would 
have been completely unacceptable in the Confederation. The important 
role this grants to the objectives, in addition to the actual power conferring 
clauses, can almost be seen as another federate modification in itself. Not 
surprisingly these modifications played an important role in the develop-
ment of the EU. Just as in the US federation, they allowed it to develop, 
achieve its objectives, and adapt far better than the Confederation.
Thirdly, regarding specific competences, the EU also comes much closer 
to the US Federation as far as its internal powers to regulate commerce are 
concerned. Even though the Confederation had the explicit objective to cre-
ate an internal market, and even contained some prohibitions that resemble 
the four freedoms, it did not have any competences to achieve its internal 
economic objectives, nor an effective system to enforce them. The EU does 
wield these competences, and does so in a way that strongly resembles the 
commerce clause and the necessary and proper clauses.
At the same time, however, the EU clearly does not come close to the 
external competences of the Confederation or the Federation. Despite the 
increasing relevance of the external for the EU, its centre of gravity remains 
internal. Interestingly the EU thereby emerges as something like a mirror-
image of the Confederation: both cover one side of the competences award-
ed to the Federation. This is additionally interesting as confederal systems 
historically were generally more concerned with the external than with the 
internal dimension of government. Crucially this means that the EU does 
not necessarily have more or less far-reaching powers than the US Confed-
eration. After all the power to declare and wage war is a rather significant 
one. Yet it is so in a very different and less day-to-day manner than the com-
petence to create and regulate an internal market.
415 Douglas-Scott (2002), 261.
416 Dashwood (2009), 35 et seq.
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At the institutional level three major modifications were highlighted in the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The judiciary thereby formed 
the most clear and most far-reaching federate modification in the institu-
tional structure of the EU. A completely separate court has been established, 
which has developed into a central and influential actor within the EU. The 
establishment of a Court is intimately related to many of the other federate 
modifications, and in fact largely responsible for several rather important 
ones.417 Different from the US, however, this central court was not support-
ed by its own branch of ‘federal’ courts.
The Executive, on the other hand, remained predominantly confederal. 
Although more developed than under the Confederation, it does not even 
approach the federate executive created under the President. In addition it 
largely remains dependent on the executive capacity of the Member States.418
The legislature presented a more mixed picture. As far as the decisional 
system is concerned the increased use of QMV in fact fully remains within 
the confederal prism, whereas the central role of state representatives in the 
decision-making process does so even more. The introduction and gradual 
empowerment of the European Parliament, especially after the introduction 
of direct elections, in turn forms an important modification. Even if degres-
sively proportional, it creates a direct link between Member Peoples and 
the EU. In general, however, the decision-making is still dominated by the 
Council, Commission, and now increasingly the European Council.
This also brings us to the representational scheme, which was one of the 
key bones of contention in Philadelphia. Here the overall result seems more 
confederal. The European Parliament again forms a major innovation from 
the Confederation. Even leaving the confederal elements of the European 
Parliament aside, however, the overall balance of representation far more 
rests on statal representation than the more ‘national’ scheme developed 
in Philadelphia. Especially the strong influence of the Council of Ministers, 
and increasingly the European Council, are relevant in this regard. Where 
in the US Federation even the State vote was given to a federate institution 
with independent individuals, these EU institutions consist of direct state 
representatives whose European powers depend on their national roles. Dif-
ferent from the European Parliament, furthermore, their consent is always 
required for any act to become law. The representational scheme thereby 
directly reflects the lack of a single European people. This is a fundamen-
tal difference with the national scheme developed in Philadelphia, where 
not only one man one vote was introduced for the House, representing full 
political equality of all American citizens, but even the statal representation 
417 See further below chapter 3, section 4 on the rule by law and the role of the ECJ in this 
regard.
418 Aided by direct effect and supremacy, that enlisted individuals and national courts to 
ensure the proper application of EU law. See also P. Craig, ‘Once upon a Time in the West: 
Direct Effect and the Federalization of EEC law’ 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1992), 453.
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was subsumed in a federate institution. Especially nothing like the Euro-
pean Council, now gaining prominence, was created in the US. Instead, a 
powerful central executive was included in the federate legislative process. 
Overall therefore, the legislative structure, and certainly the representative 
scheme of the EU fall more in the confederal than in the federate camp.
Of the sixteen modifications discussed, the EU therefore remains on the 
confederal side of the equation for eight. (No single people, no force, no 
direct taxation, no amendment by majority, secession, merged government, 
the executive and the representational scheme). Five scored as federate, or 
at least predominantly so (Supremacy, direct effect, broad attribution and 
implied powers, internal commerce competences, and a central judiciary. 
Three are here qualified as mixed (objectives, external powers, and the insti-
tutional setup of the legislature). These are either blended, the EU conforms 
to neither, or equally to both.
On the truly foundational modifications therefore, the EU remains overwhelm-
ingly confederal. It equally remains firmly in the confederal camp for sever-
al other rather fundamental points such as the use of a merged government, 
and the lack of a strong and independent executive.
Most of the federate modifications that have been taken over, on the 
other hand, concern the legal infrastructure and competences. These include 
the – mutually reinforcing – federate modifications of supremacy, direct 
effect, attribution, and the internal market competences. Many of these 
modifications were made possible by the institutional modification of a cen-
tral court with the competence to rule on the interpretation of the Treaty. 
These findings have been summarized in the table below:
Category Modification US CF Blended US Fed.
Institutional 16 Judiciary
15 Executive
14 Legislature
13 Representation 
Competences 12 Internal / commerce comps
11 War and external comps
10 Doctrine of attribution 
9 Specific objectives
Structural 8 Direct effect
7 Supremacy
6 Separate or merged gov
Fundamentals 5 Enlargement / secession
4 Amendment by majority
3 Taxation
2 Use of force
1 Single people
8 3 5
US CF Blended US Fed.
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Of course these comparative points only form one selection and their bina-
ry qualification as either confederate or federate does not do justice to the 
complexities involved. Nevertheless it is suggested that the overall outcome 
does have some value for better understanding where and how the EU can 
be placed on the spectrum between the American confederate and federate 
systems. Again taking the limitations of these comparative conclusions into 
account, the next chapter uses these comparative outcomes to develop some 
more general conclusions on the nature and functioning of the EU consti-
tutional order. Conclusions which aim to test the value of the comparison 
made, and at the same time explore what this comparison can provide us 
with in terms of understanding, inspiration and perhaps even solutions to 
some of the problems facing the interesting constitutional creature known 
as the EU.
1 Introduction: Three general propositions on the nature of 
the EU
So where do these comparative findings leave us? Switching to a more ana-
lytical mode this chapter further refines the semi crude results of our com-
parison. The central aim is to better extract and test any explanatory power 
for the EU they might hold.
To that end this chapter brings together the different comparative 
insights into three more general propositions. First, how the EU may be 
understood as an inverted confederation, which has reversed the traditional 
confederal focus from the external to the internal. Second, how the EU has 
adapted the confederal form by reinforcing and burdening its confederal basis 
with a partially federalized superstructure. Third, how this inverted and adapt-
ed structure heavily relies on a rule by law, and therefore on the very stable 
legal and administrative systems of its Member States. The term ‘modified 
confederation’ will be used to refer to these three propositions and the mod-
ernized system they jointly create more generally.
To expound and test these propositions they will be applied to the 
EU. In line with the overall objectives of this thesis the question thereby 
is whether these confederal propositions help us to better understand the 
nature and functioning of the EU. More specifically it will be examined if 
these propositions help us to better comprehend some of the surprising 
strengths of the EU, as well as some of its weaknesses.
To this end this chapter first introduces each proposition, and discusses how 
they flow from the comparative findings in the previous chapter. For each 
proposition, and the modifications underlying it, it will then be explored 
if they help explain some of the remarkable strengths of the EU’s constitu-
tional set-up. After all, confederal systems are not exactly known for their 
robustness, so it must be wondered how the EU has managed to survive 
so far. Has it, for instance, managed to remove or compensate for some of 
the structural weaknesses traditionally associated with confederal systems? 
Approaching the EU through these confederal propositions may, therefore, 
help to expose some of the hidden pillars of EU stability. Pillars which could 
then be further developed, or at least guarded from accidental demolition.
3 The EU as an inverted confederation with 
a federate superstructure: The strengths 
of a modified confederal form
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Subsequently it must also be examined if the modified confederal sys-
tem of the EU, as captured in these propositions, may help to better under-
stand the obvious weaknesses of the EU’s constitutional structure. For several 
well-known ailments of the EU may be partially understood as logical con-
sequences of its modified (con)federal set-up. Ailments which either can be 
traced back to the traditional weak spots of the confederal form, or which 
may have been newly created by the EU modifications to the traditional 
confederal form.
It should be noted that the analysis in this chapter remains descriptive. 
Although no longer based on a structured comparison alone, the analy-
sis aims to describe and understand the EU constitutional system as it is, 
including both its strengths and weaknesses. It does not yet concern the 
question whether a (modified) confederal system is also an option that 
should be normatively desired.
1.1 Structure
In light of these aims this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 first 
introduces the first proposition on the inverted nature of the EU confederal 
form, and subsequently explores its potential contribution to strengthening 
the constitutional framework of the EU. Sections 3 and 4 then do the same 
for the other two propositions on the federate superstructure of the EU and 
its reliance on a rule by law. Combining these three propositions, sections 
5 and 6 then return to the withering criticism levelled by Madison against 
confederal systems: Do the modifications described help to alleviate the 
confederal ailments he diagnosed?
1.2 Caveats and limits
Clearly the comments in this section are equally affected by all the limita-
tions of the comparison it rests on. In light of the type of analysis, its restrict-
ed scope, and the vast, multifaceted problems under study the limitations of 
these conclusions must again be stressed. Different conclusions and propo-
sitions, furthermore, could be selected for discussion, and even within the 
confederal perspective suggested much more work is required than can be 
done here.
Based as they are on a limited comparison, furthermore, and on the rela-
tively abstract discipline of constitutional theory, the conclusions devel-
oped here cannot proof direct, specific causality, if only because they lack 
the empirical foundation such claims would require. Nor can they claim 
to be sufficient explanations, as many other factors relevant for objects and 
processes under study cannot be taken into account here. Rather, any con-
clusions drawn suggest likely relations and consequences based on the ana-
lytical, comparative approach followed. By themselves these might form the 
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basis for more specific research in the future. At the same time it is neverthe-
less claimed that the proposed conclusions are sufficiently likely, and offer a 
constructive framework to approach and understand the EU constitutional 
order. A claim at least made likely by the fit between some of the generally 
acknowledged strengths and weaknesses of the EU, and those indeed pre-
dicted by the propositions developed here.
2 The inverted confederation: Europe as Impire
Traditionally confederations were primarily focussed externally. Their main 
objectives and competences lay in defence and foreign policy.1 Internally, 
their role was limited, and the members’ internal organization was left rela-
tively intact.2 The US Confederation followed this traditional pattern. It had 
exclusive war competences as well as general external competences. Legal-
ly it removed the states from the international plane, as under the Articles 
these were no longer allowed to conduct independent external relations.3 
Its internal competences, on the other hand, were limited. Most importantly 
it lacked the power to regulate trade internally, even though the Articles 
explicitly contained prohibitions we would now qualify as negative integra-
tion. A lack of internal competences that, as discussed above, contributed to 
its overall instability.4
The EU inverted this traditional confederal pattern. It lacks the external, and 
especially the military, focus and competences of the Confederation. Instead 
its primary focus is internal and economic.5 With its mutually reinforcing 
1 The United Provinces of the Netherlands, for instance, originated de facto in the wartime 
alliance that was the Union of Utrecht of 1579, and its main powers remained in external 
relations, defence and crucially the navy. The original Swiss confederation (1291(or 1315)-
1798) also was defensive in origin. The restored Swiss confederation (1815-1848) was 
aimed at both ‘economic and military affairs’, though its main focus was defensive as 
well. The economic dimension largely related to the attempted unifi cation during the 
Helvetic Republic, which could not be undone. Rather, it was only after the more federate 
constitution of 1848 that the central union really entered the fi eld of welfare and econo-
my. The German Bund of 1815 was also mainly focussed on security and defence, even if 
this security focus was also focussed internally. Hence the later separate development of 
the Zollverein. Carl Schmitt even defi nes a confederation as an ‘alliance’, being a ‘contrac-
tual relation that obligates a state to go to war in a particular instance.’ Schmitt (2008), 383. 
See further Lenaerts (1990), 233. Forsyth (1981), 17, 27, 29, 48, and 160, 190, and Elazar 
(2006), 7.
2 Jensen (1970), 133.
3 The fact that in practice the states often blatantly violated this obligation does not detract 
from the legal or constitutional focus of the Articles.
4 See chapter 1, section 5. A pattern also born out by its institutional development. The 
departments that were relatively developed were war, foreign affairs, and fi nances.
5 See also Forsyth (1981), 5.
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objectives of European peace and prosperity its centre of gravity lies with 
the internal organization of its Member States and its market.6
The primary instrument chosen to achieve the objectives of peace and pros-
perity reflects this internal focus: economic integration, which is not just an 
end in itself but also fosters interdependence via peace-dependent wealth. 
78 Not incidentally this instrument involves the creation of one internal mar-
ket.9 Constructions which Elazar pertinently defines as ‘forms of confedera-
tion emphasizing shared economic rather than political functions’, and as 
such form a ‘postmodern application of the federal principle.’10 Logically, 
the specific competences of the EU match its internal focus. As discussed 
above its key competences concern the development of an internal market, 
and other related internal objectives.11
6 Chalmers, Davies and Monti (2010), 12, 676, Van Middelaar (2009), 224-225. M.P. Maduro, 
‘Reforming the Market or the State? Article 30 and the European Constitution: Economic 
Freedom and Political Rights’ 4 European Law Journal (1997), 55 or Elazar (2006), 53: 
‘because the countries of Western Europe had mature economies, economic integration 
was the most logical way for them to proceed. In doing so, they invented a new way to 
confederate, through the Union of specifi c functions rather than through a general act of 
confederation.’
7 Cf already the Schuman declaration of 9 May 1950 and its openly federal vision: ‘The 
solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France 
and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible. The setting up 
of this powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing to take part and bound 
ultimately to provide all the member countries with the basic elements of industrial pro-
duction on the same terms, will lay a true foundation for their economic unifi cation.’ See 
in this regard also the neo-functionalist hopes underlying integration, which were based 
on the functionalist theories as developed by inter alia Mitrany and Haas. See D. Mitrany. 
‘The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional’, 4 Journal of Common Market Studies 
(1966), 119, E. Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization 
(Stanford University Press 1964) and P. Schmitter, ‘Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses 
about International Integration’ 23 International Organization (1969), 562.
8 Cf Habermas (2001a), 5, 7 and 13: ‘EU elites have replaced the original aims (of integra-
tion) with an ambitious economic agenda’. Of course, as he states, this focus also is a 
weak point for legitimacy: ‘Economic expectations are not a strong enough motivation to 
induce the population to give their political support to the risk-fi lled project of the cre-
ation of a “Union” that would be deserving of the name. for that we need a common val-
ue orientation.’ and the problem therefore lies in ‘disparity between dense economic and 
weak political interpenetration.’
9 See for instance the language in the Treaty of Rome where the customs union, free move-
ment, and transport are all grouped in title II, appropriately called: ‘The Foundations of the 
Community’. See also case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, where the Court unequivocally states 
that: ‘The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a common market, the func-
tioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community, implies that 
this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between 
the contracting states.’ Also see H. Lindahl, ‘Sovereignty and Representation in the Euro-
pean Union’, in: N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in transition (Hart Publishing 2006), 104.
10 Elazar (2006), 7.
11 See especially art. 3-5 TFEU, yet also art. 21 TEU, and above chapter 2, section 4.3.3.
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On the other hand the EU plays a far less prominent role in general external 
relations, especially of the ‘high politics’ kind.12 Its role is even more lim-
ited in defence and national security, especially when compared with the 
Confederation. Not incidentally the EU was created after two devastating 
wars between European nations. Europe had to be protected against its own 
(once) powerful armies and the nationalist ambitions and emotions that had 
inspired their use.13 The luxury of this internal focus was of course made 
possible only by American (nuclear) protection,14 which sheltered the EU 
from a more Spartan upbringing it might not have survived.15 The fact that 
even the Russian threat and the heated fears of the Cold War, realistic or 
not, did not lead to more far-reaching military cooperation underscores this 
internal focus of the European project, and its lack of a strong external, and 
certainly military, dimension.16 The failure of the European Defence Com-
munity and the Political Union further completes this picture.17
12 Art. 24(1) TEU not incidentally maintains a separate status for this area. See also E. Can-
nizzaro, ‘Unity and Pluralism in the EU’s Foreign Relations Power’, in: C. Barnard, The 
Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited: Assessing the Impact of the Constitutional Debate (OUP 
2007), 232.
13 This transformation of nationalism into an enemy by itself may also have assisted in the 
non-military focus of the EU. After all military might is of no use against such an ethereal 
enemy, but might only help to increase it.
14 Cf. S. Hoffmann, ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The fate of the Nation-State and the case of 
Western Europe’ , 95 Daedalus (1966), 3. Of course the US also had their own aims and 
uses for European integration. These included, inter alia, a strong western European block 
against Russia. See on this point T. Schwartz, ‘The Skeleton Key: American Foreign Poli-
cy, European Integration, and German Rearmament, 1949-54’ 10 Central European History 
(1986), 369, as well as the express desire of the Americans, already in 1949, for the Europe-
ans to establish some form of ‘supranational institutions, operating on a less than una-
nimity basis for dealing with specifi c, economic, social and perhaps other problems’ 
(Minister Acheson to his European ambassadors, letter of 19 October 1949, in A. Milward, 
The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951 (Methuen & Co 1984), 391.
15 The cold-war reality of course also meant that the nations of Europe could not even have 
conducted much of an independent foreign policy even if they had united for that pur-
pose. Cf Habermas as cited in J. P. McCormick, Weber, Habermas and Transformations of the 
European State (CUP 2007), 198.
16 The fact that some of the most dominant Member States disagreed signifi cantly in world 
views also prevented joint action externally of course. Furthermore this is not to deny the 
clear threat that the six perceived Russia to be. Adenauer, for instance, saw a German-
French cooperation as a clear means to protect western Europe against Russia (Cf his 
statements in J. Koch, ‘Konrad Adenauer und der Schuman-Plan. Ein Quellenzeugnis’, 
in: K. Schwabe (ed), Anfänge des Schuman-Plans 1950-1951 (Bruylant 1988), 131 et seq. The 
more limited point here is that they nevertheless did not feel a suffi cient need to set up an 
external defense capacity, such as in the US Confederation, to counter this threat.
17 The European Defence Community was a clear failure, and the WEU has equally never 
really played any role of signifi cance. See for instance Dwan (2001), 141.
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2.1 The relevance of the external for the EU…
Clearly these findings do not deny the increasing, and increasingly impor-
tant, external dimension of the EU, also in ‘high’ politics.18 Since the Treaty 
of Rome the EU has seen an impressive increase in its external objectives 
and powers.19 The fall of the Berlin wall also pushed the EU further onto 
the international stage: one could say that before 1989 the wall also kept 
part of the high politics out of European integration.20
Especially with Maastricht and Lisbon, therefore, the EU has become 
an increasingly important international actor.21 The establishment of 
the European External Action Service,22 and the creation of the High 
Representative,23 together with the ‘incorporation’ of the former third pillar 
are only recent, though significant, developments in this ongoing process.
In addition to these explicit external competences, furthermore, the external 
has become increasingly enmeshed with the ‘internal’ and economic com-
petences. To begin with, and largely due to the progressive case law of the 
Court of Justice, the EU is externally competent where this is necessary to 
effectively pursue an internal competence or objective,24 wherever it is pro-
vided for in a legally binding Union act,25 or where the external act is likely 
18 Cf in this regard also the ‘Declaration on The European Identity’ published by the Nine 
Foreign Ministers on 14 December 1973 in Copenhagen, especially point 6: ‘Although in 
the past the European countries were individually able to play a major rôle on the inter-
national scene, present international problems are diffi cult for any of the Nine to solve 
alone. International developments and the growing concentration of power and respon-
sibility in the hands of a very small number of great powers mean that Europe must unite 
and speak increasingly with one voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper 
rôle in the world.’
19 Under the Treaty of Rome, for instance, there were 86 treaty articles dealing with specifi c 
competences and decision-making rules. Under Nice this had already grown to 254, and 
Lisbon has only increased this number. See A. Maurer Committees in the EU system: A deli-
berative perspective, 8. Available via: http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/
projects/cidel/old/Workshop_Firenze/contMaurer.pdf.
20 Cf also Van Middelaar (2009), 186, 190, and 255 et seq.
21 Most certainly so in areas where it has exclusive competences, such as in the CCP. See art. 
206-207 TFEU and already Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR 1355. Here the EU forms a strong 
block.
22 Art. 27(3) TEU, Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and func-
tioning of the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU) OJ (2010) L 201/30. 
Blockmans and Hillion (2013).
23 Art. 18 TEU.
24 Now also see art. 216(1) TFEU. Case 22/70, AETR, and for recent application the open 
skies cases, including case C-467/98 Commission v Denmark (‘Open Skies’) [2002] ECR 
I-9519.Further for the elaborate development of this principle P. Eeckhout, The External 
Relations of the European Union: legal and Constitutional Foundations (OUP 2004), ch. 3.
25 Opinion 1/94 World trade Organization Agreements [1994] ECR I-5267, para. 95, Opinion 
2/92 Third Revised Decision of the OECD on National Treatment [1995] ECR I-521 par. 33 and 
Case C-476/98 Commission v. Germany (Open Skies) [2002] ECR I-9855 par. 109.
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to affect common rules or alter their scope.26 The internal competence, so to 
say, begets the external competence as well. These internal-external compe-
tences are, furthermore, flanked by the doctrine of loyal cooperation.27 Even 
where the Member States remain competent to act, and even where the area 
concerned does not fall within the competence of the EU at all, their actions 
may not interfere with any EU measures in place. In this way EU measures 
affect the external activity of Member States in areas where the EU has no 
competence at all.28
Lastly, and conversely, the external relevance of the internal achievements 
of the EU should not be underestimated. Precisely by forming one coordi-
nated block internally the external relevance of the EU and its members is 
enhanced. Larger Member States, who can with some credibility claim to 
speak on behalf of ‘Europe’ externally, may in this way enhance their exter-
nal relevance, or at least somewhat reduce the loss of external relevance vis-
à-vis upcoming powers. In this sense the EU can be seen as a replacement for 
Empire instead as the creation of an impire.29 Smaller Member States may 
(jointly) acquire some influence on the international plane, which would be 
wholly absent without the EU. Lastly, the presence of a strong Europe on 
the multi-polar chessboard might be welcomed by different external actors, 
albeit for different reasons.
2.2 …but the primacy of the internal and economic
The inverted focus of the EU, therefore, does not imply the absence of an 
external dimension. Just as the American Confederation did have an inter-
nal dimension, the EU does have an external dimension, and one that is 
becoming increasingly important. In fact, just as one major challenge for the 
Confederation became to establish an adequate internal policy, one mayor 
challenge of the EU is to add a sufficiently strong and coherent external 
policy to its internal powers without overstepping the limits inherent in its 
(confederal) form. Yet, as the US Confederation illustrates at the same time, 
a strong unified external representation is not impossible in a confederation 
at all. Quite the reverse, in fact, as historically confederations were aimed 
externally, not internally.
26 See especially Opinion 1/03 Lugano Convention [2006] ECR I-1145.
27 Though of course based in the Treaties. Since Lisbon see art. 4(3) and 24(3) TEU.
28 Art. 4(3) TFEU. See further Opinion 1/03, par. 119, and case C-459/03 Commission v Ire-
land [2006] ECR I-4635, par. 174. Also see C. Hillion, ‘Mixity and Coherence in EU Exter-
nal Relations’, in: C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited (Hart Pub-
lishing 2010), 91. For an especially broad application of this normally already immodest 
principle see the PFOS judgment, case C-246/07 Commission / Sweden (PFOS) [2010] ECR 
I-3317.
29 Although generally the non-core parts of an empire did not have voting rights or veto’s.
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Nevertheless, these important external dimensions of the EU do not 
alter the EU’s primary internal focus, and certainly not its focus on market 
over military.30 A quantitative overview of the Acquis provides a clear illus-
tration. A 2009 study, for instance, found that of all EU legislation in force 
on 1 July 2008, 42.6% concerned agriculture, and another 20% the internal 
market, including legislation on free movement. External relations, on the 
other hand, accounted for approximately 10%.31
Even though such a quantitative overview may ignore the qualitative 
importance of specific pieces of legislation, as well as non-legislative activi-
ties, and even though the fields of agriculture and the internal market have 
external implications, the overall trend is clear. Conversely, furthermore, 
and partially due to the linkage of internal and external competences, even 
most EU external competence are aimed at trade and commerce, and not at 
defence or general external relations. A fact nicely born out by comparing 
the role of the EU in international organizations. In trade related interna-
tional organisations such as the WTO, the EU plays a dominant role, where-
as it remain the Member States that dominate in organizations such as the 
UN or NATO.32
Above all, even when the external powers of the EU are duly taken into 
account, they do not come close to the exclusive external, and especially 
military, competences of the Confederation.33 The Articles completely 
removed its members from the international plane and gave Congress the 
power to declare and wage war by qualified majority. At least comparative-
ly, therefore, the EU has an internal and economic focus.
30 E-U. Petersmann, ‘From State Sovereignty to the ‘Sovereignty of Citizens’ in the Interna-
tional Relations of the EU?’, in: N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 
2006), 152. Cf also the description by Joshka Fischer of the EU’s foreign policy given to 
Van Middelaar: ‘Vergeleken met vroeger is het heel wat. Vergeleken met wat nodig is, is 
het niets.’ (compared to the early days it is quite something. Compared to what is need-
ed, it is nothing.’ Van Middelaar (2009), 292.
31 Y. Bertoncini, ‘La législation nationale d’origine communautaire: briser le mythe des 
80%’, ‘Notre Europe, Les Brefs No. 13 May 2009, available at http://www.notre-europe.
eu/uploads/tx_publication/Bref13-YBertoncini_01.pdf. Also see for similar conclusions 
C. Grønnegaard, ‘EU Legislation and National Regulation: Uncertain Steps Towards a 
European Public Policy’, Public administration (2010), 3 et seq.
32 Also see below chapter 4, section 3.1. on the limited reach of confederations in general in 
areas where law and civil servants play a more limited role.
33 See in this regard also art. 42(2) TEU and the 2008 Declaration of the European Council: 
‘The Treaty of Lisbon does not prejudice the security and defence policy of Member 
States, including Ireland’s traditional policy of neutrality, and the obligations of most 
other Member States. (Presidency Conclusions of 11 and 12 December 2008, EU Council 
17271/08 REV 1. See also Rosas and Armati (2010), 7 and 198.
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2.3 Inverting the confederal pattern
Where the main objectives and competences of the Confederation, there-
fore, lay in external relations and war but were lacking in trade, the EU 
has reversed this pattern. The centre has acquired near federate powers to 
regulate all kinds of subjects as long as a certain connection to the inter-
nal market is present.34 Defence, on the other hand, remains firmly with the 
Member States. The EU can therefore be seen as a mirror-image of the Con-
federation in terms of focus, objectives and competences. To borrow a term 
from Ferguson, Europe has been constructed as an Impire, with an internal 
focus on peace and prosperity, not an Empire with external military fears or 
ambitions.35
As the EU forms one of the most powerful economic blocks in the world, 
and taking into account the paramount importance of economic perfor-
mance today, this might not be a bad choice.36 The only point made here, 
with all caveats that accompany such a generalization of complex entities, is 
the general picture of an EU grounded in exactly the opposite arena of gov-
ernmental functions and objectives as the US Confederation.
2.4 The constitutional benefits of inverted confederalism
It is submitted that this shift in focus and foundation – infusing a confederal 
basis with internal market objectives – has been an important modification 
of the confederal model, and that this modification has strengthened the 
constitutional framework of the EU in several ways. The next sections will 
discuss four of these structural benefits of inversion, being the more con-
stant impetus for cooperation it provides (2.4.1.), the structural-institutional 
benefits of inversion (2.4.2.), the self deepening effect of an inverted focus 
34 As long as this dimension is present, even areas in which the EU does not have legislative 
competence as such may be addressed, even where an explicit ban on harmonisation has 
been included in the Treaty. Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I, case C-380/03 Tobacco 
Advertising II, and case C-210/03 Swedish Match. M. Kumm, ‘Constitutionalising Subsid-
iarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco Regulation in the European Union’ 12 
European Law Journal (2006), 503.
35 See N. Ferguson, Empire (Basic Books 2004).
36 See also J. Huysmans, ‘Discussing Sovereignty and Transnational Politics’, in: N. Walker 
(ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2006), 218. Currently, furthermore, it seems 
the stock market seems a far more effi cient way to acquire another nation than military 
conquest, and of course endless money has always been the sinews, or veins, of war. At 
the same time the ascending military might of China, estimated to have a fully modern-
ized army by 20202, including modern aircraft carriers, stealth airplanes, cyber warfare 
capabilities and anti-satellite missiles, combined with the declining military might of the 
United States might seem a worthy cause of concern. Cf. The perhaps not fully objective 
2011 U.S. Defense Department's annual assessment to Congress on the Chinese military, 
available via: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/25/us-usa-china-idUS-
TRE77N5TY20110825.
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(2.4.3.), and the coalescence of this inverted focus with a shift from state to 
market more generally (2.4.4.).
2.4.1 A constant impetus for cooperation
Most centrally it is suggested that its internal and economic focus has pro-
vided the EU with a more constant impetus for continued loyal cooperation 
than a focus on external relations and defence could have. It provided a bet-
ter engine, or fuel cell, to power the continuous cooperation that is required 
to keep a confederal system moving and to prevent it from stalling or even 
disintegrating.37
One of the major problems for confederations always lay in the lack of 
effectiveness and enforcement. As soon as the benefits of the confedera-
tion became more remote, the temptation to pursue individual state inter-
ests increased, even where this would be detrimental to the whole, or even 
statal self-interest on the longer run. With a focus on defence, for instance, 
this meant that in times of peace or less direct threats effectiveness suffered, 
often to the breaking point.38 The US Confederation is a clear case in point, 
as was duly captured by Madison
‘The close of the war however brought no cure for the public embarrassments. The States 
relieved from the pressure of foreign danger, and flushed with the enjoyment of indepen-
dent and sovereign power (…) persevered in omissions and in measures incompatible 
with their relations to the Federal Gov’t and with those among themselves.’39
The internal market, on the other hand, provides constant benefits and con-
stant opportunities for more future benefits. It also creates a constant risk 
of economic damage if a state ever becomes excluded, especially once its 
economy has come to depend on the internal market. Exclusion not just lim-
its access to the internal market itself, but also means that a state will have 
to compete on its own in a world increasingly organized in large econom-
ic blocks.40 The cost of collapse or exclusion, furthermore, increases with 
integration itself: the further integration has progressed, the higher will be 
37 Cf also Van Middelaar (2009), 38 on the internal dynamic of the EU’s internal sphere.
38 Wood (1969), 359 and 361.
39 Madison (Sketch), 8.
40 This need for a European Block to compete with other blocks already formed a driving 
force at the establishment of the EEC. The Spaak Report, for instance, began: ‘Entre les 
Etats-Unis qui, presque dans chaque domaine, assurent a eux seuls la moitie de la pro-
duction mondiale, et les pays qui sous un regime collectiviste s etendant au tiers de la 
population du globe, augmentent leur production au rythme de 10 ou de 15% par an, 
l'Europe, qui avait autrefois le monopole des industries de transformation et tirait d' 
importantes ressources de ses possessions d'outremer, voit aujourd' hui ses positions 
extérieures s affaiblir son infl uence decliner, sa capacité de progres se perdre dans ses 
divisions.’
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the costs of collapse or exclusion.41 Crucially, this means that the incentive 
to continue cooperation keeps pace with the demands made by integration. The 
EMU and the sovereign debt crisis, which will be used as a test case for the 
confederal prism more generally below, provide a clear, if not even unnerv-
ing, example of how strong this internal impetus to cooperate has by now 
become in the EU.42
For these reasons an internal market creates a more stable basis of mutu-
al interest, and therefore a more stable basis for cooperation and compli-
ance, self-interest always being a preferable basis for a polity over enforced 
compliance.43
2.4.2 Structural-institutional benefits
An internal focus also appears more geared towards creating stable insti-
tutions. Once created, these institutions assist in maintaining cooperation, 
and more generally reduce the overall institutional weakness traditionally 
associated with confederalism.
An internal market entails constant interaction between Member States, 
individuals and institutions. This requires no army or strong international 
footprint, but does require more internal competences, more detailed rules 
guiding these contacts, and more technical administration. Importantly, the 
existence of multiple detailed rules, the individual interests concerned in 
economic integration, and the sheer number of individual interactions tak-
ing place on the market also increase the need for adjudication and accept-
ing individuals as objects and subjects. Different from military operations, 
furthermore, market behaviour does fall under the normal scope of law 
and courts. Consequently the regulation of trade also generates far more 
interactions between confederal law, national legal systems and individu-
als than, say, conducting a military operation. Consequently the confederal 
centre must develop some legal-administrative capacity to deal with these 
interactions, and cooperation between national administrations, national 
courts and the confederal centre becomes more logical. Equally, doctrines of 
supremacy and direct effect therefore seem more likely to develop in such an 
entity focussed on internal organization.
41 Here the relative success of the German Zollverein between 1834 and 1867 forms an inter-
esting comparison that could be developed further. Just as an example, however, the Zol-
lverein, forming a type of customs union between German states, outlived the German 
Bund itself. It even survived and continued to operate during the Austro-Prussian war 
where its members fought on different sides. Apparently the benefi ts of belonging to this 
economic union were not easily given up.
42 The embrace of the Internal Market with the Single Market Program in 1985 was, of 
course, also partially aimed at resolving the crisis of stagnation at the time. See the White 
Paper from the Commission: Completing the Internal Market COM(85)110 fi nal.
43 Cf in this regard also our third general proposition below on the rule by law. Self-interest 
and the rule of law make for an effective combination.
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The reasoning of the ECJ in Van Gend & Loos is instructive in this regard, 
linked as it is with the internal market objectives and protection of mar-
ket parties.44 For how to create an internal market where the actual parties 
that form that market cannot rely on it? The point is further illustrated by 
the failure of the Articles in this regard. The inverted internal focus of the 
EU, therefore, not only was a modification in itself, it might also have been 
instrumental in developing and supporting some of the other crucial feder-
ate modifications discussed above.45
2.4.3 The self-deepening effect of the internal focus
The focus on market and economy also adds a self-deepening mechanism. 
Once the logic of a truly internal market is accepted, every step of integra-
tion deepens and strengthens interdependence. This subsequently suggests 
additional measures to further develop the internal market, and to safe-
guard the effectiveness of the existing level of integration.46 Once workers 
are allowed to move freely, for instance, regulation of diplomas and training 
follows, as does regulation of their remuneration, social benefits, followed 
by the rights of their (same-sex) partners and children, and the question 
how workers should unionize themselves in an internal market, and….47 
44 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos.
45 It also puts the overall power of the EU in perspective: yes compared to most confedera-
tions the EU has very far-reaching internal powers, yet these are offset by a lack of exter-
nal powers which the Member States would not even dream of surrendering. The overall 
question, which had more power overall, is therefore diffi cult to answer, since it depends 
on a qualitative assessment of internal over external powers.
46 This does not deny the necessity of political will in this progress. As the stagnation before 
the Delors Commission and the 90’s internal market program show, integration certainly 
was not a given. The claim is only that the logic of an internal focus is more conducive to 
deepening integration than an external focus.
47 Art. 45 and 49 TFEU. See amongst many others case 2/74 Reyners [1974] ECR 631, case 
C-340/89 Vlassopoulou [1991] ECR I-2357, case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165, case 
C-85/96 Martinez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691, case C-238/98 Hocsman [2000] ECR I-6623 case 
C-281/98 Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139, case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239, case 
C-456/01, Trojani, [2004] Jur I-7573, case C-200/02 Baby Chen [2004] ECR I-9925, case 
C-291/05 Eind [2004] ECR I-10791, case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, (yet also see 
case C-158/07 Förster [2008] ECR I-8507), case C-60/00, Carpenter, [2002] ECR I-6279, case 
C-73/08, Bressol, [2010] ECR I-2735, case C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779, case 
C-341/05, Laval [2007] ECR I-11767. In terms of legislation see Directive 2005/36 on the 
recognition of professional qualifi cations, OJ (2005) L 255/22, Regulation 1612/68 of the 
Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, 
OJ (1968) L/2, Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ (2004) L 158/77. On the sensi-
tive issue of recognizing relationships see art. 3(2) of the Citizenship Directive, as well as 
M. Bell, ‘Holding Back the Tide? Cross-border Recognition of Same Sex Partnerships 
within the European Union’, 5 European Review of Private Law (2004), 613.
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The examples in the EU are endless, ranging from EMU48 to (transcription 
of) names,49 and from healthcare50 to criminal sanctions for ship source pol-
lution.51 A process that itself is, of course, well known, but becomes espe-
cially relevant from a confederal perspective.52
This self-deepening tendency of the internal focus was further stimulated 
by the globalization of markets and the predominance of markets and ‘the 
economy’ over government. Privatization and liberalization, for example, 
expanded the reach of the market.53 Where the scope and importance of 
‘the market’ increases, so does the power to speak and regulate on behalf 
of that market. Certainly where this market is increasingly falling outside 
the already limited control of individual states anyway. In this sense, the 
Union’s focus on economy and market caught the more general trend in 
political organization and global realities from state to market, a fourth 
strengthening element connected to inversion.54
2.4.4 Riding the market wave
Lastly, and related to the growing importance of the market, the internal 
focus of the EU also allowed integration to dress itself in the seemingly value-
neutral garb of economics. Questions could be approached from, or translated 
into, the ‘objective’ science of economics. As a result the EU could adopt 
the powerful language of a technocratic elite that could not be disputed, 
especially not from the subjective, unscientific and perhaps even ‘perverse’ 
48 See for this dynamic for instance the 1989 Delors Report on economic and monetary 
union (Conclusions of the Madrid European Council of 1989, EC Bulletin 6-1989, 1.1.11.). 
See further chapter 13 below.
49 Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613, as well as more recently case C-208/09 
Sayn-Wittgenstein [2010] ECR I-13693, and very leniently C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn and 
Wardyn [2011] nyr.
50 Case C-159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685.
51 Case C-176/03 Ship Source Pollution I and case C-440/05 Ship Source Pollution II.
52 A fact that the some US Supreme Court justices were worried about as well in the devel-
opment of the Commerce clause. See for instance the dissent of McReynold, J, Van 
Devanter, Sutherland and Butler JJ in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 
(1937) ‘Almost anything – marriage, birth, death, may in some fashion affect commerce.’ 
Also see R. F. Nagel, ‘The Future of Federalism’, 46 Case Western Reserve Law Review 
(1996), 643, Merril (1998), 31, and McGimsey (2002), 1675.
53 Slot, Park and Cuyvers (2007).
54 See on this trend and its effect on the state J. Habermas, ‘The European Nation State. Its 
Achievements and its Limitations. On the Past and future of Sovereignty and Citizen-
ship’ 9 Ratio Juris (1996), 128.
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field of politics.55 After all, who could be against efficiency and an increase 
in wealth?56
Thus clad in economics, and engaged with the technical and seem-
ingly a-political rules that make a market, the growing impact of the EU 
was often not perceived as intrusive, or as affecting key political domains. 
As a result the internal market Acquis, including the inherently expansive 
rules and principles underlying it, could develop relatively unopposed.57 A 
customs case on the smuggling of maize will not receive the same political 
attention as a military campaign, but may nevertheless establish a principle 
that eventually affects the criminal law of Member States.58
Were the banking and sovereign debt crises indeed to lead to a swing of 
the pendulum back in favour of government and politics over market and 
economics, which is one way of understanding the populist rise, this would 
affect this important mechanism.59 Of course the opposite might also still 
happen, with the financial crisis illustrating the ultimate dominance of mar-
kets over government.60 Whatever these future developments might bring, 
55 Interestingly the tactic of many politicians appears to have been to try and master the 
language of economics as well, indirectly contributing to the discrediting of ‘politics’ as 
such. Perhaps this has contributed to their loss of status, certainly now that economics 
has lost some of its magical appeal as well, and it is diffi cult to return to a more normative 
message. This has apparently laid open the fi eld for more charismatic leadership and 
‘anti-establishment’ movements. Cf also Van Middelaar (2009), 18 et seq. on this lan-
guage and world view of functionalism, as well as his quote of Hallstein: ‘the very nature 
of this world necessitates a redefi nition of what we ordinarily mean by words like ‘poli-
tics’ and ‘economics’, and a redrawing, perhaps even elimination, of the semantic frontier 
between the two.’ (W. Hallstein, United Europe. Challenge and Opportunity (Harvard Uni-
versity Press 1962), 58.
56 For the technocratic nature of, for instance, the Commission right from inception see K. 
Featherstone, ‘Jean Monnet and the ‘Democratic Defi cit’ in the European Union’ 32 Jour-
nal of Common Market Studies (1994),149 or W. Wallace and J. Smith, ‘Democracy or Tech-
nocracy? European Integration and the Problem of Popular Consent’, in: J. Hayward (ed), 
The Crisis of Representation in Europe (Frank Cass & Co 1995), 140.
57 W. Sandholz and J. Zysman, ‘1992: Recasting the European Bargain’ 42 World Politics 
(1989), 114-115.
58 See as an example the evolution from Greek Maize to Spanish Strawberries and Ship Source 
Pollution I, cases 68/88 Commission / Greece (Greek Maize) [1989] ECR 2965, C-265/95, Com-
mission / France (Spanish Strawberries) [1997] ECR I-6959, and C-176/03 Commission v 
Council.
59 Alternatively one could say that economics itself is being politicized, or in a more neo-
Marxist view, stripped from its supposed objectivity. As soon as ‘economics’ does not just 
steadily increases wealth for all, but also requires a redistribution of wealth, even to other 
Member States, it becomes political, and the political discourse takes over.
60 Two noted anecdotal but revealing examples may illustrate the point. Firstly the daily 
turnover of FOREX lies between the 4.5 and 5 trillion dollar. This is roughly fi ve times the 
entire EU budget agreed in the multiannual financial framework for 2014-2020. The 
entire US debt of $16.5 trillion is matched easily every four days. Second, and perhaps 
more graphic and gripping, was the image of US President Obama directly and publicly 
responding in August 2011 to Standard and Poor’s downgrading the triple A status of the 
US. Here the immense power of a small group of market actors over the state became 
extremely visible.
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however, the alliance between inversion and economics has certainly con-
tributed to the development of the EU, and has so far strengthened it.
2.5 The inverted confederation: Sub-conclusion
In these four ways the inverted focus of the EU has been an instrumental 
modification to the confederal model, stabilizing it, supporting its develop-
ment, expanding its competences, and anchoring the EU in one of the most 
expanding and dominant fields of our time. The crucial importance of the 
1985 internal market programme for the development of the EU provides a 
good illustration of this internal dynamic.
Now clearly no overly simplistic or single-variable explanations can be 
given for such a complex phenomenon as integration. Many other factors 
and events impacted and guided the development of the EU. Yet it does 
appear realistic to claim that the clear choice to (re-)engage the internal mar-
ket as the spearhead of European integration played an essential role in the 
revival of the European project. Through the Single European Act, it provid-
ed both focus, incentive and means for EU action. It got the internal engine 
going again. Once going, furthermore, it seemed to provide sufficient impe-
tus to keep on going, often even picking up more speed.61 The success of the 
internal market initiative therefore helps to illustrate the structural benefits 
of inversion. Conversely, a confederal perspective might help in explaining 
why precisely the internal market turned out to be such a fortunate choice.
61 Where such an internal focus was lacking, furthermore, integration generally did not fare 
as well. Consider, for instance, such areas of ‘high politics’ as Kosovo and Libya.
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As such an internal market focus may also counter another preconception 
against confederations: that Confederations can only endure where there is 
sufficient homogeneity between the members.62 An assumption that that has 
certainly taken root in the debates on the EU and its long term viability.63 
Now the potential relevance of homogeneity does not have to be denied, 
and a lack of homogeneity can certainly form another hurdle. At the same 
time it could be wondered if the internal focus of the EU, and the self-inter-
est it generates for continued cooperation, does not undermine this virtual 
dogma, and with it one of the major flaws associated with confederations.64
3 A confederal foundation with a federalized superstructure
Our second general proposition is based on two related trends borne out by 
our confederal comparison. Firstly, the EU has incorporated several of the 
key federate modifications in what will be labelled its constitutional super-
structure. For example, the EU works directly on individuals. It claims, and 
generally enjoys, supremacy. The scope of EU competences is determined 
under a very ‘federate’ doctrine of attributed competences by the Europe-
an Court of Justice; a powerful central court which has the final say on the 
interpretation and validity of EU law.65 As will be further discussed below, 
62 This thesis was for instance defended by De Tocqueville in his Democracy in the United 
States where he held that ‘all peoples who have been seen to confederate had a certain 
number of common interests that formed the intellectual bonds of the association. But 
beyond material interests man also has ideas and sentiments. In order that a confedera-
tion subsist for a long time, it is no less necessary that there be homogeneity in he civiliza-
tion than in the needs of the various people that compose it.’ (De Tocqueville (2002), 158. 
A view that remained infl uential, amongst other places in Germany. Carl Schmitt, for 
instance, referring to De Tocqueville stated that ‘Bunds’ can only exist where ‘there is a 
substantial comparability, an existential relationship, as can be the case, for example, in 
states with a nationally comparable and similarly disposed population (…). However, 
where there is homogeneity, a federation is legally and politically possible,’. Schmitt 
(2008), 394-395. It is, however, suggested that this is a rather weak solution to his own 
federal antinomies and concept of the political. Such an assumption of homogeneity de 
facto removes the political use of a bund: either there is no confl ict so no need for politics, 
or there is a confl ict and the Bund cannot act. Either way it seems redundant, and Schmitt 
needs to sacrifi ce the essence of what he sees as the political to account for the reality of 
federations.
63 This issue will be discussed in more detail in part II but on the strong reliance on demos 
see Kirchof (1993) and P. Kirchof, ‘The European Union of States’, in: A. von Bogdandy 
and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn. Hart Publishing 
2010),739, 743 and the much debated Maastricht Urteil of 12 October 1993, BVerfGE 89, 
155 largely inspired by the work of Kirchof.
64 Note also that for Schmitt the statal form and political principles of the different polities 
(for instance monarchy or republicanism) formed one key component of this homogene-
ity. Components on which the EU is not as diverse as when thicker notions of ‘volk’ are 
followed.
65 Börzel and Risse (2000), 9-10, ‘even without the legitimate monopoly of coercive force, 
the European Union has acquired some fundamental federal qualities.’
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these federate elements also evolved over time, gaining in strength, scope 
and relevance.
The second trend, however, is that the EU consistently incorporated 
these modifications without matching the foundational modifications that under-
lie them in the US. The EU cannot use force, cannot tax its citizens, cannot 
change the Treaty by majority or prevent secession. Most fundamentally the 
EU was not directly based on the body politic of a single sovereign people. 
On these fundamentals the EU remains much closer to the Confederation.
On several other important federate markers, moreover, the EU comes 
much closer to the confederal set-up as well. It is, for instance, fully merged 
with the governmental systems of the Member States , and especially lacks 
the strong and separate executive of the Federation. Instead of having ‘inter-
nalized’ the states’ interest in an independent central institution, such as the 
Senate, this interest is represented by direct delegates of the states, as in the 
Confederation. These representatives, furthermore control two of the most 
powerful institutions, the Council of Ministers and the increasingly domi-
nant European Council, and are even more closely tied to their home state 
than delegates in Congress were.
Putting the two trends together a distinctive constitutional structure emerg-
es: a confederal undercarriage reinforced with, and burdened, by a partial-
ly federalized superstructure. In this sense the EU can indeed be seen as a 
hybrid: it contains elements of at least these two systems.66Yet crucially the 
different elements are not co-equal. Despite the importance and impact of the 
federate modifications the ultimate basis of the EU remains confederal.
It is proposed that precisely this unequal mix of confederal foundation 
and federate rebar may explain some of the distinctive features of the EU. A 
proposition that matches with the common intuition that the EU is federate 
in some ways, and yet in the end cannot be qualified as a ‘real’ federation.
If this proposition is correct, interesting questions arise as to what the 
effects are of adding federate elements to a confederal basis, and how much 
‘federate’ weight such a basis can carry.67 As will be further shown below, 
analysing the relative weight and position of these confederal and federate 
elements, as well as their interaction, can be helpful in advancing our grasp 
of the EU, the dynamic of its constitutional evolution, and some of the prob-
lems persistently troubling it.
66 See above chapter 1 section 2.
67 Obviously all constitutions are ultimately mixtures of multiple ‘pure’ models and con-
ceptions, and in that sense constitutional chimera’s. Constitutional theory is more often 
than not concerned with how these elements affect each other. What, for instance, hap-
pens when you add a presidential element to a parliamentary system, etc. In this sense 
the approach followed here follows standard constitutional theory. At the same time the 
specifi c mixture of confederal and federate elements in the EU is rather interesting, and 
also has the added element of occurring at supra-statal level.
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For example, it becomes apparent that gap between the legitimacy 
capacity of a confederal basis and the legitimacy demands of a federate 
superstructure logically leads to legitimacy problems. In addition, these 
federate powers have been transplanted into a confederal context where 
they are freed from several federate counterweights. As a result their rela-
tive power and influence might be far greater than in a completely federate 
system, which only widens the schism between basis and superstructure. 
A side effect of federate transplants that might be seen as the constitutional 
equivalent of releasing a tiger on the Galapagos Islands.
Yet despite such side effects the federate superstructure does seem to have 
significantly strengthened the EU: some of the worst holes in the confederal 
design may have been federally plugged without having to fully federate. 
Examining these plugs may therefore help to further understand why the 
EU has not yet collapsed, as well-behaved confederations are supposed to 
do, and how a stable middle ground can be found between a classic confed-
eral system and full federation. Three such plugs deserve specific attention 
here, being negative integration, which can provide a certain backbone to 
the confederal system (3.1), the federate competence system, which allows 
the EU to act (3.2), and pseudo-amendment, which further enables EU 
action and the process of self-deepening already described above.
3.1 Negative integration as a confederal backbone
As discussed, the free movement rights under the Articles of Confederation 
were strikingly similar to the prohibitions underlying negative integration 
in the EU. Rights, however, that remained parchment realities. They were 
not enforced or developed to the necessary detail required for economic 
actors to benefit from them.
In the EU, on the other hand, negative integration has played a vital role.68 
Now the story of negative integration, including its crucial role in judi-
cially sustaining European Integration through its recurring crises, is well 
known.69 It is a story, furthermore, which fully fits with the confederal per-
spective, as negative integration was largely based on the combined feder-
ate modifications of an authoritative central court, and the direct effect and 
supremacy of EU law developed by it.70
68 See for the classic tale Weiler (1991) and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Community System: The 
Dual Character of Supranationalism’ 1 YBEL (1981), 267. The confederal prism fi ts fully 
with this history of the EU developing through law.
69 Already see on the important role of the Court for integration H. Schermers, ‘The Euro-
pean Court of Justice: Promotor of European Integration’, 22(3) The American Journal of 
Comparative Law (1974), 453.
70 Also see the third general proposition below on the importance of the rule of law more 
generally.
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What the confederal perspective adds to this story, however, is how 
effective negative integration precisely reduces some of the traditional 
weaknesses of confederal organization. In other words, it helps to under-
stand why negative integration was, and is, so important in sustaining a 
confederal basis, and how a confederal basis can be protected and rein-
forced by federate elements in the superstructure.
To begin with negative integration protects and promotes integration by 
providing a pro-integration fallback option for political inaction. The Courts 
famous judgments in Dassonville, Cassis de Dijon or Defrenne are cases in 
point, as is the Courts development of EU Citizenship.71 Where the Mem-
ber States took no, or only tepid, action, the Court defended and furthered 
what it considered the integration envisioned by the Treaties. Unlike under 
the Articles, therefore, political deadlock no longer equals a halt, or even a 
retreat, in integration. Instead political deadlock may lead to further inte-
gration, and may do so along lines of legal logic, which can deviate strongly 
from the political logic of compromise.
The crucial result is that inaction stops being a cost-free option for Mem-
ber States. Rather, not acting may mean leaving the decision to the ECJ. A 
reality that can act as an effective pacemaker for stalling decision-making.
Second, and related to its pacemaker role, negative integration provides a 
base line for eventual action by the Member States. Legislation, after all, will 
not be allowed to violate primary law as interpreted by the Court. Addition-
ally where no compromise can be reached between Member States it often 
makes sense to follow the line set out by the Court. Often, therefore, the 
case law of the Court is clearly visible in the contours of secondary legisla-
tion, which sometimes even amounts to a literal codification.72 The extreme 
respect with which the four freedoms have been treated in the Lisbon Treaty 
provides a clear example of this mechanism even in primary law. This is 
not to say, of course, that the Court in its turn is not responsive to political 
signals.73
71 See inter alia cases 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, case 120/78 Rewe v. Bundesmonopol-
verwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649, Case 43/75 Defrenne, C-85/96, 
C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, Martinez Sala, C-184/99 Grzelczyk, C-413/99 Baum-
bast and R [2002] ECR I-7091, or C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein.
72 See for instance Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ (2004) L 158/77. For an a-typi-
cal example see the services directive, which appears to have managed to do less than the 
case law: Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market. On its rather stormy 
adoption and less than stormy content see C. Barnard, ‘Unravelling the Services Direc-
tive’ 41 CMLRev (1998), 323.
73 See for instance the development from C-209/03 Bidar to C-158/07 Förster, as well as the 
general recognition of subsidiarity and proportionality in the case law of the Court after 
Maastricht and Lisbon.
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In these ways effective negative integration strengthens the overall con-
federal set-up. By providing a fallback option negative integration reduces 
the need for decision-making. By providing an incentive and a direction, it 
simultaneously increases the capacity to make decisions as well. Allowing 
enforcement through individuals, furthermore, also reduces pressure on the 
limited confederal capacity for enforcement. Overall, therefore, negative inte-
gration energizes and reduces the pressure on two of the Achilles heels of 
confederal systems: acting and enforcing.
3.2 Determining competences
One of the major problems of the US Confederation lay in its lack of compe-
tences. To a large extent this lack was due to the very restrictive interpreta-
tion of the competence-conferring clauses in the Articles of Confederation.
Again several federate modifications that have been incorporated in the 
superstructure of the EU have largely addressed this problem. These firstly 
include the attribution of specific market competences, which as discussed 
above are inherently expansive. Secondly, the broad, and relatively feder-
ate, doctrine of attribution developed by the ECJ, including its teleological 
linkage between objective and competence, has been especially important.74 
A modification which is itself based on the further federate modification 
of a central court with the competence to decide on the scope of EU com-
petences. Such a central court provides a legal, generally pro-integration, 
mechanism to settle disputes on competence, reducing the possibility for 
state representatives to block decision-making by spurious competence 
challenges.
Legalizing the ultimate say on competences also has as expansive impact in 
itself. Once a competence has been accepted in a judgment it can normally 
not be rejected the next time: it is there to stay. Some consistency, further-
more, has to be introduced in legal decisions on competence. This leads to 
the development of some general principles such as effectiveness or coher-
ence, which may expand competences more generally. If a certain threat to 
the free movement of ball bearings was sufficient to justify harmonization 
under art. 114 TFEU, for instance, a similar threat would also justify har-
monization in the regulation of gambling or prostitution. Politically, how-
ever, there is quite some difference between these competences.75 Similarly 
the principle of effectiveness may be rather uncontroversial in most areas. 
74 See chapter 2, section 4.2.3. on this link between objectives and competence.
75 Obviously there still needs to be a political decision to adopt secondary legislation. See 
for an example where such political will is lacking the fi eld of gambling, also for an inter-
esting reaction by the Court of Justice. S.C.G. Van den Bogaert and A. Cuyvers ‘Money 
For Nothing: The Case Law of the EU Court of Justice on the Regulation of Gambling’ 48 
CMLRev (2011), 1175.
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Yet when the legal application of this same principle of effectiveness leads 
to a Union competence to demand criminal sanctions legal logic suddenly 
stands far removed from the political one.76 Politically, after all, such crimi-
nal sanctions form a very different kettle of fish altogether.77 The legal and 
judicial determination of competences, therefore, not only prevents back 
treading on competences that have already been accepted, it also tends to 
expand competences by applying legal logic and general principles to the 
question when a competences exists.
Together the federate modifications of a central court, a broader doctrine 
of attribution, a legal determination of competences and the inherently 
expansive nature of internal market powers addressed another one of the 
key weaknesses plaguing the US Confederation: the lack of competences 
generally, and the lack of internal competences specifically. For the EU com-
petences rarely seem to be the limiting factor, especially not where there is a 
strong political will to act.78 A strengthening factor that is closely related to 
the factor of the adaptability of the EU framework through pseudo-amend-
ment.
3.3 Adaptability and pseudo-amendment
The Confederation was unable to flexibly interpret or to alter the Articles 
where they were ineffective. The resulting inability of the Confederation to 
adapt to proven weaknesses or new circumstances formed another of Madi-
son’s key complaints. The many failed attempts to secure a stable income 
for the Confederation strongly supported his charge. Even in times of crisis 
there would always be one state blocking the amendments required, para-
lyzing the entire system as a result. Partially with this weakness in mind, 
the federate constitution allowed for constitutional amendment by majority.
As noted above, the EU has not incorporated the federate modification of 
amendment by majority. Nevertheless, the broad and judicially determined 
doctrine of powers has also had a crucial secondary effect in this regard. 
76 Case C-176/03 Ship Source Pollution I and case C-440/05 Ship Source Pollution II .
77 Legally, after all, these cases contain a standard application of the ‘effectiveness’ case law 
of the Court of Justice. Also these cases provide a further example of how the case law of 
the ECJ may prepare the way for legislative action: Lisbon has to a large extent codifi ed 
the case law of the Court, and even going one step further by even removing the limit 
introduced by the Court in Ship Source Pollution II. See art. 83(2) TFEU.
78 See above chapter 2, section 4.2 and 4.3, as well as the relation between C-376/98 Tobacco 
Advertising I and C-380/03 Tobacco Advertising II. This does also not change the fact that it 
might be hotly disputed who may act or how. A question which happens to depend on 
the specifi c legal basis and competence used as well. See in addition to the Ship Source 
Pollution cases for instance also C-91/05 Commission v. Council (ECOWAS) [2008] ECR 
I-3651.
178 Chapter 3
In addition to providing the EU with a sufficiently filled toolkit to achieve 
its objectives, it allowed the EU to develop and adapt within its existing 
Treaty framework. An ability that limited the need for frequent Treaty 
amendments.79 Living instruments do not need to be amended as often, 
thereby reducing the importance of amendment procedures.80 Put differ-
ently, the federate modifications in the superstructure of the EU allowed for 
a form of (judicial) pseudo-amendment.81
The development of the US constitution underscores this finding. So far 
it has been amended twenty-seven times. Yet some of the most impor-
tant changes did not happen through amendment at all. They were real-
ized through constitutional interpretation or through changing practices. 
Constitutional review was established, abortion allowed and the rights of 
States determined without any amendment. Most interestingly for our com-
parative exercise the crucial and expansive interpretation of the Commerce 
clause did not require an amendment either, nor was it ever blocked by an 
amendment.
The possibility of amendment by majority, in other words, has not been 
as crucial as Madison might have expected. Its function has been partially 
pre-empted by other constitutional mechanisms. Having incorporated some 
of these same constitutional mechanisms, the EU framework has therefore 
proven to be far more flexible and adaptable than the Articles. Adaptation 
and flexibility that are always crucial for survival, and reduce the need for 
constitutional amendment by majority.82
At the same time, these alternative mechanisms can only offer a partial solu-
tion. They are not capable of those fundamental changes that truly require 
Treaty amendment and the political legitimacy it entails. As in the US one 
could think of amendments that alter the representational scheme, the set-
up of the institutions, or even the switch from a confederal to a federate 
basis itself. Such fundamental changes, fortunately, still require a Treaty 
amendment, and, therefore, unanimity. As has become increasingly clear, 
79 The Single European Act, with its introduction of then art. 100A, clearly also played an 
instrumental role. Yet even this fl exibilization of the procedure for legislative action 
would have accomplished little if the competence to be applied by that action had not 
been as broad.
80 Whether the EU Treaties truly form a living instrument, or only a Frankenstein animated 
by the ECJ, is a question left up wholly to the views of the reader.
81 The Court of Justice has, of course, held that other mechanisms, such as art. 352 TFEU, 
may not be used to circumvent the rules on amendment, yet this only shifts the debate to 
the next question when something is considered as a circumvention. Hence the term 
pseudo-amendment. See Opinion 2/94.
82 See chapter 4, section 3.3. on the amendment trap, as well as Van Middelaar (2009), 65, 
and his discussion of Rousseau and the dangers of unanimity.
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especially during the decennia-long spectacle leading to Lisbon, however, 
unanimous Treaty change is not an effective mechanism.83
On the one hand, therefore, the EU has a near federate capacity to adapt and 
develop within its existing constitutional framework. On the other hand, it 
faces confederal limitations in formally amending the Treaties. Most inter-
esting from the confederal perspective, is the dynamic that results from 
combining both elements. The capacity to adapt without political process, 
combined with the inability to do so through a political process, or to com-
pensate for non-political adoptions, might actually be one of the dangerous 
imbalances caused by the federate superstructure in the longer run, as will 
be discussed further below.
3.4 Enabling self-deepening
Lastly, the federate superstructure, and the flexibility it offered, dovetailed 
with the self-deepening of the internal focus. As discussed above the inter-
nal and economic focus of the EU has a self-deepening mechanism. Broad 
competences, and pseudo-amendment by interpretation, further enable this 
self-deepening mechanism to work. Without them, after all, the increasing 
demands of the internal market will simply hit a competence limit.
Additionally there also is the self-deepening effect that federate elements 
themselves acquire in a confederal context. As noted, a federate modifica-
tion in a confederal context may well become a two-eyed man in the land of 
the blind. The confederal elements may often not be strong enough to con-
tain or counterbalance the federate ones. As a result, the federate elements 
may over time expand their relative power and influence, overshadowing 
the confederal elements (and foundations) of the EU. A dynamic that either 
overburdens the confederal basis, or may lead to a confederal counter-coup 
that may weaken the federate superstructure, and the stability it brings, too 
much.84
The benefits and risks of such self-deepening have not gone unnoticed, for 
instance with regard to the Court of Justice. By some located within its very 
own fairy-Duchy, by others seen as leading a legal coup d’état, many have 
asked how to control this powerful institution. Of course even in fully fed-
erate systems as the US it has proven difficult to contain the judicial power 
whilst at the same time respecting its necessary independence and task to 
83 Dougan (2008), 617. Also see for ‘surgical’ treaty changes and the use of intergovernmen-
tal treaties that nevertheless concern EU primary law the discussion on the EMU crisis 
below in chapter 13, section 3.2.
84 The rise of the European Council, or the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Gover-
nance in the Economic and Monetary Union (Brussels 2 March 2012) may perhaps both 
be understood as such counter-reactions. See further chapter 13, section 4.2.
180 Chapter 3
control and limit the other powers. In the EU, however, the predominance 
of the Court of Justice is further reinforced, and explained, by its federate 
nature and its confederal context. As both the (constitutional) legislator and 
the executive are far more confederal in nature, the already powerful posi-
tion of a court in a federal system is further increased.
This central role of the Court of Justice also leads us to our third general 
proposition on the rule by law and the importance of stable states for a con-
federation. In a sense taking a process initiated in Philadelphia to the next 
level, the EU seems to have taken ‘laws empire’ to unforeseen highs, and 
has done so in a way that reduces some of the executive weakness of a con-
federation.85
4 Rule by law, self-control, and the importance of stable 
Member States
As established in chapter three the EU constitutional framework incorpo-
rates five of the sixteen key federate modifications selected for comparison 
in this study. The starting point for our third general proposition lies in the 
fact that of these five no less than four are concerned with the status and 
role of law.86 Supremacy, direct effect, the doctrine of attribution and the 
establishment of a central judiciary all concern the legal dimension of the 
constitutional framework, or in other words, the role and rule of law within 
that framework.87 A finding that raises two further, related questions. First, 
how is it possible to solely incorporate these legal modifications without 
also incorporating related modifications in other areas? Second, what can 
85 Also see G. Falkner and O. Treib, ‘Three worlds of compliance or four’ 46 JCMS (2008), 
293 et seq., and Chalmers, Davies and Monti (2010), 323 –  325.
86 Already see, pointing to the federate nature of the legal system being developed, E. Stein, 
‘Lawyers, Judges and the making of a transnational constitution’ 76 American Journal of 
International Law (1981), 1. ‘Tucked away in the fairyland of Duchy of Luxembourg and 
blessed, until recently, with benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media, the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities has fashioned a constitutional framework 
for a federal Europe.’ More recently on the essential role of law, and the rule of law, for 
EU integration see A. von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles’ in: A. von Bogdandy and J. 
Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn. Hart Publishing 2010), 28-31 
and 41.
87 Obviously the important role of law for EU integration has been broadly commented 
upon. Here the point is not the novelty of this importance but its fi t with the confederal 
system. See for instance already, contrasting the political and the legal, J.H.H. Weiler 
(1981), 267, Weiler (1999), 83 and M. Shapiro, ‘The European Court of Justice’, in: P. Craig 
and G. De Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 1999), 339. On the vital importance 
of direct effect, supremacy and the Supreme Court for the US federate system already see 
the analysis in 1888 by Bryce. He found that these ‘mechanical contrivances’ were vital 
for the functioning of the system, also by establishing ‘a legal habit in the mind of the 
nation.’ J. Bryce as cited in Burgess (2006), 17.
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this predominance of legal modifications tell us about the role of law in a 
(modern) confederal system as the EU? Jointly, these questions lead us to 
the third proposition on modern confederal rule by law over stable, self-limiting 
members. A proposition that starts with the required context for a rule by 
law.
4.1 The importance of stable and well-constituted members for confederal rule
The American Confederation suffered from very weak compliance. Partially 
this was due to a lack of power in the centre and an inability to enforce. 
Another important reason for this failure, however, was the overwhelming 
need to enforce. States often and flagrantly ignored legally binding com-
mands of Congress.88 These violations, in turn, were largely due to the 
political and organizational weakness of the States themselves,89 which 
made them rather unreliable partners.90
Revolutionary ideology was radical, distrusted central authority to 
the extreme, and believed in very direct democracy in small republics. The 
problem with this theory was that it was put to practice, and with a ven-
geance.91 In varying degrees of radicalism the freshly sovereign republics 
embraced these revolutionary ideals in their new state constitutions. A fas-
cinating flurry of constitution making resulted whereby innovative appli-
cations of English political theory, British constitutional law, and colonial 
charters were mixed together with revolutionary ideals. Although the 
result and practice differed per state,92 most became far more democratic 
and radical,93 especially taking the parameters of the time into account.94 
88 See above chapter 1 section 5.
89 Wood (1969), 467: It was ‘the corruption and mutability of the Legislative Councils of the 
States’, the ‘evils operation in the States’ that actually led to the overhauling of the federal 
government in 1787.
90 Cf Madison (Sketch), 3 and 7 where he described the states as ‘feeble communities’ and 
holds that: ‘But the radical infi rmity of the “Art8 of Confederation” was the dependence 
of Congress on the voluntary and simultaneous compliance with its Requisitions, by so 
many independent Communities, each consulting more or less its particular & conve-
nience and distrusting the compliance of the others.’
91 Cf Wood (1969), 404.
92 Especially the Virginia constitution was very balanced, and played an important role in 
the convention. For although this period of experimentation led to some unstable states, 
it did provide important experiences for the Philadelphia convention. See further below, 
chapter 5 on the process of federation.
93 This even though almost all of the new state constitutions provided for a senate, explicit-
ly in recognition of the need for an aristocratic element in Government so the ‘contempla-
tive and well informed’ and the ‘wise and learned’ could check he people of which ‘few 
[are] much read in the history, laws or politics’. An aristocratic desire already indicated 
by the choice for the term ‘senate’ itself. In most states, however, these upper houses were 
to weak to really balance the directly democratic lower houses. (Cf Jefferson in his “Notes 
on Virginia” in Peden (1955), 119-120. Also see Wood (1969), 209-216.
94 McDonald (1968), 101.
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All states, except South Carolina,95 for instance, held yearly elections for 
Parliament. These legislatures were often also endowed with judicial and 
executive powers.96 Most radical was Pennsylvania.97 There, for instance, 
all legislation had to be printed for the consideration of the people before it 
could become law, and the executive and judiciary were reduced to virtual 
non-existence.98 All power, including that to adjudicate, rested with the leg-
islature.
The decision making in these state parliaments, or the ‘will’ of the peo-
ple in convention, could be swayed dramatically from one moment to the 
other by effective speakers.99 ‘Mob-democracy,’ sometimes resulted, at least 
from the perspective of the propertied classes or others on the losing end of 
this system.100
These new state governments, furthermore, suddenly found themselves 
sovereign, and no longer bound by the framework of the Empire. The colo-
nies had been used to significant degrees of self-rule, including democratic 
representation.101 Nevertheless the step to full and unlimited sovereignty 
still was a significant one.102
This revolutionary ideology, coupled with the ballooned power of unhinged 
parliaments led to significant destabilization within the states.103 One par-
ticularly important effect was the lack of protection for minorities against 
the unfettered will of the majority.104
95 Here representatives were elected biannually, as under the current US Constitution.
96 Wood (1969), 166.
97 Wood (1969), 85-87. The radical constitution there explicitly aimed to prevent ‘the danger 
of establishing an inconvenient aristocracy’. To put it bluntly, the aim of the second con-
stitution could have been called ‘to prevent the danger of an inconvenient democracy’! 
The disenchantment and disappointment with republicanism of some leading minds at 
Philadelphia added to this fear. Madison, for instance, had been an avid believer in 
abstract republicanism in 1776-77, prone as he was to theoretical purity.
98 Wood (1969), 232, 245.
99 The mutability of the laws was one of the major complaints. See for example the state-
ment that the North Carolina laws of 1780 were ‘the vilest collection of trash ever formed 
by a legislative body’, which is especially remarkable since it came from the Attorney-
General of North Carolina, James Iredell, himself charged with upholding these laws. 
(Wood (1969), 406).
100 Jensen (1970), 161.
101 The level depending per colonial charter and type of colony involved.
102 Many states also lacked a proper bureaucratic system. The federal bureaucracy in fact 
later acted as a model for several states in developing such a bureaucracy, fi lling the Brit-
ish void.
103 Wood (1969), 463.
104 McDonald (1968), 5. As Madison put his discovery of popular despotism ‘It is much more 
to be dreaded that few will be unnecessarily sacrifi ced to the many.’ (Madison to Jeffer-
son, Oct. 17, 1788, Boyd (ed), Jefferson Papers XIV, 20.
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This internal stability naturally led to problems in the functioning of 
the Confederation as well. Instead of being able to rely on the States, the 
Confederation was called upon to control them, and to become a counter-
force which would confront the States.105 This claim was especially strong 
amongst the ‘losers’ of the revolution and democratization. Predominantly 
these were British subjects and former colonial elites who had strong ties 
to the British, and who had generally controlled both politics and business 
before independence.
The Confederation could not provide this counterforce: it simply lacked the 
means and the legitimacy to do so. Its inability to provide protection further 
discredited it, especially in the eyes of those seeking to regain control over 
the states. Besides hindering the Confederation in achieving its own prima-
ry objectives, the inability to ‘control excesses’ in the states thereby became 
seen as an important ‘failure’ of the Articles in itself.106
4.2 The (more) stable basis of the EU and the capacity of self-control
Generally speaking, the EU does not have the same problem of unstable 
Member States. Quite the opposite: the relatively developed legal and 
administrative infrastructure of the Member States greatly supports it, and 
from the confederal analysis emerges as one of the key foundations for the 
relative success of the EU confederal experiment.107 A conclusion that sup-
ports the criteria for accession as set in Copenhagen and Madrid, and even 
suggests that these should be further developed.108
Obviously not all states are equally well organized, and compliance 
remains an important problem within the EU. Significant improvements, 
furthermore, can still be made in terms of good governance and loyal appli-
cation of EU law, especially when applying an ideal standard. Nevertheless 
the level of governmental organization, stability and compliance is incom-
105 Not coincidentally it was in South Carolina, a state where the conservatives retained 
most of their power, that the elites were initially less willing to support a more national 
government, seeing their local power was not threatened. Only when they started to 
loose power as well a national government suddenly became the logical solution. U.B. 
Phillips, ‘The South Carolina Federalists I’ 14 American Historical Review (1909), 541-542.
106 Jensen (1970), 19, Wood (1969), 463, 408.
107 Cf Habermas (1996), 128..
108 See the Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 21–22 June 1993, and 
the Presidency Conclusions, Madrid European Council, 15–16 December 1995. These 
conditions now include that ‘the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities (…). On the practical application see Kochenov (2008) and Smith (2003), 105 et 
seq. For a further discussion of these points see chapter 13, par. 5.2.
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parably higher than that under the Articles.109 As a consequence, the EU is 
generally not called upon to correct or restrain radical Member States, or to 
compensate for failing government and administration.110
The accession of weaker states, crises such as the Roma expulsion in 
France, the (mal)treatment of refugees in Greece, the strain on Schengen 
after Italian measures granting Schengen-visa to refugees, the problematic 
constitutional amendments in Hungary, openly Euro-aggressive populism, 
and the sovereign debt crisis are troubling developments in this regard, 
which will be further discussed below. In general, however, the EU is not 
pitted against its own Member States or asked to intervene in the same way 
as the US Confederation was.
Most important in this regard is that the developed legal and administra-
tive systems of the Member States provide a level of statal self-control. Even 
where states are tempted to temporarily forget their obligations under EU 
law, or at least prefer a technically illegal but more favourable interpretation 
of those obligations,111 their own bureaucracy and courts may restrain them 
from doing so.112 Even if not fail-safe, this mechanism significantly reduces 
the need for the centre to enforce, and therefore reduces the stress on the 
inherently weak executive dimension of confederal organization. Instead 
of having to confront the Member States, the EU can rely on them, or at 
least their own governmental apparatus, to effectuate its commands.113 For 
a confederation, this appears to be of existential importance, as it cannot 
substitute statal cooperation by force where necessary.
109 See in this regard also the formal requirements for EU membership which art. 49 TEU 
links to art. 2 TEU. It hence postulates a minimum on important rule by law values as 
respect for human dignity, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights,(…).
110 A constructive relationship seems the rule, rather than confl ict. See D. Curtin and M. Ege-
berg, ‘Tradition and Innovation: Europe’s Accumulated Executive Order’ 31 West Euro-
pean Politics (2008), 639, 649. Such confl ict may occur in he future, in which case one of the 
weaknesses of the underlying confederal scheme may come to light.
111 See for a somewhat embarrassing example the string of cases against the Netherlands 
fi nding Dutch legislation to limit immigration in violation of EU law. Violations that were 
obvious in advance, yet where the Dutch government chose to stick to a untenable but 
politically more convenient interpretation of EU law. See C-155/11 PPU Bibi Mohammad 
Imran (nyr) an the related judgment by a Dutch Court of 23 November 2102 fi nding the 
Dutch rules in violation of EU law (Rechtbank Den Haag, LJN: BY4171, Awb 12 / 9408), 
or most recently C-508/10 Commission v. Netherlands [2012] nyr.
112 In fact the Hungarian amendments weakening the position of the judiciary, even if more 
understandable from their communist heritage, are especially threatening for the EU in 
this regard, as they undermine this capacity for self control.
113 Cf also Majone’s notion of the EU as a regulatory state, G. Majone, ‘The European Com-
munity as a Regulatory State’, 5 Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (1994), 
321.
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Our third proposition points to the fact that it is through the common lan-
guage of law that the EU is able to directly relate, and even plug in to, these 
national apparatus. Hence the central importance of law, and an effective 
rule of law within the Member States, for the functioning of the EU. By 
incorporating many of the federate modifications concerning the rule of 
law, the EU equipped itself to govern in the only way a confederation really 
can: through a rule by law, and not by force.114 It is suggested here that this 
choice plays a key role in stabilizing the modified confederal system of the 
EU.115
4.3 A rule by law: The USB of confederal organization
The EU does not have the physical means to enforce its commands, nor 
has it ever sought to accumulate them. Were it to compete with the Mem-
ber States in the dimension of force or executive power, furthermore, it 
would surely loose.116 Instead it formulates its commands in the form of 
law, and relies on the openness and responsiveness to law and legal com-
mands of the Member States’ legal systems for the effectiveness of these 
commands.117 An almost institutionally-instinctive obedience to law that, as 
we saw above, has two elements. First, the Member States generally con-
sider themselves bound to respect their legal obligations under the Treaties. 
Second, they by and large respect the decisions of the legal and administra-
tive machinery, both at the national and EU level, on what these obligations 
entail.
114 Cf also the conclusion by Hinsley (1986), 212-13 that only after states became ‘constitu-
tional’ i.e. capable of responsible self-limitation such good governance was possible. The 
current crisis in Greece further seems to support this conclusion. Where does one start if 
there is no effective administration or rule of law?
115 The rule of law very thinly defi ned as the habit of systems to generally follow legal rules 
and the judgment of courts. The EU both depends on this system being available and 
entrenches the rule of law by empowering courts. Cf also Watts (1999), 14 on the import 
role of ‘respect for constitutionalism’ generally within federal systems.
116 Already by sheer force of numbers. Currently, for instance, the European Commission, 
the main administrative hub of the EU, employs around 35.000 civil servants, including 
interpreters. The Netherlands alone employs close to a million civil servants, or about 
12% of all employed persons in the Netherlands, and the Netherlands has a relatively 
small public sector compared to other EU Member States.
117 Schütze (2012), 65. Of course there are many political pressures, including self-interests of 
the states, which promote compliance as well. But this does not alter the fact that the EU 
governs through law, only that Member States have self-serving reasons to follow the law 
as well.
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Quite surprisingly this system has worked relatively well, as EU law seems 
to be generally effective.118 A reality that should affect our understanding of 
the confederal model, as well as the related general debate in jurisprudence 
on the relation between law and power.119 For it was the lack of enforce-
ment capacity that was traditionally depicted as a core weakness of confed-
erations. Madison’s analysis of the weaknesses of the Articles provides a 
telling summary of this view:
‘A sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of Government. The feder-
al120 system being destitute of both, wants the great vital principles of a Political Constitu-
tion. Under the form of such a Constitution, it is in fact nothing more than a treaty of amity, 
of commerce, and of alliance, between independent and Sovereign States.’
An analysis echoed by Washington. In hoping that the states would com-
ply with their duties under the Articles without sanction, he stated: ‘We 
have, probably, had too good an opinion of human nature in forming our 
Confederation.’121 A view that formed part of the consensus at Philadelphia 
as well: law needed to be backed by force to be effective, or even to be prop-
er law.122
The EU seems to have defied this classical rule of political and legal theo-
ry.123 Building on the relatively effective legal systems in its Member States 
it has found a type of middle road: 124 a way of managing the non-compli-
ance plaguing confederacies, without having to fully federate, for instance 
by creating a powerful central executive and granting it the right to use 
force.125
118 See P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law (OUP 2011), 476, note 95, who report a 96,3% imple-
mentation of ECJ rulings.
119 Cf Habermas (2001a), 17: ‘…the great achievement of the modern nation state, which 
with its status of citizenship fi rst created a wholly new, namely abstract, solidarity trans-
mitted by law.’ Also see Habermas 2001), 113-14: ‘the medium of state power is consti-
tuted in forms of law’ (…) ‘modern states are characterized by the fact that political pow-
er is constituted in the form of positive law.’, or Stein (1981).
120 Here referring to the Articles, see above chapter 1, section 4.2. on terminology during the 
Confederation.
121 Wood (1969), 472.
122 See C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four chapters on the concept of sovereignty (trans. G. 
Schwab, University of Chicago Press 2005), xix.
123 On this reliance on normative authority rather than enforcement capacity already see 
A.H. Robertson, ‘Legal Problems of European Integration’ 91 Recueil des Cours de 
L’Académie de la Haye (1957), 143 et seq. Also see B. van Roermund, ‘Sovereignty: Unpop-
ular and Popular’, in: N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2006), 37, 
rightly pointing out the importance of other methods than force for the effective exercise 
of authority.
124 See Maduro (2006), 515-16 on the crucial role of national actors and the ‘bottom-up’ legit-
imacy and authority this provided EU law with.
125 CF also Börzel and Risse (2000), 6.
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It did so, it is suggested, by partially separating law from power.126 
Something it was capable of doing by ‘tapping into’ the rule of law tradi-
tion of the Member States, including their well-oiled legal and bureaucratic 
machinery.127 The judicial and administrative systems of the Member States 
are organized and programmed so well, with such strong professional train-
ing and levels of independence, that they respond to legal and administra-
tive ‘input’ meeting a set of formal criteria. The remarkable acceptance of 
direct effect and supremacy are a clear example of Member State systems 
respecting and applying judicial decisions that have revolutionary effects 
for their own legal order, yet remain within the logic and language of law.128 
Once supremacy and direct effect had been accepted, at least in sub-consti-
tutional matters, the EU had even more unlimited access to this pool of – 
often relatively autonomous – professionals.129 With its ‘output’ formulated 
in the proper form of law, the EU could directly rely on this professional 
backbone of the Member States’ bureaucratic and legal organization.
The rule of law, in other words, had created a sort of USB-standard the EU 
was able to plug into: it creates a common standard via which two different 
entities can connect, communicate, and control.130 The EU did not need to 
be welded onto national systems, but like a mouse with a USB connector 
could be plugged in directly. Supremacy and direct effect thereby assist in 
the compatibility of the interacting legal orders. Yet the fundamental step, 
which even precedes and enables the use of legal doctrines as supremacy 
and direct effect, is a reliance on law and the rule of law itself. Without such 
a rule of law, after all, legal doctrines are useless.
Now it is not suggested here that all these developments resulted from a 
single grand design, or even that all actors involved were actually conscious 
of the overall system they were developing. Together, however, the devel-
opments within the EU, including the rise of the bureaucratic and legalized 
welfare state, did contribute to the circumstances in which such a confed-
eral rule by law became feasible.
126 Or at least allowing law and enforcement power to be placed further apart, being only 
indirectly linked via the sanctioning power of the Member State. A move that fi ts in a 
broader trend where even within Member States law increasingly seems to depend on 
convincing, rather than commanding or coercing subjects. Cf Habermas (2001a), 10.
127 Cf also the importance attached to administrative developments in this regard by P.L. 
Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State (OUP 2010).
128 See further chapter 10, section 8 on the discussion on the supremacy of EU law.
129 Cf in this regard the failure of art. 23 of the Union of Utrecht to explicitly recognize the 
supremacy of confederal law and obligations. Supremacy was simply not accorded at the 
provincial level, and could not otherwise be enforced either, even though the legislation 
of the Staten-Generaal, the Placaeten or ordinances, were published and generally enforced 
in the provinces.
130 Obviously this USB is not globally compatible: were ASEAN to decide that henceforth its 
decisions would have supremacy in all EU Member States the national courts would 
obviously not follow suit. The fact that this USB requires certain preconditions to be met 
does not mean, however, that it does not exist.
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The USB of the rule by law provided the EU with a sanction for non-compli-
ance without the EU needing to have the power to apply that sanction.131 Rather, 
the bureaucratic and legal systems of the Member States were so indepen-
dent that they were capable of providing a mechanism of self-sanctioning 
that actually packed a punch.132 In a sense one could see this as a form of 
cloud government: the EU does not need to incorporate the hardware of 
government, yet can access it via the rule by law network.133 As a result, EU 
law is effective, or at least habitually followed, in a way that the American 
Confederation could not hope to achieve.134
The EU reliance on the rule by law, furthermore, is safeguarded to some 
extent by the equal dependence on law and bureaucracy of Member States 
governments. Government in modern welfare states is simply too vast and 
complex to tackle without them.135 Consequently, national governments 
cannot attack the rule by law and their own bureaucracies too directly, 
as this would undermine their own capacity to govern as well.136 In this 
regard one could say that, merged as they are, the national governments 
and the EU form a Siamese (non-identical) twin, joined at the administrative 
hip. One could also see this as a less glorious variation of Kant’s vision on 
perpetual peace: a stable, cooperative republic of bureaucratic states, that 
are so dependent on their internal bureaucracy and rule of law that they are 
131 See for a separation between law and the power-in-fact of politics in this regard the work 
of Neil MacCormick. He also indicates how law both depends and enables political rule, 
a view which also allows one to ‘negate the existence of any analytically necessary nexus 
between law and state.’ N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (OUP 1999), 15. Also see 
p. 21 on the importance of customary acceptance of law for governing and p. 105 for his 
discussion of plural law.
132 Also note in this regard the important work done by the Court of Justice in opening up 
the national system for enforcement through the notions of equivalence and effective-
ness. Two notions that counteract the principle of state procedural autonomy that might 
otherwise have limited the effectiveness of EU law to a dangerous extent.
133 The limitations of the comparison are noted, including the fact that here the hardware is 
decentralized and the user centralized instead of the other way around.
134 The relative stability of the Swiss confederation might further support the proposition 
developed here. Based on the relatively more stable and established Cantons, the confed-
eral system in Switzerland was put under far less stress than the US Confederation.
135 Interestingly, therefore, the very same instrument that supported the rise of ‘sovereigns’ 
nationally now also (and logically) helps in redefi ning that sovereignty. See part II of this 
thesis on sovereignty, and for the relation between law and sovereignty in the establish-
ment of effective government in the middle ages already also M. Loughlin (2006), 58.
136 R. Bellamy, ‘Sovereignty, Post-Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty’, in: N. Walker (ed), Sove-
reignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2006), 172.
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forced to generally respect their obligations and are prevented from at least 
several excesses.137
Obviously governments can still attempt to reduce the influence of EU law 
over their courts and civil servants, and this thesis in no way claims that 
this will always be difficult to do. Nevertheless it is inherently problem-
atic for the rule of law once individuals or institutions start deciding for 
themselves which laws to apply and which not; this interferes with its rule 
bound nature. At the same time such an overall rejection of law and legal-
ity could precisely be one of the dangers of the heavy reliance placed on it 
by the EU, at least as long as additional legitimacy for such use cannot be 
created.138
4.4 Laws impire and the plural nature of the EU order
Interestingly, such a true rule by law, a real laws impire, was exactly the goal 
the American founding fathers hoped to achieve. 139 The only way they 
saw to do so, however, was by granting the federate government a real and 
physical capacity to enforce.140 For only full possession of that capacity, and 
the threat that came with it, could guarantee that the central government 
would be obeyed.
For these reasons they rejected proposals to improve the system under 
the Articles along the rule by law approach now adopted in the EU. It was 
proposed, for instance, to stabilize the confederal system via a central court, 
and by explicitly granting supremacy to confederal law.141 A suggestion that 
was rejected by Madison based on the experiences of the German confed-
eral system. The Diet of the Holy Roman Empire, he argued, had known no 
137 Clearly bureaucracies, courts and the rule of law are not fool-proof either, as Nazi Ger-
many painfully illustrates. Radbruchs ‘Fünf Minuten Rechtsfi losofi e’ should be a rude 
awakening to anyone placing too much faith in law alone. (G. Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie 
(Müller Verlag 1999), 209). At the same time more often than not law has protected certain 
fundamental rights in the EU, and so far appears our best bet. Cf on the ideal of Kant also 
Lauterpacht (1977), 25: ‘However, the federation of Kant was not a federal state; it was a 
confederation, presupposing the continued existence of sovereign states.’
138 See further part II and III and the potential of the confederal system to provide such a 
basis demonstrated in chapter 10, section 6, and chapter 12.
139 The founding fathers were very aware that they were trying to change the nature and 
operation of public authority, and the central place they were awarding to law to this end. 
Wood (1969), 66. Also see McLaughlin (1918), 231 describing the US system as a ‘compos-
ite empire based on law’.
140 Hamilton for instance, foresaw the coercive effect law itself could have: ‘Force, by which 
may be understood a coertion of laws of coertion of arms’ Law itself, in other words, was 
already seen as a type of force. He could not, however, yet perceive of law without force, 
only as an intermediary between force: ‘A certain portion of military force is absolutely 
necessary in large communities’ See McDonald (1968).
141 See especially the original Dickinson draft of the Articles of Confederation and the Pat-
terson plan introduced at Philadelphia.
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less than three central supreme courts, each with direct effect and suprem-
acy. Yet the system did not work because the system lacked the power to 
enforce their rulings:
‘Altho’ the establishmt. of Imperial Chambers &c give a more regular form to the police of 
the fiefs, it is not to be supposed they are capable of giving a certain force to the laws and 
maintaining the peace of the Empire if the House of Austria had not acquired power eno’ 
to maintain itself on the imperial Throne, to make itself respected, to give orders which it 
might be imprudent to despise, as the laws were therefore despised.’
What, according to Madison, was missing in Germany, and in the Confed-
eration, was an effective respect for law, necessary to empower a suprana-
tional court not backed by force. Yet the EU seems to have achieved exactly 
this: governing through law without itself having the physical powers to 
enforce.142 As such it managed to reinforce the confederal set-up by latching 
onto the legal systems of its Member States. Thus it softened, though clearly 
not fully solving, one key dilemma for confederations: how to enforce your 
commands effectively without accumulating central powers that exceed the 
confederal nature of the union? Effective self-control of confederal obliga-
tions seems one way to solve this puzzle: it can ensure a relatively high level 
of compliance, without relocating the powers of enforcement to the centre.
Such effective self-control, furthermore, also fits with the ‘pluralist’ feeling 
of the EU legal system.143 It can help to explain why such a heterarchichal 
system can be relatively stable, or even be understood as a system. For even 
though the Member States retain ultimate authority, it is in fact this same 
authority, exercised through the medium of law, which is turned against 
them and used to uphold their obligations under EU law. In other words the 
supreme power and effectiveness of EU law does not derive from an ulti-
mate normative superiority of the EU over the Member States.144 It derives 
from the normative power awarded to EU law by the national rule of law, 
and therefore from the normative power Member States in turn award to 
this rule of law and the almost pre-legal norms as pacta sunt servanda that 
underlie it.
This view also matches the precarious nature of this order: after all the 
power that binds is equal to the power that is bound. No higher federate 
authority exists that truly trumps the statal level, which remains primary. In 
this way the EU could indeed be described as a gentleman’s agreement or 
142 The important role of law, and then especially supremacy and direct effect of EU law, has 
of course been often noted. The additional insight suggested here, however, is that these 
instruments must be seen against the larger confederal picture, and the role that law 
plays therein.
143 For an overview of pluralist logic see chapter 8, section 5.
144 See below chapter 8, section 5 on the notion of popular sovereignty and the ultimate 
authority of the individual Member Peoples as opposed to the secondary, pacta sunt ser-
vanda based, authority claim of the EU.
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at least as an accord between morally adult legal systems: the effectiveness 
of the agreement derives from the inner constitutions of the parties. And 
where parties allow this to happen, they can violate their inner constitutions 
and breach the agreement.
In light of this rule by law, furthermore, the EU system could also be 
seen as a further evolution within the ‘government by law’ revolution ini-
tiated by the federate constitution itself: it constitutes a law’s impire even 
beyond what the Founding Fathers thought possible. One that is made pos-
sible by the stability and level of development of its members.
Clearly the role of law should also not be overstated. It is certainly not sug-
gested here that politics, or other non-legal factors, play no role in the EU 
constitutional system. They do, and they do so abundantly. In the end the 
ultimate authority and primary legitimacy of politics will trump law.145 
Compliance in the EU, to name but one example, is also improved by the 
political consequences of violating one’s obligation, seeing how the Member 
States are repeat players at the game of cooperation. Many other reasons 
besides the rule by law, therefore, can rightly be linked to the better compli-
ance within the EU as compared to the Articles. In addition the relevance of 
the rule by law is not unique for the EU, as other forms of cooperation such 
as the UN or the WTO also benefit from the rule of law traditions in (some 
of) their members.
Nevertheless it can be claimed that the rule by law has played a signifi-
cant role in EU integration, not in the least by partially addressing one of 
the classic weaknesses of confederalism. A claim that is at least supported 
by the clear failures where political mechanisms instead of legal ones have 
been relied on to ensure compliance. The failure of the stability and growth 
pact provides is an example that speaks for itself.
The reliance on law and national legal and administrative systems of 
course also has several limitations and weaknesses. It does not provide the 
same level of security as a central executive power, for instance. It is also 
limited to fields susceptible to legal or administrative control. Yet these limitations 
and caveats, which will be further elaborated below, do not remove the sig-
nificance or value of the above analysis on the rule by law and its central 
role in the EU system. A role that has of course been described before, but 
takes on a special importance and character from the confederal perspec-
tive.
145 See also below chapter 13 on the EMU crisis where this is clearly illustrated, as well as 
already Hallstein (1962), 29: ‘Just as language precedes grammar, so politics precedes 
political theory.’ See further on the political space that has been developed in the EU, 
especially in the middle layer, Van Middelaar (2009), 105 et seq. and Walker (2006a), 20. 
Also see however above chapter 3 section 4: The fact that modern power needs a legal 
system to be effective may explain part of Foucault’s paradox of sovereignty both being 
political power constituting the law, and law in turn restraining that same political power 
on which it is based.
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Our third proposition therefore points to the central importance of law and 
the stable legal and administrative systems of the Member States for rein-
forcing the confederal rule by law in the EU. A conclusion that also explains 
just why law has been so central to the EU project. Seeing how the execu-
tive, and directly representational columns are reserved to the Member 
States, the EU has reinforced the judicial column with federate elements, 
and embraced the rule by law as a truly confederal approach to govern-
ing.146
5 Back to Madison’s Score Card: Evaluating the modifications
Combining our three propositions, a picture emerges of the EU as an invert-
ed confederation with a federate superstructure that allows it to largely 
govern by law alone. Compared to the US Confederation, the EU has, there-
fore, made significant modifications. Each of these has strengthened the 
confederal framework in some ways.147
To further assess the cumulative effect of the conclusions reached above, it 
is useful to briefly return to the original confederal score card devised by 
Madison for the US Confederation. Have the modifications discussed here 
helped in remedying the five key confederal weaknesses bemoaned there-
in? 148 The answer seems to be a clear yes.
5.1 General lack of power and energy in the centre and compliance in the states
The central confederal weakness Madison identified was the general lack of 
power and energy in the centre and the corresponding lack of compliance 
in the states. Concerning energy and effectiveness in the centre, clearly the 
EU still suffers from some of the traditional weaknesses of confederation. 
Taking decisions with so many Member States is a challenge at the best of 
times, even with QMV and ‘pure’ EU institutions as the European Parliament
146 See also Timmermans (2002), 3.
147 Cf Habermas (2001), 81, 84: The inverted confederation might be one model, one perspec-
tive, to assist in the challenge to ‘bring global economic networks under political control’ 
and to do so ‘in institutional forms that do not regress below the legitimacy conditions for 
democratic self-determination.’
148 Madison named the following eleven vices: 1. Failure of the States to comply with the 
Constitutional requisitions; 2. Encroachments by the States on the federal authority; 3. 
Violations of the law of nations and of treaties; 4. Trespasses of the States on the rights of 
each other; 5. Want of concert in matters where common interest requires it; 6. Want of 
Guaranty to the States of their Constitutions and laws against internal violence; 7. Want 
of sanction to the laws, and of coercion in the Government of the Confederacy; 8. Want of 
ratifi cation by the people of the articles of the Confederation; 9. Multiplicity of laws in the 
several States; 10. Mutability of the laws of the States; 11. Injustice of the laws of the 
States.
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and the European Commission involved. The many different interest and 
perspectives that have to be taken into account mean decisions can take a 
long time, and may end up as awkward compromises. The saga surround-
ing the Services directive provides a telling example.149 The EU, further-
more, has had its share of impasses, including a veritable dark age. Indeed 
the EU has been declared dead or dying on multiple occasions.150
Obviously, therefore, the EU decision-making machinery pays a price for 
respecting the autonomy of its Member States up to a confederal level. Nev-
ertheless it is far more energetic and effective than the US Confederation, 
and seems to suffer much less from this confederal defect than one might 
expect.151 Not only has the EU survived each crisis, it always seems to 
have emerged stronger. Since the Treaty of Rome integration has increased 
impressively both in scope, depth and intensity. In addition to specific feats 
such as a Common Currency, Schengen, European Citizenship, REACH or 
a Common External Action Service, the daunting size and breadth of the 
Acquis by itself forms clear proof, in any case of the capacity to legislate.152 
Some decisions, furthermore, can be taken relatively quickly, as demonstrat-
ed by the procedure for the new environmental package.153 This can even 
reach scary speeds, as in the case of decision-making on the EMU crisis. The 
temporary stability fund, for instance, was conceived and established in less 
than 48 hours, even though the decisions involved will more likely than not 
have far-reaching effects on European integration and concerned significant 
sums of money.154
149 Barnard (1998). 323 et seq.
150 N. Ludlow, The European Community and the Crisis of the 1960’s: Negotiating the Gaullist 
Challenge (Routledge 2006), N. Ludlow, ‘Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Ger-
many, Italy and the Netherlands and the Origins of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965’ 8 
Contemporary European History (1999), 231.
151 Elazar (2006), 54: ‘Thus the Construction of common institutions proceeded in such a 
way as to minimize the threat to the existing states which sought – and seek – to retain 
independence beyond that normally allotted to Federated states and at the same time 
enabled the establishment of a suffi ciently energetic government in limited spheres with 
the means to attain the ends for which it was constituted.’
152 The implicit choice to circumvent some of the confederal obstacles (and the democratic 
ones) when creating normative acts via comitology also contributed to this effectiveness. 
See for instance F. Franchino, ‘Delegating Powers in the European Community’ 34 BJPS 
(2004), 269 or M. Pollack, The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency and Agen-
da-Setting in the EU (OUP 2003).
153 See especially the adoption of Directive 2009/29/CE of the European Parliament and of 
the Council to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
scheme of the Community, OJ (2009) L 140/63. Of course this speed in itself may a be 
seen as a problem again, for instance where the infl uence of the European Parliament is 
reduced.
154 See chapter 13, section 2 below.
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Similarly, as already indicated above, the compliance of the Member 
States is not perfect, but clearly is incomparably higher than in the Confed-
eration, and probably far higher than anything Madison could ever have 
envisioned in a confederal system.
As outlined above, several of the federate modifications at least contrib-
ute to this increased energy and compliance, or help in better grasping its 
causes. Inversion created a more effective, constant and self-deepening 
impetus to cooperate. A broad array of teleologically interpreted compe-
tences allowed this energized centre to act. Effective negative integration 
manned the fort and shocked the system back into action where the centre 
was nevertheless immobile. Rule by law over stable states, furthermore, sig-
nificantly increased compliance. Even if desiring to break their EU obliga-
tions, Member States face their own bureaucratic and judicial apparatus, as 
well as that of the EU, which can both be seized by interested individuals.
Although improvement is obviously possible, the modifications discussed 
here have at least reduced the weakness noted by Madison. The fact that the 
EU is still standing, as well as its impressive widening and deepening over 
the past decades, further suggests the effectiveness of these modifications in 
energizing confederal cooperation.
One should also apply a realistic standard. Even a fully-fledged federa-
tion, or a unitary state for that matter, would not have perfect ‘energy’ or 
compliance.155 The federate constitution, for instance, did aim to make the 
centre more energetic, yet at the same time created numerous checks and 
balances to control that energy.156 The debate on US healthcare reform, or 
the 2011 struggle over the debt ceiling and budget in the US, for instance, 
hardly bespeak of perfect energy.157 In other words, it is not a given that a 
fully federate EU system would make decisions much better or faster. In any event 
its effectiveness would strongly depend on the checks, balances and other 
restrictions built into the federate framework. Seeing how creating any type 
of EU federation now would certainly entail many of such restrictions, over-
all effectiveness might not even be served that much by federating soon.
155 The concept of ‘energy’ is here used in the convenient and useful shorthand meaning of 
the term developed in the Federalist Papers and the debates on the American Constitu-
tion more generally, including in Madison’s sketch on the failures of the Confederation. It 
denotes the will and the capacity of the (central) government to act effectively, and to 
thereby achieve its objectives. It should be contrasted with the situation under the Arti-
cles where the central government clearly lacked the will and the capacity to realize any 
will it might have.
156 The legislative process where both House and Senate produce a proposal (sometimes 
even multiple ones by different Committees) and then have to agree on a joint proposal is 
even very similar to the negotiation committee required under the ordinary legislative 
procedure, and is just as tedious.
157 As the saying goes: ‘Laws are like sausages, you do not want to know how they are 
made.’ (and in the US they usually contain pork).
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5.2 Weak finances and unstable states
A second key weakness lay in finances. The US Confederation was crippled 
by its incapacity to generate a sufficient income. Here as well the EU is in 
much better shape, even though it was not granted the right to tax. Rather, 
due to better compliance, the Member States simply pay their share, even 
if the ‘net payers’ do so increasingly grudgingly.158 In addition, the rule by 
law, and the regulatory focus of the EU also means that it does not need 
that big an income, at least in relative terms.159 As a result the EU reduces 
the stress on its confederal system for collecting revenue. Stress that will 
increase, however, as EU financial demands increase, either in fact or in 
national perception. Here again the financial crisis provides increasingly 
clear confirmation, as the EU system struggles to deal with the increasing 
financial implications of safeguarding the Euro.
Madison’s third woe, the unstable states that made up the Confederation, 
also troubles the EU, but to a lesser degree. More contextual providence 
than actual modification, the relative stability of the Member States has 
removed some of the stressors on the confederal basis of the EU. What is 
more, the stability of the states has become an enabling factor for the con-
federal rule by law.
Enlargement, financial woes and crises in national political legitimacy 
may undermine this stability of the Member States, and therefore negatively 
affect the EU as well. As we are currently seeing this in turn raises the ques-
tion to what extent the EU should be allowed to influence or control such 
national preconditions for its effectiveness. Preconditions which often touch 
on key state powers as budgets or social policy: a problem which will be 
addressed in more detail below.160
158 Security of income may also have contributed to the relative stability of the Dutch Con-
federation. In the United Provinces of the Netherlands the confederal center, or generali-
ty, first of all had a more stable revenue of its own (See art. 6 and 7 of the Union of 
Utrecht). This revenue came from taxing the shared territories (generality lands), but main-
ly from license fees imposed on merchant ships. Second, the additional levies that were 
needed were paid more loyally by the different provinces. Here it may have helped sig-
nifi cantly that Holland, by far the most powerful and wealthy province, on average 
picked up around 57% of the tab, but in return for its payments also had signifi cant infl u-
ence in the overall government of the Republic.
159 S. Korkman, Economic Policy in the European Union (Macmillan 2005), 59.
160 See chapter 13, sections 3 and 4.
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5.3 Lack of competences and the inability to (make) amend(s)
The functioning of the Articles was seriously hampered by a lack of (inter-
nal) competences. Again this problem has to a large extent been addressed 
through several federate modifications. From the perspective of an ide-
al internal market gaps certainly exist in the competences of the EU, and 
important problems remain unresolved. Improvements could, for instance, 
be imagined concerning services of general economic interest, the relation 
between market and social objectives or the many indirect problems that 
simply remain between multiple different legal systems. Many of these 
problems, however, seem more due to the impressive scope of internal pow-
ers, than to their absence. With such significant market powers the problem 
rather becomes the absence of non-market competences, which become neces-
sary to flank and counterbalance the market ones.161
In addition the EU, as an inverted confederation, is troubled by a lack 
of external competences. Just as the US confederation was hindered in its 
external activities by the lack of internal competences, the EU may require 
additional external powers to ensure effectiveness internally as well, let 
alone where it is asked to be an external actor in its own right. At the same 
time we should wonder if it is possible to extend the external powers fur-
ther without also moving to a stronger (federate) foundation for the EU; 
can a confederal system dominate both the internal and the external sphere, 
or should it necessarily leave primary control of one of these halves to its 
members as part of a necessary confederal balance? Despite these problems, 
however, the EU clearly does not suffer from the lack of internal compe-
tences in the same way as the American Confederation.
The last major flaw Madison noted in the Confederation was the inability to 
amend its own shortcomings. Again, as we saw, the modified system of the 
EU at least reduces this weakness. Formal amendment, in line with its con-
federal basis, still requires unanimity. Yet the EU system has enough inter-
nal flexibility to adapt through interpretation and convention. In addition, 
the internal focus, negative integration as developed by the Court of Justice, 
and the relative stability of the Member States have helped in achieving sev-
eral important formal amendments, such as the Single European Act. Com-
pared to the US Confederation, therefore the EU system is far more flexible 
and adaptable, although future challenges await, especially with close to 
thirty Member States and an even heavier federate superstructure.
161 See for instance cases C-341/05 Laval and C-438/05 Viking. One could of course also then 
recast such non-economic competences as market competences by simply adopting a 
broader defi nition of market. At some point however, this seems to become disingenu-
ous.
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6 Madison’s score card: A clear pass grade
Scoring the EU against the archetypal weaknesses of the American Confed-
eration it becomes apparent that the EU has been able to contain, or at least 
soften, most of them. It did so by incorporating a mix of federate modifica-
tions and utilizing its very different context. The modifications to the EU’s 
constitutional structure, therefore, seem to have been effective in stabiliz-
ing its constitutional framework to a certain degree, and have allowed it to 
survive several crises. Crises which could easily have been the downfall of 
a more conventional confederal system, but instead cause the EU to signifi-
cantly deepen and broaden integration.162
Yet what are the costs of these modifications? Can one simply place a fed-
erate superstructure atop a confederal basis, or is this the constitutional 
equivalent of armouring a deux chevaux with six inch steel plates? Can such 
modifications, furthermore, deal with the more fundamental weakness 
underlying the confederal system, such as its limited and secondary author-
ity and legitimacy, or the limited capacity to reign in the states when coop-
eration is close to the breaking point?
To address these questions, and to further complete our exploration of 
the strengths and weaknesses of a modern inverted confederal structure, 
the next chapter turns to the problems that might flow from these same fed-
erate modifications and the three propositions developed so far.
162 Cf also the intuition of Lauterpacht on the potential to strengthen the confederal form. 
Discussing some proposed changes to the League he concludes: ‘such innovations would 
go a long way towards realizing most of the conditions of a progressive political integra-
tion of humanity. … if adopted they would go a very long way towards removing the 
shortcomings of a confederation while retaining its necessary form.’ Lauterpacht (1977), 
16.

1 Introduction
A free lunch is rare, even in constitutional theory. Besides their strengths, 
modified confederal systems obviously retain many flaws and inherent 
weaknesses. What is more, the same modifications that strengthen the con-
stitutional framework of the EU may also bring new weaknesses and risks, 
or exacerbate existing ones. Some of these weaknesses and risks may be 
well known, but have perhaps not yet been traced back to their confederal 
root causes. Others are perhaps less visible or have not yet materialized, 
but logically flow from the nature and dynamic of a modified confederal 
scheme. All of these weaknesses and risks deserve to be explored as they 
may assist in better understanding the problems facing the EU and the lim-
its that remain inherent in modified confederal forms. Limits that should 
ideally be understood and respected before they are overstepped and lead 
to a full crisis
Again it is necessary to limit our discussion to some of the most central 
problems, for which end we return to our three central propositions: what 
are the risks and downsides of the inverted market focus of the EU (section 
2), its reliance on the rule by law (section 3) and the combination of a con-
federal basis and a federate superstructure (section 4)?
2 A market without borders or an EU without limits?
The inverted and economic focus of the EU energized integration. It partial-
ly did so by basing integration on a self-deepening conception of an internal 
market. As it turns out, however, this market focus might be too energetic, 
or at least too one-directional. Almost anything can be related to the market 
in some way, and therefore to an EU competence. As such this modification 
may help to better understand the increasing concern that the EU is usurp-
ing too much power, and is leaving too little space for national politics.1
1 A concern that amongst other things can be seen in the criticism of the Court of Justice, 
impossible but persistent calls for limitative lists of EU competences to be drawn up, or 
the virtual obsession with subsidiarity tangible in the Lisbon Treaty. Especially see the 
German Lissabon Urteil, BVerfGE, 2 BvE 2/08, and its attempt to establish some limits 
based on the German Constitution, see further chapter 8, section 4.4.
4 The costs of modification and the limits 
of the confederal form: Of new and 
exacerbated problems
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A market without borders might be desirable, an EU without limits is not.2
Several factors, related to the internal focus of the EU, contribute to this 
dynamic. To start with the self-deepening of the market brings ever more 
areas within the ambit of EU law. Once embarked on the project to create a 
genuine internal market, it turns out there are few areas that cannot at least 
in some way endanger this aim.3 At least no logical or inherent limit in the 
concept of a market itself seems to exist. At the same time non-market aims 
have not been elevated to the same federate level as the market, and there-
fore struggle to provide such limits.
The increasingly distant link with the market required to establish an 
EU competence or trigger free movement prohibitions is the legal reflec-
tion of this dynamic. Under the almost federate doctrine of competences 
developed by the Court, for instance, only a relatively limited link with the 
internal market is required for the competence of art. 114 or 115 TFEU to 
become available.4 One could, for instance, wonder what the real market 
risk is of not regulating the importation of thumbscrews (both serrated and 
regular) or electric chairs.5 Similarly, the very broad definition of a restric-
tion in the context of free movement law means even a rather remote con-
nection with the market may bring into play the full arsenal of negative 
integration: any national measure, ‘capable of hindering, directly or indi-
rectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade’ forms a restriction 
which and in principle prohibited. 6 Staying below this threshold has almost 
become a challenge in itself. Examples of restrictions that stretch the imagi-
nation of at least those not-initiated in common market logic are not hard 
to find. In AGM-COS.MET, for instance, a televised interview given by one 
civil servant was enough to form a restriction, and could even lead to state 
2 See in this regard the notorious claim by Lenaerts that in the EU there simply no longer is 
any: ‘nucleus of protected state powers’. Lenaerts (1990), 222. Not surprisingly here the 
EU therefore shares in the same problems that many federations face: preserving any 
area of true state autonomy. As will be further discussed in the next parts the EU will also 
require more political solutions to counter this danger. Federal law, with its inherent cen-
tral bias, cannot fulfi l this role on its own.
3 On this point see already the analysis by Hamilton, who supported his proposal to abol-
ish the states altogether with the argument that ‘they are not necessary for the great pur-
poses of commerce, revenue or agriculture.’ McDonald (1968), 141.
4 Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I [2000] ECR I-8419, case C-380/03 Tobacco Advertising 
II [2006] ECR I-11573, and case C-210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893.
5 See the truly fascinating Council Regulation 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods 
which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment OJ (2005) L 200/1, annex III point 1.3, as well as the equally 
intriguing territorial exceptions to this prohibition.
6 Case 8/74 Dassonville. See for far-reaching applications of this test amongst many others 
case C-434/04 Ahokkainen [2006] ECR I-9171, case C-170/04 Rosengren [2007] ECR I-4071, 
case C-73/08 Bressol, [or case C-188/04 Alfa Vita [2006] ECR I-8135. Although of course all 
within the logic of the internal market, these cases do betray a certain measure of radical-
ism as well.
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liability.7 In Carpenter, though not the strongest of precedents one assumes, 
a spouse turned out to be necessary for interstate commercial activities,8 as 
was a reduced rate on vignettes for disabled drivers.9 The depillarization of 
EU law may further contribute to the further evolution and broadening of 
the internal market.
Naturally under the legal logic of the internal market a restriction does 
exist in these cases, and of course even minor restrictions can have a large 
effect or create loopholes for Member States to abuse. Equally the Court can, 
and has, compensated for this broad definition of a restriction through its 
case law on justification or by excluding certain domains from the internal 
market altogether.10 Nevertheless these examples do illustrate the almost 
unlimited scope of the market, especially where there is a will to find a an 
actual or potential threat to its functioning.
Second, and in addition to this (legal) self-deepening, the market itself has 
expanded, and with it the competences and reach of the EU. With liberaliza-
tion and privatization on the rise more and more formally public domains 
have been subsumed in the market place. These domains often concern 
important and sensitive goods and services such as healthcare, public trans-
portation or energy. 11 As even the introduction of a small market compo-
nent in an otherwise fully public service can trigger the full rigour of the 
internal market, furthermore, the transition from public to private, and 
therefore controlled by internal market law, can be a rapid process.12
As a result of these developments the EU has entered an increasing num-
ber of socially sensitive areas where it has limited competences for actual 
harmonisation.13 This discrepancy between positive competences and nega-
tive reach is becoming increasingly contentious, and progressively taxes the 
7 Case C-470/03 AGM-COS.MET [2007] ECR I-2749.
8 Case C-60/00 Carpenter.
9 See case C-103/08 Gottwald [2009] ECR I-9117 Although here the restriction was found 
justifi ed.
10 See recently case C-137/09 Josemans [2010] ECR I-13019.
11 See for instance case C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931, case C-157/99 Peerbooms [2001] 
ECR I-5473, case C-385/99 Müller-Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509, case C-372/04 Watts v. Bedford 
Primary Care Trust [2006] ECR I-4325, case C-381/05 Commission v. Germany [2007] ECR 
I-6957, case C-73/08 Bressol. Further see C. Newdick, ‘Citizenship, Free Movement and 
Healthcare: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding Social Solidarity’ 43 CMLRev 
(2006), 1645 or E. Spaventa, ‘Public Services and European Law: Looking for Boundaries’ 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2002), 271.
12 Slot, Park and Cuyvers (2007), 101 et seq. Of course art. 106 TFEU creates a balancing 
mechanism here, but it only does so within the scope of the internal market law, and 
under the strict criterion that the desired level of the public service cannot be guaranteed 
within the rules established for economic activities.
13 Already see Weiler (1991), 2477 and R. Dehousse, ‘Integration v. Regulation? On the 
Dynamics of Regulation in the Community’ 30 Journal of Common Market Studies (1992), 
383.
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legitimacy of the EU. In addition it may restrict political action: where the 
EU cannot legislate because it has no competences, and where the Member 
States can only legislate within the limits of the Treaty exceptions and the 
Rule of Reason, the space for political action becomes rather limited, and 
negative integration is all that remains.14
Third, once within its scope, the EU approaches these sectors with a mar-
ket perspective backed up by near federate powers. As discussed above, 
after all, other public objectives did not receive the same federate compe-
tences, and are not enforced by federate means. Consequently, even though 
the centrality of fundamental rights is continuing to grow with the Charter, 
the market perspective remains the constitutional primus inter pares, which 
dominates non-market objectives. This carries the danger of elevating the 
market over other non-market interests. A risk even (or especially) where 
the EU does not have competences to legislate on a specific non-market val-
ue, yet where Member State competences are still subject to higher rules of 
EU internal market law.15
2.1 The challenge of an unlimited market: Collective action
The example of collective action provides an interesting example of this 
elevation of the internal market, and the risk for imbalance that accompa-
nies it.16 The tension between collective action and free movement came 
to a head in the Viking and Laval cases.17 In Laval the Swedish unions took 
collective action against the refusal of certain foreign companies to sign on 
to Swedish collective agreements, especially for posted workers. The com-
panies targeted argued these actions violated their free movement rights. 
In Viking Finnish trade unions undertook collective actions, together with 
the powerful International Transport Workers’ Federation, against a Finnish 
company wanting to reflag a ship to a Latvian flag.
In both cases the Court of Justice held that the actions fell under the scope of 
respectively the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establish-
ment.18 Especially in Viking this in itself already formed an important exten-
sion of the horizontal direct effect of the market freedoms, and with that of 
the internal market itself. Instead of demanding some form of (semi-)public 
14 See on this dynamic F. Scharpf, ‘Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Econo-
my of European Welfare States’, in: G. Marks et. al. Governance in the European Union (Sage 
1996), 15 et seq.
15 Also see more fundamentally: K. Polyani, The Great Transformation (2nd edn, Beacon 2001) 
on the inversion between market and society that the EU might entail or stimulate.
16 N. Reich, ‘Free Movement v. Social Rights in a Enlarged Union: The Laval and Viking 
Cases before the ECJ’ 9 German Law Journal (2008), 125et seq.
17 Cases C-431/05 Laval and C-438/05 Viking.
18 Art. 49 and 56 TFEU, Laval par. 98, Viking par. 64-65.
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authority for the freedoms to apply, the mere capacity to obstruct free move-
ment was enough to trigger horizontal application.19 This is a logical step 
where the aim is to protect the ultimate effectiveness of the market; why 
would powerful private entities be allowed to do what the state is not? Yet, 
already on the level of scope, this decision also illustrates the expansive log-
ic of the internal market, and the tension this creates with other objectives.
Weighing the rights involved, furthermore, free movement won out in 
both cases. The claim here is agnostic as to whether the specific outcome in 
these cases was right or wrong.20 Rather the point is that these judgments 
illustrate how the internal market logic elevates the right to establishment 
to the same level as an important social right as collective action, and in a 
specific case subsequently prioritizes free movement. Although the internal 
market rules are set at the EU level, furthermore, these social rights can-
not be fully established at the EU level.21 As a result, these rights are large-
ly defined and protected at the national level, which then has to take into 
account the supranational rules on the internal market. Again the point here 
is not that social rights should not be weighed against other interest, as they 
also are at the national level, but the prima facie imbalance between the two 
rights created by the central and federate position of the internal market.
2.2 Fundamental rights
In this regard the explicit weighing that takes place between market free-
doms and more classic fundamental rights is interesting in itself as well. In 
Schmidberger, for instance free movement of goods is weighed against the 
freedom of assembly.22 In this case, as in Viking and Laval, both are placed 
at the same level and then weighed.23 Now in Schmidberger, as in Omega 
Spielhallen, the fundamental right at stake is found to outweigh the restric-
tions on free movement. An outcome that illustrates how serious the ECJ 
takes these fundamental rights, and also how it manages to provide a cer-
tain counterbalance to the market within EU law itself.
19 Also see A. Dashwood, ‘Viking and Laval: Issues of Horizontal Direct effect’, 10 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Law Studies (2008), 525.
20 For discussion see amongst many others: J. Malmberg and T. Sigeman, ‘Industrial Actors 
and EU Economic Freedoms: The Autonomous Collective Bargaining Model Curtailed 
by the European Court of Justice’ 43 CMLRev (2008), 1115, and S. Sciarra, ‘Viking and 
Laval: Collective Labour Rights and Market Freedoms in the Enlarged EU’ 10 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Law Studies (2008), 563.
21 See also the weaker formulation of such social rights in the Charter, as well as the various 
opt-outs to even these weaker formulations.
22 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659. Note how, for instance in par. 51, free 
movement of goods is explicitly transformed into a principle, instead of a rule, to allow 
this balancing.
23 For similar exercises balancing free movement and fundamental rights also see case 
C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039, case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609 
and case C-71/02 Karner v. Troostwijk [2004] ECR I-3025.
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Again, therefore, the claim here is not that the Court, or EU law more 
generally, is deaf to all but internal market interests. Only two more limited 
claims are made. First, as with collective action, the elevation of the internal 
market as a near federate element within the EU leads to a confrontation 
between market interests and other interests that have not been elevated in 
the same manner. The fact that free movement rules are actually balances 
against fundamental rights only illustrates this elevation of the market. Sec-
ond, without automatically overruling other social or public aims, this fed-
erate elevation of the internal market does give an advantage to the market 
within confrontation, seeing how the internal market has the structural ben-
efit of its federate position and authority.
A central focus on market and economy becomes particularly problematic 
where one ascribes to thick or existential notions of the political. For either 
the EU then threatens this political core, wrongly replacing politics with 
economics. Or alternatively the internal and economic focus of the EU can 
never be strong enough to support a real polity, and must therefore lead to 
the downfall of the EU. This because a polity can only be based on more 
political notions than economic interest. See in this regard, for as thick a 
notion of the political as one can get, the discussion of a customs union by 
Carl Schmitt:
(…) unions such as postal association contracts, customs and trade unions, etc. This type of 
contractual relation or connection is characterized by the fact that it establishes obligatory 
commitments with a definable content, which are often very important, but it does not 
entail the political existence of the state as such in its totality. It is never a connection that is 
a matter of life and death.
It can be that economic or other connections become significant, but they are first decisive 
when they involve the political existence of the state. (…) If an economic connection like 
that of a customs union would result in a political community, the political element would 
simply become decisive and an additional connection involving the existence of the state 
would occur in lieu of the contractually regulated individual relations.’24
Obviously the claim in this thesis, as will be further developed in part II, is 
that the confederal form does form such a stronger political bond that can 
be partially driven by economics but should indeed be based on more. Nev-
ertheless the risk of too one-sided a market approach should be recognized.
2.3 In search of confederal limits?
Somewhat surprisingly for a confederation, therefore, the question arises 
how to curb the authority, actions and impact of the confederal centre and 
the rules it enacts. How to delimit the market in a way that does not under-
mine the project altogether? Recent case law of the Court of Justice can be 
24 Schmitt (2008), 382-383.
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seen as an attempt in this direction. In some sensitive and contested areas, 
such as gambling, soft-drugs, or particularly sensitive rules on transcription 
of names, for instance, it seems the Court works hard to create more space 
for national decision making. It even seems to be setting some moral limits 
to the market.25 As the struggles of the Court show, however, this is not an 
easy task, especially not within the legal framework currently in place.
The objective here is only to flag up this danger, and to show how it fits 
with the confederal prism proposed. From that prism, however, one could 
envision different means of addressing this imbalance. For instance some 
other EU objectives could be upgraded to a more federate level as well.26 
Conversely, the market objective itself, or parts of it, could be toned down. 
Taking a leaf from competition law, to give but one idea, one could strive for 
a workable market only, and not for a perfect one. In addition one could imag-
ine that a more established, ‘adult’ internal market could be less puritanical 
and more pragmatic in choosing its battles. All such actions, however, do 
run the risk of undermining precisely the legal focus and mechanisms sup-
porting integration. At the same time it is important that the internal market 
does not start writing cheques the rest of the constitutional structure cannot 
cash.27 Although this problem cannot be solved here, part II of this thesis 
will return to it, further building on the insights developed there regarding 
sovereignty.
3 Limits and risks of the rule by law
The second and third proposition pointed out how the EU relies on the rule 
by law. An approach that allowed it to reduce the confederal weaknesses 
concerning inaction and compliance. Several other weaknesses, however, 
remain, have been exacerbated, or have even been newly created by this 
reliance on a rule by law. Five of these, which are especially relevant to a 
theory of the EU as a modified confederal system, will be focused on here. 
First, how the range of a rule by law is limited to areas amenable to legal 
control. Second, its tendency to unbalance the relation within the trias, and 
between law and politics more generally. A problem which feeds into the 
25 See especially case C-387/96 Sjöberg [1998] ECR I-1225, and case C-137/09 Josemans. For a 
further analysis also see Van den Bogaert and Cuyvers (2011), 1175.
26 See in this regard the attempt made with the protocol on services of general economic 
interest.
27 The current situation hereby leaves Member States in a diffi cult catch 22. They can coun-
ter the market focus by elevating some other, more social objectives to an equally federal 
level within the EU. Yet this would further strengthen the EU and reduce their national 
say in these per defi nition sensitive fi elds. If they choose not to do so, however, these non-
market objectives continue to be subjugated to the internal market focus. Either way con-
trol is lost, and it should be decided in each case which is the lesser evil.
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further issues concerning the amendment trap created and the inherent but 
vulnerable reliance on the stability of Member States and their legal infra-
structure. Lastly, the risk of political free riding on the rule by law must be 
acknowledged.
3.1 Areas not amenable to legal control
First, relying on law restricts EU control to those areas covered by law. Areas 
where law holds no sway, for instance because they do not fall under the 
jurisdiction of courts or administrations, or because they are inherently 
not rule bound, escape effective control by the EU. Vice versa, the problem 
exists that the EU needs to ‘juridify’ an issue to exercise control. Luckily 
for EU effectiveness few areas seem to escape juridification these days, yet 
this limitation does help to explain why the EU is having such difficulties 
in more purely political areas. Foreign affairs, defence, or the budget, for 
instance, are generally left to the discretion of democratically elected poli-
ticians.28 Not only do they generally fall outside the competence of courts 
and bureaucrats, these areas often involve truly political decisions that are 
difficult to capture legally. As a consequence they fall within only the most 
marginal of legal limits, even where judicial review is provided for at all.
As a result, the EU cannot effectively control such non-legal fields via 
national courts or bureaucracies. An analysis that also explains why it is 
not so much the political ‘sensitivity’ of a field that limits EU involvement, 
but the level of national legal control over this field . The internal market 
inroads into criminal law, social law and immigration have shown as much. 
Rather than political or social sensitivity, it is the level of juridification and 
of rule based control in a certain area that determines the potential for EU 
involvement.
If correct, this conclusion points to two potential problems or limits for 
integration. First, it limits EU control in ‘high politics’ dimensions such as 
foreign affairs or military cooperation. Conversely, however, it points to 
another risk for the long-term legitimacy of the EU. There might be a temp-
tation to increasingly juridify core political domains so as to increase the 
capacity for EU control and prevent national political actions from under-
mining EU effectiveness. Juridifaction of these domains, however, would 
further empower courts and bureaucracies over politics, and could under-
mine both EU and national legitimacy in the longer run. A political system 
cannot live by law alone.
These risks of juridification thereby also point to another risk in the rule 
by law, and one that is already occurring: a relative empowerment of law 
over politics.
28 On budget and EMU see further below chapter 13.
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3.2 Unbalancing the Trias
Even in areas amenable to legal control, law may at points have become 
too dominant. Here we see the same challenge as with the internal market: 
where only one element in a confederal system receives near federate back-
ing, be it the market or the national judiciary, its relative power is dramati-
cally increased over elements that do not. In the end this alters the overall 
balance in ways that might not be desirable.
By introducing federate legal and judicial elements such as supremacy and 
direct effect, the EU has empowered national bureaucracies, but especially 
national courts vis-à-vis their executives and legislators.29 They now speak, 
if they choose to do so, with the supremacy of EU law. As is well known 
these federate modifications enabled even the lowest national court to 
review all national norms, up to constitutional norms, against any norm of 
EU law.30 A body of law that that contains an expansive set of rules, prin-
ciples and interpretative tools that further empower a national court where 
it wishes to be so empowered.
In this way the EU has reversed the relation between politics and law, or 
has at least affected the balance between the two in the benefit of law and 
courts. As a result the relation between the courts and the other branches 
of government has changed, as has the relation between law and political 
decision-making itself. This especially because at the same time the national 
executives have been empowered vis-à-vis their own legislatures as well, 
further affecting the Trias and the balance of power within the national sys-
tems.
At the EU level a similar empowerment of law over politics took place. A 
federate style court was placed amongst confederal political institutions. 
This court now has the authority to interpret a corpus of supreme primary 
law, with which all secondary law must comply.31 In fact the first Kadi judg-
ment of the Court of Justice seems to suggest that even primary law might 
not be exempt from review against the principles that – according to the 
Court – form the very foundations of the EU legal order.32
29 At the same time the national executives have also been empowered vis-à-vis their own 
legislatures, further affecting the Trias. This shift in power between the executives and 
legislatures will be further discussed in chapter 10 section 6.2 and chapter 12 section 3.
30 Cases 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629 and C-213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433.
31 See recently Opinion 1/09 on the potential establishment of a Patent Court.
32 Joined cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P Kadi I. For discussion see Cuyvers (2009) and A. 
Cuyvers, ‘The Kadi II judgment of the General Court: the ECJ's predicament and the con-
sequences for Member States’ 7 European Constitutional Law Review (2011), 481.
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Now it is normal for modern government to be controlled by the courts, 
and the general difficulties this creates are well known. Yet these difficul-
ties become especially acute for the EU where the political counterparts are 
based on a far more confederal footing than the ECJ. An imbalance which 
further enhances the relative power of the Court, even beyond the high lev-
el of judicial authority normally found in a federal system.
The relatively limited power of the political institutions also forms a further 
risk of the rule by law in itself. One that provides an interesting example of 
the unintended consequences of mixing a confederal basis with a federate 
superstructure, and might be labelled as the amendment trap.
3.3 Setting an amendment trap
Considering the complexities of EU legislation it is already difficult to 
respond politically to the European courts via secondary law.33 On the level 
of Treaty change, the only way to formally counteract an interpretation of 
primary law by the Court, the difficulties are even more daunting. Only 
where Member States unanimously agree on an alternative to the interpre-
tation of the Court of Justice can they use the instrument of Treaty change to 
overrule the Court.34
Clearly the Court does take into account the views and sensitivities of the 
Member States.35 Views which the Member States may express as interven-
ing parties or via other routes with different degrees of formality. Further-
more, the Court has often proven sensitive to changes in tone reflected by 
Treaty amendments. After Maastricht, for instance, a certain restraint was 
generally perceived in the Court’s case law. Similarly the clear emphasis 
on subsidiarity and the limits of EU competences in Lisbon, including the 
repeated warnings that the Charter is not intended to extend the scope of 
EU law nor EU competences, 36 gave give a clear signal to the Court which 
33 For one example see the development from Bidar, via Directive 2004/38 to Förster con-
cerning the maximum residence period that Member States may require to become eligi-
ble for study grants.
34 Also see on the limiting effect of the stringent requirements for amendment A. von Bog-
dandy and J. Bast, ‘The European Union’s vertical order of competences: The current law 
and proposals for its reform’, 39 CMLRev (2002), 237.
35 See for instance case 72/83 Campus Oil [1984] ECR 2727, joined cases C-267/91 and 
C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097, C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen, C-440/05 
Ship Source Pollution II, C-203/08 Sporting Exchange [2010] ECR I-4695, C-137/09 Josemans, 
C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] nyr., C-256/11 Dereci and others [2012] nyr., or C-370/12 Pringle 
[2012] nyr.
36 See for example art. 4, 5, 6, 12(b), and 48(2) TEU, art. 69 and 352(2) TFEU, Protocol 1 on 
the role of national parliaments in the European union, art. 3, and Protocol 2 on the appli-
cation of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality or art. 51 of the Charter.
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it appears to take into account.37 These alternative means of communicat-
ing with the Court, however, do not alter the fundamental fact that actual 
amendment, and therefore directly correcting an interpretation of primary 
law by the Court, requires unanimity.38
By establishing a federate court, yet maintaining a requirement of una-
nimity for Treaty change, the Member States have in fact created a confed-
eral amendment trap. Since each Member State can veto a Treaty change, 
amendment will only succeed when the proposed change is better than the 
status-quo for all parties.39 Clearly this will not readily be the case.40 As a 
result the status quo, being the current Treaties as interpreted by the Court 
of Justice, is deeply entrenched.
Instead of protecting members from radical change, as the unanim-
ity requirement does in a standard confederation, their own veto’s trap 
the Member States into the autonomous development of the Treaty.41 In 
a sense they have locked themselves up with a (robed) tiger and thrown 
away the key. The fact that none of the Acquis on the internal market was 
really touched in Lisbon, despite its many contested elements, illustrates the 
strength of this mechanism.
One often ignored consequence of this trap is that it becomes more dif-
ficult to claim that the current interpretations of the Court, including those 
on supremacy, rest on tacit agreement of the Member States. A claim often 
made based on the reasoning that Member States have repeatedly chosen 
not to challenge those interpretations in later Treaty amendments.42 That 
fact alone, however, only proves their inability to unanimously agree on an 
alternative. It cannot prove their consent, not even tacitly.
37 Dougan (2008), 617. Also see, for instance, the careful way in which the ECJ acts in Dereci, 
not expanding the scope of the charter itself, though giving a nudge to national courts in 
the direction of fundamental rights and the ECHR.
38 Compare the very different reality in the now re-emerging East African Union. There, 
after the fi rst case in which the East African Court of Justice ruled on its own competence, 
the Treaty was immediately amended by the Member States. See EACJ [2007] Prof. Peter 
Anyang’ Nyong’o & 10 others v. The Attorney General of Kenya & 5 others, Reference No. 1 of 
2006 and H. Onoria, ‘Botched-Up Elections, Treaty Amendments and Judicial Indepen-
dence in the East African Community, Journal of African Law (2010), 78.
39 Trade offs between the Member States are of course possible, but complex with close to 
thirty parties.
40 Two examples may suffi ce to illustrate the point. First, the inability to really reform the 
agricultural policy. Second, the ongoing traveling circus between Brussels and Stras-
bourg. A practice that cannot be defended, but only explained by the requirement of 
unanimous Treaty change, and has become an increasingly damaging symbol for EU 
wastefulness. On the ‘sticking power’ of agriculture at the EU level see A. Milward, The 
European Rescue of the Nation State (Routledge 1992), 317.
41 Cf also Tushnet (2006), 1240 on this general dynamic between the ease of amendment and 
the need for constitutional adjudication.
42 See for an example De Búrca (2006), 450.
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So far this confederal lock-in has certainly helped to protect and promote 
integration: The crucial backbone provided by entrenched negative integra-
tion, for instance, has already been discussed.43 Unfortunately, it also means 
that their might be a (widening) gap between the content of EU law as inter-
preted by the Court of Justice, and the political will supposedly underlying 
it. A fact that would provide an additional explanation for the extreme dif-
ficulties that recent attempts to substantial Treaty amendment unavoidably 
seem to run in to.44 A gap also, that might create a search for more radical 
solutions by threatened, or opportunistic, Member States in the future.45
3.4 Reliance on stable Member States and member courts
The rule by law depends on stable states and effective legal systems. Any-
thing that reduces these preconditions threatens this type of confederal rule. 
The accession of less well-developed Member States forms one such poten-
tial threat. Another threat, which bears an interesting resemblance with our 
US comparator, is the apparent rise of populist, anti-establishment parties. 
When such parties come to power, they may introduce a less stable form of 
politics, and one less concerned with loyal external cooperation, especially 
in light of the nationalist streak that often energizes them. Even when such 
parties do not participate in government, they may destabilize national 
politics, either because their support is required to govern, or because they 
scare more centrist parties into a nationalistic mode as well. The Dutch PVV 
provides a clear example of both, but examples are not hard to find within 
the EU as a whole.46
Equally the rule by law would run into difficulties where national courts 
were to cease their cooperation. Of course a certain level of resistance 
already exists, and has existed from the beginning.47 Not asking prelimi-
nary questions is one common form.48 Equally, most supreme courts openly 
challenge the basis of supremacy in EU law itself, and with that its absolute-
ness. It is suggested here, and developed in detail in the next part of this 
thesis, that a confederal system cannot but accept these claims of national 
43 See chapter 3, section 3.1.
44 Cf also the tangible fear and reluctance of the Member States when Treaty amendment 
proved necessary in the EMU crisis.
45 When this gap gets to big, Member States might start agreeing on radical amendments to 
reduce EU infl uence. The signifi cant strengthening of the European Council perhaps 
shows one example of this process already.
46 The Greek ‘Golden Dawn’ party forming a particularly worrying example.
47 See for an overview of the early case law the more detailed discussion of supremacy 
below in chapter 2, section 3.1.3.
48 It is furthermore very diffi cult to fi nd out how well EU law is applied in the day-to-day 
reality of lower courts, already as many judgments are not even published. A signifi cant 
blind spot in our understanding of the EU system, and of course a limitation that limits 
the certainty of the rule of law claim made here.
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supreme courts. Such heterarchy, at least between the EU and the Member 
States, is inherent in a confederate basis, and should be accommodated and 
managed as well as possible. What is essential, however, is that in ‘ordinary’ 
cases, supremacy of EU law seems by and large respected, again as it also 
should be in a confederal system. As long as supremacy is granted where 
the core of national constitutions is not threatened or national supreme 
courts are not forced to prove their own supreme status, the rule by law is 
not undermined too much. Only where rejecting supremacy would become 
the default position of national courts would the rule by law, on which a 
confederal system must partially rely, be made impossible.
Even where national courts do generally respect EU law, however, anoth-
er opposite risk attaches to a rule by law: it places significant stress on the 
legitimacy of law and national courts, the primary instruments of a rule by 
law. Yet not just a national revolt by the courts would undermine the EU 
system, so would revolts against the national judiciary, or law in general. 
Courts enjoy a certain level of legitimacy as independent, professional insti-
tutions that apply ‘the law’. Institutionally they derive legitimacy from their 
specific task, and from their position in the national constitutional frame-
work. This national framework, however, was not developed with their EU 
role in mind. Instead, to put it boldly, the EU has ‘commandeered’ these 
institutions through the medium of law, upsetting the national balance in 
the process.
As discussed above, this focus on law and the judiciary has so far prov-
en a very effective one for the confederal rule of the EU. Not only did it 
prevent the need for more federate intrusion into the executive or the legis-
lature, it also allowed the EU to tap into the legitimacy that courts enjoyed 
in their national systems. In the longer run, however, this EU role of courts 
might diminish their legitimacy, certainly where no national rebalancing 
takes place. Yet where the authority and legitimacy of national courts is 
threatened, so is the very rule of law on which the EU depends. For that 
reason any future conception of the EU constitutional system must also con-
sider just how to fortify and legitimate these national foundations of the EU 
system.49
3.5 Absolving political responsibility
Where too large a burden may be placed on the courts, a rule by law may 
require to little from national political actors. For a last risk of too one-sided 
a reliance on the rule by law is that it reduces the need for political actors 
to explain, justify and improve the process of integration. Instead, they can 
49 Further see chapter 10 section 6 and chapter 12 on the need for national constitutional 
systems to be better adjusted to their participation in a confederal constitutional system.
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score political points by criticizing courts and Brussels: the legal machinery 
will take care of itself and ‘force’ them to cooperate whilst they defend the 
nation.
One of the long term risks of this dynamic is that no positive political discourse 
is developed to explain, positively conceptualize, or sell the EU. The often 
clumsy campaigns and lack of a convincing message in ‘yes’ campaigns for 
referenda provide painful examples. Where there is no shortage of punchy 
one-liners on the ‘no’ side – factual correctness aside –, a positive message 
on the EU has not yet evolved through practise and repetition.
Consequently, instead of having the support of politics, courts are 
increasingly forced to go against it. And that in a time where their legiti-
macy is already under pressure in some Member States where courts, as 
other public institutions, are increasingly stripped from the almost auto-
matic authority they used to enjoy. Considering the importance of national 
courts for the modified confederal system of the EU it will be a crucial chal-
lenge to find ways to ensure their legitimacy. Equally national politics must 
be enlisted, and political free riding on the rule by law must be prevented. 
This will require, it is suggested, creating constitutional incentives that align 
political interest with that of EU integration. A challenge that will be further 
addressed in part II and III of this thesis.50
As will be clear from the overview so far the inversion of the EU’s focus, 
and its reliance on a rule by law not just strengthened the constitutional 
system. They also introduced certain weaknesses of their own, or amplified 
existing ones. It is suggested, however, that the most central problem of the 
modified confederal system of the EU lies in the growing imbalance between 
its confederal basis and its federate superstructure. A schism that directly relates 
to the legitimacy challenge the EU is facing, and points to some of the real 
limits that a confederal basis imposes.
4 The increasing schism between foundation and 
superstructure
As shown the EU has incorporated several federate modifications yet has 
consistently not incorporated the foundational modifications that underpin 
them in the US. Most crucially, the EU is not based on one sovereign people, 
but on a mixture of states and the sovereign peoples these represent. As a 
result, there is a gap between the federate superstructure of the EU and the 
50 See especially chapter 12 on the ways in which the EU could assist in restructuring, and 
enriching, the national democratic process itself.
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confederal legitimacy structure it rests on.51 The supremacy of EU law, for 
instance, is not supported by the normative superiority of a single people, 
as it is in the US.52 Similarly primary citizenship allegiance, in law and in 
social fact, generally lies with the Member State or sub-national units.53 The 
national courts derive their institutional power from the Member State con-
stitutions, not the Treaties, yet are asked to overrule those very same consti-
tutions.
It is this gap between superstructure and foundation, it is suggested, that 
forms one of the root causes of the infamous legitimacy problems of the EU, 
as well as its perceived democratic deficit.54 In this regard the confederal 
perspective fits with, and may contribute to, the impressive amount of work 
already done on the legitimacy of transnational governance.55 This grow-
ing schism also points to another inherent weakness in confederal systems: 
their limited capacity for direct conflict.
4.1 An increasing schism: A problem of normative capacity
From the confederal perspective the key problem underlying the demo-
cratic deficit is that the EU has federate powers but no federate authority 
to base them on. Consequently its problems go deeper than just the insti-
tutional set-up or the system of representation. They are directly related to 
limits inherent in the confederal basis of the EU. As long as the centre does 
not have the normative capacity to legitimize centralized federate powers, 
after all, no solutions at the EU level exist to bridge the gap between basis 
and superstructure; the problem is one of normative authority, not repre-
sentation.
51 The entire human rights turn in EU law can be understood as one attempt to fi ll this gap 
with another form of, substantive normative authority. Yet from a constitutional point 
human rights are not suitable as a basis for such normative hierarchy: they are heterar-
chichal in nature, as is natural law itself. The normative superiority of fundamental rights 
can be claimed by all, including by Member States or national courts against the EU. See 
for a further discussion of this dynamic Cuyvers (2011), 481.
52 See chapter 2, section 3.1.3.above and chapter 10, section 8 below on the effects this has on 
the nature of supremacy in the EU legal order.
53 For example the Language Communities in Belgium, the regions in Spain or the polities 
with devolved authority in the UK.
54 Clearly this analysis, as the entire democratic problem itself, dissipates where the EU is 
deemed already suffi ciently legitimated by its ‘output’ or other technocratic standards. 
Even the Commission, perhaps out of desperation or resignation concerning deeper and 
stronger sources of legitimacy, seems to have embraced this language of results. Cf the 
2006 Commission paper ‘A Citizens’ agenda: delivering results for Europe’. 
(COM/2006/0211) fi nal. Without being too cynical, however, it should at least be won-
dered if you are taking the European citizens seriously if the fundamental transformation 
in public authority that the EU entails is to be justifi ed by lowered cell-phone costs.
55 J.H.H. Weiler, U.R. Haltern and F.C. Mayer, ‘European Democracy and its Critique’, in: J. 
Hayward (ed), The Crisis of Representation in Europe (Frank Cass & Co 1995), 24.
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The development of the European Parliament illustrates the point. The 
powers of the Parliament have steadily increased since its inception as an 
Assembly with supervisory powers in 1951.56 After Lisbon it can truly claim 
to have become a serious co-legislator, also in comparison to many national 
parliaments. In many ways this has been a welcome development. Yet it 
has to be acknowledged that the consecutive upgrades of the European Par-
liament have not closed ‘the gap’.57 A thought experiment might drive the 
point home: would the legitimacy problem of the EU, and the perception of 
a democratic deficit, really go away if we made the European Parliament 
sole legislator tomorrow? Quite to the contrary. It seems more likely that 
most citizens would strongly object to such a move. Most likely they would 
see it as a decrease in legitimacy, as they feel more represented by their gov-
ernment than by ‘their’ MEP’s.58
The underlying issue, after all, is not so much that the Member States, 
or their citizens, are not represented democratically enough. Both the mem-
bers of the European Parliament and the members of government that act in 
Brussels have clear democratic mandates. It is useful in this regard to keep 
in mind the example of the German Bundesrat. Just as the Council of Minis-
ters, the Bundesrat consists of members of the state governments, yet no one 
challenges its democratic credentials as such.
The real issue, therefore, is not the system of EU representation. It is 
that there is no central normative authority to represent, be it democrati-
cally or not. For unlike the Bundesrat, the Council does not act on behalf of a 
larger and normatively primary central entity. It is for the same reason that 
it would be highly problematic to grant the EU the power to tax directly, let 
alone to allow it to use force against Member States, or to allow the institu-
tions to amend the Treaties without Member State consent. Even if all of the 
above would be done perfectly democratically the EU would still lack the 
normative authority to wield these powers.
56 See art. 20-25 of the ECSC Treaty of 1951.
57 Cf also Van Middelaar (2009), 378-379, 389, and especially 391: Het [Europese Parlement] 
is geen volkstribuun die met de steun van de straat de machthebbers uitdaagt. Het lijkt 
eerder een hofmusicus, op zoek naar de aandacht van de prins –  omdat achter de prins 
het publiek zit.’ ([The European Parliament] is not a tribune of the people who, with the 
support of the street challenges those in power. It rather comes across as a court musi-
cian, seeking the attention of the Prince –  because it is behind the Prince where the audi-
ence sits. My translation).
58 Cf Dann (2010), 271: ‘Institutionally the EP has to be regarded as a strong parliament. 
Sociologically, however, it barely exists in the European Political mindset.’ For an even 
starker analysis of the legitimizing power of the European Parliament, even under the 
– now – ordinary legislative procedure, see D. Grimm, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitu-
tion?’ 1 European Law Journal (1995), 283-4 and 296.
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4.2 The no-demos challenge...or not
Because the confederal basis of the EU does not represent a single highest 
authority, the normative authority of each member remains primary and 
more intense.59 As a result the EU cannot rely on the same normative supe-
riority that the US federate government has. Instead, it has to recognize the 
primary normative superiority of its many masters.60 Changing how each 
of these masters is represented at the EU level, therefore, does not alter the 
fact that there is no joint European body politic that normatively trumps, or 
equals, the individual Member Peoples.61
On the one hand this conclusion fits with the well-known ‘no-demos’ posi-
tion. This holds that there can be no real democracy, and therefore no real 
legitimacy, at the EU level because there is no EU people.62 Indeed the cur-
rent analysis also points to the fact that there is no such central and superior 
entity to ground EU authority in. Of course this point would be solved if the 
EU manages to fully federate. Something that might be a possible outcome 
in the (much) longer run, but does not form a realistic shorter term solution 
to this schism between foundation and superstructure. 63 In any event it is 
also not the solution explored here, given our exploration of the confederal 
form and its potential.
Different from the ‘no-demos’ position, however, the confederal analysis 
does not reduce the legitimacy issues of the EU to an insurmountable demos-
based limit inherent in democracy. Instead, it points to a mismatch between 
a confederal basis and a federate superstructure. A mismatch that would 
indeed have been solved if the EU had one ‘demos’. Yet a single demos only 
59 See for a further analysis on this point chapter 9 sections 5 and 7.
60 A fact which does not undermine the unique claim of the EU that it alone holds the com-
bined delegated authority from all members. A claim that will be explored in chapter 10, 
section 8.
61 From that perspective the European Parliament only provides a different mode of national 
representation. Why this representation is any more ‘direct’ than the representation by 
governments, as is implied by art. 10(2) TFEU, is not exactly clear. This especially for 
states where the governments are directly elected, or consist of MP’s. As the division of 
EMP’s per Member State shows the EP does directly represent the citizens, but only the 
citizens in their own Member State. In that sense the language in art. 189 EC that pro-
claimed that the EP consisted of ‘representatives of the peoples of the States brought 
together in the Community’ was more accurate than the current art. 14(2) TEU. Note in 
this regard especially he second sentence of art 14(2) TEU, which states that: ‘Representa-
tion of citizens shall be degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of six 
members per Member State.’ Not only is the predicate ‘European’ left out, representation 
clearly takes place per Member State.
62 See for a discussion of the key tenets of statism chapter 8, section 4.3. below.
63 Von Bogdandy (2000), 51. See also the political judgment in the Intergovernmental Con-
ference of 1996: Report of the Refl ection Group, Brussels (1996) p. 21 et seq. Also see 
below chapter 5 on the process of American federation.
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forms one of the potential solutions. Focussing on the lack of a demos alone, 
therefore, mistakes one potential solution for the problem itself.
The absence of a European demos does, therefore, not automatically 
mean that there are no alternatives to democratically organize the EU in a 
way that legitimizes its federate superstructure. What needs to be explored 
is if, and to what extent, a stronger yet still confederal basis for the EU can 
be conceived. A confederal basis that provides an alternative to creating one 
European people, but that is nevertheless robust enough to carry a number 
of federate elements.
Logically such a confederal solution should not start at the central level. 
It must start from the primary building blocks of a confederal system: the 
members.64 For only once a sufficient confederal normative authority has 
been established at the national level can one consider how to democrati-
cally represent it at the confederal level.
To this end Part II will investigate a confederal notion of sovereignty. It will 
be examined if such a conception, which incorporates the EU into the con-
stitutional power conferring arrangements of its different Member Peoples, 
can assist in establishing a sufficiently stable but still confederal basis. A 
confederal approach, which, if possible, might also allow us to recast the 
EU from a threat to democracy to an opportunity to protect democratic gov-
ernment. For a properly constituted confederation could take the Member 
peoples seriously, both nationally and supranationally, and allow them to 
escape the confines of the state. A solution, furthermore, that is necessary 
where one wants to truly and lastingly combine three crucial elements: 
democracy, the reality of increasing integration, and the enduring role of 
the state. A combination for which the – modified – confederal form might 
provide a suitable model if it can be properly grounded. For at the moment 
such a confederal conception and foundation for the EU’s superstructure 
is missing, even though integration is progressing. The consequence is an 
increasingly hefty toll on democratic legitimacy.
Even if such confederal solutions can be found, however, its confederal 
foundation, and the gap between foundation and superstructure will con-
tinue to impose limitations on the EU. Limitations that must therefore be 
taken into account in the future development of the EU. One such inherent 
limitation must be discussed here in more detail before we engage the quest 
64 In that sense the increased focus on the national parliaments under Lisbon, which hopes 
to draft them into the constitutional framework of the EU goes in the right direction. Mis-
takenly, however, the measures focus on the EU level once more, and not enough on the 
national process. See art. 12 TEU, and Lisbon Protocol no. 9 on the role of national parlia-
ment in the European Union. Also see on the tendency to include national organs already 
Rosas (2003), 7 et seq. and further O. Tans et. al (eds), National Parliaments and European 
Democracy: A Bottom-Up Approach to European Constitutionalism (Europa Law Publishing 
2007).
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for a stronger confederal foundation. A limitation that appears to become 
increasingly relevant and also should be taken into account when exploring 
a more stable confederal basis: the limited capacity of the confederal centre 
to actively and for a continued period of time pit itself against one or more 
Member States who willingly violate their obligations or in some other way 
obstruct cooperation.
4.3 The limited capacity of a confederal system for direct conflict
The fact that under a confederal system the members retain their ultimate 
and primary normative power also means that it is difficult for the con-
federal centre to directly confront a member. Certainly where this member 
directly relies on its normative primacy and is willing to violate binding 
legal obligations. Who, after all, is the EU to tell the French, the Greek, the 
British, the Danish or the Italian people what to do on their own territory? 
The EU also lacks the means to win such a direct conflict. It does not have an 
army or a police. More importantly, the EU also does not have the ear or the 
heart of the citizens to appeal to.65 Not incidentally, all these instruments of 
power remain with the Member States.
Again the fate of the US Confederation provides a useful example. The 
unstable American states often did not have the capacity to self-police 
their obligations under the Articles. Consequently the Confederation was 
required to enforce these obligations. In addition, Congress was asked to 
intervene directly in several states where the rights of certain groups and 
individuals were increasingly being violated. Where such violations con-
cerned (former) British individuals, furthermore, they also entailed breaches 
of the peace treaty that had been concluded with Great Britain. The Confed-
eration, however, failed to reign in delinquent states, and could not put a 
halt to persistent and blatant violations.66 It simply lacked the means and the 
authority to do so.
Such requests to become a counter-force to its members, therefore, forc-
es a confederate system exactly into the role for which it is most ill suited: 
enforcement and conflict. A lose-lose situation occurs: either the confederal 
centre does not confront the delinquent state, and loses face. Alternatively it 
may choose confrontation, but suffer even greater loss of face where it loses 
this confrontation. In the case of the US Confederation, the consequence of 
its repeated failure to intervene or protect significantly harmed its legitima-
cy and credibility.
65 Arguably where Member State governments are failing, trust in the EU may on the other 
hand exceed that in the national institutions. Italy and Greece illustrate this, up to a cer-
tain point.
66 See chapter 1, section 5.
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Clearly this limited capacity for direct conflict forms a serious limit on con-
federal systems. One could even wonder what use a constitutional system is 
that only works where it pleases the members, yet cannot enforce even the 
fundamental rules of its own system where challenged. One can, after all, 
not base a serious constitution on the hope that no crisis will occur, or that 
the self-interests of the members will never come into conflict with the rules 
of the confederation. An argument that is often used to disqualify confeder-
al rule as transitional arrangement at most.67 Once the constitutional dating 
period is over one either moves to a stable federate marriage or separates, at 
most remaining friends with institutional benefits such as a free trade zone.
Obviously this limit to confederal systems is a serious one. It forms a major 
challenge to their usability and viability. It certainly means that great care 
must be taken not to bring a confederation in a position of prolonged con-
frontation, and to relieve it as much as possible from the need to pit itself 
against Member States directly.
As we saw above the modifications in the EU already go quite some way in 
this regard. The internal market provides increasing incentives to continue 
loyal cooperation even where other national interests might point in the oth-
er direction. The rule by law and the capacity for self-control have helped by 
entrenching confederal obligations within the national systems themselves, 
relieving pressure on the EU. Similarly states are already restrained by their 
own constitutions and by other international obligations from violating 
individual rights, although recent events such as the deportation of Roma, 
the treatment of asylum seekers in Greece, and the constitutional amend-
ments in Hungary give cause for concern, and potential conflicts.68
So far these mechanisms have at least helped the EU survive several cri-
ses. The EU has generally even managed to strengthen and deepen integra-
tion via such crises. At the same time this track record does not guarantee 
this will always be the case. Further strengthening the system of the EU, 
especially by reducing or managing the schism between superstructure and 
foundation, therefore, remains of crucial importance.
67 See Kinneging (2007), or Watts (1998), 126.
68 Indeed one also sees that the Greek situation immediately put pressure on the Dublin 
system, built as it is around a typically confederal notion of mutual recognition. It there-
fore depends on proper minimum standards being observed in each Member State. See 
the ECJ judgment in C-411/10 N. S. and others [2011] nyr., as preceded by its ECtHR coun-
terpart in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, [2011] Application no. 30696/09. On Hungary now 
see case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary [2012] nyr.
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As indicated, furthermore, part III of this thesis will analyse exactly one 
such crisis: the EMU crisis, which has shaken the EU to its core, and is inter-
estingly heralded both as the end of the EU and the harbinger of even more 
far-reaching integration. As such it is an ideal, if daunting, candidate to help 
us test and develop the confederal insights developed above, as well as the 
further suggestions on strengthening the confederal basis that will be devel-
oped in part II.
5 Conclusion: The weaknesses of a modified confederation
The previous two chapters refined the semi-crudes of our sixteen-point con-
federal comparison into three more general propositions on the modified 
confederal nature of the EU. It was illustrated how these propositions, and 
the more general confederal approach they represent, can assist in better 
determining and understanding the specific strengths and weaknesses of 
the EU constitutional system.
The overarching image that arises from this exercise is a significantly 
strengthened system that nevertheless contains some serious risks and 
weaknesses. For the different modifications to the classic confederal mod-
el have indeed managed to reduce several of the most classic and existen-
tial flaws of the confederal form. An inverted focus, for instance, provided 
more ‘energy’ to the centre and ensured that the self-interest of Member 
States in cooperating kept pace with the demands of deepening integration. 
This increased will to act could be more effectively channelled and trans-
lated into action through the federate elements in the superstructure of the 
EU, which also guard against inaction. These federate elements, together 
with the stable and developed legal systems of the Member States, further 
enabled an EU rule by law, which reduced pressure on the confederal Achil-
les heals of executive capacity and compliance. The cumulative increases in 
effectiveness and stability these modifications have brought may well have 
impressed a Madison, and perhaps even surpass the expectations that some 
founding fathers had of the federate system at Philadelphia.
At the same time each proposition also pinpoints several serious flaws. 
The self-deepening of the inverted focus, for example, might lead the EU to 
unsustainable levels, just as the tendency of the federate elements in the EU 
system to increase in relative weight and importance vis-à-vis their confed-
eral counterparts. Two elements that also help to better understand the evo-
lution of the EU constitutional system more generally. A rule by law may be 
no match for direct political challenges, may actually undermine the politi-
cal dimension needed to sustain EU integration, and in any event depends 
on several preconditions that may not hold. Most fundamentally, however, 
the growing schism between the federate superstructure and the confederal 
foundation of the EU puts an increasing strain on the overall constitutional 
structure and its legitimacy.
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All in all these are serious challenges that need to be addressed or at least 
taken into account. Before further drawing these findings together in a gen-
eral conclusion, and exploring some potential suggestions and solutions in 
part II and III, it is, however, useful to first turn to a second and so far unex-
plored dimension of our confederal comparison: the process of American 
federation.
As will be seen, several of the key procedural elements driving and 
enabling the federal transition in the US seem to be lacking in the EU. 
Even if the economic crisis provides a certain push factor towards federa-
tion, therefore, this is not supported, or even counteracted, by some other 
relevant procedural factors brought to the fore by the process of federa-
tion in the US. If correct this is directly relevant to our further research, as 
it increases the stakes of finding a confederal solution, simply because it 
becomes more unlikely that a federate one will be available any time soon. 
Equally, some of the procedural findings are directly relevant for the solu-
tions explored in part II and III. For this purpose the next chapter will first 
address the fascinating process underlying the US transition into a federa-
tion, before chapter 7 provides a general conclusion to part I.
1 From Confederation to federation: The process
Having analyzed the substantive position of the EU between our confederal 
and federate waypoints this chapter looks at process. What factors drove the 
constitutional change in the US, who were involved, and how was such a 
dramatic shift realized?
A better grasp of this process not only sheds light on the nature of (con)
federal systems and the European modifications. It also provides some 
concrete foundation for debates over whether Europe could or should ‘fed-
erate’, and if so how. No claim whatsoever is made, however, to complete-
ness when it comes to explaining the origins of the American constitution.1 
Equally, considering the high context-dependence of political processes, all 
earlier caveats on the risks and limits of comparative research must again 
be stressed.2 Fundamental shifts of this magnitude, however, are very rare. 
Carefully designed and well documented shifts are rarer still.3 Consequent-
ly we cannot be too picky in our choice of comparators.
Acknowledging these limitations, our focus is intentionally restricted to 
several elements that, even considered in relative isolation, provide relevant 
comparative insights for the EU. In addition it must be emphasized that on 
some points the reality in the US was not that far removed from the one in 
the EU. Most importantly the move to a federate system in the US was far 
from automatic. There was very strong opposition to such centralization, 
and this opposition was lead by many prominent figures. Moreover, the 
major consequences of federation were known. The new constitution was 
openly described as nationalist, and there could be no doubt that the states 
and the peoples would be giving up their independent sovereign status. In 
other words, the stakes were clear and both sides were well represented. 
Any claim that the move to a more centralized system in the US was not 
contentious, and thus not comparable to the EU, is therefore simply incor-
rect.
1 Beard (1986), Beeman, Botein and Carter (1987), McDonald (1985), Rakove (1996) or 
Wood (2003).
2 See especially Introduction, section 4.2. and chapter 1, section 3.
3 Elazar (2006), 33.
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Four process elements that are of particular relevance for the EU be dis-
cussed here. First, and most centrally, the elite structure in the US which, 
unlike in the EU, was geared towards federation. (section 2). Second, the 
anti-democratic nature of the US transition (section 3). Regarding the more 
practical aspects of constitutional change the confidentiality of the US draft-
ing process and the use of attached amendments (sections 4 and 5) and the 
importance of aemulatio rather than innovatio will be discussed (section 6), 
before we end with a sub-conclusion on process in section 7 and continue to 
the overall conclusion of part I.
2 Elites and elite structure: If you cant beat them make them 
join you
One of the most interesting comparative process points concerns the make-
up and incentive structure of the relevant political elites. The relevance of 
this structure can be summarized by one question: who will lead further 
European integration? The term ‘elite’ is intended here as a descriptive and 
value neutral term, to the extent possible, and only as a shorthand to indi-
cate those in relevant positions of (political) power.
2.1 The federate path to power in the US
The US experience is of great interest on this point. The new constitution 
was conceived, formulated, and intensely promoted by powerful elites. 
These groups, as usual, were motivated by a variety of interests, ranging 
from the idealistic to the downright selfish.4 One especially relevant incen-
tive, however, united them: many of these elites had lost their hold on the 
state legislatures.5 They were threatened by the radical democratization of 
politics in their states.6
4 See for an account that very much stresses the personal interests of the Founding Fathers 
(yet has now been largely discredited), for instance Beard (1986).
5 See for instance the resolution that Sam Adams, one of the radical leaders, offered to Con-
gress on 10 May 1776: those colonies which had not yet adopted governments ‘suffi cient 
to the exigencies of their affairs’ should be encouraged to adopt such governments ‘as 
shall, in the opinion of the representatives of the people, best conduce to the happiness 
and safety of their constituents in particular, and America in General’. De facto this 
amounted to a general coup against conservatives who controlled the ‘old’ governments. 
(Jensen (1970), 98).
6 Jensen, (1970) intro p. xxiii. En p. 9 et seq. Jensen even describes these elites as the ‘ruling 
aristocracy’ and the ‘political oligarchy.’ In fact, the revolution was: ‘as much a war 
against the colonial aristocracy as a war for independence’ (p. 11). In which the aristoc-
racy was in a tight spot: Once (grudgingly) in rebellion, it needed the ore radical and 
democratic party to succeed, but thereby empowered their own natural opponent. Where 
these elites had retained control of the executive, they also strongly supported federation. 
Jensen (1965), 336.
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The issue of paper money provides an illustrative example. Most of the 
elites, including the founding fathers, were large creditors and traders. In 
those capacities they were alarmed by the introduction of paper money. 
Paper currency was printed in large quantities, yet did not have sufficient 
backing. As a result it soon lost any value. At the same time, however, state 
legislatures controlled by more radical factions decreed that paper money 
should continue to be accepted as valid payment of debts. Obviously these 
measures were highly popular with the increasing number of people in seri-
ous debt. For the creditors, however, paper money equalled writing off all 
outstanding loans. Multiple other comparable measures were taken, espe-
cially harming the interests of those with strong ties to the old tyrant.
Questions of social justice aside, these elites felt wronged and threat-
ened. Yet they had lost their hold over the public bodies in the states, and 
hence were unable to protect their interests and their views on the proper 
social order of things at the statal level. These elites, therefore, repeatedly 
turned to Congress to protect their interests. As described above, they were 
consistently disappointed. Congress lacked the energy and authority to 
assist, and often also the will.
With no more hold over their states, and no help coming from the weak cen-
tre, further centralization, and ensuring control of the new central govern-
ment to be created, was seen by a cross-state elite as the only way to regain 
political power.7 Centralization thus received the strong support of different 
elites, who jointly still controlled important political, economic and intel-
lectual resources. A group, furthermore, that included individuals with 
enormous personal authority such as George Washington and Benjamin 
Franklin. It is safe to say that without these elites – who played a vital part 
in the entire process from getting Congress to appoint a Committee charged 
with amending the Articles, convincing this Committee to violate its orders 
and to draft a new federate constitution instead, ensuring the adoption of 
this Constitution by popular conventions and delivering the first presi-
dents – federation would likely not have occurred.8
7 Although compared to current standards the respect and acceptance of ‘ones betters’ was 
still quite high. The story of one anti-federalist is almost endearing, ‘he did not seek re-
election because he had been too keenly made aware of ‘the want of a proper Education I 
feel my Self So Small on many occasions that I all most Scrink into Nothing Besides I am 
often obliged to Borrow from Gentlemen had advantages which I have not.’ Wood (1969), 
487.
8 McDonald (1968), 11 et seq., Wood (1969), 485. Because, as Lee pointed out, ‘we must 
recollect how disproportionately the democratic and aristocratic parts of the community 
were represented’ not only in the Philadelphia Convention but also in the ratifying con-
ventions, many of the real anti-federalists, those intimately involved in the democratic 
politics of the 1780’s and consequently with an emotional as well as an intellectual com-
mitment to Anti federalism, were never clearly heard in the formal debates of 1787-88.’
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This important pro-federation role of ousted elites in the US points to an 
important difference with the EU. One that certainly applies to the Neth-
erlands, but also seems to holds true for other Member States: there is no 
strong elite, and certainly no pan-European one, that requires federation to 
secure or increase its influence. Nor is there a central EU-elite with sufficient 
political power in the Member States to lead a federate charge. There is, in 
short, no critical mass of unified elites that stand to benefit from federation.
Obviously there are political parties that support further integration, 
even if they generally do so with an impressive lack of energy, and only as 
long as they are in government. Strongly championing Europe, or at least 
placing Europe centre stage, however, is not even an option. Hamilton cap-
tured this logical tendency in a confederation, and the converse importance 
of channelling ambitions via the central government:
‘He did not mean corruption, but a dispensation of those regular honors & emoluments 
which produce an attachment the Government. Almost all the weight of these is on the 
side of the States; and must continue so as long as the States continue to exist. All the pas-
sions then we see, of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern most individuals, and all 
public bodies, fall into the current of the States, and do not flow in the stream of the Gen-
eral Government. The former therefore will generally be an overmatch for the General 
Government and render any confederacy, in its very nature precarious.’9
Going through the Dutch election manifesto’s and party programs on the 
EU, for instance, this is immediately obvious: these are usually short, gener-
ally opportunistic and mostly lack vision and real European ambition. The 
‘new elite’ furthermore, if we could label the new populist leaders as such 
for now, is strongly opposed to further integration: their power lies nation-
ally. Equally there are of course many other elites, such as business lead-
ers, that do support European integration. Yet these lack the political power 
that the US elites could mobilize, and may also not desire to surrender the 
influence they have established at the national levels. Equally the different 
circles of elites that might have a pro-European interest are not as aligned 
and unified by a common enemy as they were in the US.
Based on the parallel with the US it is suggested this relative lack of a strong 
pro-integration elite, let alone a pro-federation elite, is partially due to the 
fact that there is no critical mass of (political) elites that derive their power from 
Europe, or ultimately aim to derive such power from Europe within the time span 
of their (political) future.10 What is more, this elite structure is consolidated 
9 The only option Hamilton saw was to put ‘complete sovereignty’ in the centre, so that all 
these powers start to work for the central government. Gouverneur Morris supports this 
sentiment: ‘loaves & fi shes must bribe the demagogues. They must be made to expect 
higher offi ces under the general than the State governments.’ (July 2nd 1787, McDonald 
(1968), 140, 158).
10 Cf Wood (1969), 361 and F. McDonald, E Pluribus Unum (Houghton Miffl in 1965), 30 and 
56.
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rather than challenged by the confederal organization of political power in 
the EU.11 Two conclusions that need some unpacking.
2.2 The national path to (EU) power
Even though Europe clearly enhances the power of some elites, especially 
those in government, the road to European political power runs through 
national political power. Nor can Europe assist much in getting to power 
in a Member State.12 Consequently the EU is predominantly controlled by 
individuals whose primary authority, and therefore political interest, lies at 
the national level.
One consequence of this national basis of political power is that the 
current confederal structure of the EU maintains an elite structure that actu-
ally opposes more far-reaching political integration, at least along federate 
lines.13 One can simply not hold it against politicians that they listen to, 
and prioratise, the demands of their national power base. Nor can they be 
expected to dismantle that power base in favour of a stronger centre where 
they will not hold equal power or status. At the same time, the EU itself 
does not have sufficient venues, means or legitimacy to bypass these statal 
or infra-statal elites and influence the people directly.
As long as principal political power lies nationally, therefore, it is contend-
ed that politicians will use Europe to get national power, and not the other 
way around.14 Although anecdotal the many examples of politicians prefer-
ring (a shot at) national power over high EU office are significant in this 
11 In the terms of neo-functionalism one might say that the predicted ‘political spill over’, 
has not occurred, or at least not to the critical level required to actually create spill over 
effects. See for instance S. George, Politics and Policy in the European Union (3rd edition, 
OUP 1996) p. 38-43.
12 Even though limited to its circumstances, the 2012 loss of former French President Sar-
kozy, despite open support from German Chancellor Merkel and a leading role in the EU, 
provides one illustration, as do the repeated electoral bills footed by German Chancellor 
Merkel herself.
13 This not to deny that other elites, especially business and fi nancial elites, have (at times) 
strongly promoted European integration, for instance being directly involved in the Sin-
gle Market Program though organs such as the European Round Table. See N. Fligstein 
and P. Brantley, ‘The Single Market Program and the Interests of Business’ in: B. Eichen-
green and J. Frieden (eds), Politics and Institutions in an Integrated Europe (Springer 1995) 
or Sandholz and Zysman (1989), 95.
14 Compare in this regard the interesting parallel with the US confederation where it was 
also complained, including by George Washington, that ‘the strong men preferred to 
serve in state governments rather than to serve in Congress.’ And Hamilton stated: ‘Each 
State in order to promote its own internal government and prosperity, has selected its 
best members to fi ll the offi ces within itself, and conduct its own affairs.’ Van Tyne (1907), 
543.
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regard.15 As they are the professionals in the arena of political power, we 
would be wise to follow their instinct as to where ultimate power still lies: 
in the Member States. Almost none of them think they are capable of achiev-
ing more political power by leading the charge for European federation, be 
it by merely proclaiming that cause nationally or actually achieving it.16
The resilience and self-maintaining effect of this elite structure also 
helps to explain the mistake in one of the assumptions of Neo-functional-
ism: the expectation that elites, including national political elites, would 
shift their loyalties to the European centre, and would from there promote 
further integration.17 Although repeated contact and prolonged activity 
on the European level does have an effect, this effect is not as significant 
or fundamental as seems to have been expected. Considering the implicit 
anti-democratic streak in such functional transfers of authority and loyalty 
this might also not be a bad thing.18 In any event such functional accounts 
did not take into account, or at least underestimated, the pull of democrat-
ic and party systems in the Member States through which national elites 
gain power. A reality which forces them to cater primarily to their national 
audience,19 including to their sentiments of nationalism and identity that 
only seem to increase where integration deepens.20 A mechanism, howev-
er, that does not deny the real authority and influence wielded in Brussels, 
or the many actors that compete for this authority and influence, but only 
emphasizes the relative primacy of the national process.
Federate ideals for the EU, therefore, have to deal with two related chal-
lenges. Firstly the lack of national elite push factors; there are no national elites 
that are either threatened or systematically out of power and that seek their 
15 See for example David Milliband preferring a shot at UK political power over becoming 
the fi rst High Representative or Franco Frattini who had little doubt in giving up his seat 
in the Commission to joint the Government of Berlusconi as foreign minister.
16 For a further discussion on the related question how to better integrate and relate the 
national democratic legitimacy and power base with the EU obligations that come with it 
see chapter 10 section 6 and chapter 12.
17 Cf Haas (1958), 312-13 or Wiener and Diez (2009), 49. Cf also the notion of political spill 
over which suffers from the same problem: J. Transholm-Mikkelsen, ‘Neofunctionalism: 
Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the European 
Community’, 20(1) Millennium: Journal of International Studies (1991), 5.
18 Craig (1999), 7: ’Democracy was, by way of contrast, a secondary consideration in a dou-
ble sense. This was in part because it was felt that the best, or perhaps only, way of secur-
ing the desired peace and prosperity was by technocratic, elite-led guidance.’
19 Moravcsik (1993), 473.
20 A. Niemann and P.C. Schmitter ‘Neofunctionalism’, in: A. Wiener and T. Diez (eds), Euro-
pean Integration Theory (2nd edition, OUP 2009), 52 ‘More orthodox theorists of interna-
tional relations have long protested that neo-functionalist systematically (and naively) 
underestimated the continued impact of sovereignty consciousness and nationalism as 
barriers to the integration process.’
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salvation in empowering the Union.21 Why, after all, create a political rival, 
where now one can have the best of both worlds: representing the ultimate 
national legitimacy at the EU level, and representing or blaming the EU 
where it helps to increase power nationally.22 The US situation was also 
rather unique in this regard, linked as it was to its colonial past and recent 
independence from Great Britain.
Second, the EU not only lacks this specific push factor, but would even 
need to overcome the existing confederal elite structure, and the elites that 
depend on it, in order to achieve a federate level of integration. Where elites 
were a push factor for federation in the US they form a hurdle to federation 
in the EU.
National democratic mechanisms themselves, therefore, seem to restrict 
federate integration, which creates an interesting tension between further 
integration and democracy. A tension that can also be seen at work in our 
second process element. One that is not often emphasized in American dis-
cussions of the Constitution, as it does not fully fit with the mythical image 
of the founding fathers as the white knights of pure democracy.
3 The anti-democratic revolution23
Many proposals for a federate Europe rely on the necessity of federating to 
‘increase democracy’.24 Often the US Constitution thereby acts as a shining 
example: was Philadelphia not one of the birthplaces of modern democracy, 
of a government by the People and for the People? Yet here actual histo-
ry and mythology must be separated, for the reality behind the process of 
American federation was not as simple.
21 A situation that forms a problem for effectiveness and EU legitimacy more generally 
because such push factors are equally lacking to inspire national political elites to 
enhance, or even defend, the authority and legitimacy of the confederal system already 
in place. See, reinforcing this tendency, also the comments above on the dependence of 
the rule by law, and the way this takes some of the responsibility of the shoulders of the 
political actors.
22 Moravcsik (1993), 514-17.
23 Wood (1969), 485 ‘Both the proponents and opponents of the Constitution focused 
throughout the debates on an essential point of political sociology that ultimately must 
be used to distinguish a Federalist from an Antifederalist. The quarrel was fundamental-
ly one between aristocracy and democracy’ and p. 493: ‘those beliefs in elitism that lay at 
the heart of their conception of politics and of their constitutional program.’, and p. 496 
‘That the people were represented better by one of the natural aristocracy (…) was the 
defi ning element of the Federalist philosophy.’
24 See especially the discussion of statism, including federate aspirations for the EU in chap-
ter 8, section 4.
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In fact one could describe American federation as an anti-democratic revolu-
tion.25 Jensen even goes as far as to call it an ‘anti-democratic crusade’.26 The 
opponents of the federate constitution also attacked it as such. In the words 
of Richard Henry Lee, one of the anti-federalists’ most impressive champi-
ons: ‘every man of reflection must see that the change now proposed is a 
transfer of power from the many to the few.’27
Many drafters and supporters of the new constitution were openly opposed 
to the ‘radical’ democracy of the revolution.28 As discussed the shift towards 
direct democracy had cost most of them their political power. But it also 
conflicted with their deeper beliefs on social justice and the proper organ-
isation of a polity. Finding ways to control the will of the people became 
crucially important, so as to ensure that this will could be rationalized and 
checked by ‘the purest and noblest characters’29 the nation could offer. As 
Edmund Randolph put it at the beginning of the Philadelphia convention,
‘our chief dangers arise from the democratic parts of our constitutions. (…) None of the 
constitutions have provided sufficient checks against the democracy’.30
25 Wood (1969), 562 even states that there is ‘something disingenuous’ about the emphasis 
on democracy in the federal defence of the constitution: ‘They appropriated and exploit-
ed the language that more rightfully belonged to their opponents.’ To illustrate, John 
Adams, for example, literally quoted Aristotle on aristocracy in defending the Constitu-
tion (John Adams, Notes for an Oration at Braintree, 1772, in: L.H. Butterfi eld, L.C. Faber 
and W. D. Garrett, Diary and autobiography of John Adams vol. 2 (Belknap Press 1962), 57-60. 
Many federalist leaders saw aristocracy as a necessary element of government (Wood 
(1969), 200 et seq.): ‘The Americans were thoroughly familiar with the theory [of mixed 
constitutions-AC] and this knowledge was even ‘Axiomatic’. ‘The republicanism of the 
Revolution was not for most Americans directed at aristocracy per se, but only at an arti-
fi cial Crown-created aristocracy which owed its position not to merit but to connections 
and infl uence. That some sort of aristocracy ‘consisting of a small number of the ablest 
men in the nation’, was necessary for the stability of their mixed republics few Whigs 
denied.’
26 Jensen (1970), XV: ‘therefore they are unwilling to accept the idea that the articles of Con-
federation were an expression of the democratic philosophy of the eighteenth century 
and that the Constitution of 1787 was the culmination of an anti-democratic crusade’
27 See ‘Letters from the Federal Farmer’, no. 4 of 12 October 1787, from either Richard Henry 
Lee or Melancton Smith. Available online via: http://www.constitution.org/afp/fed-
far00.htm.
28 The failures and dangers of democracy were a commonplace in the Philadelphia conven-
tion. As Madison notes (July 2) ‘Every man of observation had seen in the democratic 
branches of the State Legislatures, precipitation-in Congress changeableness, in every 
department excesses agst. personal liberty private property & personal safety. What qual-
ities are necessary to constitute a check in this case? Abilities and virtue, are equally nec-
essary in both branches. Something more then is now wanted.’ This second branch (the 
Senate) must therefore have the ‘aristocratic spirit’.
29 Federalist Paper no. 10.
30 Cf Jensen (1970), XX.
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If possible Gouverneur Morris, another leading figure, was even more 
explicit:
‘the mob begins to think and reason. Poor reptiles! It is with hem a vernal morning; they 
are struggling to cast of their winter’s slough, they bask in the sunshine, and ere noon they 
will bite!’31
And that same Morris on if this would come to pass:
‘farewell aristocracy. I see, and I see with fear and trembling that if the disputes with Great 
Britain continue, we shall be under the worst of all possible dominions; we shall be under 
the domination of a riotous mob. It is to the interest of all men, therefore, to seek for 
reunion with the parent state.’32
It is true that, despite this sentiment, the Constitution eventually adopt-
ed still left the US as one of the most democratic nations of the time. So 
much so that ironically the mixed system created has almost come to define 
democracy. The shift to a federation was, however, emphatically not intend-
ed to increase democracy, but to decrease it.
The fundamental shift towards a single American people also dove-
tailed with this aristocratic goal of checking the democratic element: it paci-
fied radical factions that might hold a majority in one state by merging them 
into a more amorphous whole.33 Put more bluntly, besides an honest reliance 
on popular sovereignty the famous ‘We the People’ also had as its aim to 
pacify the actual citizens by locking them into a semi-abstract notion that 
empowered the central government yet was too vast for any faction to ani-
mate directly.34 A move anti-federalists aptly perceived as one radically reduc-
ing democracy.35
31 Gouverneur Morris to mr. Penn, New York, May 30, 1774, in Force, American Archives, 
4th series, 1: 342.
32 Idem, p. 342-343. For the aristocratic elements already present in radical republicanism 
itself via the notion of virtue, see Wood, (1969), 71 et seq. This existing thread of republi-
canism provided an important basis for the convention. Also see Madison declaring that 
government had fallen ‘into the Hands of those whose ability or situation in Life does not 
entitle them to it’, that is ‘men without reading, experience or principle’ (Federalist Paper 
no. 62, notably a public defence of the Constitution). Wood ((1969), 503) even states that 
‘by the 1780’s the most common conception used to describe the society was the dichoto-
my between aristocracy and democracy, the few and the many.’ On this dichotomy see 
further Cuyvers (2007).
33 Jensen (1970), 28, 91, 95, Wood (1969), 411.
34 Of course this was before the arrival of mass media. In any event the opponents of the 
constitution did heatedly point out its aristocratic nature as well: See for instance Lee: 
‘the government, in which the great body of the people, in the nature of things, will be 
only nominally represented.’ (McDonald (1968), 201 et. seq.)
35 Jensen (1970), 117.
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Now obviously these aristocratic objectives only form one of the many ele-
ments that were driving American federation. Equally the federate constitu-
tion that resulted can still be seen as democratic, depending on the yardstick 
used. Nevertheless the anti-democratic objectives behind the American pro-
cess should be taken into account when contemplating a federate Europe, 
especially when the objective is to democratize the EU. For federation is not 
the same as democratization. Just as confederalism does not equate with inter-
governmental or undemocratic, federation cannot be equated with demo-
cratic. Although the founding fathers have done a truly impressive PR-job 
in linking the federation and democracy, there simply is no necessary or 
automatic link. Federation can equally be used, as in the US, to reduce 
democracy, or at least to dampen the direct democratic influence of member 
peoples or factions.
The democratic level of any federate polity will, therefore, depend on 
how the federate system is developed, as well as on the prior issue of how 
one includes the scale, level and directness of representation in one’s defini-
tion of democracy. In one imaginary configuration, for instance, it could be 
imagined that after an explosive rise of populist parties we would indeed 
have a similar situation of ousted former elites in the EU who would turn to 
the EU to regain control. Here suggestions of federation would again aim to 
restrain the more direct strands of democracy rather than trying to increase 
them. Even leaving fictitious scenarios aside, however, it in any event 
becomes harder to push federation as the solution for democracy where it 
has to be honestly acknowledged that such federation carries an inherent 
aristocratic tendency.
It should be stressed, therefore, that the federate move in the US was not 
intended to increase democracy but to check it. Nor should federation sim-
plistically be equated with democratization. A point that will be further 
developed in part II of this thesis where, based on a confederal notion of 
sovereignty, it will be explored to what extent the confederal form, instead 
of the federate form, might hold part of the key to realign the democratic 
process with the reality of far-reaching integration and the multiple centres 
of public authority it creates. A confederal solution that, unlike federation, 
would not require disassembling the Member States, and with them the 
entire foundation for the current organization of public authority in Europe.
4 The benefits of secrecy: Inverting the convention scheme and 
attached amendments
A more limited, practical element of process concerns the complete secre-
cy during the drafting of the Constitution in Philadelphia. Obviously, there 
was no twitter to violate such secrecy, but it was still an achievement that 
all delegates respected the agreement not to divulge anything about their 
deliberations until work had been completed. This had one marvellous ben-
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efit, as is evident from the notes published later: open debate and compro-
mise seeking were possible, and no loss of face occurred when a point had 
to be ‘surrendered’.36 In fact, it is highly doubtful if agreement could have 
been reached otherwise. After an agreement had been reached during the 
Convention, however, a full public debate was initiated to discuss the result-
ing proposal. A debate that was not concerned with what should ideally be 
included in a draft constitution, but on whether the proposed system, inevi-
tably a compromise but still defended as a consistent whole, was desirable.
The EU, and especially the new ‘convention system’ now enshrined in the 
Treaties despite the failure of the Constitutional treaty, follows a reversed 
procedure.37 Transparency and open debated are primarily sought during the 
drafting, infusing any and all political rivalries directly into the debates. The 
subsequent ratification in the Member States, however, was less rigorous, 
although large differences exist in the rigour of the public debate in differ-
ent Member States. Even more sadly, where direct public support was asked 
via a referendum it was far too often refused. Without implying that there 
were many realistic alternatives, it only needs to be remarked here that this 
reverse order of events, at least as compared to the US, has so far only seems 
to have increased distrust and resentment in many Member States.
It should be asked, therefore, if the reverse US order does not make bet-
ter sense:38 to first, in relative seclusion, draft a proposal, which after real 
debate can then receive a proper democratic seal of approval.39 Such a pro-
cess, which comes closer to the Treaty amendments of old, safe the thorough 
and open debate afterwards, would seem superior in general, but is espe-
cially crucial if the step towards full federation is seriously contemplated. 
Such a fundamental shift, after all, requires higher political support than 
parliamentary ratification, and better drafting than public conventions seem 
capable of. Such a reverse process could perhaps also benefit from one other 
mechanism without which ratification of the US constitution would have 
failed: attached amendments.
36 Cf more generally on this point Tushnet (2006), 1236.
37 Art. 48 TFEU. This EU system in fact has very little to do with the reality of the US con-
ventions after which it is named. As discussed above, furthermore, political leaders tried 
hard to avoid a convention in the amendment of art. 136 TFEU.
38 Somewhat cynically, when it was time to stop refl ecting and adopt Lisbon, the very same 
Treaty that prescribes the conventions, a very closed approach was taken. First, political 
agreement was reached in closed discussions between ministries (Sherpa’s). Only then 
was a point ‘opened’ for an IGC. See Chalmers, Davies and Monti (2010), 39.
39 Watts (1998), 128: ‘ an important aspect of the establishment of federal systems is the 
degree of elite accommodation and public involvement in the process. In the contempo-
rary era, when the importance of democratic processes is increasingly emphasized, elite 
accommodation by itself may no longer be suffi cient for legitimizing new political sys-
tems; this has complicated the patterns of negotiation for the establishment of federal 
systems, as the development of the European Union has demonstrated.’
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5 Attached amendments
Many states were facing majority opposition to the Constitution. Sever-
al state conventions were even debating a second national Convention in 
which states could propose amendments. Something which, if allowed, 
would have enormously delayed, and probably sunk the entire Constitu-
tion. It would certainly have undermined its coherence. Starting on a pro-
posal from Madison in New York, it was then suggested to allow ratification 
to be accompanied by a set of proposed amendments to the constitution. 
Instead of demanding amendments or attaching reservations up front, all of 
these proposed amendments would then be dealt with under the mechanism 
of the new Constitution. This method was adopted by most states, who did 
indeed add proposed amendments to their act of ratification. Without this 
outlet, if simply forced to say yes or no, the nine state majority required 
would not have been achieved. Also, most of the commonly proposed 
amendments were indeed adopted afterwards: the first ten amendments, 
including the bill of rights, closely follow the attached state amendments, 
especially the Pennsylvania one.40
The flexibility that this mechanism allowed was vital, but even more impor-
tant was what it indicated: the states accepted, and had faith in, the political 
process that was to develop under the new constitution. They did not need 
to legally determine everything up front, but trusted that their proposals 
would be properly dealt with under that new system.
A similar process could be envisioned for the EU, also at the level of 
secondary law: ratification could be accompanied by further amendments 
or proposed secondary legislation. Suggestions which should then receive 
careful attention at the EU level, and perhaps could even be the subject of a 
special amendment procedure.
6 Aemulatio, not innovatio
The popular myth has it that a group of demi-gods, in an historically unri-
valled concentration of intellect and virtue, gathered at Philadelphia. Man-
aging to capture truth and democracy itself on Parchment, they brought 
forth the completely unique federate constitution of the US. As a myth, this 
story has been quite helpful in generating support for the constitution, and 
building an American nation. It certainly has been more effective than the 
EU attempt at symbolism in the Constitutional Treaty, which backfired with 
impressive and almost comical force. It is also just that: a myth.41
40 Beeman (2010), 386 et seq.
41 ‘When a great question is fi rst started, there are very few, even of the greatest minds, 
which suddenly and intuitively comprehend it, in all its consequences’ (Wood (1969), 44.
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To a very large extent, the new American constitution built on, and even 
copy pasted, existing materials.42 First, many of the innovations were direct 
responses to the failures of the Confederation.43 Second, a wealth of recent 
constitutional experiments in the states was at hand: many of the delegates 
at Philadelphia had the benefit of first hand experience in drafting these 
state constitutions.44 Of these recent examples especially the Virginia con-
stitution served as an important model.45 Third, many elements of the Con-
stitution were based on traditional British constitutional theory, and on the 
colonial bond that the US had enjoyed with Great Britain.46
Naturally, important innovations were made as well, for instance in the way 
that such existing elements were combined. In addition, some of the enlight-
enment political theory relied on was put into practice for the first time.47 
Yet understanding the US constitution as complete innovation, instead of 
impressive aemulatio may lead to the dangerous conclusion that new consti-
tutions can be devised in abstraction and completely anew, if only one just 
has enough smart people.48 What the US process learns, in fact, is that the 
best change lies in practical yet well thought through and informed, emu-
lation.49
7 Process conclusions
The process elements outlined above provide some specific insights for the 
future process of developing the EU constitutional order. Their overarching 
trend, though based on a selective sample, points to several key process ele-
ments underlying US federation that are lacking in the EU. Most important-
ly the national democratic and elite structure prevents rather than propels a 
42 Cf. Wood (Creation), 564.
43 McLaughlin (1918), 239.
44 This experience had brought both practical constitutional ideas and a deeper change in 
the understanding of, and approach to, politics. Wood, (1969), xvii, 127.
45 In addition the New York constitution of 1777 and the Massachusetts one of 1780 also 
paved the way for some of the ‘innovations’. New York, for instance, had a very strong 
senate and a more powerful executive in the governor. Massachusetts had the strongest 
governor of them all, whose authority included the power to veto all legislation, unless 
the house repassed it by a 2/3 majority.
46 See in this regard also the earlier plan by Benjamin Franklin that had proposed a further 
American Union but still under the aegis of the Empire.
47 For a similar argument about how most of the ‘remarkable institutional features’ of the 
EU ‘came out of the existing toolbox of international law’ but were combined in a 
‘unprecedented’ manner see: De Witte (2012), 19 et seq.
48 For a thorough overview of the underlying experiences and theories see McDonald 
(1985) as well as Beeman (2006).
49 Jensen (1970), 162 notes on the location of sovereignty in the Articles: ‘it was a matter of 
practical politics, arrived at by the political manoeuvring of two opposing parties having 
quite different political aims and ideals.’. On the EU also see Habermas (2001a), 4.
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fundamental shift in political authority. In addition, one of the key norma-
tive argument that seems to support European federation – making the EU 
more democratic – is largely based on a confusion between having a central 
normative authority and how this authority is represented, or between fed-
eration and democracy. Even aside from any desire to federate, furthermore, 
the process via which the EU establishes its own basic rules might benefit 
from the US experience in the Philadelphia Convention.
Consequently these process elements only confirm the necessity of finding 
confederal solutions to the woes and weaknesses of the EU, at least for the 
foreseeable future. In addition, as will be developed further in the part II, 
they may point the way to some methods of actually strengthening the con-
federal basis of the EU, without having to fully federate.
1 The modified confederation as a model?
Part I of this thesis has illustrated the value of a confederal understanding 
of the EU. The EU can be usefully understood as a further evolution of the 
unfashionable but rich confederal form. Approaching the EU as a modi-
fied confederal form provides us with an instructive prism to better under-
stand its nature, functioning and evolution of the EU. It helps to explain, for 
instance, the relative success and deepening of European integration, the 
plural nature of the EU legal order, or the increasing gap between the grow-
ing federate authority of the EU and its static confederal legitimacy. The 
modified confederal approach equally fits with the general intuition that the 
EU is federate in some sense, but not ‘really’ so, just as a moped with a big-
ger engine is not really a racing bike. Several more specific findings underlie 
these general conclusions on the relevance and potential of reconnecting the 
EU with confederalism.
To begin with the confederal perspective has proven instructive in delin-
eating where the EU does follow the classic confederal model and where 
it does not. To operationalize the confederal model for this purpose the EU 
was compared against two concrete examples: the often ignored American 
Confederation and its evolution into a federal state. A comparison that was 
structured around sixteen key federate modifications that shaped this evo-
lution. Jointly these modifications created a comparative grid on which the 
EU could be positioned between the confederal and the federal poles.
A systematic comparison subsequently showed that the EU remains 
confederal on eight of these federate markers. Crucially, however, these 
eight include all foundational modifications that together provided the consti-
tutional basis for American federation: The EU is not based on a single peo-
ple, may not use force against its members or impose direct taxes. Equally 
no amendment by majority is possible, but secession is. Lastly the govern-
ment of the EU is fully merged and not separate as in the US, has a weak 
executive and relies on a primarily confederal representational scheme. 
On all these foundational points the EU remains confederal. These find-
ings, therefore, support the initial intuition that the EU sufficiently shares 
in the core characteristics of the confederal form to be usefully approached 
as such. Especially relevant for our comparative purpose, furthermore, is 
that EU is not based on a single European people, whereas the assumption 
of one sovereign American people constituted the very core of the federate 
shift in the US.
6 Conclusions part I: The Modified 
Confederal Model of the EU
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At the same time the constitutional system of the EU has incorporated five 
important federate modifications. To begin with EU law claims, and gener-
ally receives, supremacy and direct effect. The EU can also rely on a broad 
doctrine of competences, as well as on specific competences to regulate 
commerce internally. The US Confederation sorely lacked these instru-
ments. Lastly, and vitally, a central court was established and given the final 
say on the interpretation of EU law. Not incidentally these federate elements 
coincide with several hallmarks of the EU constitutional order: they are the 
federate all-stars that stand out in the otherwise confederal team. They have 
proven to be of vital importance for the nature and functioning of the EU, 
and should be considered crucial modifications to the standard confederal 
model.
The remaining three federate modifications compared presented a more 
mixed result. As far as objectives, external powers and the institutional set-
up of the legislature were concerned the EU system was either blended, 
conformed to neither, or equally to both the systems under the American 
Confederation and the US Federation.
2 An inverted confederation with a federate superstructure 
relying on a rule by law
These comparative findings, and the interesting blend of confederal and 
federate elements they reveal, help us to better understand the function-
ing and evolutionary dynamic of the EU. To better serve this purpose these 
individual comparative findings were aggregated and analytically refined 
into three more general propositions on the modified confederal system that 
has evolved in the EU, and that has managed to address several of the exis-
tential weaknesses of confederalism.
To begin with, these modifications show how the EU can be understood as 
an inverted confederation. As an ‘impire’ the EU inverted the traditional exter-
nal and military focus of confederations to an internal and economic focus. 
A modification that has had a significant impact on the overall function-
ing and stability of the EU. Most importantly this internal focus provided 
a more secure incentive for confederal cooperation. For where traditional 
confederations often broke down after the external threat disappeared, an 
internal market provides a more constant spur for cooperation: there are no 
times of peace in the marketplace. Consequently Member States have a con-
tinuous interest in economic cooperation, and face immediate and serious 
harm if they are excluded. What is more, this incentive to cooperate and 
overcome other self-interests keeps pace with the level of integration: the 
more developed the market, the bigger the benefits and the higher the costs 
of exclusion. This federate modification, therefore, helps to explain the rela-
tive stability of the EU, as well as its capacity to spread to ever more sensi-
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tive areas and overcome deep crises. The level to which the Member States 
have so far been willing to go during the EMU crisis is a case in point.
The inverted focus on an internal market also provided an inherent 
incentive to deepen integration: the market has virtually no limits in itself, 
and can always be improved. An internal market is also far more likely to 
spawn a more developed institutional and legal framework. In contrast 
to external relations a market concerns innumerable interactions between 
individuals and public authorities in areas covered by national law. As such 
famous EU doctrines as supremacy and direct effect were also far more like-
ly to develop within an internal market concerned with the proper tariff for 
urea formaldehyde than in a defensive confederation.
By stimulating such institutional and legal developments the inverted focus 
of the EU also links to the second proposition developed in part I: how the 
EU combines a confederal foundation with a federalized superstructure. 
An image that clearly materializes where one zooms out and combines the 
results on the sixteen points compared: on all foundational modifications 
the EU remains confederal, whereas it has incorporated five federate modi-
fications at the structural and institutional level.
These different federate elements in the superstructure of the EU, 
including supremacy, direct effect and the ECJ, help to explain the remark-
able effectiveness and stability the EU has achieved, certainly for a con-
federal system. Negative integration as developed by the Court of Justice, 
for instance, provided an essential legal backbone. It limited the effects of 
political inaction and acted as pacemaker where the political process stalled. 
Broader competences allowed the EU to act where there was political will. 
The broad and judicially developed system of EU competences even com-
pensated for the confederal rigidity of the amendment process through 
what may be termed pseudo-amendment. Together these federate modifica-
tions reduced several of the existential weaknesses in the classic confederal 
model: the superstructure reinforced the basis.
The federalized superstructure these modifications created also enabled the 
EU to develop a genuinely confederal rule by law, the third general prop-
osition developed in part I. No less then four of the five federate modifi-
cations incorporated in the superstructure of the EU concern law and the 
legal system. Where the legislative and the executive remained largely or 
wholly confederal, the legal column was federalized to a significant extent. 
Through these federate legal modifications as supremacy, direct effect 
and other legal principles developed by the Court of Justice the EU could 
plug in to the well-developed legal and bureaucratic systems of its Mem-
ber States. It could subsequently rely on these systems, and the capacity for 
statal self-control they contain. A mode of governing wholly unavailable to 
the American Confederation because its members were far to unstable and 
undeveloped. A mode of governing that also explains the importance of law 
in the EU as well as the plural nature of its legal order: it allows the EU to 
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govern relatively effectively without itself acquiring the institutional capac-
ity or normative authority normally deemed necessary to ensure compli-
ance. As such this rule by law partially challenges the conventional linking 
of law and power and law and state. It thereby forms a further evolution of 
the federal idea developed in Philadelphia itself, creating an impire of law 
beyond what even the founding fathers deemed possible.
Though clearly not fail-safe, the rule by law is secured by the fact that 
Member States have become dependent on their own legal systems as well: 
they cannot do without courts or bureaucrats. And it is difficult to reduce 
the rule of law reflexes in these systems, which like a USB standard allow 
the EU to plug in through the format of law, without undermining their 
effectiveness altogether.
Jointly these modifications have significantly strengthened the constitution-
al system of the EU. They have created a modified confederal model which 
at least softens the most existential weaknesses in the system of the Ameri-
can Confederation. Weaknesses so aptly analyzed by Madison, and which 
largely inspired the federate Constitution.
The inverted focus and the legal backbone of negative integration, 
for instance, improve the ‘energy’ in the centre, spurring it to act. Broadly 
defined powers allow it to act. An effective rule by law ensures compliance 
of acts once the centre has acted, without the centre needing to develop the 
capacity to enforce. Several of the confederal Achilles heels mentioned by 
Madison are therefore covered, including the lack of authority and capacity 
to act in the centre, the inability to amend and a lack of compliance due to 
limited enforcement capacity. All in all not a bad score for the modified con-
federal model. Certainly not as it belongs to a constitutional sub-species that 
normally rivals the Panda bear in its seeming desire for extinction.
3 Weaknesses and risks of a modified confederal system: 
A widening gap…
At the same time many challenges remain, and some serious new ones have 
been created by these modifications as well. A further use of the confederal 
perspective is therefore to assist in better identifying and understanding 
these weak spots in the modified confederal system of the EU.
The self-deepening tendencies of the internal market, for instance, raises the 
problem of delimitation: are there any boundaries to the internal market? 
And how to balance a federate and legalized market against other objectives 
that are organized at a confederal and political level?
The rule by law approach of the EU, furthermore, has several inherent 
weaknesses as well. It is logically limited to areas governed by law, exclud-
ing several important areas of public authority not reducible to legal con-
trol. Where an area is nevertheless legalized to allow for EU control the 
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relation between the members of the Trias, and between law and politics 
more generally, may be unbalanced. Conversely a reliance on law may also 
reduce the politicization of EU topics; integration is seemingly imposed by 
courts and bureaucrats and becomes the opposite of politics. This allows 
national politicians to refrain from taking responsibility for European inte-
gration, let alone for developing a political narrative capable of explaining 
or supporting it.
Most problematic, however, a rule by law seems to depend on sev-
eral preconditions which might not endure. These include the stability of 
the Member States and the openness and receptiveness of their legal and 
bureaucratic systems to an EU rule by law. Where these preconditions are 
threatened, as they increasingly seem to be, a rule by law may loose its 
effectiveness, and classic confederal compliance problems resurface.
The most fundamental risk in the modified confederal model, however, 
stems from the increasing gap between the confederal basis and the feder-
ate superstructure of the EU. As was shown the federate elements in the 
EU system have gradually expanded and deepened over time. The EU, for 
instance, claims increasing authority on ever more sensitive areas, which 
strongly increases its legitimacy demands.
On the other hand the confederal basis of the EU cannot match this fed-
erate deepening, and is left struggling to meet these increasing legitimacy 
needs of the federate superstructure. The confederal elements in the EU sys-
tem are also incapable of stopping their federate counterparts from expand-
ing further, nor can these federate modifications be removed altogether as 
this would undermine overall stability.
The inevitable clash between these trends is clear, and is exemplified rather 
dramatically by the EMU crisis. Yet importantly the confederal perspec-
tive demonstrates that this legitimacy gap should not be misdiagnosed as 
a problem of democratic representation. Nor can it be reduced to a ‘no-dem-
os’ argument. It is true that the creation of a single European people would 
establish a federate basis, and therefore close the gap between basis and 
superstructure. However, such a European demos only forms one of the pos-
sible solutions. It should not be mistaken for the problem itself, which origi-
nates in the increasing gap between a confederal basis and an expanding 
federate superstructure.
This distinction between the legitimacy gap itself and the potential solu-
tion of a European demos is particularly important, furthermore, because the 
creation of a European people seems unlikely, at least for quite some time to 
come. As chapter 6 showed, several of the key factors that drove the process 
of US federation are absent in the EU. Some factors are even reversed, and 
work against federation. One of the most vital differences in this regard con-
cerns the difference in elite structures. The typical post-colonial elite struc-
ture of the US promoted federation: several groups of ousted pre-colonial 
elites hoped to regain political power and influence through federation. 
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In the EU no such group exists, or in any event does not form a sufficiently 
critical mass. Both national and European political power derives primarily 
from the national level. Rather than aiming to empower the European cen-
tre, this reality incentivizes current elites to protect their national authority 
and strongholds from further centralization. Contrary to the US, therefore, 
the current elite structure in the EU resists rather than supports a federate 
shift of ultimate authority to the EU. In addition it was shown that the pro-
cess of US federation should, for an important part, be understood as an 
attempt to limit democracy, and to ensure that democracy was sufficiently 
tempered by aristocratic elements. Federation as such should, consequently, 
not be confused with democratization. Federation is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for democracy: in fact the situation under the American Confed-
eration could be described as more democratic than the system envisioned 
by the founders at Philadelphia, as they themselves openly acknowledged.
4 Closing the gap?
Obviously this leaves the question how to strengthen the confederal foun-
dation of the EU. How to do so before it crumbles under the weight of its 
own federate superstructure, and without leaving the confederal confines 
imposed by the lack of a European people? A foundation that will have to 
build on the specific strengths of the confederal model, yet must avoid its 
many inherent weaknesses.
Although clearly not coming close to a final solution to this fundamental 
challenge, the next part of this thesis engages precisely this challenge of 
modifying and strengthening the EU confederal basis.
It does so by exploring another classic concept of constitutional theory, 
and one which also played a key role in the US: sovereignty. Can a confed-
eral conception of sovereignty be envisioned which can help to construe a 
foundation strong enough to support the federate superstructure of the EU? 
For if such a stronger confederal foundation can be established it would 
allow the EU to retain and develop its modified confederal system. An out-
come that is considered normatively desirable because of its ability to actu-
ally combine unity and diversity in a reasonable effective manner, and to do 
so in a way that realigns government and national democratic systems with 
the global reality that requires governing. As such a reinforced confederal 
system could even open up an interesting model for international organiza-
tion more generally.1
1 Cf. Elazar (2006), 51: ‘There are many indications that the European Community with its 
functional arrangements presages a revival of confederal government in other parts of 
the world as well.’
Part II
A confederal conception 
of sovereignty

1 Introduction: ‘We the peoples’?
Part I identified an increasing gap between the authority capacity of the EU’s 
confederal foundation and the authority demands of its expanding federate 
superstructure. This gap, it was suggested, forms one of the root causes of 
the EU’s legitimacy problems.
How to deal with this gap? A question that feeds into the more general 
challenge of grounding and democratically legitimizing an entity like the 
EU. A question also that brings to mind Rousseau’s comment on the con-
federal dream of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre: ‘He has designed so to speak the 
roof of a building of which it was necessary to show the foundations.’1
A first obvious solution would be to downsize the federate superstructure. 
The problem is that the EU relies on its federate superstructure for stability. 
Downsizing it to a sufficiently confederal level would, consequently, revive 
the classic weaknesses of confederation and undermine the stability of the 
entire EU.2 In the case of the EU the federate roof not just seeks a founda-
tion, it also keeps the building together.
Upgrading the EU’s foundation to a federate level is not a realistic solu-
tion either. At least not in the foreseeable future.3 Nor is it necessarily desir-
able.4 It would mean relinquishing the potential the confederal form holds for 
a more flexible and extra-statal design of government. One that is based on 
improved methods of democratically legitimizing public authority on sever-
al distinct levels, rather than just subsuming its members into a larger state.5
1 Rousseau, Oeuvres, III p. 658. Also see for the ideas of Rousseau on the ‘good Abbé’ Rosas 
(2003).
2 Although more work could be done to see if some federate modifi cations could be safely 
reduced, better contained or at least counterbalanced this path will not be further 
explored here.
3 Von Bogdandy (2000), 43-44, Rosas (2003), 2, Van Middelaar (2009).
4 Cf already Max Kohnstamm in his diary on October 19th 1956: ‘We moeten niet natie Euro-
pa in plaats van natie Frankrijk plaatsen. Dit zou kleine zaak zijn die catastrofe ten slotte 
toch niet zou vermijden.’ (We must not replace the French nation with a European nation. 
This would be a small-minded affair that would not avoid catastrophe in the end.’ (my 
translation) in, M. Segers and M. Kohnstamm, De Europese dagboeken van Max Kohnstamm. 
Augustus 1953 – September 1957 (Boom 2008), 187. Pleading for federation see – rather 
famously – F. Mancini, ‘Europe, The Case for Statehood’ 4 European Law Journal (1998), 43. 
Also see G. Morgan, The Idea of European Superstate (Princeton University Press, 2005).
5 Cf also the argument in Habermas (2001).
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Consequently neither dismantling the federate superstructure, nor creating 
a US-style federate basis are feasible ways forward. A conclusion that seem-
ingly leaves the EU, and us, in a bind. The EU seems to have both gone too 
far, and not far enough. It is either a failed orange, or a tangerine with dan-
gerous delusions of grandeur.
Building on the confederal approach, part II of this thesis suggests that a 
confederal conception of popular sovereignty may offer one way out of this 
dilemma. It may provide a sufficiently stable, legitimate, and flexible basis 
for EU authority without undermining the Member States as primary cen-
tres of public authority or the member peoples as separate, independent 
and sovereign entities.
The starting point for this suggestion again lies in the US. More spe-
cifically it lies in the federal evolution of the concept of popular sovereignty that 
enabled the US to federate. As will be suggested the EU could emulate this 
federate application of sovereignty by taking it one confederal step further. 
A step that fits with the evolution and logic of sovereignty, and one that 
would enable the EU to reinforce its constitutional foundation without leav-
ing the confederal confines.
2 Aims and advantages of a confederal conception of 
sovereignty
Part II therefore explores a possible evolution towards a confederal concep-
tion of sovereignty for the EU. If feasible, such a conception would serve 
several more specific aims and offer several advantages that are useful to set 
out first.
2.1 Removing sovereignty as an obstacle to constructive theory
To begin with a confederal conception may reduce the false juxtaposition 
between sovereignty and integration, and the unfortunate effects this juxta-
position has on a constructive constitutional theory of the EU.
Currently sovereignty is generally seen as an obstacle to integration.6 As 
a result those defending national sovereignty often see themselves forced 
to limit integration to a low level that does not undermine the sovereign 
state. Those supporting further integration generally feel compelled to reject 
sovereignty altogether precisely because it obstructs any meaningful level 
of integration.7 The resulting conflict leaves sovereignty a divisive concept. 
6 See amongst many others Schütze (2012), 48: ‘From the very beginning, the idea of state 
sovereignty hindered an understanding of the nature of the European Union.’ See for a 
detailed discussion ch. 9 below.
7 Bellamy (2006), 168.
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One that is either strongly attacked or absolutized as the last line of defence 
against a European super state.8
Since both camps field convincing arguments, this juxtaposition tends to 
force one into some undesirable and often untenable positions. The result 
generally is an unhelpful deadlock in the debate on European integration. 
Like the German Constitutional Court, for instance, one may end up defin-
ing the minimum ‘substance’ of national democracy, or devising all kinds 
of other unworkable or opportunistic limitations on integration.9 The alter-
native strategy of ostracizing sovereignty altogether generally leaves one 
with a daunting hole in the organization and legitimization of authority.10 
What tends to remain are several free-floating authorities that are hopefully 
restrained, but scarcely legitimated, by a dialogue between them on some 
values they are presumed to share.
An evolved notion of confederal sovereignty may be able to soften this jux-
taposition between integration and sovereignty. In doing so it may also bring 
sovereignty back in play as part of the solution. Instead of having to over-
come sovereignty, and all the normative authority and national history that 
comes with it, the EU could start to rely on it. An outcome that also leads to 
the second, and even more fundamental, advantage of confederal sovereign-
ty for the EU: the prospect of a sufficiently stable and legitimate foundation.
2.2 Grounding the EU in its sovereign member peoples
A confederal conception of sovereignty could enable the EU to ground its 
authority, including its federate superstructure, in the one foundation strong 
enough to support it: the sovereign member peoples as embodied, organized 
and represented by their states.11 This would allow a solid confederal foun-
8 Cf Lindahl (2006), 87.
9 See for a detailed discussion of the case law of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht chap-
ter 8 section 4.4.
10 This also within the Member States, where national authority may be linked to the dis-
course of sovereignty as well, or in the words of Walker, where ‘notions of sovereignty’ 
are necessary ‘within the meta-language of explanation.’ (Walker (2006b), 25). This is 
especially the case in the Central and Eastern European Member States, where, largely 
due to their Soviet history, sovereignty plays a far more central role, and ‘relinquishing’ it 
is both far more sensitive and generally constitutionally restricted. See A. Albi, ‘Postmod-
ern Versus Retrospective Sovereignty: Two Different Discourses in the EU and the Candi-
date Countries’, in: N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2006), 402.
11 See on this position of the citizens also Pernice (2002), 511 et seq. as well as De Witte 
(1995), who contemplates placing sovereignty in the peoples of the EU taken together. As 
such this position does not believe that ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘universal’ shared principles 
can be enough to carry the full weight of public authority, even though they can play an 
important supportive role. Different see, for instance,: M Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan 
Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and 
beyond the State’, in: J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutio-
nalism, International Law and Global Governance (CUP 2009) p. 258.
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dation without requiring the abolition of the Member States or the separate 
member peoples. Rather than competing with these entities for authority 
and legitimacy, or even threatening to replace them altogether, the EU could 
build on them in a more symbiotic, and confederal, fashion.
If such a confederal foundation could be conceptualized, sovereignty could 
indeed be turned from an obstacle to theory and integration into a construc-
tive tool for both. A reapplication that would allow the EU to harness the 
legitimizing and organizing potential of sovereignty, instead of resisting it. 
Several further advantages would also flow from these two primary ones.
2.3 The fit of confederal sovereignty with EU Treaties and case law
A first additional advantage of confederal sovereignty is its fit with the con-
secutive EU Treaties and their progressive interpretation in the case law of 
the European Court of Justice. It particularly fits with, justifies, and delim-
its one of the fundamental trends in both: the progressive inclusion of the 
individual.12 From direct effect to direct representation, expanding EU citi-
zenship, or the inclusion of national parliaments into the EU institutional 
structure, all of these developments can be placed in the gradual relation 
building between the EU and its popular sovereigns, and the ‘ever-closer 
union among the peoples of Europe’ already envisioned in the preamble of the 
Treaty of Rome.13 A relation, however, that is still in need of the conceptual 
and constitutional foundation that confederal sovereignty may help to con-
strue.
2.4 Confederal constitutionalism and confederal supremacy
Two further advantages concern the fit between confederal sovereignty and 
EU constitutionalism, and the different perspective it allows on the suprem-
acy conundrum.
To begin with a confederal approach fits with the increasing popularity 
of approaching the EU through a constitutional lens. A confederation, after 
all, creates a constitutional bond between the different members, certainly 
where this bond is based on the sovereign peoples directly. At the same time 
a confederal approach also captures the ambivalence of a purely constitu-
tional understanding of the EU.14 An ambivalence perhaps best captured by 
12 Cf Rosas (2003), 3.
13 To the extent that political authority is relational in nature, the EU can also only become 
political, and be politically legitimized, by establishing a relation with the citizens. (Cf H. 
Arendt, ‘What is Authority?’ in: H. Arendt, On Revolution (Penguin 1973), 175). Part of the 
exercise here is to show how such a relation with the sovereign people directly does not 
require federation or the removal of the states.
14 Cf on this point also Schmitt (2008), 385 and his term of a ‘constitutional contract’.
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the term constitutional treaty, which retains the link with both the interna-
tional and the constitutional dimension.15
Second, and closely related, a confederal conception of sovereignty also 
allows a more logical understanding of the seemingly incompatible claims 
to primacy at the national and the EU level. Claims which from a confederal 
perspective are simply based on different and largely compatible grounds. 
Consequently the clash between national and European claims to suprem-
acy may be partially neutralized once they are related to the overarching 
claim of the sovereign member peoples.
2.5 An attractive narrative: A confederal evolution of democracy
Lastly, and most tentatively, confederal sovereignty may assist in constru-
ing a more positive and normatively attractive narrative of the EU. In the 
US, after all, federalism became part of the powerful narrative of popular 
government: the sovereign people were given two governments who would 
both strive and compete to serve the citizen.16 Confederal sovereignty might 
allow a similar narrative by recasting the EU as a creature of the member 
peoples. Instead of a threat to democracy and national identity the EU 
could also be seen as a second layer of government that liberates the people 
from their entrapment in the state, and allows them to exist and act on the 
increasingly vital global plane. From this perspective the EU may transform 
from a threat to national democracy to a tool to restructure and update the 
national democratic process, and save it from irrelevance. To explore the 
potential for such a narrative this particular value of confederal sovereignty 
will also be introduced in part II, before it is further tested and developed in 
part III of this thesis.
3 Approach and method: Limiting scope and ambitions
Now it appears customary to start any expedition into the realm of sover-
eignty by proclaiming one’s utter despair. 17 The concept is so old and con-
15 See for a discussion of this question chapter 10 section 7.
16 See for the anti-democratic intentions behind this narrative, however, above chapter 5, 
section 2 and 3.
17 See for instance: M. Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law (4th ed., Allen 
and Unwin 1982), 15 or R. Barents, De Communautaire Rechtsorde (Kluwer 2000), 69. 
Although more optimistic views can be found as well, as in: J.D.B. Miller, The World of 
States: Connected Essays (St. Martin’s Press 1981), 16: ‘Just as we know a camel or a chair 
when we see one, so we know a sovereign state. It is a political entity which is treated as a 
sovereign state by other sovereign states’, Of course the rather circular nature of this 
approach might in turn only serve to increase desperation again. Defying the mysticism a 
‘working defi nition’ is also provided by Walker (2006b), 6.
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tested18 that compared to analyzing it, even the Danaids had an easy job.19 
More hole than barrel, any attempt to fill in even the basics dissipates inglo-
riously.20 One popular solution, therefore, is to simply discard the entire 
concept: Even if practical in the past, surely this archaic notion no longer 
forms a useful paradigm in this post-modern age of globalization.21
Clearly this author does not share the rejection of sovereignty as a use-
less relic.22 Quite the opposite: the controversial role of sovereignty only 
18 H. Jahrreis, ‘Die Souveränität der Staaten. Ein Wort – mehrere Begriffe – viele Misver-
ständnisse’, in: R. Hofmann (ed), Die Entstehung der modernen souveränen Staates (Kiepen-
heuer & Witsch 1967), 35 et seq., Loughlin (2006), 56, A disagreement that is already quite 
clear from the wide array of confl icting adjectives used such as domestic sovereignty, 
monetary sovereignty, new sovereignty, pooled sovereignty, popular sovereignty legal 
sovereignty, political sovereignty etc.
19 Just epistemologically the terrain is already a minefi eld. See for instance J. Bartelson, A 
Genealogy of Sovereignty (CUP 1995), especially ch. 2. An impressive overview is, however, 
given by Hinsley (1986).
20 H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (J. Springer 1925), 102 et seq. already gives eight different 
meanings and applications. S.D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton Uni-
versity Press 1999), 3 gives four. G. Schwarzenberger, ‘The Forms of Sovereignty’, 10 CLP 
(1957), 264, compares discussing sovereignty to ‘shadowfi ghting’ whilst according to 
Koskenniemi every attempt to defi ne it per defi nition oscillates between two necessary 
yet irreconcilable poles: M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The structure of Internati-
onal Legal Argument (CUP 2005). Also see: N.G. Onuf, ‘Sovereignty: Outline of a Concep-
tual History’, 16 Alternatives (1991), 425 et seq.
21 This is not an exclusively modern phenomenon, by the way. Kelsen already supported 
abolishing it for example (H. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Volker-
rechts (Tübingen 1920), 321 et seq., in the 1950’s sovereignty was also on its way out (W.J. 
Rees, ‘The Theory of Sovereignty Restated’ 59 Mind (1950), 495, and Foucault equally 
rejected it forcefully (M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge (Harvester 1980), 121. Nevertheless 
such rejections of the concept do seem to have become more popular with the current glo-
balization and European integration. See, amongst many others, K. Schiemann, ‘Europe 
and the loss of sovereignty’, 56 International Comparative Law Quarterly (2007), 475; D. 
Held, A Globalizing World? (Routledge 2004); Krasner (1999); W. Wallace, ‘The Sharing of 
Sovereignty: the European Paradox’ 47 Political Studies 1999, 503; D. Philpott, ‘Westphalia, 
Authority, and International Society’, 47 Political Studies (1999), 566; MacCormick (1999); 
W. Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’, 103 Ethics (1992), 48 or already T. Koop-
mans, ‘De Europese Gemeenschappen en het Nederlandse staatsbestel’ RM Themis (1980), 
276, 287. For a very clear overview see Van Roermund (2006), 33 discussing the ‘Argument 
from Redundancy’ and the ‘Argument from Incoherence’. An alternative is to accept the 
concept, yet to deny it has a fi xed extension, such as Koskenniemi (2005), 242: ‘There sim-
ply is no fi xed meaning, no natural extent to sovereignty at all’.
22 Perhaps one could even reverse matters: sovereignty is so fundamental and dominant a 
paradigm, that every (seeming) diversion from it draws enormous attention. Also see R. 
Jackson, Sovereignty: The Evolution of an Idea (Polity Press 2007), 110: ‘We are living at a 
time when existing territorial jurisdictions are vested with exceptional international 
validity’. Equally see Koskenniemi (2005), 237, Lindahl (2006), 87, Walker (2006), 301-31 
and Walker (2006a), vi: ‘Yet the idea of sovereignty cannot just be whished away. Neither 
is it obvious that it will simply wither away, nor that its secular decline should be 
approved or encouraged.’
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seems to reaffirm its continued relevance.23 Nevertheless its multi-dimen-
sionality, rich history, and the numerous learned – and conflicting – com-
ments devoted to it do mean that any attempt to permanently pin down 
sovereignty inevitably runs into its diverse meanings and uses. Sovereignty 
arrangements differ per polity, and may even be contested within a polity. 
Agreeing on the Belgian, Spanish, British or Dutch sovereign, for instance, is 
already difficult in itself.24 Sovereignty, and the vocabulary on sovereignty, 
furthermore, are intimately linked to the state and carry strong normative 
connotations. Any application outside the state must, therefore, be sensitive 
to the statal context and normative assumptions imbedded in sovereignty 
discourse.25
These risks and limits, together with the modesty they necessarily inspire, 
must be respected when engaging with sovereignty.26 All previous caveats 
about comparative and conceptual analysis in general, furthermore, have 
to remain in full force as well. By engaging sovereignty, furthermore, we 
also enter a more normative dimension, certainly where particular notions 
as popular sovereignty are not just described or analyzed, but suggested as 
the ‘best’ option for the EU. In addition even a descriptive analysis of sover-
eignty cannot avoid highly contested and normative terrain. This normative 
dimension also forms an important limitation, as any disagreement on nor-
mative assumptions may not be settled objectively. To a certain extent the 
analysis in part II minimizes this risk by relying on normative conceptions 
that are as thin as possible, and are hence generally shared. These primarily 
include a thin notion of democracy and the claim that within a democratic 
system authority should ultimately derive from, or be linked to, the people. 
Where thicker notions are relied upon, furthermore, these will be defended.
At the same time the limited aim of this chapter does not require us to pro-
vide the exclusive or ‘true’ definition of sovereignty, if that is even possi-
ble for social facts. The far more limited aim is to put forward, and make 
an initial contribution to, a specifically confederal conception of popular 
sovereignty suited for the EU. Rather than demanding its expulsion from 
civilized EU discourse, in other words, it explores whether European inte-
gration should not embrace sovereignty, albeit by spearheading a gentle 
23 Cf. De Witte (1995), 170: ‘the debate on the Treaty on European Union has started a new 
phase of turmoil in the legal analysis of European Integration, and the concept of sover-
eignty is playing a key role in this debate which should be acknowledged by both its 
defenders and its opponents.’
24 See for instance the contributions by J. Ziller, M. Aziz, M. Cartabia, K. Armstrong, B. de 
Witte and C. Mik in: N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition,(Hart Publishing 2006).
25 J. Shaw and A. Wiener, ‘The Paradox of the European Polity’, in: M. Green Cowles and M. 
Smith (eds), State of the European Union vol. 5: Risks, Resistance and Revival (OUP 2000), 64, 
Loughlin (2006), 57.
26 Cf Carl Schmitt (2005), 16-17.
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reapplication of its essential core to new circumstances.27 To this end, and 
actually building on the richness and variety within the idea of sovereignty, 
two definitional elements of confederal sovereignty will be proposed.
First and foremost it will be suggested that a confederal conception of 
sovereignty should be based on an internal, and not an external concept of 
sovereignty. Much of the current confusion surrounding sovereignty and 
the EU derives from – often implicit – reliance on simplified and external 
conceptions of sovereignty. 28 Second, and flowing from this internal focus, 
sovereignty should rest with the different semi-abstract member peoples 
as constituted within their states.29 Though these two elements clearly 
fall short of a sufficient definition, it is suggested that they form necessary 
elements, and already give some shape to a confederal conception of sov-
ereignty. In any event they assist in demonstrating the prima facie attractive-
ness of such a conception.
These two elements will be developed and tested through two complemen-
tary methods. On the one hand part II will demonstrate the fit of confederal 
sovereignty with the logic and conceptual evolution of sovereignty. It does 
so via a succinct conceptual analysis which first untangles the internal and 
external strands of sovereignty, and subsequently shows how confederal 
sovereignty forms a logical next step in the evolution of internal sovereignty.
On the other hand confederal sovereignty will be tested against the 
opposing camps of statism and pluralism. Two influential schools that lie 
at the opposite ends of the ‘sovereignty’ debate: the ‘statist’ defenders of 
sovereignty, with the Bundesverfassungsgericht as its main champion, and the 
27 Walker (2006), 28: ‘(…) the dynamic of transformation within late sovereignty will 
involve the continuous evolution, rather than the demise of sovereignty.’
28 See for instance Maduro (2006), 504-5. For, right after the ritual despair and the exonera-
tion that sovereignty is a contested concept, as described above, it usually turns out that 
happily there does exist an acceptable working defi nition of sovereignty. This defi nition 
may respectably be used, especially where sovereignty is not the main focus. It generally 
is a variation of ‘internal supremacy over all other authorities within a given territory, 
and external independence of outside authority.’ Cf. R.O. Keohane, ‘Ironies of Sovereign-
ty: the European Union and the United States’ 40 JCMS (2002), 746 (Citing Bull) or com-
parable Jackson (2007), 6. For a similar conclusion already drawn in 1922 see Carl Schmitt 
(2005), 17: ‘Nevertheless the old defi nition, in phraseological variations, is always repeat-
ed: Sovereignty is the highest, legally independent, underived power.’ The general accep-
tance of this defi nition unfortunately, seems to be directly proportional with its meaning-
lessness. Essential questions such as the meaning of supremacy or authority are not 
answered, but simply made part of the defi nition.
29 This does not necessarily entail the claim that within each Member State the people are or 
should be the formal sovereign as well, even though almost all national constitutions of 
EU Member States do acknowledge the sovereignty and ultimate authority of the people. 
See for an overview chapter 10, section 3.2. and chapter 12.
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‘pluralist’ challengers, rejecting sovereignty as a thing of the past.30 This con-
frontation with statism and pluralism also connects our confederal approach 
to the existing theories on the EU and to the challenges these theories engage 
with. In addition to testing the feasibility of confederal sovereignty in itself, 
this application of a confederal approach also explores a potential synthesis: 
to what extent may the key truths and objectives of statism and pluralism be 
far more compatible with each other than they seem, at least once both are 
considered from an evolved understanding of confederalism and sovereign-
ty.31 If correct, a confederal application of sovereignty may allow us, at least 
in part, to combine the respective strong points of statism and pluralism.
4 Structure
To achieve the aims set out above section II is structured as follows. First we 
need to set out the perceived problems concerning sovereignty and the EU: 
why do sovereignty and integration seem to deadlock? To do so we turn to 
the statist and pluralist schools, and their opposing views on sovereignty 
(chapter 8). Once we have established an understanding of the problem we 
turn to the conceptual development of sovereignty itself. It will be dem-
onstrated that, different from what is often assumed, internal and external 
sovereignty are two distinct, albeit related, concepts. To this end the devel-
opment of the internal and external strands of sovereignty will be traced 
through five different stages of their development and conceptual entangle-
ment, including the accommodation of federal government and sovereignty 
in the US. These stages lead up to the current point where the EU again 
collides internal and external sovereignty, acting as a sort of Hadron collider 
for constitutional theory and the concept of sovereignty. Just as the Hadron 
collider breaks up atomic particles by colliding them, the presumed elemen-
tary particle of sovereignty is collided with the EU, and subsequently breaks 
up into the more elementary particles of internal and external sovereignty, 
the characteristics of which we can then study separately (chapter 9).
30 On the (academic) prominence of (constitutional) pluralism see, somewhat hyperbolic, 
Weiler (2012), 1 who calls it a ‘academic Pandemic’. A pretty exclusionary virus at that 
since ‘Constitutional Pluralism is today the only Party Membership Card which will 
guarantee a seat at the High Tables of the public law Professoriate.’
31 In this regard this thesis aims to contribute to the aim already formulated by Walker: ‘The 
task, therefore, of political and constitutional theory in conditions of late sovereignty is 
not to imagine, or to anticipate, a world in which new political values and virtues fl our-
ish in the absence of sovereignty, but to imagine and anticipate ways in which such val-
ues and virtues may fl ourish through the operation of sovereignty (emphasis in original). 
Walker (2006), 31.
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Once the internal and the external concepts of sovereignty have been 
separated in this way, the idea of a confederal conception of sovereignty will 
be further introduced. Subsequently the different advantages set out above 
will be tested and explored (chapter 10), and some general conclusions 
will be drawn (chapter 11), before we continue with part III, which proffers 
some, highly tentative, suggestions to apply the conclusions reached in part 
I and II to the challenges of institutionalizing a confederal evolution of the 
national democratic process and the EMU crisis.
1 Sovereignty as an obstacle: The statist and the pluralist 
challenges
Sovereignty and integration do not seem natural allies. The absoluteness 
and centralism associated with sovereignty appear to block supranational 
cooperation, or forces it to the extreme of forming a new sovereign state.1 
Conversely it seems integration must overcome sovereignty to be success-
ful. Not surprisingly, therefore, sovereignty has been a problematic and 
divisive concept for EU integration.2Yet, if sovereignty and integration are 
indeed fundamentally incompatible, any confederal attempt to reconcile the 
two would be inherently futile. Before exploring the potential of a confed-
eral conception of sovereignty for the EU it is, therefore, necessary to first 
examine this apparent clash between sovereignty and integration, and the 
theoretical deadlocks that result from it.
To that end this chapter turns to statism and pluralism: Two of the cur-
rently most dominant schools on EU integration that together perfectly rep-
resent the common assumption that integration and sovereignty conflict, 
and that substantiate this position with a range of arguments. Both schools 
hold powerful, yet strongly opposed, views on integration. Sovereignty fig-
ures prominently in both, albeit as Saint George in the one and the dragon 
in the other. Contrasting statism and pluralism therefore provides a useful 
starting point for the analysis of confederal sovereignty and its potential 
for the EU. It forces any conception of confederal sovereignty to engage 
with the strongest and most fully developed arguments against combining 
sovereignty and integration that currently exist. It also connects the analy-
1 Cf for instance BVerfGE, 2 BvE 123,267, 2 BvE 2/08 (2009) Lissabon Urteil, par. 228 or Schü-
tze (2009), 1090 and 1095, including his translation of Jellineks classic position on federal-
ism, illustrating how even in a federal state undivided sovereignty remained with the 
federate center: ‘Whatever the actual distribution of competences, the Federal State 
retains its character as a sovereign State: and, as such, it potentially contains within itself 
all sovereign powers, even those whose autonomous exercise has been delegated to the 
Member States.’ Alternatively see D. Wyatt, ‘New Legal Order, or Old?’ 7 European Law 
Review (1982), 147, who on the basis of this dichotomy forces the EU into the corner of an 
international organization.
2 See in this regard already the clear language by Monnet, which he had drafted for an 
earlier version of the Schuman declaration: ‘This proposal has an essential political objec-
tive: to make a breach in the ramparts of national sovereignty which will be narrow 
enough to secure consent, but deep enough to open the way towards the unity that is 
essential to peace.’ (Monnet (1978), 296)
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sis in this thesis to some of the leading views in the current debate on the 
nature of the EU, instead of developing it in splendid but sterile isolation. 
The overview below, therefore, will also form the basis for a more critical 
appraisal of both schools later in part II, as well as for the attempt to estab-
lish a (partial) confederal synthesis between them. For as will be seen both 
statism and pluralism lead to certain deadlocks in our thinking on Euro-
pean integration. Several of these deadlocks derive from incorrect or unsuit-
able conceptions of sovereignty, and it is here that a confederal approach 
can make one of its contributions, as it precisely reduces or circumvents 
these deadlocks. At the same time the overview also serves to test the con-
federal approach itself, as it should also be able to incorporate and build on 
the important insights provided by both schools.
The following sections will first introduce the dichotomy between statism 
and pluralism (section 2). Subsequently statism will be set out (section 3) 
beginning with an overview of its academic defence. Based on this over-
view the key tenets of statism will be briefly outlined, after which we turn 
to the forceful judicial application of these tenets by the German Bundesver-
fassungsgericht and the vital role played by sovereignty in this application. 
Section 4 then sets out the academic defence of pluralism, including its use 
of the EU as a crown witness against sovereignty. Considering that there is 
no explicit judicial defence of pluralism available, this section then provides 
several conclusions on the strengths and weaknesses of pluralism, includ-
ing its powerful attack on statism. After statism has been allowed a rejoin-
der, two attempts to bridge the dichotomy between statism and pluralism 
will be briefly discussed (section 5), before some general conclusions on the 
dichotomy between statism and pluralism, and between sovereignty and 
integration, are drawn in section 6.
The overview provided will be based on the work of several leading figures 
from the respective schools. It must be stressed, however, that the aim in this 
chapter is not to make specific contributions to either statism or pluralism, 
or to set out in detail the existing – and important– differences within each 
camp. Rather the aim is to sketch the larger picture, and, abstracting from 
these internal conflicts, set out the core characteristics of both approaches 
and their relation to sovereignty.
2 Central dichotomies: National v. international or statism 
v. pluralism
The EU is commonly placed in the spectrum between the national and the 
international.3 Is it a state like entity best approached as a national system, 
3 De Witte (2012), 49, 53. For an early example see C. Sasse, ‘The Common Market: Between 
International and Municipal Law’, 75 Yale Law Journal (1965-6), 659.
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or is it an international organisation, a ‘creature of international law’?4 
National conceptions tend to suggest further federation as the best way for-
ward for the EU to achieve sufficient stability and to match the Member 
States in effectiveness and legitimacy.5 Alternatively they lead to a sui gener-
is conception where the EU cannot be made to fit the national framework.6 
Conversely the international view maintains that the EU, as a far-reaching 
form of voluntary association between states, does not exceed the outer lim-
its of an international organization. 7 For example it derives its powers from 
the Member States and does not posses any original or ultimate authority of 
its own accord.8
Within this national – international dichotomy a confederal approach 
can already be of use as a conceptual halfway house. A more funda-
mental dichotomy, however, should be distinguished, already because 
it underlies and incorporates the national – international one. This is the 
dichotomy between statist approaches on the one hand, and non-statist, or 
plural approaches on the other.9
3 The statist – pluralist dichotomy
Statist approaches start from the existing statal framework. The concepts 
and normative ideals surrounding the nation-state, and the encompassing 
system for public authority they create, are applied to the EU. The question 
becomes where the EU fits within this statal framework. It must be stressed 
that this statal framework includes the national – international dichotomy. 
The inter-national, after all, derives from the statal order.10 The question 
whether the EU is national or international, therefore, remains within the 
statist paradigm.
4 De Witte (2012), 19.
5 See Kinneging (2007), 40 or Mancini (1998).
6 See supra Introduction, section 4.1. on the sui generis character of the EU as well as Baque-
ro Cruz (2008), 389.
7 See also the work of Hoffman, especially Hofmann (1966), 862 and ‘Refl ections on the 
Nation-State in Europe Today’ 21 Journal of Common Market Studies (1982), 719.
8 T.C. Hartley, ‘The Constitutional foundations of the European Union’ 117 Law Quarterly 
Review (2001), 225, 228, 243, also see Milward (1992).
9 Also see in this regard N. Walker, ‘European Constitutionalism in the State Constitutional 
Tradition' 59 Current Legal Problems (2006), 51.
10 See for a detailed discussion of this point chapter 9, sections 2 and 4.
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Pluralist approaches reject the statal framework itself, which they see as 
monist and rigid.11 They strive to develop a post-statal framework, which 
shows how the EU falls completely outside, and not just in-between, the 
national and the international.12 Instead of a statal world with clear centers 
of ultimate authority, we live in a plural reality where multiple overlapping 
centers and orders must interact with each other.
Both approaches also flow from two opposing yet necessary logics or meth-
ods. On the one hand one can approach the EU from the existing statal the-
ory and see how the EU fits, or should be made to fit. On the other hand 
one can start from the apparent innovations in the EU that appear to defy 
the statist framework, and then see how existing theory must be changed 
or discarded to allow for these innovations and the plural reality they seem 
to create.13 Both approaches, however, seem to lead to conflicting out-
comes, and hence a dichotomy in the theory of the EU.14 Neil Walker nicely 
expresses the logical tension between both approaches where he juxtaposes 
pluralism with constitutional monism, which is one form of statism:
‘Constitutional monism merely grants a label to the defining assumption of constitutional-
ism in the Westphalian age which we discussed earlier, namely the idea that the sole cen-
tres or units of constitutional authorities are states. Constitutional pluralism, by contrast, 
recognises that the European order inaugurated by the Treaty of Rome has developed 
beyond the traditional confines of inter-national law and now makes its own independent 
constitutional claims, and that these claims exist alongside the continuing claims of states. 
The relationship between the orders, that is to say, is now horizontal rather than vertical – 
heterarchichal rather than hierarchical.15
The fundamental dichotomy, therefore, does no lie between the state and 
the international, as the international is a function of the state.16 Nor does 
it lie between statism and federation, as a federation is only another vari-
ant of the state. The real dichotomy lies between the statal and non-statal 
conceptions of public authority, of which pluralism forms one of the most 
prominent schools. So let us take a closer look at these two schools and this 
dichotomy between statal and pluralist conceptions.
11 N. MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht Urteil: Sovereignty Now’ 1 European Law Journal (1995), 
264: ‘(…) the most appropriate analysis of the relations of legal systems is pluralistic rath-
er than monistic, and interactive rather than hierarchical.’
12 J.H.H. Weiler and U.R. Haltern, ‘Constitutional or International? The Foundations of the 
Community Legal Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz’, in: A-M 
Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), The European Courts and National Courts 
– Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing 1998), 331.
13 See in this regard also the comments on normalism v. exceptionalism in Introduction, sec-
tion 4.1.
14 See discussing this tension, and in a sense its emergence into general awareness at the 
Maastricht judgment, Baquero Cruz (2008), for instance at 405.
15 Walker (2002), 337.
16 See also N. Walker, ‘Legal Theory and the European Union: A 25th Anniversary Essay’, 25 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2005), 587.
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4 Statism: The sovereign state as bulwark and safe haven
Statist accounts emphasize the essential position of the state. Be it because 
democracy is only possible within the sovereign state, because the state 
embodies and protects a pre-political ‘Volk’, because the nation-state is the 
optimum or only viable form of political organization, or for other reasons, 
the central postulate is that the sovereign state must not be ‘dissolved’ in 
the process of European integration.17 Because of this vital role of the state 
it also becomes logically necessary to contain the EU within the realm of 
international cooperation.18
Based on the work of some leading statist scholars, the next sections first 
introduce statism as developed academically and provide an overview of 
the key tenets of statism. Subsequently, the analysis focuses on one of the 
most influential and developed judicial defences of statism and sovereignty: 
the Lissabon Urteil of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht.
4.1 Academic statism
The work of Paul Kirchhof epitomizes statism, partially because of its rath-
er pure and undiluted form.19 He strongly emphasizes the essential role of 
the state, which must remain the primary and ultimate entity in the orga-
nization of public authority. He especially stresses the unique capacity of 
the state to provide democratic legitimacy.20 As the EU is not a state, and is 
not based on a single European people, the EU can never provide an equal 
– or sufficient – level of democracy.21 Protecting the state against integra-
17 The danger of ‘dissolving’ is taken from P. Kirchhof, ‘Europäische Einigung und der Ver-
fassungsstaat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’ in: J. Isensee (ed), Europa als politische Idee 
und als rechtliche Form (Duncker & Humblot 1993), 64.
18 See in this regard the qualifi cation of ‘supranational organizations’ as a species of inter-
national organizations in handbooks on the law of international organizations, such as in 
H. Schermers and N. Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity (4th 
edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003), 46. Also see Forsyth (1981), x: ‘However, classical 
theory does not positively indicate why or how states join together voluntarily to create a 
body capable of legislating for their own citizens – indeed, precisely because of its 
emphasis on state sovereignty, it tends to make one deeply sceptical of the possibility of 
such a development, and to deny in the name of theory the reality that exists before one’s 
eyes.’
19 So explicitly so in his academic work that one may safely assume the same for his previ-
ous position within the Bundesverfassungsgericht, not least as Judge Rapporteur of the 
Maastricht Urteil (BVErfGE 89, 189 (1993).
20 Kirchhof (2010), 737.
21 ‘Due to its indirect legitimation through the peoples of its members (Staatsvölker) and not 
through a European people (Staatsvolk), the European Union cannot lay claim to the legit-
imation, the universal nature and the power of re-innovation of a constitutional state.’ 
Kirchhof (2010), 739 and 743.
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tion, therefore, is necessary to protect democracy itself. But the state is of 
even more fundamental importance for human life than democracy alone:
‘(…) without the safety of a state, the human being remains without peace, reliable liberty 
under the rule of law, the secure frame of professional and personal development, future 
provisions and existential safety.(…) The end of history was proclaimed, but that, finally, 
led to the insight of founding states so that the preconditions of a free development of the 
people would be established.’22
The sovereign state must, therefore, remain the foundation of all political 
organization. A position which necessarily entails that ‘European public 
authority is ancillary to state authority, which grows out of and rests upon 
the state foundation.’23
As a non-statal entity the EU can also not have a ‘real’ constitution. The: 
‘term ‘constitution’ suggests the emergence of statehood – the ultimate 
source of a legal order, absolute primacy, the authority of constitution mak-
ing of the people (pouvoir constituant), and the presence of an exclusive and 
basic political structure.’24 This fundamental and exclusive nature of a con-
stitution means that two real constitutions cannot coexist in the same ter-
ritory. As a consequence, any claim that the EU does or should have a real 
constitution attacks the constitutions and independent existence of the 
Member States. Talk of EU constitutionalism, therefore, is not a harmless 
borrowing of terms. It threatens the very basis of political and legal organi-
zation: the state.25
Under this statist approach the concepts of state, people, democracy, and 
constitution are bound together.26 The notion of state sovereignty captures 
this unity. It safeguards all that is fundamental and necessary for a well 
ordered public authority. As a result ‘Every state demands sovereignty, 
the ultimate and final power to ensure domestic law and peace, in order 
to preserve independence from other states and to represent community in 
relationships with third parties. Sovereignty protects the state’s cohesion (…)’ 
Kirchhof is obviously well aware of the high level of integration already 
22 Idem, 755.
23 Cf also Hartley (2001), 235.
24 Idem. Similarly see Boom (1995), 209.
25 Kirchof (2010), 740. Also see p. 744: ‘Hence, the constitutional states’ independence, the 
characteristics of their constitutions and the achievements of their constitutional history 
would get pulled into vortex of a European constitution and would eventually become 
lost within it.’ Note that logically within the statist framework the granting of constitu-
tional status to one entity means removing that status from the other. Statism cannot, 
therefore, be simplistically be seen as one side of a pluralist account without completely 
denaturizing it.
26 For the extremely thick normative and historical conception of ‘people’ relied on by 
Kirchhof as an additional objection to European constitutionalism and democracy see 
Kirchof (2010), 747-748. Equally linking these concepts Grimm (1995), for instance at 291.
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established, and does try to accommodate far-reaching integration. He 
acknowledges that ‘membership of a state in the European Union’s union 
of states affects its sovereignty.’27 Yet this effect does not exceed the standard 
practice of sovereigns to cooperate and enter into mutual, binding legal 
relations.28 Therefore:
‘Membership in the European Union leaves the Member States’ sovereignty with them, in 
the sense of final responsibility for the public authority exercised by the European Com-
munity and its present responsibility vis-à-vis its people. The question regarding sover-
eignty does not remain open: (…). The democratic state keeps the internal and external 
sovereignty together and accounts for its recognition within the European Union vis-à-vis 
the people.’29
The EU, therefore, derives its authority from the Member States alone, and 
not from the people directly.30 A hierarchical reality that also means that 
EU law can only take effect within the limits set by the respective national 
constitutions.31 This assessment does not deny the high level of integra-
tion within the EU, nor the need for that integration. The EU ‘calls for the 
reconsideration of statehood open to the world’.32 Kirchhof even accepts 
that ‘The treaties constitute the basic order of the Community, which (…) is 
partially superior to the Member States’ constitutions.’33 Within this frame-
27 Kirchof (2010), 741, 747-748. The EU also ‘calls for the reconsideration of statehood open 
to the world and a sovereignty open to Europe.’
28 In the words of De Witte: Member States act ‘(…) as the Herren der Verträge, bound by 
nothing else than their respective national constitutional rules and by the rules of interna-
tional treaty law; they act as ‘independent and sovereign states have freely decided [..] to 
exercise in common some of their competences.’ De Witte (2012), 36. He rightly adds that 
‘the fact that the Member State governments act as ‘Masters of the Treaty text’ does not 
mean that they also control what happens with the Treaties once they enter into force.’ 
Which is of course another point. See on his qualifi cation of the EU as an international 
organization also De Witte (2010), 324.
29 Cf Grimm (1995), 285: ‘That was the birth of the modern State, which raised itself above 
society, now conceived of as privatised, and saw its attribute in sovereignty, understood 
as supreme irresistible power over society.’
30 Kirchof (2010), 744. See similarly Grimm (1995), 290 and T. Schilling, ‘The Autonomy of 
the Community Legal Order: An Analysis of Possible Foundations’ 17 Harvard Internatio-
nal Law Journal (1996), 394.
31 Kirchof (2010), 743, 746. At the same time, however, Kirchhof urges judicial cooperation, 
and efforts by all parties to prevent the primacy question from even being posed, ‘The 
judiciary fosters the culture of standards, equalisation and co-operation, not of predomi-
nance, submission and rejection. To this extent, Europe offers the chance to discover 
anew the classic legal ideal of balance of powers. (p. 759) .
32 Kirchhof (2010), 741, and 747: ‘These states’ functions have always exceeded the individ-
ual state’s capacity (…) Hence, states depend on co-operation in overarching organisa-
tions.’
33 Idem, also: ‘On the other hand, the ECJ is the ultimate interpreter of European law, and as 
a result interprets Union institutions’ competences and powers at the expense of the 
domestic constitutional institutions.(…) Furthermore, the development of substantive 
constitutional law is strongly infl uenced by European law.’(p. 745). Also see Grimm 
(1995), 297.
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work of cooperation, however, the states remain ‘(…) independent – and in 
this regard non-connected (…) because unlike the EU they have been truly 
‘constituted.’34
Fundamentally, therefore, the EU can be no more than a side-wheel.35 The 
sovereign state remains the basis for political organization. The EU is not 
capable of taking over from the state, and must, in the interest of all, also 
not aspire to do so.36
Dieter Grimm, also a former judge in the Bundesverfassungsgericht, has 
developed a milder version of statism.37 He also sees the statal context as 
the only one able to provide the conditions necessary for a true democratic 
process.38 At the EU level, on the other hand, ‘even the prerequisites’ for 
democracy ‘are largely lacking’, let alone actual democracy itself.39 These 
prerequisites, furthermore, such as a European party system, citizens’ 
movements, European media or a common language ‘cannot simply be 
created.’ Retaining the state, and upholding its primacy and ultimate hier-
archy, therefore, is again a demand of democracy itself: ‘The achievement 
of the democratic constitutional state can for the time being be adequately 
realised only in the national framework.’40 This does not mean that ‘the 
political form of the nation-State ought to be preserved for its own sake’. 
Grimm even admits that ‘the nation-State, understood as a political unit 
that regulates its internal affairs autonomously, is something whose time is 
past.’41 Supranational cooperation is required to address this challenge, but 
must necessarily stay within the limits imposed by democracy, and there-
fore by the statal system.42
34 Kirchof (2010), 741, my emphases. Note the use of ‘partial’ and of the term ‘superior’ 
instead of supremacy or primacy. On p. 746 it is phrased even more restrictive as ‘Euro-
pean law has limited primacy over the Member States’ constitutional law according to the 
Member States’ order of application’.
35 P. Kirchhof, ‘The Balance of Powers Between National and European Institutions’, 5 Euro-
pean Law Journal (1999), 225.
36 Kirchof (2010), 757.
37 For instance he rejects the notion of a ‘Volksgemeinschaf [ethnic community ILF]’ as the 
only basis for true democracy. Kirchof (2010), 297.
38 Cf Grimm (1995), 293. ‘The democratic nature of a political system is attested not so much 
by the existence of elected parliaments, (…) as by the pluralism, internal representativity, 
freedom and capacity for compromise of the intermediate area of parties, associations, citi-
zens’ movements and communication. Where a parliament does not rest on such a structure, 
which guarantees constant interaction between people and State, democratic substance is 
lacking even if democratic forms are present.’
39 Grimm (1995), 294.
40 Grimm (1995), 297.
41 Grimm (1995), 297.
42 See also D. Grimm, ‘The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization’ 12 Constellati-
ons (2005), 460 and D. Grimm, ‘Comments on the German Constitutional Court's Deci-
sion on the Lisbon Treaty. Defending Sovereign Statehood against Transforming the 
European Union into a State’, 5 European Constitutional Law Review (2009), 353.
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The statist perspective is obviously not just academically defended by 
former judges of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Hartley, for instance, also 
strongly defends a statist approach, including the claim that the Member 
States remain the sovereign and ultimate authorities.43 His rather Kelsinian 
approach starts from the qualification of the EU as a creature of law. As such 
it cannot but depend on its own legal foundation, being the legal systems of 
the states that created it.44 Any other claim would require a radical change 
of the current ‘Grundnorm’. In turn this would entail that ‘sovereignty had 
been transferred to the Union.’45 Such a radical change is legally not pos-
sible, already because the national constitutional courts, gatekeepers of the 
authority the EU now relies on, would not allow it.46 As a result: ‘The Mem-
ber States remain sovereign.’47 Any claim that denies this basic fact, and 
proclaims the EU to have an independent or supreme authority, can only do 
so by denying reality, and thus by ‘a wave of the jurist’s magic wand.’ Such 
grand, constitutional ambitions for the EU, therefore, suffer ‘from a reality 
deficit’.48
4.2 Empirical statism
In addition to these predominantly theoretical claims, based on the nature 
of inter alia democracy and a legal system, statism can also draw on more 
empirical research in the field of international organization.49 Especially 
so on Liberal Intergovernmentalism, which emphasizes the continued cen-
trality of the state. The forceful work of Moravcsik plays a leading role in 
this field.50 Leaving formal legal and theoretical arguments to one side, he 
points to the continued predominance of actual power that remains with 
43 For another passionate British statist perspective see the work of H.W.R. Wade, especial-
ly: ‘The Legal Basis of Sovereignty’ Cambridge Law Journal (1955), 172, ‘Sovereignty and 
the European Communities’ 88 Law Quarterly Review (1972), 1, ‘What has Happened to 
the Sovereignty of Parliament?’ 107 Law Quarterly Review (1991), 1, and ‘Sovereignty – 
Revolution or Evolution?’ 112 Law Quarterly Review (1996), 568.
44 Hartley (2001), 225, 228, 243, Hartley (1999), 148, 179.
45 Hartley (2001), 232. A claim that would be ‘overwhelmingly rejected’ and therefore means 
that ‘The theory of constitutionalisation (…) is wrong.’
46 Hartley (1999), 160-61, similarly Schilling (1996), 397.
47 Hartley (1999), 179. For a French variant of statism, further linking sovereignty and the 
state by postulating a necessary and exclusive relation, see A. Pellet, ‘Les Fondements 
Juridiques Internationaux du Droit Communautaire’, in: Academy of European law: Collec-
ted Courses of the Academy of European law (vol. V Book 2, Kluwer Law International 1997), 
229: ‘L'identité entre souveraineté et forme étatique est totale: toute entité souveraine est 
nécessairement un Etat et tout Etat est nécessairement souverain.’
48 Hartley (1999), 181.
49 Also see Hoffman (1966) and Hoffman (1982).
50 Moravcsik (1993), 473, A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power 
From Messina to Maastricht (Cornell University Press 1998) and A. Moravcsik ‘The Euro-
pean Constitutional Settlement’, in: K. McNamara and S. Meunier (eds) Making History: 
European Integration and Institutional Change (OUP 2007), 50.
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the states. In terms of key resources as money, enforcement power or legiti-
macy the EU does not even come close to its Member States. It are the pref-
erences and actions of these ‘critical actors’, that determine EU action, and 
ultimately the process of integration itself. Far from eclipsing the states, the 
EU should be perceived within the existing statist framework as ‘an inter-
national regime for policy co-ordination.’51 From that perspective the EU 
rather strengthens,52 or even rescues, the state.53
4.3 The key tenets of statism
Based on the overview given above, and for the purposes of this thesis, the 
key tenets of statism can be outlined as follows.
First and foremost statism starts from the ultimate authority of the state 
(1). It is the state that remains the foundation and apex of public authority.54 
Usually this claim is also linked to democracy: (2) the state is the essential 
habitat of democracy, whereas the EU does not offer the same democrat-
ic safeguards or even lacks the capacity for true democracy altogether.55 
A claim which is often supported (3) by the lack of a European people or 
demos,56 and (4) with empirical claims on the remaining centrality and 
unique resources of the state, for instance in terms of legitimacy, democratic 
process, money or administrative capacity.57
Several further elements then flow from this central position of the 
state. To begin with (5) the authority of the EU can only be derived from the 
ultimate authority of the state,58 and (6) therefore is inherently subject to, 
and circumscribed by, this higher authority.59 Any act which violates these 
limits is ultra vires and therefore does not bind the national legal orders.60 
51 A. Moravcsik and F. Schimmelfennig, ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism’, in: A. Wiener and 
T. Diez (eds), European Integration Theory (2nd edition, OUP 2009), 68. This does not mean, 
however, that institutions, or the EU as a whole, does not matter, just that they are not in 
the drives seat.
52 A. Moravcsik, ‘Why the European Community Strengthens the State’ Centre for Europe-
an Studies, Working paper series No. 52 (Harvard University 1999).
53 Milward (1992).
54 Kirchof (2010), Grimm (2005), Hartley (2001).
55 Grimm (1995), 293-4, 297.
56 See on this point also L. Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (Columbia University Press 
2001).
57 ‘The EU, like other international institutions, can be profi tably studied by treating states 
as the critical actors in a context of anarchy.’ Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009), 68. 
This does not mean, however, that institutions, or the EU as a whole, do not matter, just 
that they are not in the drivers seat. Also see Moravcsik (1993), 473, or Moravcsik (2007), 
50.
58 Hartley (2001), 228, 243, Hartley (1999), 148.
59 Maduro (2006), 507-8, including footnotes 12 and 13. Decision 170, Granital of 8 June 1984 
by the Italian Constitutional Court and by the Belgian Cour d’arbitrage judgment no. 
12/94, Ecoles Europeenes, of 3 February 1994 (Moniteur Belge 1994).
60 See paradigmatically BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993) Maastricht Urteil par. 88-89.
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(7) Ultimate supremacy can, already for these reason, only lie at the national 
(constitutional) level,61 and, therefore, be wielded by national constitutional 
courts alone.62 Equally the EU (8) cannot have a real constitution, at least 
not in a meaningful sense of the term.63 Consequently, and as recognized by 
the Treaty, (9) the Member States remain the Masters of the Treaties. They 
retain the full power to amend the Treaties, withdraw or even abolish the 
EU altogether.64
Lastly, and as a further result of all former tenets, (10) the EU must remain 
within the conceptual space left by the state:65 As long as it does not become 
a state it must be limited in authority and status to a level which does not 
undermine the minimum authority and the ultimate hierarchy that neces-
sarily accrue to states.66 The residual conceptual space this leaves to the EU 
is then often, though not necessarily, linked to the construct of an interna-
tional organization, which may or may not be sui generis.67
All in all, therefore, statism requires that integration take place within the 
boundaries of the sovereign state alone. Having established these theoreti-
cal tenets of statism, we now turn to their judicial application in practice. 
This judicial application has been particularly relevant for the develop-
ment and impact of statism, and forms one of the key legal realities that 
any viable theory on the constitutional structure of the EU should take into 
account.
4.4 Application: Judicial statism
Probably the most impressive support for statism comes from the 
many national constitutional and highest courts that have adopted stat-
ist approaches.68 Perhaps not surprising, – they have been established to 
61 Schilling (1996), 399.
62 As phrased by Chalmers, ‘(…) all the highest national courts enjoy a de facto veto over 
the development of the Community legal order.’ D. Chalmers, ‘Judicial Preferences and 
the Community Legal Order’ Modern Law Review (1997), 180. Also see Hartley (1999), 160-
61, or Schilling (1996), 397.
63 Kirchhof (2010), 755, or Boom (1995), 209.
64 Art. 48 and 50 TEU, also see on these points chapter 2, section 2.4.3. and 2.5.3. on amend-
ment and secession in the EU.
65 Cf Pellet (1997), 229.
66 Grimm (2005), 460.
67 For a strong defense of why the EU should still be seen as an international organization, 
though not necessarily linked to other statist tenets set out above, see De Witte (2012).
68 This statist approach by national courts is often creatively posited by pluralist as proof of 
their theory. In all seriousness, however, it cannot be claimed that from their internal legal 
perspective these courts accept true pluralism in the sense of waving the ultimate hierar-
chy of their own constitutions and accepting a fundamental heterarchy. Nevertheless 
qualifying these courts as true pluralists would then make it impossible not to be a plu-
ralist except by surrendering to a higher authority, making the label trite.
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uphold their national constitutions – almost all of these courts have defend-
ed the ultimate supremacy of their national constitutions.69 Sovereignty 
generally features prominently in these judgments. Central and Eastern 
European constitutional courts have been particularly outspoken in defend-
ing the sovereignty and independence that was so recently regained.70 To 
complete our overview of the statist approach to sovereignty we now turn 
to one particularly well developed and influential sample of judicial stat-
ism: the Lissabon Urteil of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. A judg-
ment by one of the most influential constitutional courts in the EU in which 
sovereignty plays a vital role, and which forms a key point of reference for 
any discussion on statism, sovereignty and European integration.
4.4.1 The Lissabon Urteil: The statist challenge of the Bundesverfassungsgericht
For decades, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVG) has played both a leading 
and a controversial role in the debate on European integration.71 The Lissa-
bon Urteil forms one of its central contributions to this debate.72 To date it is 
the Court’s most developed attempt to conceptualize the EU as a union of 
sovereign states (Staatenverbund), and thereby to provide a convincing stat-
ist paradigm for European integration.73 Even though it has been developed 
69 See for the history of this development generally Oppenheimer (1994) and (2003). For 
further examples see for instance Mik (2006), 390-91, the Czech Constitutional Court 
judgment in Landtova Pl. ÚS 5/12, or the Polish Constitutional Court in its judgment of 
11 May 2005, K18/04. Even the Spanish Constitutional Court, although most politely, 
eventually retains ultimate primacy for the national constitution. (See its Declaration 
1/2004 of December 13 2004 on the Constitutional Treaty, (BOE number 3 of 4 January 
2005) par. 35, 55 et seq.). Further see Besselink (2007), 9 or Baquero Cruz (2008), 397.
70 See generally A. Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CUP 2005), or Mik (2006), 390-91.
71 See already BVerfGE 31, 145 (1971), but the saga traditionally starts from BVerfGE 37, 271 
(1974) Solange I and and BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986) Solange II, to continue with BVerfGE 89, 
155 (1993) Maastricht Urteil, BVerfGE 102, 147 (2000) Banana Market, BVerfGE 113, 273 
(2005) European Arrest Warrant, and BVerfGE 118,79 (2007) European Emission Certifi cates 
and post Lisbon BVerfGE 1 BvR 256/08, 1 BvR 263/09, 1 BvR 568/08 (2010) Data Retenti-
on, BVerfGE 2 BvR 2661/06 (2010) Honeywell, BVerfGE 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10 and 
2 BvR 1099/10 (2011) Euro Rescue Package, BVerfGE 2 BvE 8/11 (2012) Sondergremium, and 
BverGE 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 
be 6/12 (2012) ESM Treaty. See in general, amongst the vast literature inspired by this 
earlier case law, M. Herdegen, ‘Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: Consti-
tutional restraints for an Ever Closer Union’ 31 CMLRev (1994), 235 or M. Payandeh, 
‘Constitutional Review of EU Law after Honeywell: Contextualizing the Relationship 
between the German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice’ 48 CMLRev (2011), 
9, as well as the references below.
72 2 BvE 2/08 (2009) Lissabon Urteil. For citation this chapter will use the English offi cial 
translation available on the website of the Court at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidun-
gen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. References to the case will, for reasons of brevity, 
only mention ‘Lissabon’ with a paragraph number.
73 For earlier attempts see in its case law also see Aziz (2006), 293.
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by important case law since,74 the Lissabon Urteil, therefore, remains the cen-
tral case for our discussion of statism and sovereignty. This especially as in 
its core the Lissabon Urteil is a fundamental defence of sovereignty and the 
state.75 A defence of sovereignty as a central concept for the organization of 
political authority, but foremost a defence of German sovereignty. A defence 
for which sovereignty is normatively armoured with the notion of ‘democ-
racy’, welded onto the concept of ‘state’, and developed into an ultimate 
barrier against too far-reaching integration.
For reasons of efficiency no general summary of the judgments will be giv-
en.76 This chapter will therefore only give a very brief overview of the case, 
before engaging those parts of the judgment relevant for our purposes: the 
statist use of sovereignty by the BVG, and the resulting limits on European 
integration. A forceful defence of sovereignty that any viable notion of con-
federal sovereignty must be able to counter or incorporate.
4.4.2 Background and brief overview of the Lissabon Urteil
In the Lissabon Urteil the BVG checked if the Lisbon Treaty went beyond 
the level of integration allowed by the German constitution. In its earlier 
case law the BVG had already established two boundaries in this regard: 
human rights77 and ultra vires.78 It now added a third: identity review:79 ‘the 
Court reviews whether the inviolable core content of the constitutional identity 
of the Basic Law pursuant to Article 23(1)(3) in conjunction with Article 79(3) 
of the Basic Law is respected.’80 The German Constitution does not allow 
integration that would violate this core. If such integration is nevertheless 
74 See especially BVerfGE 2 BvR 2661/06 (2010) Honeywell and BVerfGE 2 BvR 987/10, 2 
BvR 1485/10 and 2 BvR 1099/10 (2011) Euro Rescue Package.
75 Thym (2009), 1796, T. Lock, ‘Why the European Union is Not a State. Some Critical 
Remarks’, 5 European Constitutional Law Review (2009), 407. See also the dissenting opin-
ion from Justice Landau to BVerfGE 2 BvR 2661/06 (2010) Honeywell, par. 97 and 102.
76 Many excellent general discussions are already available. See for instance Thym (2009), 
Schönberger (2009), F. Schorkopf, ‘The European Union as An Association of Sovereign 
States: Karlsruhe’s Ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon; 10 German Law Journal (2009), 1220, C. 
Tomuschat, ‘The Ruling of the German Constitutional Court on the Treaty of Lisbon’, 10 
German Law Journal (2009), 1259, R. Bieber, ‘Comments on the German Constitutional 
Court’s Decision. ‘An Association of Sovereign States’’, 5 European Constitutional Law 
Review (2009), 39, Grimm (2009), 353.
77 BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974) Solange I, and BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986) Solange II.
78 Maastricht Urteil, par. 49. Also confi rmed in the Lissabon Urteil, for instance par. 240.
79 This can be usefully applied as a separate test, but conceptually comes closer to a further 
development of the ultra vires logic itself, only now applied to the German Constitution 
and its wide but limited authority to support European integration. See further A. 
Cuyvers, ‘Een soeverein hof bewaakt de soevereine staat om het soevereine volk te 
behoeden voor een soeverein Europa: Het Lisbon Urteil als these en antithese voor de 
verhouding van Nederland tot de EU’ in: J.M.J. Rijn van Alkemade and J. Uzman (eds) 
Soevereiniteit of pluralisme? Nederland en Europa na het Lissabon-Urteil (Wolf Legal Publish-
ers 2011), 49 et seq. See also Lissabon par. 218 or 226.
80 Lissabon par. 340.
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desired, the only way to do so is for the constituent power of the people to 
adopt a new constitution which subsumes Germany into a European feder-
ate state.81
The nature and content of this new identity test, including its relation to 
democracy, will be discussed in more detail below. Here it suffices to say 
that the BVG ultimately held that the Lisbon Treaty did not violate the Ger-
man Constitution. Before reaching that conclusion, however, the BVG first 
denied even the capacity of the EU to ever develop into a true democratic 
polity. This because the EU can never equal the democratic legitimacy pro-
duced within a state, at least not without transforming into a state itself.82 
Nevertheless the EU does posses certain democratic elements.83 At the 
moment the nature and level of these democratic elements suffices for the 
competences that have been transferred so far.84 Further transfers of sover-
eign powers may alter this balance, and require further democratic checks 
at the European or the national level.85 As the capacity for democracy on 
the EU level is limited, however, so must the maximum level of powers that 
may be delegated to the EU be limited as well.
The Lisbon Treaty, therefore, survived review. Yet it did so with multiple 
alarms ringing, and with future trap wires being set, at least in theory. It is 
against this general background that the specific treatment of sovereignty in 
the Lisbon Urteil must be seen.
4.4.3 A sovereign people under a sovereign constitution in a sovereign state
The Bundesverfassungsgericht takes protecting sovereignty seriously. The 
term sovereignty occurs 73 times in the reasoning of the judgment. Even 
more impressive is that both the state, the people, and the constitution 
turn out to be sovereign, with the BVG as the (sovereign?) watchdog for all 
these sovereigns. Paragraph 216, for instance, holds that ‘the basic law not 
only assumes sovereign statehood, but guarantees it’, and paragraph 298 
‘Even after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the Federal Republic 
of Germany will remain a sovereign state.’ Notwithstanding this sovereign 
state paragraph 334 declares the ‘the continuing sovereignty of the people’, 
whereas paragraph 340 talks about ‘(…) the sovereignty contained in the 
last instance in the German constitution.’
81 Lissabon par. 228.
82 See amongst others Lissabon paras. 272, 280, 286
83 For instance Lissabon paras. 271 et seq.
84 Lissabon paras. 272, 278, 280, 286.
85 In a measured warning shot that did not endanger the Treaty of Lisbon itself the BVG 
did, in this line, demand amendments to the national legislation accompanying the Trea-
ty which would better secure the role of the German Parliament in the use of art. 252 
TFEU and other fl exibility clauses. See Lissabon paras.406 et seq, and for the German 
repair legislation the Federal Law Gazette No. 60 of 24 September 2009.
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Comparing the different uses, a sovereign state is explicitly assumed in 
paragraphs 216, 224, 226 229, 235, 240, 247, 249, 275, 278, 287, 298, 299, 329, 
339, 343 and 351. The sovereign people make an appearance in paragraphs 
208, 209, 218, 334, 179 and 347.86 Paragraphs 179, 216 340, en 339 nominate 
the constitution as the sovereign. Interestingly, a combination of the three 
appears possible as well, as in paragraph 231:
‘In a functional sense, the source of Community authority, and of the European constitu-
tion that constitutes it, are the peoples of Europe with their democratic constitutions in their 
states.’87
Here ultimate authority lies with the state, the people and the constitution 
together, creating a kind of sovereign trinity.88 Everyone is allowed to be 
sovereign, it appears, except the EU.
Considering the central position of sovereignty in the argumentation of the 
BVG this lack of clarity, intentional or not, is not very helpful. This mirac-
ulous multiplication of sovereigns within one legal order also seems hard 
to square with the concept of sovereignty itself, certainly in the way the 
BVG apparently understands it. Most often, however, it is the state that is 
declared the sovereign. More importantly, even where other entities as the 
people or the constitution are referred to as ‘sovereign’, this sovereignty is 
ultimately redirected to the state through the notion of democracy, effective-
ly endowing the state with sovereignty again. This linkage between state, 
sovereignty and democracy greatly increases the centrality of the state in 
the reasoning of the Court, and deserves closer attention.
4.4.4 Democracy as the normative armour of the sovereign state
Just as the academic supporters of statism, the BVG merges democracy, sov-
ereignty and the state together. Democracy forms the normative core and 
power source of this construction.
The BVG starts with art. 38(1) GC, that guarantees the right to vote. Via 
the argument that an effective right to vote89 also requires a well functioning 
democratic system, this right to vote, together with art. 20(1) and 20(2) GC, 
becomes a fundamental right to a democratic polity.90 As art. 20 GC falls 
under the ‘eternity clause’ of art. 79(3) GC, this right belongs to the invio-
86 Lissabon 280 en 281 further indicate, however, that there can be no sovereign European 
people.
87 As will be discussed in chapter 8 this holy trinity might, from a different perspective, 
offer a useful starting point to link the case law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht to the 
notion of confederal sovereignty. Also note that, against the views of Kirchof, the Treaties 
are here referred to as a ‘European Constitution.’
88 See, for instance, also Lissabon paras. 347 and 350.
89 Lissabon 167.
90 See for instance Lissabon 208-210. A right that even goes back to the even more funda-
mental value of human dignity enshrined in art. 1 GC.
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lable core of the constitution.91 And it is this inviolable core of democracy 
on which the ultimate primacy of the German constitution is founded. Con-
sequently, each argument against the ultimate primacy of German law is 
automatically transformed into an argument against democracy.
The BVG subsequently postulates a sovereign state as the conditio sine qua 
non for this democratic core.92 The Court supports this linkage with the 
claim that a true democratic process requires a certain critical mass of con-
tent and influence.93 To exaggerate the point, where the competences of the 
German federal government are reduced to the management of parks and 
other public greenery, the right to vote for this government looses its val-
ue. As a result, there could be no more real democratic process in Germany 
anymore, simply because there would be no power to control democrati-
cally. Certain key areas of public authority, therefore, need to remain under 
the control of German politics:
‘European unification on the basis of a union of sovereign states under the Treaties may, 
however, not be realised in such a way that the Member States do not retain sufficient space 
for the political formation of the economic, cultural and social circumstances of life. (…) Essential 
areas of democratic formative action comprise, inter alia, citizenship, the civil and the military 
monopoly on the use of force, revenue and expenditure including external financing and all elements 
of encroachment that are decisive for the realisation of fundamental rights, above all as regards 
intensive encroachments on fundamental rights such as the deprivation of liberty in the 
administration of criminal law or the placement in an institution. These important areas 
also include cultural issues such as the disposition of language, the shaping of circumstanc-
es concerning the family and education, the ordering of the freedom of opinion, of the press 
and of association and the dealing with the profession of faith or ideology.94
Democracy requires that all these areas remain under the control of one 
single political system. They may not be divided over separate centres of 
authority. For this single political control the BVG only sees one candidate: 
the sovereign state, that ‘globally recognized form of organization of a viable 
political community.’95
91 Art. 79 (3) GC reads: ‘(3) Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Fed-
eration into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the prin-
ciples laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.’
92 Lissabon 224, also see 226.
93 Lissabon 218, 226, 244 and 246. See also BVerfGE 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10 and 2 BvR 
1099/10 (2011) Euro Rescue Package, par. 98: ‘The right to vote also comprises the funda-
mental democratic content of the right to vote, that is, the guarantee of effective popular 
government.’, as well as par. 101.
94 Lissabon 248 (my italics). Also see 252 et seq. for a further determination of this critical 
democratic mass. The Court does nuance this enumeration, for instance by not excluding 
all EU infl uence in these fi elds but only requiring that suffi cient control is maintained. 
For a confi rmation of this line, and its application to the issue of revenue and expenditure 
see BVerfGE 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10 and 2 BvR 1099/10 (2011) Euro Rescue Package.
95 Lissabon 224.
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Only a sovereign state, therefore, is capable of bringing all these fields 
under democratic government. As a consequence, any attack on the sover-
eign state entails an attack on democracy as well. As paragraph 248 puts it: 
‘the safeguarding of sovereignty demanded by the principle of democracy.’
In this way the sovereign state has been normatively armoured with 
nothing less than democracy itself, a powerful shield against integration. 
Proponents of further integration in these key areas become opponents of 
democracy. The EU itself, furthermore, is certainly obligated to respect these 
national core competences, seeing how it is founded on the value of democ-
racy.96
4.4.5 The case of sovereignty and democracy v. integration
The Lissabon Urteil develops a fundamental defence of the sovereign state 
as the heart-lung machine of a people under democratic self-rule.97 For that 
reason, it sets some limits to the maximum level and form of integration 
under the current German constitution,98 and denies the ultimate primacy 
of European law.99 Within these limits, however, the German constitution, 
and the BVG, is ‘Europarechtfreundlich’.100
The judgment provides an important contribution to the discussion on 
sovereignty and the EU. It therefore must be addressed by any confederal 
approach to the EU, certainly one which relies on sovereignty as a founda-
tion rather than a nemesis of integration. The judgment also exposes several 
weak spots in competing plural conceptions of European integration, and 
therefore is an essential part of the theoretical background developed here. 
The position of the Court, for instance, seems to conform better to the current 
political reality, which hardly qualifies as cosmopolitan, than pluralism does. 
96 Art. 2 and 6 TEU.
97 See, for instance, Lissabon 224 and 226. Also Thym (2009), 1796.
98 Lissabon 228, 263-4, 252 et seq. ‘What has always been deemed especially sensitive for the 
ability of a constitutional state to democratically shape itself are decisions on substantive 
and formal criminal law (1), on the disposition of the police monopoly on the use of force 
towards the interior and of the military monopoly on the use of force towards the exterior 
(2), the fundamental fi scal decisions on public revenue and public expenditure, with the 
latter being particularly motivated, inter alia, by social-policy considerations (3), deci-
sions on the shaping of circumstances of life in a social state (4) and decisions which are 
of particular importance culturally, for instance as regards family law, the school and 
education system and dealing with religious communities (5).’
99 For instance Lissabon 330.
100 The judgment certainly contains many positive and constructive elements, not the least 
of which is its outcome. For early constructive judgments, furthermore, see already the 
acceptance by the BVG in 1967 that EU law trumps ordinary statutes, even if adopted at a 
later time, BVerfGE 22, 293 (1967) and BVerfGE 31, 145 (1971). The theoretical core of the 
Lisbon judgment nevertheless lies in setting limits. Under due recognition, and apprecia-
tion, of its constructive elements, and the obvious overall constructive attempt to prevent 
an open confl ict, this chapter focuses on these limits.
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Similarly it seems to better capture the factual balance of power between the 
Member States and the EU.101
Fully in line with the tradition of the BVG, however, the judgment is also 
highly contested, and appears to be based on several theoretical black 
holes.102 Even though the often decried reference to a pre-political ‘Volk’ has 
disappeared,103 in its stead new far-reaching positions have been adopted 
on issues as democracy, sovereignty, and the relation between both. Posi-
tions that partially rest on unsupported generalizations, or rather uncon-
vincing assumptions, such as the claim that only ‘one man one vote’ 
systems can be truly democratic.104
These positions also lead to equally problematic challenges, such as 
defining the substance of democracy and hence the limits of integration. 
The opportunistic and somewhat unconvincing selection of limits provided 
by the BVG in the Lisbon judgment testifies to the difficulties this raises.105 
The further nuancing concerning the actual policing of these borders in the 
Honeywell judgment suggests the BVG itself is very aware of this difficulty 
as well: The indication that it will only act in exceptional cases after the ECJ 
has been consulted, and even then granting the ECJ a ‘Fehlertoleranz’, can 
hardly be seen otherwise.106 The EMU cases highlight similar weaknesses 
within the specific area of revenue and expenditure, where for instance 
101 Concerning the political climate see the rise of populist an often anti-EU parties across 
Europe. As to the political power of the Member States the recent sovereign debt crisis 
provides an illuminating example, where the Member States, and with them the Europe-
an Council, took control. See the discussion on the EMU crisis from the confederal per-
spective in part III. Further see Editorial Comments ‘An ever Mighty European Council’ 
46 CMLRev (2009), 1383, and for a sober and factual analysis of the still immense and 
dominant power of the Member States, A. Moravscik, ‘The European Constitutional 
Compromise and the Neofunctionalist Legacy, 12 Journal of European Public Policy (2005), 
349, and Moravscik (2001). Based on this analysis one could even wonder if the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht does not feel itself to threatened by the EU.
102 C. Schönberger, ‘Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht’s Epigone at Sea’, 10 German Law Journal 
(2009), 1209, Thym (2009), 1795.
103 See the far thinner conception of the people, for example, in Lissabon par. 251. Further see 
Thym (2009), 1816, as well as the difference between the approaches of Kirchhoff and 
Grimm set out above.
104 Editorial, 5 European Constitutional Law Review (2009).
105 See also D. Halberstam and C. Möllers, ‘The German Constitutional Court says ‘Ja zu 
Deutschland’, 10 German Law Journal (2009), 1241, 1249-1251.
106 BVerfGE 2 BvR 2661/06 (2010) Honeywell, par. 60, 61 and 66. Similarly see the deferential 
application of Lisbon BVerfGE 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10 and 2 BvR 1099/10 (2011) 
Euro Rescue Package. Note also that the BVG is exclusively competent to declare an EU act 
ultra vires, which at one level sits uneasily with the logic of being ultra vires itself but does 
reduce the danger of judicial ‘accidents’. Further see the critical dissent by Justice Landau 
on what he sees as ‘excessive requirements’, ‘shying away’ from enforcing limits, and a 
deviation from the limits established by the Lissabon Urteil, and Payandeh (2011), 9.
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‘only a manifest overstepping of extreme limits is relevant.’107 Several other 
unconvincing assumptions and consequences mar the approach of the BVG 
as well. Foremost amongst these is the fact that it blocks a necessary evolu-
tion in democracy by locking the people in the state instead of empowering 
them externally.
These problematic weaknesses will be further discussed below, where it 
will be seen to what extent a confederal notion of sovereignty may provide 
a more constructive and viable alternative to the reasoning of the BVG, or 
may alternatively help to strengthen the approach of the BVG by providing 
a more suitable notion of sovereignty.108 For example confederal sovereign-
ty may allow the BVG to protect sovereignty in a way that does not obstruct 
democracy from adapting to interdependence.
Be of these objections what they may, however, they do not detract from 
the fact that the BVG has chosen to defend the sovereign state. Its view, fur-
thermore, is not just one of the many opinions (this one included) on the 
relation between the EU and the Member States. It is the judicial qualification 
of that relation by the highest court of a not unimportant Member State. As 
a result it is a determining factor in the same phenomenon of integration it 
aims to describe, a legal observer-effect so to speak.109 Even if one disagrees 
with the BVG, therefore, any alternative vision will have to incorporate the 
fact that a key player like the BVG continues to approach the EU as a union 
of sovereign states. An approach in which it is followed by many other con-
stitutional and supreme courts.
The challenge from statism, therefore, is clear: integration within the bound-
aries of the sovereign state alone. Sovereignty is embraced as a core value, 
linked to several other vital values as democracy, state, nation and constitu-
tion, and subsequently developed as the ultimate bulwark against advanc-
ing integration.
107 In BVerfGE 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10 and 2 BvR 1099/10 (2011) Euro Rescue Package, 
par. 131. More generally see par, 124 et seq, where the BVG retreats to the procedural 
safeguard of Bundestag ‘control’ of ‘fundamental budgetary decisions.’ See on this proce-
dural safeguard also BVerfGE 2 BvE 8/11 (2012) (Sondergremium) and BverGE 2 BvR 
1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 be 6/12 (2012) 
ESM Treaty, for instance par. 198 et seq. For discussion see A. von Ungern-Sternberg ‘Par-
liaments – Fig Leaf or Heartbeat of Democracy? Case note to German Constitutional 
Court Judgment of 7 September on the Euro Rescue Package’ 8 European Constitutional Law 
Review (2012), 304.
108 See below chapter 10 section 4.
109 The observer effect in physics ponts to the fact that the act of observation may actually 
affect the object being observed. Similarly the BVG cannot rule on the process of Europe-
an integration without affecting it.
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5 Pluralism: Overcoming sovereignty and our darker selves
Pluralism challenges the statist approach at its root: 110 it rejects hierarchy 
itself, and with it the central and ultimate position of the sovereign state.111 
Between the legal systems in the EU there is no ultimate hierarchy, but only 
a heterarchichal reality wherein multiple independent centres of authority 
co-exist.112 And as there is no apex, the state cannot claim to be it. In the 
words of Neil MacCormick, one of the founding fathers of EU pluralism:
‘So relations between states inter se and between states and Community are interactive 
rather than hierarchical. The legal systems of member-states and their common legal sys-
tem of EC law are distinct but interacting systems of law, and hierarchical relationships of 
validity within criteria of validity proper to distinct systems do not add up to any sort of 
all-purpose superiority of one system over another. It follows also that the interpretative 
power of the highest decision-making authorities of the different systems must be, as to 
each system, ultimate.’113
Or as formulated by the equally leading mind of Neil Walker:
‘Constitutional pluralism recognizes that in the post-Westphalian world there exists a 
range of different constitutional sites and processes configured in a heterarchichal rather 
than a hierarchical pattern, (…).’114
In reaching this conclusion pluralists generally start from precisely those EU 
novelties that seemingly defy hierarchy and the statal framework. Novelties 
that require novel thinking: ‘We must try to take seriously the unique and 
novel character of this ‘mixed commonwealth’ [EU], and aim for theoretical 
perspectives that respect its uniqueness and novelty rather than wedging it 
into old stereotypes.’115 Walker even points to an epistemological necessity 
for a pluralist approach: truly knowing either the EU or the national systems 
and their respective claim to authority, and representing them as indepen-
dent constitutional centers, requires a ‘different way of knowing and order-
ing, a different epistemic starting point and perspective with regard to each 
110 This section discusses pluralism in its relation to the EU, and not the more general theory 
of (legal) pluralism that underlies it. See for this theory more generally G. Teubner, ‘The 
Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism’ 13 Cardozo Law Review (1992), 1443, or J. 
Griffi ths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism (1986), 1.
111 Cf also M. Avbelj and J. Komarek, ‘Four Visions of Constitutional Pluralism’ EUI Working 
Papers 2008/21, 2, also introducing pluralism as a reaction to ‘the statist origins of classi-
cal constitutionalism’.
112 K-H. Ladeur, ‘Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality – The Viability of the Network 
Concept’, 3 European Law Journal (1997), 331.
113 MacCormick (1999), 118.
114 Walker (2002), 317. Note though that Walker does try to combine, or at least connect, his 
pluralism within an overall and continuing development in political organization, an 
does not see it as a radical break from modernity, which signifi cantly adds to the attrac-
tiveness of his views. See also Walker (2012), 57.
115 MacCormick (1999), 156.
273The statist and pluralist challenge
unit(y);’116 As a result there simply is no meta-position, or an ‘Archimedean 
point’, from which we can simultaneously know both units, let alone con-
nect them or subject one to the other. As a result even knowing the EU is 
impossible without adopting a pluralist framework.
By clinging to a statist perspective, or even by searching for a form of non-
statal hierarchy, we therefore miss the essence of the EU, and with it its great 
potential. It is like approaching a cubist Picasso as a Rubik’s cube that needs 
ordering. Instead of welcoming the liberation and possibilities it entails, one 
tries to destroy it by reducing it to that which it has transcended.
Challenging the existence, and necessity, of one ultimate rule, – be it a 
Kelsinian Grundnorm, a Hartian rule of recognition, or a natural law truth 
– lawyers should therefore stop trying to understand the European legal 
order as an either/or between the Member States and the EU.117 They 
should accept the fact that each distinct legal order follows a different hier-
archy if pushed to the extreme. Continuing to search for the primary egg or 
supreme chicken will not provide a (conceptual) answer for the EU author-
ity conundrum.118
Once heterarchy is embraced concepts like a sovereign state no longer seem 
tenable. Trying to comprehend a plural reality from an intrinsically hierar-
chical concept as sovereignty is impossible. As Kumm states: ‘Constitutional 
pluralism (…) allows us to reconceive legitimate authority and institutional 
practices in a way that makes do without the ideas of the state, of sovereign-
ty, of ultimate authority, and of ‘We the People’ as basic foundations of law 
and the reconstruction of legal practice.’119 From the elementary particles of 
public authority states and sovereignty become ‘passing phenomena of a 
few centuries.’120 An overcoming of hierarchy that also conforms with sev-
eral more post-modern assumptions that often inform pluralism, such as 
the impossibility of objective or absolute foundations, knowledge, objectiv-
ity or truth.121 Clearly such ontological or epistemological assumptions sit 
uneasily with the idea of hierarchy as such, let alone with sovereignty.
116 N Walker (2002), 337.
117 See for one of the founding fathers: N. MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’, 56 
Modern Law Review (1993), 1, MacCormick (1995), 259, or MacCormick (1999).
118 Although sometimes, when push comes to shove, an eventual hierarchy is accepted. See 
for an example Kumm (1999) or Maduro (2006).
119 M. Kumm as quoted in Avbelj and Komarek (2008), 34. The EU is ‘post-statist, post-
nationalist and post-positivist’ (p. 27).
120 MacCormick (1993), 1. Also see D.M. Curtin, Postnational Democracy: The European Union 
in Search of a Political Philosophy (Kluwer 1997), 50-51.
121 See for a challenge to knowledge that would (almost) make one quit academia and spend 
life on matters that one can talk about, the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, for instance in 
Über Gewissheit (edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, Harper 1972).
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5.1 The EU as crown witness against sovereignty
For theories claiming, or prophesising, the demise of sovereignty as a useful 
construct the EU understandably forms a crown witness.122 The argument 
generally goes as follows.123
First, it is illustrated how within the EU the once mighty sovereign state 
has lost its position at the apex of political organization, and can no lon-
ger be considered sovereign. And indeed, even though states have bound 
themselves by treaties for centuries,124 including via a range of interna-
tional organizations, no other organization of states has had such a signifi-
cant impact on the functioning of its members as the EU.125 One only has to 
enumerate some of the key developments to drive the point home. Member 
States, for instance, no longer hold the exclusive supreme legislative or judi-
cial power, traditionally considered key marks of sovereignty.126 Some have 
even surrendered their entire monetary policy, another key mark.127 EU law 
claims to trump all national law, including constitutional law.128 Even in 
fields where the EU has no competences Member States are still bound to 
respect the negative limits imposed by EU law. Directly or indirectly, there-
fore, EU law affects even the most sensitive areas such as healthcare, educa-
tion, collective bargaining, social housing, immigration, benefits, criminal 
law, and taxes. 129
The rapidly developing notion of citizenship, furthermore, increasingly 
prevents Member States from giving preferential treatment to their own citi-
zens.130 Further limitations flow from the different layers of fundamental 
122 See N. MacCormick, ‘Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State’ 44 Political 
Studies (1996), 555 or Walker (2006), 3. See for a clear example MacCormick (1993), 1, who 
calls the sovereign state a ‘passing phenomena of a few centuries’.
123 Also see Bellamy (2006), 168, 175. Hinsley (1986), 121.
124 In 2100 BC already a treaty was concluded between the rulers of Lagash and Umma con-
cerning their boundary. (A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (MacMillian 
1954), 1-2), whereas the Greek City-States had a system of treaties as well as an ‘external 
policy’, such as for example the Delic Union. Also see: J. Shaw, International Law (5th edn. 
CUP 2003), 16. In line with the points described above, the hypothesis of this chapter is 
that the EU is exactly so threatening because it for the fi rst time confronts internal and 
external sovereignty on a large scale by applying the (constitutional) logic of internal 
sovereignty on the external relation between states. Of course it is already quite curious 
that the beginning of the modern system of nation-states is placed in the treaties underly-
ing the peace of Westphalia.
125 See for example the famous analysis of Lenaerts: ‘There simply is no nucleus of sovereign 
power that the Member States can invoke, as such, against the Community.’ (Lenaerts 
(1990), 220).
126 At least under the perspective of EU law. Even statists as Kirchhof and Grimm, further-
more, accept this impact of the EU as a fact. See chapter 8, section 4.1.
127 See chapter 9, section 3.1.
128 Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L., Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Case 106/77 Sim-
menthal.
129 See for a more detailed discussion and references above chapter 3, section 2.4.
130 See for example C-73/08, Bressol.
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rights that are supranationally defined and enforced.131 The new develop-
ments regarding economic policy and budgetary control only confirm this 
trend: they affect money and fiscal policy, the heart and soul of politics.132 
All these qualitative changes in the role and power of the state, furthermore, 
cannot be masked by a formalistic focus on the (theoretical) power of the 
Member States as ‘Masters of the Treaties’.
Once it has thus been established that the Member States can no longer be 
considered sovereign, the second step in the argument points out that the 
EU has not assumed sovereign statehood either.133 Although the EU has 
an impressive array of powers and claims supremacy over Member State 
laws, it lacks too many vital elements, such as executive capacity, an army 
or a people of its own, to be considered sovereign.134 As neither the EU nor 
the Member States are sovereign, the necessary conclusion seems to be that 
somewhere in creating the ‘sui generis’ structure of the Union, sovereignty 
has left the building.135
The conclusion that the EU has rid us and itself of sovereignty is then often 
further supported with one or more of these additional arguments.
To start with one can point to the reality, and impressive potential, of 
authority-conflicts within the EU that simply have no (legal) solution.136 
The most famous of these is the simmering conflict between the Court of 
Justice and the different constitutional and supreme courts set out above. 
Such conflicts illustrate that there is no clear and linear hierarchy, no ulti-
mate or sovereign authority which can settle these questions. Instead, mul-
tiple ‘highest’ points exist, neither of which can command or overrule the 
other.
131 These now include inter alia the strongly overlapping EU Charter, the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and the General Principles of EU law. See exploring the limits of 
these regimes Von Bogdandy et al (2012a).
132 See for a discussion of the EMU crisis and the responses so far below chapter 13, section 
2.
133 See MacCormicks famous comparison with virginity on this point: Sovereignty can be 
lost without another gaining it. (MacCormick (1999), 126.
134 Here pluralists and statist agree. See however the opinion of advocate general La Pergola 
in NIFPO and NIFF, case C-4/96 [1996] ECR I-681, footnote 7, holding that the Commu-
nity had concluded a treaty ‘acting as a single sovereign entity.’
135 As Europa carried off by Zeus. Also see the qualifi cation of the EU as a ‘non-sovereign 
commonwealth of post-sovereign states’, by N. MacCormick, ‘Democracy, Subsidiarity 
and Citizenship in the “European Commonwealth’, in: N. MacCormick (ed), Constructing 
Legal Systems. ‘European Union’ in Legal Theory (Kluwer 1997), 338-39.
136 For a recent example see the Czech Constitutional Court judgment of 31 January 2012, 
Landtova Pl. ÚS 5/12, rejecting a preliminary ruling of the ECJ as fundamentally mistaken 
and creating an open conflict for which no further legal solution exists, at least not 
between the legal orders involved.
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Secondly, there is the normative argument against sovereignty. Sover-
eignty is rejected as morally problematic in itself. The sad track record of 
devastation by sovereign states, both within heir borders and outside, is 
used to show how sovereignty has contributed to some of the worst abus-
es in history. In addition, reliance on sovereignty stands in the way of new 
and morally superior ways of organizing the world. Ways which empha-
size cooperation and individual rights rather than power and the right to 
be left alone. 137 The dialogue made necessary by the lack of a single highest 
authority is hence turned into a normatively superior form of political orga-
nization with a vital civilizing effect
Lastly, just as statism, these theoretical arguments are often supported fur-
ther by a more empirical analysis: in the interdependent world of today any 
notion of sovereignty is outdated anyway. Vital areas such as the economy, 
basic resources, the environment, migration, or security have outgrown the 
state, and can only be tackled through cooperation. Interdependency has 
thereby reached such a high level that talk of an absolute and unlimited 
sovereign state is outdated at best. More likely, however, it should be quali-
fied as a dangerously foolish state of denial for those not capable of grasp-
ing today’s complex reality, and are desperately clinging to the security of a 
less dynamic past.138
5.2 The key tenets of pluralism
Obviously many relevant differences exist within the plural universe of 
pluralism. At the same time, taking together the observations above, it is 
possible to identify several key elements underlying and uniting pluralist 
approaches, also in their shared resistance to statism.
First and foremost, (1) pluralism denies and rejects hierarchy. Instead a fun-
damental heterarchy between different legal orders or centers of authority 
is posited.139 (2) The state is one (important) of these authority centers, also 
because it houses the national legal system. Yet it no longer is the sole or 
137 See for example, MacCormick (1999), 117, N.W. Barber, ‘Legal Pluralism and the Europe-
an Union’, 12 European Law Journal (2006), 328, or Walker (2006b), 11 et seq.
138 See amongst many others J. Camilleri and J. Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The politics of a 
Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Edward Elgar Publishers 1992), or K. Ohmae, The End of 
the Nation State. The Rise of Regional Economics (Free Press 1995).
139 Cf Baquero Cruz (2008), for instance 412, 414-415, describing pluralisms ‘rejection of any 
sort of hierarchy’. Further see A. von Bogdandy, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect 
for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty’ 48 CMLRev (2011), 1417, Ladeur (2007), 
331, M. Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Confl ict: Constitutional Supremacy 
in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty’, 11 European Law Journal (2005), 262, 
M. La Torre, ‘Legal Pluralism as an Evolutionary Achievement of Community Law’ 12 
Ratio Juris (1999), 182, or MacCormick (1993), 1.
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ultimate one.140 Instead (3) public authority is dispersed over multiple and 
pluriform centres of governance,141 including international organizations, 
committees, networks, and even companies.142 The far-reaching and intru-
sive characteristics of the EU (4) far exceed the boundaries of a mere inter-
national organization, and form clear proof of this statal decline.143 Such a 
plural organization of government is also (5) the only possible one for a glo-
balizing and plural reality.144
The lack of a (statal) hierarchy also means that (6) no single centre can 
claim ultimate supremacy: a plural reality entails the existence of multiple 
conflicting claims to supremacy which are all valid from the internal per-
spective of their own legal orders.145 Both the national constitutional courts 
and the ECJ are, therefore, right, albeit within their own legal orders.146 As 
‘no legal solution’147 exists to authority conflicts between them, therefore, 
the different centres of authority (7) need to rely on cooperation and dia-
logue to prevent and solve such conflicts.148 Generally this need is then (8) 
embraced as a normative victory as well.149 Cooperation based on dialogue 
(or even ‘multilogue’) 150 transcends the less civilised, and in a sense less lib-
eral, reliance on formal authority. It requires discussion,151 and thereby, one 
140 ‘Whenever we should date the emergence of the sovereign state, and wherever we may 
locate its fi rst emergence, it seems we may at last be witnessing its demise in Europe, 
through the development of a new and not-yet-well-theorized legal and political order in 
the form of the European Union.’ MacCormick (1999), 125.
141 Pernice (2002), 511.
142 Chalmers, Davies and Monti (2010), 199, P.L. Lindseth, ‘‘Weak’ Constitutionalism? Refl ec-
tions on Comitology and Transnational Governance in the European Union.’, 21 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies (2001), 145, and Lindseth (2010), for instance p. 21 et seq.
143 The EU goes ‘well beyond’ the ‘status of international organization’ (Douglas-Scott 
(2002), 260). See De Witte, (2012), 50 for a clear enumeration, and rejection, of the general 
arguments against qualifying the EU as an international organization, and therefore as 
inside the normal statist-IO framework. For a similar overview of facts with the opposite 
qualifi cation see Schütze (2012), 60-61.
144 MacCormick (1999).
145 At least once the ‘internal’ perspective of these different legal systems is adopted and 
respected. MacCormick (1995), 259.
146 MacCormick (1999), 141.
147 ‘Acceptance of a radically pluralist conception of legal systems entails acknowledging 
that not every legal problem can be solved legally. (…) The problem is not logically 
embarrassing, because strictly speaking the he answers are from the point of view of dif-
ferent systems. But it is practically embarrassing to the extent that the same human 
beings or corporations are said to have and not to have a certain right. (…). MacCormick 
(1999), 119.
148 F. Mayer, ‘The European Constitution and the Courts’, in: A. von Bogdandy and J. Bas 
(eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (1st edn. Oxford, Hart, 2006), 323. I. Per-
nice, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action’, 15 Columbia Journal of 
European Law (2009), 349, A. von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles of EU law: A Theoreti-
cal and Doctrinal Sketch’ 16 European Law Journal (2010), 95.
149 See for instance Mayer (2006), 323.
150 Maduro (2006), 513.
151 Avbelj and Komarek (2008), 20.
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hopes, communication, (rational) argumentation and taking the perspective 
of ‘the other’.152 Requirements that may transcend the (severe) downsides of 
the absolute and authoritarian state, as well as its simplistic world view.153
5.3 The fit and failure of pluralism
Considering its tendency to take meta-positions, or at least external posi-
tions, it is hardly surprising that constitutional pluralism is especially popu-
lar, or even dominant, in academia.154 Its intellectual and post-modern flair 
appeals to key values in academia, where it is also not burdened with the 
responsibility of taking individual decisions but with grasping overall real-
ity. As a result, however, we cannot, nor do we need to, go into a judicial 
application of pluralism. Rather, as mentioned, pluralism tries to claim the 
statist point of view retained by national constitutional courts as proof of its 
own position. Consequently we can proceed with some concluding remarks 
on pluralism and its rejection of statism and sovereignty, before we move on 
to that statist rejoinder, and some bridging attempts.
For based on the tenets set out above, pluralism attacks statism as thorough-
ly outdated. It is an ostrich-like reaction to a brave new world. A reaction 
which equals clinging to the abacus in an age of quantum computing. Con-
sequently it cannot begin to grasp the reality of the EU. A fact also illustrat-
ed by the statist reliance on some highly formal arguments, like the right to 
secession or the requirement of unanimous Treaty amendment, which pur-
portedly preserve the ultimate authority of the state. Important facts, which, 
however, do not capture the substantive reality in the EU, just as the formal 
legal fact that in theory all land belongs to the British crown does not portray 
a realistic image of the real estate market in the UK. Statism should, there-
fore, be abandoned for a pluralist understanding that can think beyond the 
binary divide in states and international organizations:
152 See classically the work of Weiler, for instance, J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Why Should Europe Be a 
Democracy? The Corruption of Political Culture and the Principle of Toleration’, in: F. 
Snyder (ed), The Europeanisation of Law: The Legal Effects of European Integration (Hart Pub-
lishing 2000), Weiler (2000) or Weiler (1999) especially chapter X: ‘To be a European Citi-
zen: Eros and Civilization’.
153 Von Bogdandy (2010), 95, Pernice (2009), 349, Walker, (2006b), 11 et seq., Maduro (2006), 
501, Kumm (2005), 262, J. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory 
(Polity Press 1999), 118 et seq., MacCormick (1999), 117 or D. Held, Democracy and the 
Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Polity Press 1998), for 
instance 135.
154 Also J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Introduction’ in J.H.H. Weiler and G de Búrca (eds.), The Worlds of 
Constitutionalism (CUP: Cambridge, 2011) p. 1.See for some academic views closely relat-
ed to the bench, however, A.W.H. Meij, ‘Circles of Coherence: On Unity of Case law in the 
Context of Globalisation’, 6 European Constitutional Law Review (2010), 84, and A. Voßkuh-
le, ‘Multilevel cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts: Der Europäische Ver-
fassungsgerichtsverbund’ 6 European Constitutional Law Review (2010), 175.
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‘As noted earlier in our critique of state-centredness, to try to explain the new emerging 
post-Westphalian order in one-dimensional terms, by reference to national delegation, 
Intergovernmentalism and the traditional law of international organisations, is to try to 
force square pegs into round holes, and to understate the extent and distort the character of 
the transformation which is underway.’155
Jointly these arguments lead to the conclusion that we are in need of anoth-
er, post-sovereign, paradigm to structure and understand the EU, and with 
that the future of public authority.156 Pluralism consequently fits with the 
experiences of globalisation and the apparent loss of control that accom-
panies it. As such it contains a great deal of valuable insights, and rightly 
forces attention to the complexity of reality and the multiplicity of intercon-
nected public and private processes taking place simultaneously.
At the same time pluralism has the tendency to be destructive in the 
sense of removing too much of the foundation that, for instance, statism is 
working so hard to retain. Little is given in return, furthermore, especially if 
one does not dare to put too much stock in the inherent value of pluralism 
or voluntary cooperation. In addition pluralism might have the tendency to 
underestimate the power retained by the states, and may focus too exclu-
sively on a few plural phenomena. These potential weaknesses in plural-
ism will be further discussed below, after we have been able to explore the 
conceptual development of sovereignty, and can relate those findings to the 
concept of sovereignty implicitly assumed by pluralism. At this point, how-
ever, it suffices to conclude that pluralism forms a direct challenge to sover-
eignty as it is commonly understood, and in certain ways even appears to 
be its complete opposite or negation. Consequently the pluralist conception 
of integration challenges any confederal conception of sovereignty as just 
another doomed attempt to re-establish some hierarchy in a fundamentally 
plural reality.
5.4 The statist rejoinder
In their turn statist generally reject pluralism as a special branch of wishful 
thinking.157 Pointing to the remaining centrality of the state they claim the 
high ground of realism, and continue to pour some cold water on what they 
see as overheated theoretical enthusiasm. For instance, pluralism would 
not provide enough stability, but instead replaces ‘established institutions, 
approved values and reliable political experiences’ with hopes of coopera-
tion and self-restraint.158 It also fails as a concept of law, as it cannot solve 
155 Walker (2002), 337.
156 MacCormick (1999), Walker, (2006b), or Schiemann (2007), 475.
157 Hartley (1999) and Hartley (2001). For a further discussion see also chapter10 sections 4 
and 5, containing a confederal criticism on both schools.
158 Kirchhof (2010), 736.
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conflicts.159 Instead pluralism leads back to precisely the sort of politics and 
power struggle the EU was intended to prevent.160 Also, it is argued that 
pluralists tend to rely on a highly restrictive understanding of internation-
al organization. One that does not give enough credit to the flexibility and 
potential of international law, and falsely increases the paradigm shattering 
‘uniqueness’ of the EU.161
Overall, from the statist perspective, the pluralists seem to loose themselves 
in some important but less than revolutionary innovations in the EU. Swept 
off their feet by these innovations, and guided more by their hopes than 
a sober appraisal of actual political power and legitimacy in the EU, these 
exceptions are declared the rule.
6 The statist – pluralist divide: Bridging attempts
As the overview above confirms, a divide exists between statist and plural-
ist accounts, their views on sovereignty, and the two basic approaches to 
the EU they represent. A divide that is especially problematic as both views 
contain much of value, but at the same time contain dangerous weaknesses 
as well, as they so effectively point out in each other.
Now of course a wealth of possibilities lies between the strong statism 
of Kirchof and the ‘radical’ pluralism of MacCormick.162 Some of these pos-
sibilities developed do also reduce the gap between the two approaches in 
their purest forms. At the same time these generally seem unable to escape 
the gravitational pull of either one basic approach in the end; ultimately 
some hierarchy is accepted with all the risks of monism, or it is rejected, 
with all the risks and instability of pluralism.
Nevertheless these attempts to bridge the divide again contain much of 
value, certainly for a confederal approach that seeks to establish a viable 
confederal middle ground for the EU. Before we continue to the confederal 
approach suggested in this thesis, therefore, it is useful to briefly discuss 
some of these bridging attempts. Especially interesting in this regard is the 
sub-category of ‘constitutional pluralism’. A sophisticated branch of plu-
ralism that attempts to establish some structure in plurality whilst steering 
clear of ultimate and formal hierarchy.
159 Of course this reduction in the ‘utility of law as a determinate guide to conduct at least in 
the area of confl ict’ is recognized by several well developed conceptions of pluralism, but 
even these may skip too easily over the fact that precisely in these cases of confl ict guid-
ance is necessary, and appeals to pluralist perceptions may become attractive, also as an 
abuse. The quote is from MacCormick (1999), 102.
160 See for instance, also for a further and forceful critique on pluralism, Baquero Cruz 
(2008), 389.
161 De Witte (2012), 21. Similarly Hartley (2001), 225 et seq.
162 Such as his own later version of pluralism under international law: MacCormick (1999), 121.
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Constitutional pluralism illustrates the difficulty of bridging the statist – 
pluralist divide, and hence the potential contribution of a confederal middle 
ground. But it equally shares the ‘constitutional intuition’ of confederalism in 
its quest to combine statism with pluralism, or a certain foundation with far-
reaching heterarchy. As will be seen below, therefore, a confederal approach 
may particularly contribute to further develop constitutional pluralism.
6.1 Constitutional pluralism: Constitutionalizing plurality without hierarchy
Constitutional pluralism tries to regain some coherence and system with-
in the limits of plurality through the use of constitutionalism. In a sense it 
thereby takes the notion of a constitution from the statist camp and attempts 
to make it switch sides.163 Within this extra-statal notion of constitutional-
ism coherence can then be pursued in various ways.
Kumm, for example, postulates several overarching values in a Dworkinian 
attempt to create a substantive superstructure without establishing a formal 
hierarchy.164 All EU legal orders share ‘the basic constitutional principles 
of political liberalism: the rule of law, democracy, human rights, comple-
mented by subsidiarity (..).’165 Coordination of these legal orders should be 
based on these shared substantive values. Decisions should not depend on a 
formal and preordained primacy of either the national or the EU legal order, 
but on the best fit with these values.
Kumm’s approach does create some structure and coherence without (for-
mal) hierarchy. It equally stimulates debate and dialogue on the content 
of these values. Yet though the values he enumerates are broadly shared, 
his approach does not break free from more radical pluralism in the end. 
For only where agreement already exists on these values and their specif-
ic application is no authority structure (or EU) needed. Where agreement 
remains absent, however, no specific interpretation can be imposed.166 That 
is, unless one accepts some formal hierarchy to apply these values, this 
approach relies on a enlightened, liberal revival of natural law theory where 
all authority derives from substantive correctness and conformity with 
supreme values. By replacing a formal hierarchy by a substantive hierarchy, 
163 Cf Kumms notion of ‘Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ in Kumm (2005), 262. See for 
the vehement rejection of any such attempts at recruitment Kirchof (2010) strongly deny-
ing the viability of constitutional language outside the state. In any event this feat does 
require softening constitutionalism, and hence freeing it from some of the thicker norma-
tive layers surrounding it, which also reduces the very normative force required by plu-
ralism. Also see Schilling (1996), 389 and Schütze (2012), 67.
164 Kumm (2005), 262.
165 M. Kumm as quoted in Avbelj and Komarek (2008), 26.
166 Cf in this regard the challenge to any form of authority by R.P. Wolff, In Defense of Anar-
chism (University of California Press 1998).
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therefore, we revive the classical natural law problem: who may authori-
tatively formulate and apply these values? Unless we assume agreement, 
and hence assume away the problem we want to solve, we return to a radi-
cal heterarchy, even within national legal systems.167 A heterarchy which 
threatens even the thin concept of law as defined by Fuller.168 What is more, 
the far from hypothetical risk arises that both the ECJ and the state courts 
will simply rely on such substantive arguments and values to establish an 
ultimately procedural and hierarchical claim to supremacy.169 In addition 
the combination of a post-modern logic of pluralism with the existence of 
some form of substantive, knowable and intersubjectively valid, values, 
even if based on discourse, seems problematic. In a sense the attempt to 
avoid formal hierarchy thereby leads to the assumption of a substantive 
hierarchy even more inimical to the roots of pluralism itself.170
6.2 Heterarchy under Contrapunctual principles
Instead of creating order through substantive principles one can also 
attempt to take the sharper edges of pluralism by relying on overarching 
procedural principles.171 Participants in the different legal orders within 
the EU should follow certain procedural axioms that would prevent con-
flict and ensure a harmonious functioning of the EU legal order. Maduro’s 
‘Contrapunctual’ principles provide a clear example of the strengths, and 
weaknesses, of such an approach.172 What is needed to ‘manage the non-
hierarchical relationship between the different legal orders and institutions’ 
is a set of ‘Contrapunctual principles:173
‘In a sense, for pluralism to be viable in a context of a coherent legal order there must be a 
common basis for discourse. Such a basis is a set of principles shared by all the participants 
that, while respecting their competing claims of authority , guarantees the coherence and 
integrity of the European legal order. These are understood as framework principles that 
characterise the form of European legal pluralism and regulate the relation among the dif-
ferent national legal orders and between these and the EU legal order.’174
167 See on this risk Cuyvers (2011), 49 et seq.
168 L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, (2nd ed, Yale University Press 1969), especially chapter 2.
169 Cf in this regard the reasoning of the ECJ in Kadi I, fi nding that it alone is able to defi ne 
and protect the substantive values in play. Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi I.
170 See in this regard also the epistemological defense of pluralism by Walker discussed 
above.
171 As an intermediate option, and with a strong Kelsinian streak, one could also opt for a 
pluralism between the EU legal orders, yet under the overarching system of international 
law. See, for instance, MacCormick (1999), 119-121 or N. MacCormick, ‘Risking Constitu-
tional Collision in Europe?’ 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1998), 517. Here as well, 
however, the actual controlling force of international law remains vague, as it must 
remain if it is not to undermine pluralism as such.
172 Maduro (2006), 520.
173 Idem, p. 523.
174 Idem, p. 524.
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Such a procedural framework can indeed reduce conflict, and may accu-
rately describe the efforts by different actors in the EU to prevent conflict. 
Yet these procedural principles ultimately run into the same barriers as the 
substantive values relied on by Kumm. They even do so more spectacularly 
due to their formal nature. A clear risk exists of postulating a superior over-
arching system that ultimately undermines real pluralism,175 which means 
that the escape in proceduralism cannot dissolve the tension between the 
(legal) need for some (limited) form of hierarchy and pluralism.176
This tension is already visible at the level of language. Maduro states, 
for example, that: ‘these are the principles to which all actors of the Euro-
pean legal community must commit themselves (…). This commitment is 
voluntary but it may still be presented as a limit to pluralism’177 Undoubtedly 
due to a lack of imagination, this does beg the question: if the commitment 
is not voluntary (must) how does this fit with pluralism? Yet if it is volun-
tary, how does it provide a limit? Equally the more free and friendly use of 
‘principles’ is sometimes replaced by the less plural sounding contrapunc-
tual ‘rules’.178
The implied hierarchy in contrapunctual law becomes even more obvious 
once one takes into account the three actual rules or principles it entails. For 
instance ‘each theory must be constructed so as to adjust and adapt to the 
competing theories’.179 Simply translated this means that the different legal 
systems may not seek, or at least not maintain, conflict. Yet this makes the 
logic, or envisioned ‘solution’ circular: One prevents conflict by imposing a 
rule that each system should prevent conflict. The same goes for the prin-
ciple whereby each system is prohibited to affirm its identity in ‘a manner 
that either challenges the identity of the other legal orders or the pluralist 
conception of the European legal order itself.’180 Again conflict is concep-
tually removed by prohibiting it (without claiming hierarchy). A require-
ment, furthermore that does not seem to fit with the current case law of 
most national constitutional courts or the primacy claim of the ECJ.181
175 Notice in this regard the assumption of something like an overarching EU legal order: 
‘The European legal order should be conceived as integrating the claims of validity of 
both national and EU constitutional law’ Idem, p. 524.
176 For an institutional alternative, aimed at resolving potential confl icts not by posing sub-
stantive or procedural values but by creating an institution to resolve them (based on the 
principles it sees fi t) see the proposal by Weiler for a Constitutional Council comprised of 
national and EU judges: J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The European Union Belongs to its Citizens: 
Three Immodest Proposals’, 22 European Law Review (1997), 150.
177 Maduro (2006), 524.
178 Idem, p. 525.
179 Idem.
180 Idem, p. 526.
181 For a recent example see the decision of the Czech constitutional Court of 31 January 
2012, Landtova Pl. ÚS 5/12, or the different national judgments regarding the European 
Arrest Warrant. See J. Komarek, ‘European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest 
Warrant: In Search of the Limits of “Contrapunctual Principles”, 44 CMLRev (2007), 9.
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Thirdly it is suggested by Maduro that ‘When national courts apply EU 
law they must do so in such a manner as to make these decisions fit the 
decisions taken by the European Court of Justice but also by other national 
courts.’182 Not only does this rather delimit freedom under pluralism, it also 
imposes a truly herculean task on judges: even Dworkin only required a fit 
within one legal order.183 Perhaps the best illustration of this implicit hier-
archy, however, is that Maduro himself finds it necessary to put the word 
independent between quotation marks where he eventually states that: ‘The 
integrity and coherence of the pluralist legal order will stem from the obliga-
tion of any national legal order to construct their ‘independent’ conception of 
EU law in a manner that is compatible with the other conceptions and with 
a coherent European legal order.’ Direct hierarchy between the ECJ and 
the national courts is replaced by a perhaps even more stringent obligation 
towards higher principles of contrapunctual law.184 As a result, when one 
takes these principles seriously they seem hard to square with true plural-
ism and its rejection of hierarchy. When one does not, they do not solve the 
problem of plural chaos implicitly accepted by Maduro.185
Perhaps this problem could already have been expected, seeing how the 
comparison Maduro makes with music ignores that the harmonious balance 
in a piece of music has been predetermined by an omnipotent composer, 
and is safeguarded by a conductor. Rarely does one put 28 musicians with 
highly different instruments and musical training in a room without sheet 
music and says: play! Especially not where one wrong note may have the 
weight and effect that supreme court rulings have. For changing the politi-
cal rule of a continent is not the same as musicians jamming or improvising, 
and as the previous ‘concert of Europe’ has shown, false notes may carry 
grave consequences. For most fundamentally supreme courts are not musi-
cians, and the legal rule of a continent is not a piece of music.
182 Maduro (2006), 528.
183 A problem equally applying to the substantive values of Kumm.
184 Maduro (2006), 538.
185 Would one leave adherence to these principles fully voluntary, one would, it seems, sim-
ply return to Weilers genuinely plural, and self-declared ‘noble’, notion of ‘constitutional 
tolerance’. Constitutional tolerance ‘is premised on the need of the legal orders of the 
Member States voluntarily to accept the constitutional discipline demanded by the Euro-
pean legal order, even absent a constitutional demos.’ Under this approach, for instance, 
the ‘French and the Italians’ are ‘invited to obey’. Weiler (2012), 12-13 (italics in original) 
and Weiler (2000), for the original concept. Clearly such hopes of nobility and voluntary 
compliance question not just the nature of law, but even the need for law. Conceptual 
issues aside, statist, or cynical commentators may point to the fate of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, or the suspension of Schengen obligations by France and Italy, for some 
serious doubts as to the survival chances of nobility when faced with strong national self 
interest or identity.
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7 Conclusion: A sovereign either/ or?
A fundamental dichotomy seems to lie between sovereignty and integra-
tion, and hence between statism and pluralism. For the moment one sup-
ports a meaningful notion of sovereignty, as the statists do, one is seemingly 
forced to establish and defend all kinds of sovereignty-based limits to inte-
gration. A task that not just appears herculean, but also far too static. Reject-
ing sovereignty altogether in a plural embrace of integration, however, also 
leaves one with some rather fundamental gaps and problems. How, for 
instance, to ground public authority without sovereignty? Or why would 
one accept any form of authority at all, not just within the overarching inter-
national legal order, but even within national legal systems?186 For once the 
anti-hierarchical genie is out of the lamp, it is hard to prevent it from spirit-
ing away all formal hierarchy.
To complicate matters, both approaches convince on some points whilst 
falling short on others. Statism increasingly struggles to accommodate the 
current realities of integration within a statal framework. Vice versa plural-
ism struggles to relate its claims to the existing, and still vital, statal struc-
tures or any other form of foundation for that matter. As a result it remains 
rather ethereal and academic, lacking the capacity to solve conflicts or carry 
much weight.187 Certainly not the amount of weight it offloads unto itself 
from the shoulders of the state.
Several insightful and constructive attempts have been made to reduce 
the divide between both approaches. Yet these also seem unable to really 
emancipate themselves from either linear hierarchy or radical pluralism.188 
Consequently we seem trapped in an unattractive dichotomy: statism or 
pluralism, established theory or tabula rasa, foundation or flexibility, sover-
eignty or the EU.
As indicated this thesis explores the potential of a confederal conception 
of sovereignty. A conception which could soften the juxtaposition between 
the views described above, and between sovereignty and integration more 
generally. For example it could allow a high level of operational heterarchy 
within a more exceptional but clear confederal hierarchy. A goal worth striv-
ing for as it would allow us to take the best of both camps, whilst helping 
to strengthen the constitutional foundation of the EU. In this quest for such 
a confederal conception of sovereignty the following chapter turns to the 
conceptual development of sovereignty itself: Is the concept of sovereignty 
really as absolute and as anathema to integration as it seems?
186 See Cuyvers, (2011), 481.
187 Chalmers, Davies and Monti (2010), 199.
188 Cf the conclusion of Baquero Cruz (2008), 414: ‘tertium non datur’.

1 Introduction-A tale of entanglement
Having set out two prominent and opposing views on the EU and sover-
eignty, and the conflict between sovereignty and integration that seems 
to result, we now turn to sovereignty itself. The following chapter takes a 
closer look at the original concept of sovereignty behind the absolutist myth 
that now surrounds it, and obfuscates debates on sovereignty and integra-
tion. In doing so it demonstrates the conceptual fit and coherence of a con-
federal conception of sovereignty, and how such a confederal conception 
even forms a logical further step in the federal application of sovereignty.
To substantiate these claims this chapter traces two developments in the 
conceptual evolution of sovereignty.1 First, it will be shown how internal 
and external sovereignty are at their root two separate concepts, which over 
time have become increasingly entangled and confused. 2 It will be argued 
that it is precisely this confusion between internal and external sovereignty, 
and the resulting tendency to approach the EU from ill-suited and absolutist 
1 Cf on the importance of the historical development for an understanding of sovereignty 
also Laski: ‘Nothing today is more greatly needed than clarity upon ancient notions. Sov-
ereignty, liberty, authority, personality – these are the words of which we want alike the 
history and defi nition; or rather, we want the history because its substance is in fact the 
defi nition.’ H.J. Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays (Harcourt, Brace 
and Company 1921), 314.
2 See for a powerful formulation of this distinction already Lauterpacht: ‘(…) it is only by 
dint of a gross inaccuracy of language that we give the same designation of sovereignty 
to the supreme authority of the State as determined by its constitutional law and to its 
legal position in international law.’ Lauterpacht (1977), 9. A statement which could also 
form the motto of part II. For the customary blending of the two see for instance B. Fass-
bender, ‘Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law’, in: N. Walker (ed), 
Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2006), 116: ‘According to a widely shared view, 
sovereignty has two complementary and mutually dependent dimensions: Within a 
state, a sovereign power makes law with the assertion that this law is supreme and ulti-
mate, i.e. that its validity does not depend on the will of any other, or ‘higher’, authority. 
Externally, a sovereign power observes no other authority.’ For another recent example 
see Thym (2009), 1796.
9 A tale of entanglement: 
The evolution and confusion of 
internal and external sovereignty
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external conceptions of sovereignty, which underlies much of the presumed 
conflict between sovereignty and integration.3
Second, within the concept of internal sovereignty we will focus on the 
development of popular sovereignty, and specifically on its federal applica-
tion in the US. Not incidentally these two developments coincide with the 
two definitional elements of internal and popular sovereignty part II aims 
to develop.
The outcome of this analysis will serve as a further basis for our discus-
sion on a confederal conception of sovereignty and its potential to guide 
and support European integration. It will provide the conceptual tools 
required to further outline such a confederal conception, and to overcome 
the counterproductive and ultimately false juxtaposition between sover-
eignty and integration.
2 Five phases of historical development
To properly disentangle internal and external sovereignty, five different 
steps in the historical development of these concepts are suggested and ana-
lyzed. First, internal sovereignty is developed by Bodin as a solution for the 
internal organization of the polity (section 3). Second, the concept of sover-
eignty, as developed for internal purposes, is applied to create and structure 
an external order. Sovereign, territorial units become the building blocks of 
the now ‘international’ order (section 4). Third, modern constitutional theo-
ry increasingly introduces ‘abstract’ internal sovereigns. These abstractions 
require constitutional delegation of sovereign authority and therefore allow 
‘sovereignty’ to be freely divided and shared within the state. Popular sov-
ereignty forms one application of this development, and is combined with 
federalism in the US (section 5). Fourth, external sovereignty retains, and 
strengthens, the fiction of one absolute sovereign per territory. As long as all 
sovereign powers remain delegated within one state this remains a usable 
fiction (section 6). Fifth, and last, powers traditionally delegated within the 
state are delegated ‘externally’, that is outside the state. As a result, the logic 
of internal sovereignty enters the domain of external sovereignty. The result 
is a clash between two logics. Where internal and external sovereignty are 
not distinguished, or where an external conception of sovereignty is exclu-
sively relied on, this clash cannot be explained, and sovereignty as such 
seems to loose its relevance (section 7).
3 In this sense the aim of this chapter could also be described as a vindication of Althusius. 
An aim that is logically connected to an application of federalism, which has fi rm roots in 
the more contractual approach of Althusius. See J. Althusius, Politica (translated by F.S. 
Carney, Liberty Fund 1995).
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It is this last development, and the resulting clash between internal and 
external sovereignty, which both requires and suggests a confederal evolu-
tion of sovereignty.
Obviously the proposed analysis triple jumps through vast, complex, and 
contested terrain. It does not intend to give a complete or final conceptual 
history of sovereignty. The five steps described above have also been cho-
sen pragmatically and make no claim to exclusivity or historical necessity. 
4 In addition the overview below provides a synopsis of a more elaborate 
conceptual analysis of sovereignty carried out elsewhere.5 Here only those 
conclusions are presented which are necessary for the specific argument 
developed here.
3 Bodin and the origin of the absolute myth
The starting point of our second trip down historical memory lane lies with 
Bodin.6 Firstly so because Bodin did lay the theoretical foundation of sov-
ereignty as a distinct concept.7 He has had a lasting influence on not just 
the content, but also the structure of the discourse on sovereignty.8 A genu-
ine understanding of his project, therefore, is a necessary condition for any 
real understanding of the nature and historical development of this concept. 
Second, the confusion of internal and external sovereignty partially stems 
from mistaken interpretations of Bodin. Especially to blame are too rigid 
and simplistic interpretations of his notions of ‘absoluteness’ and ‘indivis-
ibility’.
Appreciating Bodin’s real views, therefore, helps to untangle internal and 
external sovereignty at their root. Four elements in Bodin’s conception are 
especially relevant for this purpose: its complete internal focus, its relative 
absolutism, its exclusive use of a personal sovereign, and the prescriptive nature 
his sovereignty.
4 This is not to say that the development of sovereignty forms one straight or necessary 
development since Bodin. Cf on this point also Schmitt (2005), 16-17.
5 Cuyvers (2011a), 49 et seq.
6 Clearly recognizing that the questions underlying sovereignty are as old as human soci-
ety itself. See also Hinsley (1986), 27 and the overview by G. Buijs, ‘Que les Latins appellent 
maiestatem’: An Exploration into the Theological Background of the Concept of Sover-
eignty’, in: N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2006), 229 et seq.
7 Hinsley (1986), 121, J.H. Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Rise of Absolutist Theory (CUP 1973), 
1 et seq.
8 Franklin (1973), P. King, The Ideology of Order (George Allen & Unwin 1974). Which is not 
the same as saying that Bodin is the Alpha en Omega of sovereignty (Onuf (1991), 427)
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3.1 The internal focus and relative absolutism of Bodin’s sovereign
Any appreciation of Bodin must start with the internal focus of his project: 
how to organize political authority within a polity. 9 This internal focus was 
not very surprising if one considers his primary concerns: enormous reli-
gious tensions,10 civil wars,11 renegade nobles, and the development of ever 
more sophisticated theories supporting a right to resist the monarch.12 Bul-
warking internal order and the authority of the monarch therefore formed 
the core objectives of the Six Livres. 13
Bodin’s famous definition of sovereignty as ‘la puissance perpétuelle et absolue 
d’une république’14 formed a direct answer to this threat to internal order and 
security. It exclusively concerned the relation sovereign-subject within the 
polity.15 The relation between sovereigns did not form part of Bodin’s notion 
of sovereignty, and was not regulated by the concept.16
9 A. Jakab, ‘Neutralizing the Sovereignty Question: Compromise Strategies in Constitu-
tional Argumentations before European Integration and since’ 2 European Constitutional 
Law Review (2006), 375, and H. Lindahl, ‘Sovereignty and Symbolization’ 28 Rechtstheorie 
(1997), 353. Franklin (1973), 41.
10 Cf Hinsley (1986), 119-120.
11 Although ones count may differ, between 1562 and 1598 there were eight religious wars 
in France. The fi rst version of the Six Livres was not accidentally published four years 
after the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre.
12 Two important examples: Brutus, Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos (1570-1579, translated by G. 
Garnett, CUP 2003), and J. Boucher, De Justa Henrici tertii Abdicatione (Paris, around 1589).
13 Jean Bodin, Les Six Livres de la République (Paris 1583). Unless indicated otherwise, this 
chapter refers to the English translation of J.H. Franklin, Bodin: On Sovereignty (CUP 
2007), with book and chapter number, in addition to the page number. On these objec-
tives see, for instance, Book I, chapter 8, 19, as well as Franklin (1973), xiv et seq. Further 
see Lindahl (2006), 88.
14 Bodin, Book I, chapter. 8.
15 A fact already borne out by his method of fi nding ‘those properties not shared by sub-
jects’, but only possessed by the sovereign. Bodin, Book 1, chapter 10, 46.
16 Quite the opposite in fact: Sovereigns had the right, and in some situations perhaps even 
the duty, to intervene in another sovereigns territory, with force if need be. Bodin, Book II, 
chapter 5, 113-14, or Book II, chapter 5, 120. Note that this is equally true for Hobbes, a 
fellow founder of sovereignty, who ‘made no attempt to extend the notion of sovereignty 
beyond state borders.’ Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Translated by G. Schwab, 
University of Chicago Press 2007), xxiii.
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In addition Bodin’s sovereign was not as absolute as is customarily assumed.17
Ironically, ‘Bodin’, ‘absolute’ and ‘sovereign’ have by now become almost 
synonymous.18 Yet in reality absolutistic notions of sovereignty represent a 
caricature of his theory.19 Obviously the Six Livres did aim to strengthen the 
position of the monarch, and contains no shortage of absolutist one-liners.20 
Yet in fact Bodin went to great lengths to retain21 the many limitations on 
the powers of the monarch that existed in French legal practice.22 On several 
points he stretched his conceptual framework to the extreme, and perhaps 
even beyond, to accommodate such limitations on power.
The first and most important of these limits lay in the subordination of the 
sovereign to the laws of God and nature.23 Although only God was allowed 
to enforce these laws, this qualification was a very real one for Bodin.24 On 
a careful reading of his work, furthermore, additional limits on the sover-
eign abound. The sovereign, for instance, was not capable of changing the 
basis, content, or scope of his own sovereignty,25 nor was he allowed to 
levy taxes at his pleasure or confiscate private property.26 In addition the 
sovereign was under an obligation to honour contracts with his subjects,27 
even though this obligation is interspersed with complex exceptions.28 
17 Franklin (1973), 102 et seq. Bodin himself, by the way, discusses several authors before 
him that, in his opinion, already wrote about the absolute power of the monarch. See, for 
instance, Book I, chapter. 8, 10.
18 See, amongst others, Schmitt (2005), 5, Walker (2002), 345, B. Yack, ‘Popular Sovereignty 
and Nationalism’, 29 Political Theory (2001), 527, R.O. Keohane, ‘Ironies of Sovereignty: the 
European Union and the United States’ 40 JCMS (2002), 746, A. James, ‘The Practice of Sov-
ereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society’, (47) Political Studies (1999), 462, 
E. Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory (OUP 1956), 60. Or see judicially: J. Holmes: 
‘The very meaning of sovereignty is that the decree of the sovereign makes law’, Ameri-
can Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co (1909) 213 U.S., 347, 356, 358, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 512, 513.
19 Cf. also Hinsley (1986), 122.
20 See already Book I, chapter 8, 3, and Book I, chapter 10, 50, 87.
21 Franklin (1973), 79 et seq. and Franklin (2007), xxv.
22 Hinsley (1986), 91, 105-7.
23 His own works on religion lead one to suspect that Bodin himself would value the Ratio, 
and the laws of nature derived by it, over any Divine law. See his interesting Colloquium 
Heptaplomeres de Rerum Sublimium Arcanis Abditis in: M. Leathers en D. Kuntz (trans); Col-
loquium of the Seven about Secrets of the Sublime (Hildesheim 1970), in which he constructs a 
dialogue between the different faiths.
24 ‘For if we say that to have absolute power is to not to be subject to any law at all, no prince 
of this world will be sovereign, since every earthy prince is subject to the laws of God 
and nature and to various human laws that are common to all peoples.’ (Bodin Book I,
chapter. 8,10) See for further examples also: Book I, chapter. 8, 8, 13, 32 or 34.
25 Bodin, Book I, chapter. 8, 18 and Book I, chapter. 10, 49.
26 For the discussion of confi scation and taxes see Bodin Book I, chapter 8, 21, 39-40.
27 See amongst others Book I chapter 8, 14, 35-36
28 Bodin, Book I, chapter 8, 42-45.
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This obligation includes the duty of a sovereign to follow judicial rulings 
in a contractual dispute.29 In combination with the prohibition on expro-
priation Bodin, therefore, de facto outlined a fundamental right to property 
which the sovereign needed to respect.
Of course these restrictions could not be enforced against the crown by 
force.30 Yet it can only be concluded that the sovereign Bodin envisioned 
was not as absolute as an isolated reading of some of his statements might 
indicate.
3.2 The personal sovereign and the impossibility of a constitution
For Bodin sovereignty always rested with real individuals, be it with a sin-
gle monarch or a group.31 Two consequences of this personal conception of 
sovereignty are especially relevant here.
First, a personal sovereign makes delegation unavoidable because no 
single individual is capable of exercising all sovereign attributes without 
help. Bodin, therefore, accepts that the sovereign will delegate the daily 
exercise of his sovereign authority to others, as long as such attribution does 
not amount to a de facto relinquishing of his sovereign attributes.32
The second important consequence of a personal sovereign is that it does 
not allow for an abstract sovereign such as ‘the state’.33 The impossibility 
of abstract sovereigns in turn made it impossible for Bodin to subsume his 
sovereign under a supreme constitution, or even to differentiate between 
‘ordinary’ legislation and a constitution. The sovereign had to be the highest 
legislator. He was also, therefore, the unrestricted constitutional legislator, 
meaning that his own powers could not be circumscribed by a constitution. 
29 Bodin, Book I, chapter 8, 42. On the other hand, the sovereign should also have the power 
to judge in fi nal instance, although Bodin does imply that he should not do so in civil 
cases to which he is a party.
30 Bodin, Book II, chapter 5, 115.
31 For this reason perpetual sovereignty also simply meant ‘for life’ (Book I, chapter 8, 6). 
See for an example his discussion of the Venetian system in Book II, chapter 1, 98-99.
32 Bodin, Book I, chapter 10, 58.
33 Even though Bodin could have developed such a conception in multiple places in his 
work. His discussion of democracy and aristocracy, after all, lead him to situations in 
which a large group is jointly sovereign. Especially in a democracy where the population 
constantly changes and is amorphous the step to an abstraction as ‘the people’ or the 
nation’ is nearby. Also, Bodin uses the maxim ‘the king never dies’ (Book 1, chapter. 8, 
44), which implies some abstraction in the crown. On this old and established rule even 
in his own time see, E. Kantorowicz, The Kings Two Bodies: A Study in Political Medieval 
Theology (Princeton University Press 1957). Nevertheless Bodin does not follow these 
leads to a more refi ned, abstract conception of the sovereign. His notions of indivisibility 
and the focus on a personal sovereign apparently blocked such a step.
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Combined with the fact that the sovereign could not bind his own future 
self, a proper constitution became impossible, both conceptually and prag-
matically.34 As will be seen below, such abstract sovereigns and constitu-
tional layers were two of the major modifications introduced during the 
subsequent development of internal sovereignty.
3.3 The prescriptive nature of sovereignty
A fourth and last element that requires discussion here concerns the distinc-
tion between prescriptive and descriptive conceptions of sovereignty. This 
distinction traces the difference between (legal) authority and (factual) power: 
Is sovereignty concerned with or determined by ‘absolute’ factual power, or 
by supreme legal authority?
Bodin clearly recognizes the importance of actual power, including the 
capacity of the sovereign to use force.35 Yet fundamentally his conception 
concerns legal authority, not actual power.36 His primary attribute of sover-
eignty, for instance, is the capacity to legislate, and not some factual power 
or force.37 Equally Bodin rejects the possibility of usurping sovereignty by 
force, even where a subject might have accumulated far more actual power 
than the sovereign. Considering the entire purpose of sovereignty for Bodin 
– ensuring order through well constituted authority – distinguishing sov-
ereignty from actual power is also the only logical possibility. Were sover-
eignty to depend on the actual distribution of power it would, for instance, 
fluctuate and lead to factual power contests. The net result would be strug-
gle and chaos, and an open invitation to usurpers.38
With his conception of sovereignty the jurist Bodin was, therefore, not 
describing actual power. Quite the opposite: it was the threatened power of 
the monarchy that led him to his conception of sovereignty in the first place. 
In that regard his concept aimed to change reality, or at least counter some 
developments in the balance of power. Describing the reality on the ground 
would, therefore, not have brought Bodin closer to this objective. Instead he 
34 See on this point also Grimm (1995), 286.
35 See, for instance, Bodin, Book II, chapter 1, 108: ‘(…) and in matters of state, the master of 
brute force is the master of men, of the laws, and of the entire commonwealth.’ This doses 
of Realpolitik, however, is also immediately relativized: ‘from a legal standpoint, says Papi-
nian, we must look not to what they do at Rome, but what they ought to do.’ Whereby 
Bodin eventually chooses for legal authority over power again.
36 See also Fassbender (2006), 116.
37 Bodin, Book I, chapter 8, 23. Bodin’s analysis of different historical examples is also 
revealing on this point, always declaring the legal authority to be sovereign instead of 
usurpers holding de facto power (Book II, chapter 5, 114-115, 117, Book II, chapter 5, 110).
38 The importance Bodin attaches to respecting the sovereign also shows in the period of a 
hundred years it takes for an usurper to become the legitimate sovereign: No usurper, in 
other words, will ever live to see that day. Book II, chapter 5, 112.
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was searching for a normative concept to structure and guide the reality of 
actual power in a suitable manner. Consequently, his conception contained 
a large prescriptive element. It described how authority should be organized, 
hoping the reality of power would then follow suit.39
3.4 The descriptive fallacy
The distinction between prescriptive and descriptive conceptions of sov-
ereignty is an important one, especially when assessing the potential of a 
constructive conception of sovereignty for the EU. Many of the arguments 
claiming that the growing interdependence in the world undermines sover-
eignty implicitly confuse the descriptive with the prescriptive,40 and fail for 
that reason.41 Typically such approaches are linked to rather radical concep-
tions of sovereignty as an absolute, undivided and unlimited power. After 
checking such absolutist conceptions against the confused reality of political 
power, sovereignty is then usually declared officially deceased, as to our 
surprise no such supreme centre of power is found.42
With Werner and De Wilde I will term this approach the descriptive fallacy.43 
For of course actual power is not organized and exercised in a neat hierar-
chical and linear process. In any real decision, be it judicial, bureaucratic 
or political, a multitude of actors may exert influence. And these actors do 
not stand in a one-dimensional, fixed hierarchical relation to one another.44 
Understanding and describing this actual power reality is highly important, 
yet falls squarely within the realm of the empirical sciences. Prescriptive 
39 J.H. Franklin, ‘Sovereignty and the Mixed Constitution: Bodin and his Critics’, in: J.H. 
Burns and M. Goldie (eds), The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700 (CUP, 
1991), 298.
40 Cf also M. Kumm, ‘The Moral Point of Constitutional Pluralism. Defi ning the Domain of 
Legitimate Institutional Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Objection’ In: J. Dickson 
and P. Eleftheriadis (eds) Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (OUP 2012), 216.
41 A nice example is K. Jayasuriya, ‘Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law: From 
Political to Economic Constitutionalism’, 8 Constellations (2001), 442.
42 Cf G. Marks, L. Hooghe, and K. Blank, ‘European Integration from the 1980s: State-Cen-
tric v. Multiple-Level Governance’ 34 JCMS (1996), 346-7, describing how (the presumed 
sovereign state) does not have ultimate control.
43 W.G. Werner and J.H. De Wilde, ‘The Endurance of Sovereignty’ 7 European Journal of 
International Relations (2001), 283, 285. Also see the four misunderstandings identifi ed by 
Van Roermund (2006), 35 et seq.
44 Something already clearly described by precisely a descriptive approach as neo-function-
alism. See for instance George (1996), 36. Additionally, if a descriptive conception of sov-
ereignty is applied it is not the complexity of today’s world that would undermine it. 
Even in Bodin’s time his concept made no descriptive sense: There never has been a real 
leviathan.
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concepts such as sovereignty, however, should not be denaturized into such 
a descriptive exercise.45
Sovereignty, it is suggested, should therefore be understood as a prescriptive 
concept, and not as a descriptive one.46 It was also developed as such by 
Bodin. It is a theoretical concept that abstracts from reality, aiming to create 
order and hierarchy in a complex reality which obeys no single or stable 
hierarchy.47 As the historical and conceptual analysis below will show, sov-
ereignty has been developed and used to mould reality and justify certain 
power set-ups, not to describe it.48 A role it may again be able to perform for 
the EU, and other forms of regional integration.
This does not make sovereignty an excuse to ignore reality. To be able to 
exert any normative influence any conception of sovereignty must stay 
sufficiently close to the reality it aims to guide.49 It is therefore suggested 
sovereignty should be understood as sharing in that same double relation-
ship that law has with reality (and therefore politics). On the one hand it is 
there to guide and shape reality, which means it cannot be simply falsified 
by finding a single example where reality does not conform to the sovereign 
ideal.50 On the other hand it cannot deviate too far from reality, as this sim-
ply means it has lost its normative status and influence.51
45 Law, as an inherently normative system, stands in a special relation to such factual 
description. Law, after all, contains norms as how things should be, instead of just 
describing how they are. In addition law has institutions who get to decide on what the 
social reality will be, as society is in need of ending confl icts. Sovereignty to an extent is 
the self-refl exive exercise of this task. For it is exactly the aim of sovereignty to structure 
and normatively order this power reality, girding it with legitimacy where it suffi ciently 
approaches the ideal-type.
46 Cf Walker (2006b), 31-2 and 6: ‘(…) sovereignty involves a ‘speech act’ – a claim to order-
ing power.’
47 R. Jackson, ‘Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical 
Landscape’ 67 Political Studies (1999), 439. At the same time, of course, legal authority can 
then be used as a platform to acquire the necessary factual power, that is, the normative 
system becomes part of the dynamics of actual power.
48 Hinsley (1986), 68: ‘it is in the realm of theory that the concept of sovereignty must be 
sought’. See also Burgess (2009), 227. This also fi ts with the position of sovereignty ‘at the 
boundary between politics and law.’ (Walker (2006b), 20).
49 Forcefully Schmitt (2005), 17-18: (…) it utilizes the superlative “the highest power” to 
characterize a true quantity, even though from the standpoint of reality, which is gov-
erned by the law of causality, no single factor can be picked out and accorded such a 
superlative. In political reality, there is no irresistible highest or greatest power that oper-
ates according to the certainty of natural law.’ And; ‘the connection of actual power with 
the legally highest power is the fundamental problem of sovereignty’.
50 Cf also for a very sharp analysis of this, admittedly faith, of lawyers in ‘the creative force 
of the rule’ Van Middelaar (2009), 22: ‘only the legal rule can transform a conceptual cas-
tle in the air into an institutional fact.’ (my translation).
51 See especially how even Kelsen (1925), who goes to extreme lengths to keep his theory of 
law ‘pure’, has to introduce some notion of effectiveness in his defi nition of law, again 
binding the defi nition and status of law to reality, and not just a legal norm
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In line with this prescriptive nature of sovereignty, some of the potential of 
a confederal conception of sovereignty precisely lies in envisioning a more 
convincing and legitimate understanding of EU authority.52 In doing so, the 
suggested definitional elements proposed must of course stay within the 
relevant conceptual and factual limits,. But in line with the historical role 
of sovereignty, they intentionally contain an element of idealism as well: an 
image of what the EU can and should become.53 A potential that requires 
action, and not just passive discovery.54
3.5 Sub-conclusion: Dismantling the absolutist myth of Bodin
Instead of an absolute monarch with unlimited worldly power, Bodin’s sov-
ereign was an internally focused and prescriptive ideal with impressive but 
far from absolute legal authority. The crude notion of an absolute, omnipo-
tent Leviathan as the only possible sovereign simply cannot be ascribed to 
Bodin. In fact Bodin himself was ‘amazed’ by the criticism of a contempo-
rary that he was de facto propagating tyranny.55
In any event Bodin’s prescriptive idea proved to be a phenomenally power ful, 
and flexible, conceptual tool for the future organization of political authori-
ty.56 It was so useful that it inspired the development of both our modern 
concepts of internal and external sovereignty, although internal sovereignty 
developed further Bodin’s actual concept within the state, whereas exter-
nal sovereignty only used a simplified version as a starting assumption.57
52 In that manner it also hopes to address the normative weakness underlying (constitu-
tional) pluralist accounts, contributing to the challenge set by Kumm: ‘In other words, 
what is the constitutional theory that can provide an account of the normative point, 
structure and limits of constitutional pluralism?’ Kumm (2012).
53 Cf in this regard also Walker (2006b), 3, on the need to defi ne the explanatory and norma-
tive purpose of an assessment of sovereignty: ‘This is not to say that sovereignty can 
mean whatever we want it to mean (…). it is also crucial that the knowledge claims that 
emerge from that scheme are more generally persuasive.’ Part of the persuasiveness of 
the proposed conception of sovereignty here precisely derives from such a normative 
attraction, and aims to enhance ‘the explanatory and/or normative value of that overall 
scheme.’ In this sense it forms a return to the more ‘confi dent’ use of sovereignty in the 
‘Westphalian phase’ (p. 10). On the need / capacity of ideas to make alternative realities 
‘conceivable’ also see Lindseth (2001), 145, 163. Further see the interesting argument on 
sovereignty as a ‘social psychology’ that Schütze (2012), 57 draws from Kelsen.
54 See further below chapter 12 on the national adaptations required. Also see Lindahl 
(2006), 111.
55 Jean Bodin, République 1961, Epistola in its introduction, cited in Franklin (2007), xxvi.
56 Loughlin (2006), 61, S. Lee, ‘A Puzzle of Sovereignty’, 27 California Western International 
Law Journal (1997), 244, Bartelson (1995), 83 and 98.
57 Cf Hinsley (1986), 125: ‘But it was not for nothing that subsequent theorists would be 
unable to ignore the notion of sovereignty or to alter Bodin’s statement of it to any sig-
nifi cant extent – that the further history of the concept will be a history of its use and 
misuse in varying political conditions and not of restatements of it in different or in novel 
terms.’
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4 The Primitives and the creation of the external
The second step in our conceptual detective on the development and con-
fusion on internal and external sovereignty concerns the externalization of 
sovereignty. The assumption of one exclusive, highest authority per delin-
eated territory, after all, has tremendous organizing potential. Suddenly 
the world can be divided into territorial units with one representative each. 
A stark contrast with the complex and pluriform organization of author-
ity in Medieval Europe, where authority was divided along overlapping 
functional, territorial, personal and sectoral lines, including the conflicting 
authority claims of the church and even more worldly rulers.58
4.1 Discovering the external via the internal
In this second step early internationalists59 such as Vitoria,60 Suárez,61 
Gentili,62 and Grotius63 seize this potential to create the external itself.64 For 
only after the creation of the ‘internal’ by Bodin could an ‘external’ space 
be conceived as well.65 In this ‘external’ space territorial sovereigns could 
58 Franklin (1973), 4 et seq. Koskenniemi (2005), 116, and Jackson (2007), 25, ‘They conceived 
of themselves as belonging to one, unifi ed Christian World – Christendom – however 
loose and wobbly its unity might be in practice.’ Other actors could only become external 
after their was a realization of the internal. Also see G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy 
(Dover Publications 1988), 16.
59 A group also known as ‘primitive scholarship’, D. Kennedy, ‘Primitive Legal Scholar-
ship’, 27 Harvard. International Law Journal (1986), 1 et seq.
60 F. de Vittoria (1480-1546), central work Refl ectiones Theologicae, of which especially De 
Indis Noviter Inventis (on the recently discovered Indians) and De Iure Belli Hispanorum in 
Barbaros (On the right of war waged by Spain against the Barbarians) would now be con-
sidered ‘international’. See: E. Nys (ed), J. Pawley Bate (trans), Classics of International Law 
No. 7 (Carnegie Foundation 1917).
61 F. Suarez (1584-1617), of which the most relevant ‘international’ work is De Legibus, ac Deo 
Legislatore (On the Law, and God the legislator). See: J.B. Scott (ed), G. Williams, A Brown 
& J. Waldron (trans), Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suárez, Classics of International 
Law No. 20 (Clarendon Press 1944).
62 A. Gentili (1552-1608), See especially his De Iure Belli Libri Tres (Three book on the right to 
war), in: J.B. Scott ed., J. Rolfe (trans), Classics of International law No. 16 (Clarendon Press 
1933) and De Legationibus Libri tres (On Envoys), in: J.B. Scott (ed), G. Laing (trans), Clas-
sics of International Law No. 12 (OUP 1924).
63 H. Grotius (1583-1645), with of course as the central work for this chapter De Iure Belli ac 
Pacis Libris Tres (On the right of war and peace), in: J.B Scott (ed), F. Kelsey (trans), Classics 
of International Law No. 3 (Clarendon Press 1925).
64 Shaw (2003), 20; Jackson (1999), 432, Hinsley (1986), 185, who talks about a ‘refashioning’ 
of internal sovereignty that is required.
65 Hinsley (1987), 159.
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in turn become the exclusive actors.66 Instead of the linchpin in the inter-
nal organization of a polity, sovereigns become the building blocks of what 
we by now have learned to see as the international legal order.67 The major 
consequence of this conceptual innovation was revealed and illustrated 
by Westphalia:68 Sectoral, functional and overlapping authority was to 
be replaced by a system of territorial, sovereign units, with one supreme 
authority each.69
4.2 A new concept is born: External sovereignty
In this way external sovereignty transplanted Bodin’s concept of internal 
sovereignty into the external arena.70 As a result, external sovereignty has 
many similarities with internal sovereignty. It naturally shares some struc-
tural elements and underlying logic with its conceptual parent.71 The early 
internationalists also remained in sync with Bodin on several other impor-
tant points. For instance, they generally retained personal sovereigns.72 
Equally their external sovereigns were not absolute but remained bound by 
the rules of God and nature.73
66 Obviously historical and gradual developments are concerned here, and territory has 
always played an important ordering role. This role, however, was not yet as conceptu-
ally fundamental or developed as it became. No concept or understanding of an interna-
tional system, existing of specifi c territorially organized external actors, yet existed (Shaw 
(2003), 15). In addition, this was a fi rst, conceptual step. It would take a long time before 
the world indeed consisted, or was generally perceived to consist, exclusively of territo-
rial sovereigns. Important here is especially that such a world became imaginable. See also 
Bartelson (1995).
67 Grotius, for instance, held that the law between nations derived its binding force of from 
the will of all or many nations. See also L. Strauss and J. Cropsey (eds), History of Political 
Philosophy (3d edn, University of Chicago Press 1987), 390 and Hinsley (1986), 90 as well 
as his differentiation between internal and external sovereignty in chapters IV and V.
68 Of course the conceptual development was, in its turn, infl uenced by the already chang-
ing political reality in the period before Westphalia.
69 At a time where many of these ‘sovereigns’ had long lost true internal sovereignty as 
understood by Bodin, a fact that further underscores the complete abstraction from the 
real internal sovereign in the external discourse.
70 Also see Shaw (2003), 21: ‘the idea of the sovereign as supreme legislator was in the 
course of time transmuted into the principle which gave the state supreme power vis-à-vis 
other states.’
71 The argument by Van Roermund that both internal and external sovereignty ‘fl ow from 
an idea of sovereignty being ‘supreme power’.’ Is recognized. A relation between the two 
concepts is also not denied, nor is it claimed that this distinction is a suffi cient answer in 
itself to the ‘Argument from Incoherence’. Merely that it provides a better sovereignty 
narrative for the EU. Van Roermund (2006), 40-41.
72 Koskenniemi (2005), 98-99, Bartelson (1995), 98.
73 See for example Vittoria, De Indis sect. I, 120-122 or Vitoria (Quoting the Bible, Romans 
13) in ‘De Potestate Civili’ lxx., Suárez, De Legibus, Book I, Chapter I, sect. 6, or De Legibus, 
Book II, Chapter 19, sect. 9, 348-349, Gentili, De Iure, p. 10, and Grotius De Iure Belli, Prole-
gomena par. 16. Further see Kennedy (1986), 4 et seq., Koskenniemi (2005), 95 et seq., and 
H. Bull, The Anarchical Society (3rd ed. Palgrave 2002), 29. Hinsley (1986), 181.
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Despite these similarities, however, external sovereignty formed a sepa-
rate and distinct concept from internal sovereignty, already at its incep-
tion. External sovereignty completely abstracts from Bodin’s core question, 
namely the internal position of a sovereign in his own polity. This core ques-
tion is turned into the assumption: an absolute sovereign exists in each ter-
ritory, and represents this territory externally.74 All the complexities with 
which Bodin was concerned, therefore, become irrelevant. Instead they are 
simplified into a simple assumption and applied to the relation between 
sovereigns that did not concern Bodin. As internal and external sovereignty 
still attached to the same entity (the monarch), this fundamental difference 
between internal and external sovereignty, however, was not yet very con-
spicuous, although it would lead both concepts to develop very differently.
5 The constitutionalization of the internal sovereign
The third step in our analysis describes the taming of the internal sovereign. 
For where sovereigns increasingly became a reality instead of an ideal, the 
need quickly arose to effectively control their authority. A desire, however, 
that proved a challenge, both practically and conceptually.
The modern history of taming sovereign and governmental power is so well 
known that one could almost suffice with naming a series of icons: Locke, 
Montesquieu, Hume, Rousseau, Hamilton, Madison, Mill, Tocqueville, and 
so on.75
Within this history our analysis focuses on three developments that 
are of special interest to a confederal conception: the shift from personal to 
abstract sovereigns, the creation of a constitutional layer between the sov-
ereign and the exercise of sovereign prerogatives, and the invention of the 
people as the semi-abstract sovereign underlying that constitution. Devel-
opments that lead us to the second definitional element of confederal sover-
eignty explored in this thesis, that of popular sovereignty and its potential 
appeal for EU integration.
74 As shown below, within the concept of external sovereignty this internal question will 
increasingly be abstracted from. See also Hinsley (1986), 225.
75 More recent additions to this canon of course exist.
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5.1 The abstract sovereign: Abstractions don’t shoot
Although abstraction often form an escape where true understanding is 
lacking,76 for sovereignty abstraction proved part of the solution.77 One of 
the central strategies to reconcile ‘absolute and effective power’ with ‘lim-
ited and controlled power’78 turned out to be the use of abstract sovereigns. 
79 Abstractions as ‘the state’ or ‘the nation’ made it possible to make the 
internal sovereign more absolute, and less threatening for liberty at the 
same time.
To begin with an abstract sovereign avoids many of the problems of a 
human sovereign.80 An abstraction will never have delusions of grandeur 
or put his individual interest over the common good. Even more fundamen-
tally, an abstraction cannot decide, act, or exercise power itself. In this sense 
an abstraction resembles the Eunuch in a Harem, the classical solutions to 
the quis custodiet.
The impotence of an abstraction to act necessitates an elaborate sys-
tem of delegation, as eventually a competence will have to be applied by a 
person.81 It is this need to delegate all public power from the abstraction to 
institutions and individuals that creates the crucial room required to accom-
modate a separation of powers and checks and balances, without removing 
the sovereign as the theoretical and conceptual basis under the legal order.82 
Under an abstract sovereign, therefore, conceptual space becomes available 
to freely cut, separate, limit and divide public authority.83 Although Bodin 
accepted the possibility of delegation, such pervasive and all-encompass-
ing delegation is an important modification to his conception, and enables 
76 Cf the discussion of rationality and knowledge by Hayek (1960), ch. 2 and 3.
77 As it did already in the early Thomist attempt to reconcile absolute multiple claims to 
power (Community, Church, Empire) which could only be accommodated by assuming 
a higher yet more abstract notion of divine sovereignty. Also see Hinsley (1986), 99. Alter-
natively, abstraction could be seen as a logical recognition of the fact that the unity pre-
supposed by sovereignty is only the (fi ctive) agent to whom the joint (or popular) inten-
tion is ascribed; there need not be a physical, concrete ‘we’ for individual agents to 
ascribe an action to it. Cf. Van Roermund (2006), 47.
78 Also see Federalist Paper No. 37.
79 Jakab (2006), 375 et seq. On this point I therefore disagree with Hinsley: only after Bodin 
was a more coherent way found to create both an unrestricted power yet escape simple 
absolutism. (Hinsley 1986), 125).
80 Cf Hinsley (1986), 221.
81 Hinsley (1986), 146.
82 Cf in this regard also Dworkins comments on the notion of discretion. R.M. Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1978), 31.
83 Here any Critical Legal Studies approach would of course point out that in reality a fi c-
tion is deployed to mask the real holders of power, and this power needs to be traced 
back to the actual people behind such fi ctions to fi nd out what they had for breakfasts. 
Compare also Schmitt’s auctoritatis interposito (Schmitt (2005), 31). Acknowledging this 
risk, see nevertheless the discussion above on the fact that abstract sovereigns, as a legal 
fi ction, are exactly used not to force a regression into actual power analysis.
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the use of a modern constitution to structure and control internal sovereign 
authority.
5.2 The constitutional layer
With an abstract sovereign a constitution becomes a logical, and even nec-
essary step, even from the perspective of the sovereign. After all the con-
stitution is not a way in which the sovereign restricts himself, but a way 
in which the sovereign restricts his servants, thereby safeguarding his own 
sovereignty.84
The constitution, or any layer of rules between the actual wielders of 
public authority and the sovereign, thereby offers a practical means to 
reduce the classical tension between the ‘absoluteness’ of sovereignty and 
the obvious desire to safeguard some ‘higher norms’ such as the right to 
life or property. For within a constitutional layer these higher norms can 
be positivized, which makes them clear, cognizable and legally enforceable. 
Formally, furthermore, such constitutional rights do not form a restriction of 
the sovereign, yet a restriction the sovereign has placed on his own servants. 
Factually however, as the sovereign power can only be wielded via interme-
diaries who are bound by the constitution, such constitutional safeguards 
tend to cover all exercise of public authority. The constitutional order in this 
way absorbs the higher norm, and internalizes it.85
The shift to abstract sovereigns and constitutions also enabled a further 
development within internal sovereignty: the discovery of the people as a 
semi-abstract sovereign. Here we are of course especially interested in the 
evolution of internal and popular sovereignty that supported American fed-
eration, and lead to the famous ‘We, the people’.
84 Although the problem remains to what degree the constitution can limit the sovereign in 
the future, for instance by entrenching clauses. On the other hand, no legal contraption is 
truly capable of blocking the will of an activated people, or other energy peaks in reality, 
if these truly want to alter the constitution.
85 See especially variants of ‘Soft Positivism’ such as that of H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 
(2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1994), in which the Rule of Recognition may also refer to ‘soft’ 
sources of law such as morality. Obviously this strategy does not solve the fundamental 
theoretical problem what to do when the constitution itself confl icts with a higher norm. 
The practical signifi cance of this question, however, is greatly reduced where the consti-
tution usually matches the ‘higher’ norm. It is no coincidence that most ‘universal, ‘high-
er’ norms are nowhere protected more effectively than as part of a constitutional frame-
work, latched directly to public power itself. As long as we do not agree on the content 
and status of fundamental norms, especially not once we leave the safety of abstraction, 
the best option might indeed be to prevent the need for asking these questions by positiv-
izing them in constitutions or treaties in a form of pre-emptive practicality.
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5.3 The Federalists and the sovereign ‘We’
As discussed in part I the American Constitution leaves little doubt as to 
where sovereignty lies: the people. The people are the ‘fountain of author-
ity’ for all public power.86 This ‘people’ however, form an abstract, almost 
mythical figure. One that disappeared into the background, certainly after 
the Constitution had been ratified.87
Obviously the US has an actual population, consisting of very real people. 
These people are, however, not constantly present as the sovereign. Nor-
mally these citizens form one part of the democratic system of governance 
as established by the sovereign ‘People’88
This separation between the ‘People’ as sovereign and the people as the 
normal electorate also becomes apparent after one realizes that the ‘sov-
ereign’ was deliberately left without any means to act once it had enacted 
the Constitution.89 Outside the Constitution and the system of government 
it creates ‘the People’ have no more means to execute their wishes. Even 
amending the Constitution has to take place within the framework of the 
Constitution itself.90
86 Federalist Paper No. 51.
87 See chapter 2, section 2.1.2. One could, furthermore, go one step further and state that 
even during the ‘founding’ moment ‘the people’ were a purely symbolic construct allow-
ing the presupposition of unity. Cf Lindahl (2006), 98: ‘The sovereign people is not a real 
entity but a symbolic pole lying ‘outside’ the community of individuals , and by reference 
to which these individuals can recognize themselves as the members of a polity.’ Such a 
fully abstract understanding of the people fully fi ts with the (normative) aims of this 
thesis, and does not prevent relating the EU to these different abstractions.
88 On the act whereby the people as the pouvoir constituent create the constitution and attri-
bute political power to themselves and public institutions also see Grimm (1995), 290.
89 Compare in the framework of a Schmittian analysis the people with the ‘unmoved mov-
er’, the watchmaker that after activating the mechanism withdraws. The people here are 
both Pouvoir Constituant, and Pouvoir Constitueé. See, also pointing out this incapacity of 
the people, H.P. Monaghan, ‘We the People[s], ‘Original Understanding, and Constitu-
tional Amendment’, 96 Columbia Law Review (1996), 121-122, 168. Monaghan, however, 
ignores the normative claim and prescriptive nature of sovereignty, and the capacity of 
the people to become a reality. On the other extreme, reminding us of the risk (or benefi ts) 
of direct action by the sovereign people see the work of Amar, for instance A.R. Amar, 
‘The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Art. V’, 94 Columbia 
Law Review (1994), 457.
90 See article V of the US Constitution. Clearly the option of revolution remains, but this 
would bring us back to an analysis of real power, and not legal authority. Also see Federa-
list Papers No. 51.
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Exorcising the direct use, and abuse, of the people’s sovereign power actu-
ally formed one of the explicit aims of the Federalists.91 For the biggest dan-
ger in ‘popular government’ was tyrannical rule by a faction.92 Publius is 
painfully clear:
‘whilst all authority will be derived from and dependant on the society, the 
society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citi-
zens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority will be in little danger 
from interested combinations of the majority.’93
Put more plainly, although the people as a whole are the sole legitimate 
source of power, we would rather not see them wield that power directly.94 
The original and ultimate sovereign authority is therefore placed in a (semi-)
abstraction, the People.95 This abstraction can then be used as a legitimate 
source and tool to delegate parts of this public authority over the different 
parts of government. At the same time, however, this approach creates a 
strong, and important, normative link between the people and the differ-
ent levels of government. The people, furthermore, may be an abstraction 
in daily practice, yet certainly have the potential to become far less abstract 
in times of crisis or fundamental conflict. Especially so when the constitu-
tional layer does not provide a substantive or procedural solution and one 
or more factions are able to appeal directly to the authority of the people.96 
91 See also chapter 5, section 2 and 3 on the abuse and excesses of democracy after the revo-
lution.
92 See especially Federalist Papers No. 10 for the classic formulation of this point.
93 Federalist Papers No. 51.
94 Cf in this regard also the, somewhat contradictory, limited grant of sovereignty to the 
people in art. 1 of the Italian constitution: ‘Sovereignty belongs to the people, who exer-
cise it in the manner, and within the limits, laid down by the Constitution.’ A limit that 
also fi ts with the remaining position of the state and the inviolable core of some constitu-
tional values (not provisions), such as embodied in art. 139, which cannot be amended. 
Here one could say that ultimate sovereignty even lies in these values. Cf Cartabia (2006), 
317. Art. 33 of the Belgian constitution equally limits the sovereign powers of the nation.
95 As an abstraction, one can also disagree on when this pre-political people was estab-
lished. It can for instance be asked if the American people were created by, or with, the 
federate Constitution, or whether they predated it. Clearly this question is also one of 
self-creation and therefore politics. Lincoln, for instance, and other anti-secessionists dur-
ing the Civil War, would hold that the American People had even predated the Confed-
eration and had created the states. In the words of Lincoln: ‘The Union is older than any 
of the States; and in fact created them as States.’ The only thing relevant here is that the 
US Constitution presupposes the existence of a sovereign American people. Whether cre-
ated before, during, or after the ratifi cation of the Constitution is not even that relevant. 
The quote is from M.E. Brandon, Free in the World, American Slavery and Constitutional 
Failure (Princeton University Press 1998), 174.
96 A referendum may be an (intermediate) solution allowing a controlled appeal to the peo-
ple (if not quite the pre-political constituant). Cf in this regard the qualifi cation of a consti-
tutional referendum by the French Conseil constitutionnel in Maastricht II as ‘adoptées par 
le Peuple français’(…) ‘constituent l’expression directe de la souveraineté nationale.’
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As will be discussed further below, this might be the situation in the EU at 
the moment where increasing appeals to the authority of the people in the 
form of referenda are felt to be necessary.
5.4 Combining federalism, sovereignty, and democracy
The American use of popular sovereignty already formed an interesting 
development in internal sovereignty in itself.97 So interesting that the con-
cept of popular sovereignty could of course easily fill several volumes by 
itself. Here we can only make two limited and selective points regarding the 
potential of popular sovereignty for a confederal notion of sovereignty.
Firstly, the use of a semi-abstract people as the sovereign allowed a rec-
onciliation between sovereignty and federation.98 Ultimate authority was 
located in the non-statal and largely abstract entity of ‘the People’. Through 
the constitution, the People then delegated sovereign prerogatives directly 
to both governments. As a result, both government hold original power, 
independent from one another.99 By creating a semi-abstract sovereign over 
and above the multiple governments the federalists transformed sovereign-
ty into a foundation for the federate structure that it appeared to resist. 100
To grasp the importance of this reconciliation it is important to realize 
that, as in the EU today, sovereignty was initially used as a key argument 
against the proposed federate system.101 The federalists countered this argu-
ment precisely by basing these multiple and separate governments on a sin-
gle sovereign people.102 Instead of anathema, the plurality of governments 
reflected and safeguarded the sovereignty of the people.103
Second, and of special interest to the EU, popular sovereignty dovetailed 
with democratic theory. By choosing the people as the ultimate locus of sov-
ereignty, the American system linked sovereignty and federation to democ-
racy, greatly contributing to the normative appeal of both. Though, as we 
saw, the constitution did also aim to reduce what were seen as the excess-
es of direct popular government, it at the same time provided a powerful 
97 Elazar (1976), 9 et seq., Elazar (2006), 41.
98 See below chapter 2, section 2.1.2.
99 See also Grimm (1995), 287: ‘The splitting of the legal order is thus preceded by a splitting 
of the public power into a pouvoir constituant, formed by the people as sovereign, and 
various pouvoirs constitutes deriving their power from it.’
100 In this regard I disagree with Schütze (2009), 1077, that the US did not focus on sover-
eignty. Sovereignty was very much considered, and then a pragmatic and novel approach 
was taken. Also see Elazar (2006), 41: ‘Rather than accepting the sixteenth-century Euro-
pean view of the sovereign state, Americans understood sovereignty to be vested in the 
People’.
101 Wood, (1969), 527-529, and Bailyn (1993).
102 This line of argument even became ‘the basis of all Federalist thinking’ (Wood, (1969), 
530), not accidentally merging sovereignty with democratic theory at the same time.
103 Cf also Elazar (2006), 39 and 41.
305A tale of entanglement: The evolution and confusion of internal and external sovereignty  
foundation for democratization in the long run. For in addition to the dem-
ocratic mechanisms within the Constitution, the people were postulated as 
the ultimate source of authority and legitimacy. Even though one can, and 
probably should, question the extent to which this assumption reflects real-
ity, this is an important normative statement. It expresses a key constitution-
al value, which has surely impacted on the development of actual politics 
in the US. In any event it forms an important source of legitimacy for the 
American government in general, as its authority can be founded on the 
People directly. The lasting appeal and power of the ‘We the People’ is a 
testimony to the potency of this linkage.104
As will be discussed further below, both the capacity of popular sovereign-
ty to ground multiple governments, as well as its normative linkage with 
democracy may be of use to an EU needing to bridge a gap between its con-
federal foundation and a necessary but weighty federate superstructure.105 
First however, we return to the development of external sovereignty. The 
fourth and penultimate step in our analysis will show how external sover-
eignty became increasingly absolute, and further removed from its histori-
cal roots in internal sovereignty.
6 Fulfilling the myth: External sovereignty and the creation 
of the absolute
In step two of our analysis we saw how the concept of internal sovereignty was 
used as a basic assumption to create, found and structure an external order.
104 Clearly this linkage also comes at the price of some conceptual confusion, including the 
charge of incoherency, generally based on Foucault, that sovereignty aims to ‘express 
both the (political) power that enacts law and the law that restrains (political) power.’ 
Equally it injects some clearly whish full thinking or ‘In one fell swoop it turns both rule 
of law and democracy into a romantic dream of universal participation.’ (Van Roermund 
(2006), 34, 40). At the same time this transition, which precisely allows the move from 
pre-legal to a legal, constitutionalized, and self-restraining order, also forms the power of 
sovereignty. See also for a positive evaluation of this sovereign ‘paradox’ Walker (2006b). 
Equally the proposals in this thesis would also fi t with a ‘refl exive’ understanding of 
popular sovereignty, which leaves the self-defi nition of their unity to the different mem-
ber peoples.
105 At the same time the conceptual problems inherent in popular sovereignty must be rec-
ognized as well, especially its (unfounded) presumption of a unity at the moment of con-
stitution, and the related danger of according ‘primacy of presence over representation.’ 
(Cf Lindahl (2006), 95-97, and 111). Besides pragmatically pointing to the de facto useful-
ness of popular sovereignty, one could also point to the role of time here, seeing how the 
claim of unity has to be sustained and approved in the future. To the theoretical objection 
that ‘unity cannot be generated from plurality’ the perhaps low brow but effective 
answer of, for instance, the federalists would be that they have managed to do precisely 
that. Lindahl also accepts this where he speaks of ‘the core of irreducible groundlessness 
at the heart of every political community (…).’ (p. 113).
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This fourth step looks at two subsequent developments in external sover-
eignty. First, how externally the ‘state’ became the exclusive carrier of sover-
eignty. Second, how this external sovereignty became increasingly absolute 
and dominant.106
6.1 From Monarch to State: Disconnecting the external from the internal
Gradually, the state has become the model-T of external sovereignty: 
external sovereigns may come in all forms and shapes, as long as they are 
states.107 In this way territorial sovereigns became the exclusive, and con-
ceptually standardized, building blocks of the ‘external’.108 An approach 
that has been of great practical value in conceptualizing the international 
legal order, providing it with subject, object and foundation at the same 
time.109 Such an exclusive role for the state, however, also had significant 
consequences
for external sovereignty, and its relation to internal sovereignty.
To begin with this development required the definition of a state to become 
so general that it could encompass all possible types of internal organiza-
tion. From people’s-republic to democracy and theocracy, all can be a state 
as long as they have effective control over people and territory.110 In turn, 
however, this meant that the external sovereign had to be fully detached 
from the reality and complexities of the internal sovereign. No longer unit-
ed in the person of the monarch, the internal and the external sovereign 
become two different entities.111
A second consequence of the state becoming the sole possible exter-
nal sovereign was that – by necessity – the state also became the exclusive 
external representative of the whole internal sovereignty. The internal sov-
106 See also Fassbender (2006), 118 et seq.
107 When Henry Ford was asked in what colours his famous Model-T could be ordered he 
famously answered (so goes at least the story) ‘People can get the Model-T in any colour 
they want, as long as it is black’. He had discovered that black paint dried the fastest, and 
therefore sped up the production process.
108 In the words of Lauterpacht: ‘The orthodox positivist doctrine has been explicit in the 
affi rmation that only states are subjects of international law.’ E. Lauterpacht (ed), Interna-
tional Law: Collected Papers, Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, vol. II (CUP 
1975), 489, Shaw (2003), 177.
109 Shaw (2003), 189 et seq. Of course this foundation still contains many a problem as well. 
See Koskenniemi (2005), 246 et seq.
110 Or where other, powerful, sovereigns decide they are, or should be, sovereign. See Kras-
ner (1999).
111 Kennedy (1986), 8. One result of the recent weakening of absolute external sovereignty, 
therefore, also might be that doubt arises as to the right of external representation where 
another, normatively more authoritative, internal sovereign claims sovereign rights, such 
as a popular resistant movement or a suppressed people claiming the right of self-deter-
mination. Here the internal sovereign also shimmers through, upsetting the external sys-
tem.
307A tale of entanglement: The evolution and confusion of internal and external sovereignty  
ereign simply did not have another route to manifest itself externally. As 
a result internal sovereigns were, in a sense, locked in to their external shells. 
Where internally the state is (formally) subordinate to the sovereign People, 
externally this subordination is reversed, as it is assumed that the state has 
full internal control and say over its ‘population’. The only remaining link 
between internal and external sovereignty here is the assumption underlying 
external sovereignty that somewhere within the national order a supreme 
authority exists, and that this sovereignty is represented by the state.
6.2 The absolute external sovereign
In addition to this divergence between the identity of the internal and the 
external sovereign, the external sovereign also became increasingly abso-
lute. To start with, the exclusive position of the state logically makes it a far 
more absolute and powerful actor than the divided, checked, and circum-
scribed internal recipients of delegated sovereign prerogatives. The abso-
lute nature of the externally sovereign state was further reinforced by the 
theoretical victory of positivism in international law.112 Positivism freed the 
external sovereigns from the normative limits that the early international-
ists had still firmly believed in. Unlike the internal sovereign, however, they 
were not, or at least not to the same level, encapsulated under a constitu-
tional structure.
The modern external sovereign, therefore, emerged as an absolute and 
unlimited state, exclusively representing the national sovereignty on the 
international plane. The state had turned into the absolute and mythical 
entity the internal sovereign never was.
6.3 The conceptual dominance of external sovereignty
The external statal sovereign did not just eclipse the internal sovereign in 
absoluteness. External sovereignty also eclipsed internal sovereignty in vis-
ibility and conceptual dominance. The archetypical example of a sovereign 
changed from the sovereign monarch to the sovereign state. The rise of the 
nation-state only supported this image.
The conceptual dominance of the external sovereign was further 
enhanced by the fact that all the bearers of delegated internal sovereignty 
formed part of the state. Though divided functionally and geographically, 
all public authority was in the hands of different emanations of the state. 
Consequently, the state became the exclusive nexus between internal and 
external sovereignty; it exercised all internal public authority and was the 
exclusive, absolute external sovereign. Even though internal and external 
sovereignty were no longer united in the crown, the difference between the 
internal and the external sovereign was still masked by the state.
112 Koskenniemi (2005), 226 et seq., Shaw (2003), 25.
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At the same time the internal sovereign became less visible. It was 
increasingly embedded in, and hidden behind, the ever more devel-
oped legal and constitutional system.113 The more seamless these sys-
tems became, and the more the exercise of public authority was guided 
by detailed rules, established conventions and effective procedural mech-
anisms to prevent or solve conflicts, the more the sovereign People could 
fade into the background. The very success of the constitutionalist project 
to encapsulate the sovereign within a constitutional framework, therefore, 
decreased the visibility and daily relevance of the sovereign. Sovereignty 
became more of a postulate for the state, and became less and less relevant 
in daily practice.
Combining these developments, it is not surprising that the state was 
increasingly seen as the sovereign, overshadowing more fundamental, 
and ultimately more authoritative, internal conceptions of sovereignty. 
Completing the eclipse of internal sovereignty it even became common to 
assume that internal and external sovereignty are two elements of the same 
concept.114 In a form of conceptual patricide, external sovereignty thereby 
swallowed the notion of internal sovereignty, out of which it had itself 
developed.
6.4 Sub-conclusion: Towards a fifth step in sovereignty?
The previous sections outlined how internal and external sovereignty form 
two distinct concepts, both of which developed along completely opposing 
lines. Internal sovereignty became characterized by increasing delegation 
and diffusion of public authority. Using abstract sovereigns, and through 
increasingly complex systems for constitutional delegation, the exercise of 
sovereign authority was increasingly divided. Popular sovereignty linked 
internal sovereignty with democratic theory, and allowed a ‘federal twist’, 
further dividing power over multiple separate governments.
External sovereignty, in contrast, became increasingly typified by con-
centration and absoluteness. States became the sole and absolute sovereigns 
in the ‘external’ order. To enable this development external sovereignty 
was decoupled from internal sovereignty. The internal locus of sovereignty 
became irrelevant, and was replaced by the assumption of effective control 
over population and territory.
113 Cf the conception of sovereignty as a borderline construct developed by Carl Schmitt 
(Schmitt (2005), 1 et seq.)
114 Cf Thym (2009), 1795, 1798, as well as A. Bleckmann and B. Fassbender, in: B. Simma (ed), 
The Charter of the United Nations, vol I (2nd edn. OUP 2002), Art. 2(1) paras. 3 et seq.
309A tale of entanglement: The evolution and confusion of internal and external sovereignty  
With the internal sovereign benignly receding behind the national constitu-
tional order, the absolute and highly visible external sovereign, furthermore, 
became the dominant image of the sovereign. Due to the states’ monopoly 
over delegated internal sovereign prerogatives, internal sovereignty increas-
ingly became seen as one side of (the states) overall sovereignty.
More recently, however, the exclusive, and absolute, position of the state 
has come under pressure.115 Both internally and externally the state appears 
to have lost its place at the pinnacle of public authority. Multiple related 
factors contribute to this development, amongst which ‘globalization’, 
increased interdependence, advancements in technology, and the decline of 
strict legal positivism.116 We are, of course, especially, interested in one spe-
cific phenomenon in this regard: regional integration, of which the EU is the 
most prominent example.
These developments propel us from the relative safe haven of the past to 
the still unfolding present in the EU. They bring us to what, in the catego-
rization developed in this thesis, would be a fifth phase in the conceptual 
development of sovereignty. As will be shown below, grasping this phase 
requires a sharp distinction between internal and external conceptions 
of sovereignty. For the developments spearheaded by the EU can best be 
understood as a further development of internal sovereignty at the expense 
of external sovereignty, and therefore as a clash between these two concep-
tions.
7 The EU: Where internal and external sovereignty meet?
Considering the confusion of internal and external sovereignty, and the rela-
tive dominance of external sovereignty, it can come as no surprise that the 
EU is generally approached from external conceptions of sovereignty, and 
that this is often unwittingly so. Moreover external conceptions of sover-
eignty might also be consciously considered the most appropriate. After all 
the EU is based on an international treaty signed by states. The domain of 
external sovereignty par excellence one would say.117
115 See also Fassbender (2006), 124 et seq.
116 C. Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New 
Century’, 281 Recueil des Courts (1999), for instance p. 63 et seq., or P-M Dupuy, ‘The Con-
stitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited’, 1 Max Planck Year-
book on United Nations Law (1997), 1.
117 For a good example of this statist assumption, as well as its dogmatic strength, see also 
the contribution by former British foreign secretary Jack Straw, ‘A constitution for 
Europe’ in the Economist, 12 October 2002. He states, without any hesitation, that: ‘The 
constitution should start with just a few lines, setting out what the EU is—a union of 
sovereign states who have decided to pool some of that sovereignty, better to secure 
peace and prosperity in Europe and the wider world.’
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Yet from the absolutist perspective of external sovereignty the EU offers 
a rather spectacular and confusing sight indeed. Significant competences, 
clearly linked to the exercise of sovereign authority, are taken from the 
state and delegated to an external and non-statal entity. Sovereignty, once 
absolute and indivisible, becomes a flexible substance. It appears capable 
of amazing feats such as being pooled, shared, cut up, temporarily given 
away, or simple being left in the middle.118 Feats that are fully at odds with 
the absolute conceptions of external sovereignty that were outlined above. 
As a result we indeed appear forced to choose between sovereignty or the 
desire for integration.119
Once the EU is approached from the perspective of internal sovereignty a 
more logical and appealing, if far from perfect, picture emerges. EU char-
acteristics that appear so baffling from the external perspective, such as 
far-reaching delegation and division of sovereign authority, become far less 
revolutionary. Internal sovereignty, after all, has already evolved to embrace 
total delegation and division of sovereign prerogatives over multiple actors. 
The federate twist even allowed the internal delegation of sovereign author-
ity over multiple separate governments.
The perspective from internal sovereignty will be further developed 
in the following chapters. Three main conclusions, however, can already 
be drawn here based on the conceptual analysis carried out above, and the 
resulting distinction between internal and external sovereignty.
7.1 The conceptual fit of integration and confederal sovereignty
The first main conclusion is that European integration does not conflict 
with sovereignty as such, but only with external concepts of sovereignty. 
The EU does fit with the concept of internal sovereignty and its tradition of 
constitutionally dividing powers. Internal sovereignty, furthermore, forms 
the more fundamental concept of sovereignty, as it is both conceptually and 
normatively trumps external sovereignty. The assumption of internal sov-
ereignty, for instance, underlies external sovereignty. And where external 
sovereignty abstracts from democratic theory, internal sovereignty has man-
aged to dovetail with it through the notion of popular sovereignty. The EU, 
118 A development primarily initiated judicially. See, famously, E Case 26/62 Van Gend en 
Loos, Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L., and for the next steps case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR 
1339 and Joined cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P Kadi I, but is now also making theoretical 
furore. See amongst many others: L.J. Brinkhorst, Europese Unie en Nationale Soevereiniteit 
(Oratie Leiden 2008), Jackson (2007), Walker, (2006b), 5 especially note 7, J. Jackson, ‘Sov-
ereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept’, 97 American Journal of Inter-
national Law (2003), 782, 801, 145 et seq., Habermas (1996), 125 et seq., MacCormick (2003), 
1 et seq., De Witte (1995).
119 See the juxtaposition set out in chapter 9 above. Also see M. Keating, ‘Sovereignty and 
Plurinational Democracy: Problems in Political Science’, in: N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in 
Transition (Hart Publishing 2006), 192, 198.
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therefore, fits with what is ultimately the most important concept of sover-
eignty, even if it is not the most conspicuous one.
The second conclusion is that a confederal notion of sovereignty forms a 
logical next step in the evolution of internal sovereignty. As illustrated the 
evolution of internal sovereignty is one of increasing abstraction and del-
egation, with the federate twist even allowing the division of sovereign 
powers over multiple governments. Confederal sovereignty takes this evo-
lution one step further. It incorporates extra-statal, and even non-statal, 
entities into the framework for the delegation of sovereign powers. Instead 
of delegating the exercise of sovereign powers to the state alone, the sov-
ereign delegates some of his power outside the state, and thereby partially 
emancipates itself from the state.120 The conceptual evolution of internal 
sovereignty, including its federate twist, here provides us with a wealth of 
conceptual substance and space to support this further evolution along con-
federal lines.
Furthermore, a confederal evolution also fits with the prescriptive 
nature of internal sovereignty. Just as under Bodin or in the US, it can be 
used to indicate how public authority should be organized and legitimated, 
and to subsequently help create that desired reality. An admittedly norma-
tive use of sovereignty that will be further explored and defended below. It 
nevertheless deserves to be stressed here already, as it explains why a con-
ception of sovereignty for the EU is not directly falsified by any descriptive 
inaccuracy.
Jointly these two conclusions also lead to a third general conclusion: We are 
not so much witnessing a clash between integration and sovereignty, but 
one between internal and external sovereignty.
7.2 The clash between internal and external sovereignty
If regional integration can indeed be seen as a logical confederal develop-
ment within internal sovereignty, where does the tension between sover-
eignty and integration come from? Why is the EU not simply embraced as 
an application of internal sovereignty?
The analysis above suggests that this is because, instead of a clash between 
sovereignty and integration as such, we are witnessing a clash between 
internal and external sovereignty. In the confederal system of European 
integration the organizing principles of internal sovereignty are being 
120 In this sense the confederal form fulfills exactly the need identified by Fisher in his 
famous 2000 speech: ‘The completion of European Integration can only be successfully 
conceived if it is done on the basis of a division of sovereignty between Europe and the 
nation-state.’ Fisher (2000).
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applied in the ‘external’ domain: substantial sovereign powers are constitu-
tionally delegated to entities outside the state.121 Internal sovereignty, there-
fore, is conquering ground previously held by external sovereignty.
As a result, the long separate domains of internal and external sover-
eignty are increasingly colliding. The state no longer forms a complete 
barrier and controlling nexus between the two. Where internal and exter-
nal sovereignty were first united in the crown, and where the difference 
between both was later masked by the state, the internal sovereign is now 
openly challenging the external sovereign. The existing conceptual frame-
work, which sees both as part of the same concept, cannot explain this colli-
sion. Instead it remains committed to the dominant but unsuitable notion of 
external sovereignty. As a result this standard framework leads one to either 
reject integration or the concept of sovereignty as a whole. An outcome that 
fully follows the juxtaposition between statist defenders of sovereignty and 
pluralist defenders of integration outlined earlier. Not incidentally, as will 
be further shown below, both schools rely on unsuited external notions of 
sovereignty. Both can, therefore, be strengthened and even partially recon-
ciled when infused with a confederal notion of sovereignty.
The tension between sovereignty and integration, therefore, should be 
exposed as a clash between internal and external sovereignty. Consequently 
we are also not witnessing the decline of sovereignty. Rather we are wit-
nessing a relative decline of external sovereignty, and a relative ascendance 
of internal sovereignty. A development which cannot be comprehended as 
long as internal and external sovereignty are not separated, and the concep-
tual and normative primacy of internal sovereignty is not recognized.
This renewed ascent of internal sovereignty, in a confederal form, holds 
great opportunity for supporting and organizing far-reaching cooperation 
and integration between states. At the same time it also creates many chal-
lenges as it upsets part of the established and deeply rooted system for the 
exercise of public authority in place. Advantages and challenges that will be 
set out in more detail in the next chapter, now that the fit and coherence of a 
confederal conception of sovereignty has been established.
121 Cf in this regard the intuition of W. Friedmann in 1964, referring to the Community: ‘If 
mankind is to achieve a more effective international organization (…) the development 
must be from international towards constitutional law.’ Note also the reliance on ‘effec-
tiveness’, a key principle for the EU Court of Justice in justifying EU authority. W. Fried-
mann, The Changing Structure of International Law (Stevens & Sons 1964), 113.
1 Introduction: The uses of confederal sovereignty
Having set out the commonly assumed conflict between sovereignty and 
integration in chapter 8, and the conceptual feasibility of confederal sov-
ereignty in chapter 9, this chapter further unpacks confederal sovereignty, 
and explores its explanatory and normative potential for the EU.1 It first 
provides an introductory overview of confederal sovereignty (section 2), 
and establishes its fit with the EU Treaties and the case law of the European 
Court of Justice (section 3). Subsequently the idea of confederal sovereign-
ty is further developed and tested by examining the potential advantages 
indicated in chapter 7. First to be discussed is the potential of confederal 
sovereignty to reduce some of the theoretical deadlocks that flow from the 
misconceived contradiction between sovereignty and integration, including 
some of the disagreement between statism and pluralism (sections 4 and 
5). Second, and even more fundamentally, the capacity of confederal sover-
eignty to provide a more stable and potent confederal foundation for the EU 
will be explored. A vital task as this foundation must be able to support the 
increasing federate superstructure of the EU outlined in part I (section 6).
In addition to these two primary objectives, three further and mutually 
related benefits of confederal sovereignty will then be examined as well. To 
begin with it will be seen if confederal supremacy can help to explain why, 
and to what extent, constitutionalism seems to fit the EU (section 7). Sub-
sequently we look at its potential to conceptualize a distinctly confederal 
form of supremacy for EU law. This would be a conception of supremacy 
that grants a certain type of broad operational primacy to EU law, without 
undermining a narrow but ultimate supremacy of national constitutions 
(section 8). Last, but certainly not least, we test the capacity of confederal 
sovereignty to create a normatively attractive narrative of and for the EU. 
1 See Walker (2006b), 3. The proposed analysis thereby also hopes to meet Walkers criti-
cism that ‘abstract debate’ on sovereignty remains ‘sterile and meaningless’. The concep-
tion developed in this chapter actually aims to connect a notion of sovereignty to the 
specifi c context of the EU, so that ‘the particular conception of sovereignty within the 
particular intellectual scheme in question helps to produce signifi cant knowledge claims 
on behalf of the scheme as a whole.’
10 The Confederal Potential of 
‘We the peoples’
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One that builds on the potential of the EU to modify and improve the demo-
cratic process, rather than casting it as a necessary democratic evil (section 9).
2 Outlining a confederal conception of sovereignty
So what would confederal sovereignty look like? What conceptual outlines 
can be established based on the two definitional elements of internal and 
popular sovereignty suggested here as necessary elements of such a confed-
eral conception?
The most basic shift concerns the identity of the sovereign. From the inter-
nal perspective it is no longer the state that forms the sovereign starting 
point.2 Instead it is the sovereign entity that underlies public authority with-
in the state. Under a popular conception of internal sovereignty this would 
be ‘the people’. Already due to this basic fact all challenges lamenting that 
the Member States are loosing their sovereignty due to integration loose 
their comprehensibility. These challenges simply target the wrong sover-
eign.3 Instead the question should be if the people, or any other internal 
sovereign, have lost their sovereignty due to European integration.4 A ques-
tion that must be approached from the internal perspective, including its 
extensive practice of delegation.5
For as we saw above, the development of (semi-)abstract sovereigns, 
such as ‘the people’, necessitated extensive delegation.6 In turn, such del-
egation enabled the development of a constitutional layer, which structured 
the delegation and laid down some general rules and outer limits for the 
use of delegated powers. Within that constitutional layer authority could 
subsequently be divided without dividing the underlying sovereignty. The 
federate twist even allowed a division of authority over multiple distinct 
governments, though still only within one state.
2 On the way in which the concept of sovereignty used tends to lead to an unhelpful statist 
focus also see Schütze (2009), 1095.
3 Cf. also Börzel and Risse (2000), 7.
4 From here on the discussion will assume the people as the internal sovereign. Most argu-
ments made here, however, will also fi t wit other internal and abstract sovereigns. Yet, as 
will be further discussed below, it is believed that a popular conception of internal sover-
eignty might of special interest to the EU.
5 For a possible counterargument, focusing on the continued necessity of the state to repre-
sent the people, see Walker (2006b), 14, note 31. As clarifi ed further below, however, this 
argument looses its force against a confederal conception, which has no qualms in 
acknowledging the relative normative primacy of the statal sub-units.
6 Cf Hinsley (1986), 222, ‘the only remaining recourse was to locate sovereignty in the 
body-politic which the community and the state together composed, the community 
being regarded as wholly or partly the source of sovereignty and the state as the sole 
instrument which exercised it.’
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From the confederal perspective the EU largely follows this system of con-
stitutional delegation of sovereign powers, albeit with three major modi-
fications. First, the internal sovereigns have now delegated part of their 
authority outside their own statal framework. Second, the recipient of the 
delegated power is a non-statal actor. Third, multiple internal sovereigns 
have reciprocally delegated sovereign prerogatives to one and the same 
external entity, the EU. What has changed, therefore, is the practice of solely 
delegating sovereign powers of this scope and nature within the own state, 
not the practice of splitting up and parcelling out sovereign powers itself.7
Clearly these are important modifications in the organization of public 
authority, whose effects will be further analysed below. They do not, how-
ever, alter the fundamental structure of internal and popular sovereignty. 
For neither of these require the sovereign to delegate solely to one recipi-
ent.8 A fact already born out by the US federate system, as well as by the 
federate systems within the EU for that matter. All of these have multiple 
recipients of delegated authority.
Equally there is nothing in the concepts of internal and popular sov-
ereignty that requires a sovereign to delegate powers within a single state 
only, or that the recipients of sovereign prerogatives could only be statal 
actors.9 As shown in chapter 9, nothing in the concept of internal sover-
eignty prevents such extra-statal delegation, certainly not as it is the internal 
sovereign that underlies the state, and not the other way around.
Confederal sovereignty, therefore, does not start from federate sover-
eignty, but from the more basic assumption underlying the federal use of 
sovereignty: The basic capacity of a sovereign people to delegate part of its 
sovereign powers to alternative centres of government. Different from the 
federate use of sovereignty, however, sovereign authority is directly dele-
gated to an extra-statal actor.10 This confederal application of sovereignty 
unravels the traditional understanding of sovereignty where the ‘external’ 
is the exclusive domain of sovereign states. Nonetheless it forms a perfectly 
7 This, furthermore, is also an adaption of the federal model, which fi rst creates different 
actors within a single state, to which one people then delegates powers.
8 See also chapter 10, section 4 on the case law of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
which mistakenly relies on this implicit assumption.
9 The American States or German Länder, after all, are not sovereign states either. Cf also O. 
Beaud, ‘Europa als Föderation? Relevanz und Bedeuting einer Bundeslehre für due 
Europäische Union’, 5 Forum Constitutiones Europea (2008), 18 or Lindahl (2006), 89. 
Equally this approach also fi ts with Loughlins understanding of sovereignty as a tool to 
‘give expression to the distinctively political bond between a group of people and its 
mode of governance.’ It is only that the group now includes multiple peoples, and that 
the mode of governance is confederal. Loughlin (2006), 56.
10 Note that the defi ning difference between federate and confederal use of sovereignty 
here list in the extra-statal delegation, and not in the fact that the EU is also a non-statal 
actor. The non-statal nature of the EU does, however, form an interesting further modifi -
cation on its own, and equally fi ts fully with the confederal approach developed here.
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logical application of federal popular sovereignty, only now in a confederal 
modus outside of statal boundaries.
Once this capacity for the external delegation of sovereignty authority is 
acknowledged, the EU can be understood as a logical application of this 
capacity. An application which forms an evolution of the federate system 
analysed in part I: instead of creating one state to encapsulate the delegation 
of sovereignty, the EU includes the ‘external’ in the ‘internal’ constitutional 
systems of its members.11 The EU is grounded in each national constitu-
tional system separately: it does not receive its power in one chunk from 
an overarching supreme entity, but in multiple parcels from the different 
member peoples. Vice versa the EU included in all national constitutional 
schemes for the delegation of sovereign authority.12 Relying on the rule by 
law, the establishment of an overarching state is not deemed necessary, as 
the whole is held together by a confederal and not a federate bond.
Though not creating a European state, this evolution does end the virtual 
monopoly of the state in executing sovereign authority and representing the 
internal sovereign. An arrangement that carried several benefits, for instance 
in terms of coherence and legitimacy. The loss of these benefits must now be 
compensated for, as will be further discussed below and in part III.
The more fundamental point here, however, is that the new confederal 
arrangement in the EU fully fits with internal and popular sovereignty. The 
EU can be logically understood as a simultaneous delegation of sovereign 
authority by multiple sovereign member peoples to one and the same cen-
tre of government.13 This delegation, furthermore, is reciprocal between the 
11 See already on how the confederal constitution should be considered as part of the consti-
tution of the individual Member States, Schmitt (2008), part IV. See also the French Conseil 
constitutionnel, Décision No. 2004-505 DC of 19 November 2004, on the Constitutional 
Treaty, par 11: the French constitution recognizes ‘l’existence d’un ordre juridique com-
munautaire integrer à l’ordre juridique interne et distinct de l’ordre juridique international.’
12 Cf. here the notion of a ‘composite constitution’, as suggested by Besselink (2007), inter 
alia on p 6, and 15. The confederal perspctive fits with such composite approach, 
although more than the concept of Besselink a confederal perspective stresses the prima-
cy of the national, and hopes to explain and support the necessary hierarchy to deal with 
confl icts between the different components. As such it may provide part of the limits of 
the composite constitution Besselink himself predicts. See chapter 10 sections 6,7 and 8 
for further discussion of thse points.
13 Cf in this regard also the views of Calhoun on how popular sovereignty may resolve the 
tension between the indivisibility of sovereignty itself, and the federal co-existence of 
multiple governments wielding sovereign powers. Views which can easily be transposed 
to a confederal system, or rather were developed to support the confederal reading of the 
US Constitution that Calhoun favoured: ‘There is no diffi culty in understanding how 
powers, appertaining to sovereignty, may be divided; and the exercise of one portion 
delegated to one set of agents, and another portion to another: or how sovereignty may 
be vested in one man, or in a few, or in many.’ This insight into the potential of sover-
eignty may be supported and developed, however, without ascribing to Calhoun’s con-
federal reading of the American Constitution. As cited in Forsyth (1981), 125.
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member peoples. Each people delegates authority in return for EU influ-
ence, but also for the delegation of sovereign authority to the EU by the 
other member peoples.14 Not incidentally this leads to the confederal mir-
ror image of the sovereignty structure in a federate system. Instead of one 
people delegating authority to two levels of government, in the EU multiple 
sovereign peoples reciprocally delegate part of their sovereign prerogatives 
to one and the same extra-statal government.
In true confederal style the definition of a member people is thereby left 
to the national level.15 Who belongs to the French or Estonian people, and 
how these express their will, is determined within the national legal orders. 
Equally, and as will be further shown below, confederal sovereignty leaves 
a certain primary, or existential, authority and legitimacy with the different 
Member States. Nonetheless confederal sovereignty can at the same time 
create a sufficiently strong link between the member peoples and the EU 
to support a federate superstructure, and to keep the Member States on 
their toes – an important objective of federalism more generally. For unlike 
under federate popular sovereignty the centre does not receive the norma-
tive authority of the whole people, whilst the Member States remain the 
principal bodies through which the member peoples have organized them-
selves.16
Obviously confederal sovereignty and its application to the EU face mul-
tiple challenges. In addition, the conception explored here wilfully contains 
an element of idealism, as it also aims to provide a guide for the future 
development of the EU. Nevertheless confederal sovereignty can already 
claim a strong fit with the EU and with EU law today. Before we explore the 
advantages of confederal sovereignty further, it is first useful to establish 
this fit in more detail.
3 The fit between confederal sovereignty and the legal and 
normative basis of the EU
Legally and normatively confederal sovereignty fits with the Treaties as 
interpreted by the Court of Justice, their normative foundations, and some 
key trends in their evolution. A fit which obviously relates to the confederal 
foundation of the EU established in part I, and which can be demonstrated 
14 Excepting exceptional arrangements such as opt-outs, rebates or exemptions for specifi c 
members, furthermore, these reciprocal delegations are, in principle, also of equal size. In 
the case of enhanced cooperation this reciprocity is also visible in the limited rights of 
those members not participating.
15 Art. 9 TEU, art. 18-21 TFEU.
16 On the strong but ‘secondary’ claim to primacy this creates to the EU see chapter 10 sec-
tion 8.
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through three key elements: the basis of the EU in delegation, the values of 
democracy and popular government, and the increasing relation between 
the EU and the individual.
3.1 The legal fit: Delegation of sovereign powers
Article 4 and 5 TEU explicitly base the EU on the principle of conferral. The 
EU only has those powers that have been delegated to it. All powers that 
have not been delegated to the EU ‘remain’ with the state, unless delegated 
to another entity.
The EU, therefore, has been incorporated into in the national constitu-
tional scheme whereby the sovereign member peoples delegate sovereign 
prerogatives between different centres of government. As such art. 4 and 5 
TEU do not transfer any sort of original competence or sovereignty onto the 
EU. They only delegate the exercise of some sovereign powers. The case law 
of the Court of Justice on the principle of conferral, and its meaning for the 
status of the EU, confirms this confederal approach.
To begin with the Court has never claimed actual sovereignty for the EU. It 
only holds that EU institutions have been ‘endowed with sovereign rights’. 
Similarly the Member States have not lost internal sovereignty either, which 
they never had. They only ‘limited their sovereign rights’,17 or as it was 
phrased in Costa v. E.N.E.L.: ‘the EU, having real powers stemming from a 
limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the Com-
munity, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights.’18
The Member States, therefore, have not limited their sovereignty. Some of the 
sovereign rights previously delegated to the Member States are now del-
egated to the EU, and therefore outside the statal framework altogether.19 
This reasoning has been consistently followed by the Court.20 Recently it 
17 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos.
18 Notice how the limitation of sovereignty is equated to a transfer of powers, and how only 
the Member States have limited their sovereign powers, not the member people. In this 
regard the Court also fi nd that: ‘The transfer by the states from their domestic legal sys-
tem to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty 
carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subse-
quent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail’.
19 Equally see Ruling 1/78 [1978] ECR 2151 on the Euratom Treaty, where the ECJ held that: 
‘The Member States, whether acting individually or collectively, are no longer able to 
impose on the Community obligations which impose conditions on the exercise of pre-
rogatives which thenceforth belong to the Community and which therefore no longer fall 
within the fi eld of national sovereignty.’
20 See also case 294/83 Les Verts. Cf also the comparable statement by the BVG in BVerfGE 2 
BvR 2661/06 (2010) Honeywell par. 53: ‘The primacy application also corresponds to the 
constitutional empowerment od art. 23.1. of the Basic Law, in accordance with which 
sovereign powers can be transferred to the European Union.’ or BVerfGE 2 BvR 987/10, 2 
BvR 1485/10 and 2 BvR 1099/10 (2011) Euro Rescue Package, par. 100.
319The Confederal Potential of ‘We the peoples’ 
has been reconfirmed in Opinion 1/09. Reiterating the autonomy of the EU 
legal order the Court holds:
‘It is apparent from the Court’s settled case-law that the founding treaties of the European 
Union, unlike ordinary international treaties, established a new legal order, possessing its 
own institutions, for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, in 
ever wider fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals (…) The essential characteristics of the European Union legal order thus consti-
tuted are in particular its primacy over the laws of the Member States and the direct effect of 
a whole series of provisions which are applicable to their nationals and to the Member 
States themselves’21
Following this internal, confederal logic the supremacy and potential direct 
effect of EU law should also not come as a surprise, just as the supremacy or 
direct effect of national law does not.22 In any event the internal perspective 
of a sovereign people delegating power to both their state and the EU fully 
squares with the notion of conferral, and the fact that the EU lays claim to 
certain ‘sovereign prerogatives’ without claiming sovereignty as such.
3.2 The normative fit: The value of democracy, popular rule and identity
Normatively a confederal conception of sovereignty fits with the respect for 
national identity and the democratic values and principles which underlie 
the EU.
The EU is ‘founded’ on the value of democracy.23 This foundational val-
ue requires the EU to recognise not just the national democratic systems, 
but also the sovereign position and ultimate authority of the member peo-
ples that underlies these national democracies.24 This duty is confirmed by 
the ‘strict observance and the development of international law, including 
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter’ required by Article 
3(5) TEU. These principles include the right to self-determination, and with 
21 In addition: ‘In contrast, the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international 
agreement, none the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on 
the rule of law. The Community treaties established a new legal order for the benefi t of 
which the States have limited their sovereign rights and the subjects of which comprise not 
only Member States but also their nationals.’
22 See further chapter 10, section 8.
23 Art. 2 and 10 TEU. The functioning of the EU is even founded on representative democra-
cy. Already see as well the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity, which in 
par. 2 defi nes as central to that identity: ‘the principles of representative democracy, of the 
rule of law, of social justice — which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of 
respect for human rights.’
24 For the fundamental and superior status of such principles in the legal order see the 
forceful language of the ECJ in C402/05 P en C415/05 P Kadi I, par. 283-285, and espe-
cially 303.
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that the ultimate authority of a people.25 As stated, for instance, in Article 
21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): ‘The will of the 
people shall be the basis of the authority of government (…).’
In line with this respect for the member peoples, the consecutive Treaties 
have consistently aimed to create an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe.26 The peoples are to remain the ultimate – and separate – building 
blocks. The new Article 4(2) TEU cements this recognition by requiring the 
EU to respect the different national identities.27 A clear attempt to safeguard 
the ultimately confederal authority and sovereignty structure of the EU.
Basing the EU on a confederal conception of sovereignty equally provides 
a normative fit with the national political and legal systems. All Member 
States ascribe to democracy as a fundamental value. In fact they have reaf-
firmed so by ratifying the EU Treaties.28 Article 7 TEU even creates an EU 
mechanism, political as it may be, for the EU to monitor and enforce these 
values of democracy and self-rule against a Member State. Embryonic as it 
is, this allows the EU to protect a sovereign people against their own state.
More fundamentally, however, democracy, and the related assumption 
of popular sovereignty, are already of foundational importance to the Mem-
ber State legal systems.29 Sixteen Member State constitutions and the Croa-
tian Constitution explicitly acknowledge the sovereignty of the people and 
25 See also Petersmann (2006), 146: ‘The universal recognition of inalienable human rights 
to self-government legally limits state sovereignty by requiring respect (…) for popular 
sovereignty including rights to individual and democratic participation in the exercise of 
government powers.’
26 Art. 1 TEU. The preamble of the Rome Treaty already spoke of ‘an ever-closer union 
among the peoples of Europe.’ Even more interestingly the second paragraph of the pre-
amble referred to the Member States as ‘their countries’, i.e. the countries of the member 
peoples. The preamble of the Single European Act talks of ‘the democratic peoples of 
Europe’, and that of the Maastricht Treaty of deepening ‘the solidarity between their peo-
ples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions’ as well as repeating 
the desire to ‘to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe.’ Amsterdam also consistently speaks of the ‘peoples’ in the European Union. 
Nice does not mention the people at all. Even the Constitutional Treaty, perhaps the most 
unifying in its aims and understanding of the EU (see for instance art. 1 speaking of ‘the 
will of the citizens and States of Europe’), retains its basis in multiple peoples. Its pream-
ble, for instance, still speaks of ‘the peoples of Europe’. See for instance, also art. I-3 or 
III-280 for this focus on multiple peoples.
27 ‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their 
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, 
inclusive of regional and local self-government (…).’
28 Art. 2 and 6 TEU, as well as art. 49 TEU.
29 Heringa and Kiiver (2012), 15.
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the fact that all public authority derives from these people.30 Six other Mem-
ber State constitutions nominate ‘the Nation’ as sovereign. Without denying 
the conceptual and historical significance of such ‘Nations’, they can largely 
be equated with accepting the sovereignty of the People which make up the 
Nation, certainly for the normative dimension discussed here.31 Similarly, 
even the famed ‘Sovereignty of Parliament’ in the UK has become increas-
ingly linked to the notion of representation of the Community, and hence 
with representing the people.32 The Dutch Constitution does not mention 
sovereignty at all, yet if a notion of sovereignty were to be included it is dif-
ficult to imagine any other candidate than the people.
The Cypriot and Danish Constitutions provide a slightly different pic-
ture. For obvious reasons the Cypriot Constitution does not declare ‘the 
people’ sovereign. Instead it declares a sovereign republic, which respects 
both the Greek and the Turkish ‘Communities’. Section 12 of the Danish 
Constitution places ‘supreme authority’ in the King, who is nevertheless 
bound by the Constitution. Twenty-four out of twenty-seven Member State 
constitutions, therefore, either directly or indirectly acknowledge the ulti-
mate authority of the people. The three exceptions, furthermore, also fully 
acknowledge the value of democracy and popular representation, which in 
itself creates a strong link between public authority and the people.
Two remarks on the proposed use of popular sovereignty for an EU con-
ception of confederal sovereignty, however, must be stressed at this point. 
First, it is a conception intended for the EU legal order. As such it remains 
compatible with Member State systems that rely on a non-popular internal 
sovereign. The proposed conception of confederal sovereignty, however, is 
at its strongest and most appealing where the national and EU conception 
of the internal sovereign are aligned along the lines of popular sovereignty. 
30 See art. 1 of the Austrian Constitution, art. 1(2) and 1(3) of the Bulgarian Constitution (but 
also see art. 9 and 44(2)), art. 1 of the Croatian Constitution, art. 2 of the Czech Constitu-
tion, art. 1 of the Estonian Constitution, Section 2(1) of the Finnish Constitution, Art. 20(2) 
of the German Basic Law, art. 1(2) of the Greek Constitution, art. 2(2), 5 and 68(1) of the 
Hungarian Constitution, art. 1 of the Italian Constitution, art. 1(2) of the Latvian Consti-
tution, Art. 1 and 3 of the Portuguese Constitution, art. 2 of the Romanian Constitution, 
Art. 2(1) of the Slovak Constitution (but also see art 43(3) and 106), art. 3(2) of the Slove-
nian Constitution, art. 1(2) of the Spanish Constitution, and art. 1 of the Swedish Instru-
ment of Government.
31 See art. 33 of the Belgian Federal Constitution, art. 3 of the 1958 French Constitution and 
art. 3 of the Declaration of Human and Citizen’s rights of 1789, which still forms part of 
that Constitution, art. 1 of the Irish Constitution, which also refers to the ‘Most Holy Trin-
ity, from Whom is all authority’, art. 2 of the Lithuanian Constitution, art. 32 of the Lux-
emburg Constitution, and art. 2(1) of the 1989 Polish Constitution and art. 4(1) of the 1997 
Polish Constitution. De Witte notes for instance that, ‘(…) the sovereign ‘Nation’ in Bel-
gium ‘(…) would now, if the article had to be rewritten, be called the ‘people’. (B. de 
Witte, ‘Do not Mention the Word: Sovereignty in Two Europhile Countries: Belgium and 
the Netherlands’, in: N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2006), 353.
32 J. Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament (Clarendon Press 1999), 231.
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Second, and related, a popular conception of confederal sovereignty pur-
posefully contains an element of idealism. Where a national system does 
not recognize popular sovereignty, the EU may be a source of inspiration. 
In this way as well the EU can positively contribute to democratisation, 
instead of threatening it.33
3.3 The evolutionary fit: The increasing relation between the EU and the 
individual
Having established the respect of the EU for the sovereign peoples in 
their collective capacities, a last element of fit concerns the increasing rela-
tion between the EU and the individual. This increasing relation forms a 
clear trend throughout the evolution of the EU. The famous direct effect of 
EU law already created an unmediated link between individuals and the 
EU legal order. Contrary to the norm in ‘international’ law, the individual 
became a subject, and not just an object of EU law.34 A link that broadened 
and deepened with the expansion of EU law itself.
Already under the ECSC, furthermore, the peoples were directly 
involved politically as well. The Assembly was composed of ‘representa-
tives of the peoples of the Member States’.35 Art. 10 TEU continues this line 
with a more individual twist, declaring that ‘Citizens are directly represent-
ed at Union level in the European Parliament.’ Several other innovations 
under Lisbon have deepened this political link. The inclusion of national 
parliaments into the constitutional structure of the EU directly involves the 
national representatives of the member peoples.36 Article 10(3) TEU gives 
each citizen the right (or perhaps implores him) to ‘participate in the demo-
cratic life of the Union.’ Article 11 TEU obliges EU institutions to ‘give citi-
zens and representative associations’ an opportunity to make known their 
views.
The new citizens’ initiative forms another clear attempt to more directly 
involve individuals at the European level.37 Though weak, the initiative cre-
ates a direct channel between the peoples and the EU level. In a sense it 
forms a confederal check where the peoples feel that either the EU institu-
tions, or their own statal representatives, are not doing their job properly. 
Now the required number of one million citizens must represent ‘a signifi-
cant number of Member States’. In other words, even in a citizens’ initiative, 
33 For this potential see in more detail below chapter 10 section 9 and chapter 12.
34 See for a relativization of this ‘uniqueness’ De Witte (2011) and De Witte (2012).
35 Art. 20 ECSC.
36 Art. 12 TEU and Protocol No. 1 on the role of national parliaments in the EU.
37 Art. 11 TEU. Also see now Regulation 211/2011 on the citizens’ initiative OJ (2001) L 
65/1, and for discussion of its uses and (many) weaknesses M. Dougan, ‘What are We to 
Make of the Citizens’ Initiative? 6 CMLRev (2011), 1807, and J. Mendes, 'Participation and 
the role of law after Lisbon: A legal view on Article 11 TEU', 6 CMLRev (2011), 1849.
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as in the election of the EP, individuals are still acting as representatives of 
their sovereign member peoples, not just as EU individuals. At the same 
time this direct involvement of the peoples at the EU level, nascent as it may 
be, does underscore that the EU is not based on the sovereign states alone, 
but more confederally on the sovereign peoples that underlie these states as 
well.
The strongest direct relation between the EU and the individual is obvi-
ously formed by EU citizenship. The derived status of EU citizenship cap-
tures the secondary, but direct, relation between the EU and the individual: 
‘Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national 
citizenship.’38
For on the one hand EU citizenship is hereby structured as a second-
ary citizenship. The EU does not have the power to create an own citizenry 
independent from the Member States. Nor can it refuse anyone citizenship 
that has been granted that status nationally. The EU has to build on the 
existing citizenship relations. Limits that underscore the confederal respect 
for the sovereign peoples described above, and for the existential relation 
between the member peoples and their own states.
On the other hand, and notwithstanding its derived status, EU citi-
zenship does establish a direct link between the EU and the individual. 
Furthermore, largely in the hands of the ECJ, EU citizenship is gradually 
evolving towards a stronger and more meaningful status, which even 
provides increasing rights against the own Member State.39 One example 
of this development can be found in the gradual pressure on the scope of 
EU law exerted by EU citizenship. Especially the developments in Rottman 
and Zambrano and are telling in this regard.40 They underscore the increas-
ing importance of the direct link between the EU and the citizens, and the 
believe that this link should not be curtailed too easily.41
A confederal conception of sovereignty fully accords with this direct though 
secondary link between the EU and the citizen. As the sovereign peoples 
have directly delegated part of their sovereign authority to the EU, it only 
makes sense that the EU enjoys a direct – and two directional– link with 
these peoples. At the same time it is equally logical in a confederal system 
that this link remains secondary to the one enjoyed by the Member States 
and their peoples. As discussed in part I it is the essence of a confederal 
38 Art. 9 TEU. Also see art. 20 TFEU. Even though ‘destined to be the fundamental status’ it 
remains subordinated to citizenship of a Member State (See cases C-85/96 Martinez Sala 
and C-184/99 Grzelczyk).
39 C-184/99 Grzelczyk.
40 See C-34/09 Zambrano, C-434/09 McCarthy, C-256/11 Dereci and others, C-40/11 Iida 
[2012] nyr, and C-356/11 and C-357/11 O.E.A [2012] nyr.
41 For a (willingly) rather extreme extrapolation of EU citizenship in this regard see Von 
Bogdandy et al, (2012) 489 et seq.
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system that the constituent parts remain primary and are not subsumed in a 
single superior authority.42 It are these constituent parts that, as pre-existing 
and self-referential entities, join in a confederal bond with other such enti-
ties.
Consequently the confederal perspective both fits with and explains the 
direct link that exists between the EU and the member peoples, and places 
logical limits on this link. As will be further explored below and in part III, 
however, it is becoming increasingly urgent that, in true confederal style, 
this link is better conceptualized and organized at the national constitutional 
level.
Despite the remaining challenges of properly organizing confederal sover-
eignty, however, it can be concluded that this concept, and the confederal 
approach that underlies it, show a sufficient fit with the EU and its legal 
order. Combined with the conceptual fit already established, this provides 
a sufficient basis to further engage with the potential advantages of confed-
eral sovereignty set out above. Advantages to which we now turn in more 
detail, beginning with the capacity to dissolve some of the theoretical dead-
locks that flow from the apparent contradiction between sovereignty and 
integration, including the related clash between statism and pluralism.
4 Dissolving the clash between statist sovereignty and 
plural integration
Chapter 8 discussed the apparent deadlock between sovereignty and inte-
gration: you cannot have your sovereign cake and let it be eaten by others. It 
further showed how this juxtaposition of sovereignty and integration leads 
to a deadlock in the theory of European Union, and for example forced both 
statism and pluralism to either defend the sovereign state and limit integra-
tion, or to embrace integration and reject sovereignty.
Chapter 9 subsequently demonstrated how integration does not inher-
ently conflict with the concept of internal sovereignty, but how the real 
conflict is between integration and external sovereignty, and even between 
external sovereignty and internal sovereignty as such.
To build on these findings, and to further test and illustrate the capacity 
of confederal sovereignty to dissolve the conflict between sovereignty and 
integration, we return to the schools of statism and pluralism. Below it will 
be shown how both rely on unsuited external concepts of sovereignty, and 
how this forces statism and pluralism into positions that are untenable and 
counterproductive. Positions furthermore, that are also unnecessary. For as 
will subsequently be suggested, both schools can successfully switch to a 
42 See chapter 1, section 5.1.2.
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confederal conception of sovereignty. This would help them overcome the 
false choice between sovereignty and integration they now force themselves 
to make, and would actually allow them to better achieve their respec-
tive core objectives. What is more, it would also reduce the contradiction 
between statism and pluralism as such. An outcome that is especially valu-
able because both camps defend important values and field convincing 
arguments, certainly so for a confederal understanding of the EU that seeks 
to combine respect for the Member States and peoples with a plural organi-
zation of public authority.
4.1 Statism and confederal sovereignty
Chapter 8 demonstrated how the BVG, applying the key tenets of statism, 
postulated the sovereign state as a conditio sine qua non for democracy. Only 
a sovereign state, which controls a critical mass of competences, can provide 
and guarantee a democratic process. EU integration, therefore, is only com-
patible with the German constitution as long as the German state retains a 
controlling say in certain key competences.
The BVG thereby raised a legitimate and necessary question: how much 
power can be outsourced before the state, and the democratic process that 
controls it, loose their relevance?43 Its statist stance also contains many other 
valuable points, certainly for a confederal thinking of the EU. The attempt 
of the BVG to protect the state, and with it the German people, against ever 
expanding EU powers fits with the fact that in a confederation primary 
authority and legitimacy should remain with the sub-units.44 As a result it 
is highly important to counterbalance the risk of centralization that seems 
inherent in federal systems.45 The choice for sovereignty as a regulating 
concept in this regard also seems sensible.
From the great responsibility it carries for the German people and their 
constitution, its critical and conservative approach can also be more than 
understood: why change a system that works and replace it with a still 
emerging system of which even the proponents cannot agree on its finalité 
or nature, let alone guarantee its stability. After all we are not playing for 
43 See for a factual relativiztion of the Courts fears for the relevance of Germany: Moravscik 
(2005), 349, and Moravscik (2001).
44 The Member States have also spent signifi cant time and energy in creating this primary 
link with the people, for instance through the creation of national identities and social 
securities. Not only is the EU incapable of matching this link, the Member States will not 
want to give up this primacy, and are certainly capable of defending it precisely because 
of their primary legitimacy. Cf. also on this point Van Middelaar (2009), 314, 359.
45 Note that the argument here is not that the EU must necessarily remain confederal, and 
should therefore respect the status of the member states. The more limited point is that, 
as long as the EU remains a confederation or desires to remin one, it should respect this 
status. Obviously the sovereign member peoples retain the option of joining a federate 
EU, and relinquishing their sovereign status.
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nickels. On the table are fundamental questions on democracy, identity, and 
the rule over more than 500 million people. The position of the BVG with-
in the German legal order, furthermore, also leads to a necessary bias. The 
BVG has been established to protect and uphold the German constitution, 
not to surrender it. All in all, the reluctance of the German Constitutional 
Court to erode the foundations of the current statal system appears respon-
sible. It rightly places the burden of proof on those hailing a new order of 
things.
At the same time the Lissabon Urteil contains several weaknesses.46 Its rea-
soning, for instance, rests on a number of rather general, undeveloped and 
opportunistic definitions of core notions as democracy or the state. Notions 
which are nevertheless asked to carry quite some weight. The most relevant 
weakness for the present discussion, however, is the BVG’s unhelpful and 
unnecessary reliance on an external and statal notion of sovereignty.47 For 
as shown earlier, it is the state that ultimately forms the sovereign in the 
framework developed by the BVG.48
Its choice for a statal sovereign traps the BVG in an unfruitful external para-
digm. One unsuited to conceptualize European integration, or to lay down 
realistic and effective limits to that integration. As will be illustrated below, 
in the longer run this unfortunate choice of sovereign even threatens some of 
the very values the BVG tries to safeguard, such as democracy and national 
identity.
In this regard two specific problems that result from the BVG’s application 
of external sovereignty to the EU must be discussed in more detail. To begin 
with the static and defensive position the Court locks itself into. Second, 
and most fundamentally, the way the BVG locks up both the people and 
the democratic process in the state. A form of conceptual protective custody 
that only blocks their necessary evolution, and removes any opportunity for 
the EU to be founded on a stronger democratic basis.
46 The judgment was also criticized right from the start. Very critical see: W.T.E. Eijsbouts, 
‘Ein Land, ein Volk, ein Richter’, Het Financieele Dagblad (3 juli 2009), 7 and further 
refi ned, W.T.E. Eijsbouts, ‘Wir Sind das Volk: Notes About the Notion of ‘The People’ as 
Occasioned by the Lissabon-Urteil’ 6 European Constitutional Law Review (2010), 199. Fur-
ther see Schönberger (2009), 1202. Bieber (2009), 391, Grimm, (2009), 353, Thym (2009), 
1796.
47 For the importance of external sovereignty generally for the German debate on sover-
eignty see Aziz (2006), 279-280, emphasizing the fact that Germany had just reacquired 
‘full’ sovereignty in 1990 only.
48 Or at least is provided with an automatic monopoly on sovereignty. See chapter 8 section 
4.4.3.
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4.2 The statist Maginot line against integration
By opting to preserve the sovereignty of the German state in order to pro-
tect the German democracy and identity the BVG opts for an inherently 
defensive strategy. Although European integration can play an (important) 
role, the core of political and democratic life must remain within the state. 
A position that results from the far from evident claim, common to statism, 
that democracy is only possible within the sovereign state.49
Even more problematic is that this approach forces the BVG into an her-
culean, counterproductive and not really judicial task of defining these core 
competences, and with them the essence of democracy and the political pro-
cess. A substantive exercise that sits uncomfortably with the more proce-
dural and self-determining essence of democracy. Not surprisingly the parts 
of the Lissabon Urteil outlining these core competences are amongst the least 
convincing. To begin with the selection of the ‘essential areas of democratic 
formative action’50 is almost not supported by arguments. Why are these 
enumerated competences so essential, and why are other viable candidates 
not? 51 As most areas mentioned by the BVG happen to coincide with those 
powers still largely remaining under the competence of the Member States 
at the time of the judgment, it is difficult to suppress the suspicion of theo-
retical opportunism.
Furthermore, the idea of a fixed list of competences that together form the 
essence of democracy, and the German identity, does not seem very prom-
ising in itself. And as it is static, it will inevitably run into difficulty in the 
future, certainly considering the current pace of integration. The consti-
tutional Maginot line of sovereignty and democracy can be outflanked all 
too easily. A fact already illustrated by the difficulties of the BVG in actu-
ally holding the fort in the Lissabon Urteil. A clear gap, for example, exists 
between the logic of and rhetoric of boundaries, and the eventual conclu-
sion that the Lisbon treaty stays neatly within the limits prescribed.52 It is 
very difficult to see how the current level of integration has not removed 
several competences from the German State that are not at least as impor-
tant for the democratic process as those mentioned by the BVG. The Honey-
well judgment and the EMU judgments have made it even more obvious 
49 This chapter will not discuss the second leg of the BVG test for democracy, being if the EU 
itself is democratic enough, and which democratic standard should be applied to a non-
statal entity as the EU.
50 Lissabon, 248.
51 Schönberger (2009), 1209.
52 Idem, ‘there is probably no other judgment in het history of the court in which the argu-
ment is so much at odds with the actual result.’
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that the BVG will only police these boundaries in highly grievous cases, or 
frontal attacks.53
Naturally the tactic of formulating a hard limit and then virtually nuancing 
it away in application should also be seen as a wise and pragmatic solution, 
and as part of a dialogue with the ECJ.54 At the same time it underscores 
the weakness of the limiting strategy chosen by the BVG.55 Where the aim 
is to actually limit integration, the defence chosen should be able to do so. 
To that end the limit itself should be flexible enough to adapt to changing 
circumstances. For as static defences have proven throughout history: once 
breached they loose much of their value.
4.3 Trapping the people and the democratic process in the state
Second, and partially due to this static and defensive strategy, the external 
and statist approach of BVG traps the people, and the democratic process, 
in the state. As a result the BVG again endangers what it seeks to protect.
The reproach that the BVG is locking up the people in the state is perhaps 
unexpected. The Lissabon Urteil explicitly refers to the sovereign people 
that, as the sole pouvoir constituant, are the source of all public authority.56 
The people are even given the power to dissolve the German state, despite 
the eternity clause in the Constitution.57 The actual authority of the peo-
ple, however, is clipped significantly by the way in which the BVG welds 
democracy and sovereignty to the state. The people have no choice but to 
delegate ‘their’ authority to a state. Within this statal paradigm, further-
more, the only two choices the German people are given are between the 
German state or a European federation.58 The second alternative of dis-
solving Germany into a European federate state is so far-reaching, that de 
facto the current German state remains as the sole alternative. This severely 
restricts the peoples’ freedom of delegation. Politically speaking the people 
can be compared to consumers in a communist regime: free to spend their 
political capital with the sole supplier available, being the German State.
53 BVerfGE 2 BvR 2661/06 (2010) Honeywell, BVerfGE 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10 and 
2 BvR 1099/10 (2011) Euro Rescue Package par. 200 and 206, BverGE 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 
1421/12, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 be 6/12 (2012) ESM Treaty. Also 
see in this regard the rather fl exible acceptance of art. 8(2) TESM and the possible loss of 
German voting rights in par. 237. Further see Payandeh (2011), 10.
54 Compare in this regard also the equally open and cooperative approaches to the ESM by 
the Estonian Riigikohus (Constitutional Judgment 3-4-1-6-12 of 12 July 2012, ESM Treaty), 
and to the Fiscal Compact by the French Conseil constitionell (decision No. 2012-653 DC 
9 August 2012).
55 BVerfGE 2 BvR 2661/06 (2010) Honeywell par. 66.
56 Lissabon, 231 and 234.
57 Lissabon, 228.
58 Lissabon, 228.
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Yet why should the people themselves not be allowed to decide on the del-
egation of powers? And why should the limits of such delegation not be 
determined by the democratic process itself, instead of by some judicially 
determined limits?59 Is the desire to centralize such core competences not 
an outdated notion of democracy, originating in a time that the myth of 
autarky was at least somewhat plausible? For in today’s world, increas-
ingly defined by interdependence, the question which authority should lie 
at what level seems like a particularly crucial question for the democratic 
process to engage with.60
Moreover, even after a power has been delegated to the EU the question 
remains for national politics how to use the influence that has been acquired 
in return for the delegated powers. What the BVG does not substantiate, 
and probably also cannot substantiate, is why the application of national 
competences is the sole possible substance of national democracy: Why 
can the use of voting rights in regional organisations not make democracy 
worthwhile? The national discussion on, for instance, the services directive, 
the Lisbon Treaty itself, or the financial crisis for that matter, seem to sug-
gest otherwise.61
The limitation on national democratic decision-making regarding delegation 
is additionally problematic considering its weak basis. The rather oppor-
tunistic selection of ‘essential’ competences was already commented upon. 
Even more problematic, however, is the entire idea of a substantive core of 
competences itself. An idea that implies that there can only be one core per 
democratic entity, and consequently also only one truly democratic entity 
per geographic unit. There can, after all, only be one centre of authority that 
exclusively holds the required preponderance of essential competences.62
This statal swaddling of democracy is so restrictive that it would not even 
be compatible with the democratic reality in existing federate systems, 
including the German one. 63 It is, after all, the essence of the federate form 
that essential competences, such as social security, criminal law or family 
law, are divided over multiple governments. Under the logic of the BVG, 
this would mean that there is either no full democratic process in a federate 
system, or that only one of the levels of government in a federation could be 
really democratic. Yet in democratic federations, such as the US or Germany 
59 See for a further discussion of this point below chapter 10 section 6 and chapter 12.
60 Habermas (1996), and Habermas (2001), 58. As will be discussed below such questions 
can thereby provide extra substance to the national process, partially replacing control 
over outsourced competences.
61 See Barnard (1998), 323 et seq.
62 Logic that in a sense follows Bodin’s argument from indivisibility. See Bodin, Book I, 
chapter 10.
63 See above chapter 2 section 2.1.2. and chapter 9 section 5 for the sovereignty arguments 
leveled against the US federation as well.
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the states and the central government do have autonomous democratic pro-
cesses.64 Fully appreciating the difficult position of the BVG, which simulta-
neously needs to protect a German unity externally and a federate diversity 
internally, this seems an ultimately indefensible position.
The external conception of sovereignty relied on by the BVG, therefore, 
traps both the people and the democratic process within the – declining – 
state. It does so at a time where it is becoming obvious that the relatively 
random scope of the state no longer forms the sole level at which influ-
ence needs to be exercised to be effective. In other words, the net effect of 
the BVG’s approach is to safeguard democratic control at a level that may 
often guarantee little real world power or actual influence.65 Yet what is the 
value of a German vote that determines the national political outcome on, 
say, social security, but cannot determine, or even affect, reality? Though 
with the best of intentions, the external conception applied by the BVG thus 
undermines its own central aims and only threatens democracy in the long 
run. For as a result of its protective stance neither the role of the people or 
the democratic process can evolve and adapt to the changing circumstances 
that necessitate integration in the first place.66
4.4 The potential benefits of confederal sovereignty for statism
A transition towards a confederal conception of sovereignty may help stat-
ism in better achieving several key aims, whilst reducing some of its weaker 
spots. That is, even the statist aims and objectives may be better served by 
applying an internal, and ‘softer’ confederal conception of sovereignty than 
by sticking to seemingly more forceful and absolute external conceptions.
First of all the confederal perspective may not recognize the ultimate 
authority of the Member States, but it does recognize the ultimate authority 
of the member peoples. It thereby empowers the people, who are also the 
intended beneficiaries of statism, directly. In addition, it also accepts that 
the Member States form the primary, if not exclusive, embodiment and rep-
resentatives of these sovereign people. As such it not only provides protec-
tion to the people, but also to the Member States, as should be done in a 
64 Elazar (2006), 33.
65 This forms the opposite of the descriptive fallacy: It assumes that sovereignty can be fully 
separated from actual power.
66 The warning of Grimm, himself a former judge in the BVG, on the need for law to respect 
the political becomes of even greater interest here: ‘Total legislation is neither desirable 
nor possible. The task of politics consists in the production of a just social order in chang-
ing circumstances. With complete legal binding this task could not be carried out. That 
would instead confine politics to the implementation of norms and thus ultimately 
reduce it to administration. A society so organized would render itself incapable of adap-
tation or even survival. (Grimm (1995), 287).
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confederal system. Protection that includes the national (judicial) power of 
safeguarding the ultimate authority of the people where truly threatened.67
Contrary to the statist perspective, however, confederal sovereignty can 
actually empower the people instead of trapping them in the state. It offers 
them more choices in delegating their power, and allows them to extend 
their influence, and legitimacy, beyond the state.68 It thereby creates at least 
a starting point for the further evolution of the democratic process itself, and 
does so in a way that includes European integration in the democratic pro-
cess instead of excluding it. A potential further explored in part III. This is of 
vital importance as democracy will have to keep pace with global develop-
ments, and cannot be protected by locking it into the state for safe keeping.69
Internal sovereignty also allows more flexibility than the BVG’s approach 
of setting fixed limits to integration. The level and limits of integration may 
become part of the democratic process, preventing courts from having to 
define and defend democracy. Simultaneously it opens up a path for the EU 
to ground its authority in the people directly without dismantling the states, 
and for the people to exert democratic control on the EU. In fact the con-
cept of a Staatenverbund could form a useful starting point here, especially 
when coupled to the BVG’s idea that power in the EU should derive from 
‘the peoples of Europe with their democratic constitutions in their states.’70 
Of course, as will be seen below, many problems attach to such flexibility 
and inclusion as well, but at least it seems to offer more perspective than a 
retreat within the state.
Before further exploring such applications of a confederal conception of 
sovereignty, however, it is useful to first return to the opposing school of 
pluralism. As with statism, it would appear that several of its weaknesses 
relate to a reliance on external sovereignty, whereas its valuable insights 
could be strengthened by incorporating an internal notion of sovereignty.
5 Pluralism and the confederal perspective
As discussed, pluralism, to the extent that it has a shared core, stresses the 
lack of an ultimate authority or hierarchy. Our current reality is one of mul-
tiple levels of interacting legal orders and actors. A point of view that direct-
67 See on the secondary primacy of EU law chapter 10 section 8.
68 See also on this ‘augmenting’ potential Loughlin (2006), 81.
69 For a prime example of such an approach which ostentatively protects democracy and 
national identity but in reality only guarantees their demise by welding them to the state, 
see T.H.P. Baudet, The signifi cance of borders: why representative government and the rule of 
law require nation states (Doctoral thesis Leiden University 2012).
70 BVerfGE, 2 BvE 123,267, 2 BvE 2/08 (2009) Lissabon Urteil par. 231.
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ly clashes with the sovereign claims of the BVG, and seemingly leaves little 
space for any form of sovereignty at all.
Pluralism thereby makes some very convincing points, and fits with several 
facts that appear beyond denial. We are seeing a plural reality where mul-
tiple centres of authority are engaged in a dialogue, where different public 
authorities maintain public views that are clearly incompatible with each 
other, and where no single actor seems capable of imposing its view on all 
others. States are losing power and influence as events force them to coop-
erate and compromise.71 In that light the EU does seem a credible crown 
witness against any statist view, and sovereignty with it.
Just as statism this pluralist perspective also has much to offer to a 
confederal model. For a confederation logically knows multiple centres of 
authority. And because all these rely on separate authority bases they do 
not stand in a clear hierarchy to one another, nor do they need to. In the 
confederal model developed here, for example, both the Member States and 
the EU receive sovereign authority directly from the member people. They 
do not depend on each other for this authority in any hierarchical way. As 
a result, in a confederation the constitutional value and importance of pro-
cedural principles such as loyal cooperation, subsidiarity or mutual respect 
increases, as does the value of dialogue in general.
Yet despite its useful insights and accurate description several problems 
surround this popular school of thought as well. As with statism, some of 
these problems can be traced back to the (implicit) use of an external notion 
of sovereignty. In the case of pluralism, however, this concerns the resis-
tance against such an external notion. Resistance that leads to an overre-
action, and to an overstatement of the tension between sovereignty and 
integration. As a result pluralism might reject far more of what is valuable 
in sovereignty than is necessary to sustain its key values and insights.
Two problematic points in pluralism are especially relevant in this regard. 
First, it removes instead of provides a proper foundation for political 
authority, even though its search for alternative foundations for EU authori-
ty through notions of citizenship contains interesting leads. Second, some of 
the key descriptive truths it draws on are not as antithetical to sovereignty 
as it claims, but rather require a basis in internal sovereignty.
71 This is a fact even acknowledged by those who argue that the state remains as the central 
actor, and that, for instance, organisations as the EU only ‘rescue’ the nation state. Even in 
such arguments, after all, the state is in need of some saving or support to retain its cen-
tral position in a globalizing reality. Cf. for example A. Milward, The European Rescue of 
the Nation State (Routledge 1992).
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5.1 Free floating authority
As a post-modern logic pluralism seems better suited to deconstructing our 
existing foundations than creating sufficiently powerful new ones. After tra-
ditional notions such as sovereignty have been debunked, we are generally 
left with a daunting conceptual, political, and legal hole.72
By denying ultimate hierarchy, for instance, pluralism must also deny 
the ultimate sovereignty of the people. A denial that directly attacks the 
basis for national democracy. It also removes any chance of grounding the 
EU, including its federate superstructure, in these member peoples. As dis-
cussed above, however, these sovereign peoples seem one of the few foun-
dations strong enough to carry that burden. Equally no final authority is left 
to settle conflicts, no matter how fundamental their challenge may be to the 
polity as a whole.73
Once traditional foundations for political authority have been rejected, fur-
thermore, legitimacy must be derived from other and much weaker sources 
such as output, procedural concepts, or abstract shared values.74 The denial 
of ultimate popular authority, therefore, explains the tendency of pluralists 
to revert to more technocratic or procedural sources of authority.75 Yet there 
is a realistic concern that these alternative sources are too thin, at least for a 
fairly large majority of the population. In any event this is what the recent 
rise of populism and, to say the least, less than enlightened politics, so far 
seems to indicate. Rational citizenship and enlightened values seem to hold 
a limited attraction, certainly in times of crisis. Furthermore, basing the EU 
on a different legitimacy structure than its Member State systems could cre-
ate a conflict, and could undermine the legitimacy of those Member States 
as well.
The request to the European peoples to commit themselves to such an 
alienating, post-modern Europe that continues to defy qualification under-
standably lacks appeal. Where integration nevertheless continues, without 
providing more convincing answers as to the foundation of its author-
ity, legitimacy naturally remains a problem.76 Instead of finding a stron-
ger foundation to carry the federate superstructure of the EU, the Union 
becomes a free floating entity. In this regard the somewhat clinical basis of 
72 Cf Loughlin (2006), 76. Especially so where sovereignty is seen as the answer to the con-
stitutive act / challenge of creating unity in a plural chaos. That is: Without sovereignty, 
or another conceptual answer to the same question, we do not even have unifi ed entities 
that can interact, dialogue or interpenetrate. We just have, ultimately, individuals. See to 
this end especially Van Roermund (2006), Lindahl (2006), and Huysmans (2006).
73 Lindahl (2006), 105, Baquero Cruz (2008), 398.
74 Habermas (1995), Habermas (2001), Kumm (2009), 258.
75 Habermas (2001), Maduro (2006), Kumm (2005), 262, MacCormick (1999).
76 See for instance: Habermas (1996), 126 et seq., Douglas-Scott (2002), 255 et seq.
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postmodernism in epistemology perhaps remains too dominant in plural-
ism; how to base trust in a political system on a fundamental distrust of all 
knowledge remains difficult to see.
5.2 The descriptive basis and prescriptive weakness of pluralism
The strength of pluralism lies in its accurate description of the heterarchy in 
the legal reality of the EU. As we saw, however, sovereignty is a prescriptive 
concept not a descriptive one. It contains a normative claim of how power 
should be organized and who should have the ultimate say. As a result the 
descriptive claims of pluralism do not directly affect sovereignty.
Even where the descriptive basis of pluralism is turned into a norma-
tive command – thou shall not desire hierarchy– the descriptive foundation 
of this command eventually undermines it. For the command cannot offer 
a solution where a fundamental conflict does arise. If we take, for instance, 
the not fully imaginary situation of an open conflict between a national con-
stitutional court and the ECJ. Even though pluralism might celebrate the 
capacity for such a conflict to arise, it provides no solution once the conflict 
is there. Yet it is part of the function of a constitutional and legal system to 
solve such conflicts, and to prevent extra-legal escalation. In this sense plu-
ralism reflects the Kantian dream of civilized republics that will never go to 
war: although highly desirable it fails to be political theory as it assumes that 
those factors of the human condition making a political system necessary 
will disappear.77
Similarly pluralism does not solve the need for hierarchy, and therefore 
sovereignty, in law. It simply assumes hierarchy will not be necessary as no 
dispute will arise or escalate, and that not providing an answer will remain 
a viable option.78 Consequently pluralism is not a prescriptive or a legal the-
ory. It is a description of the current reality in the EU, based on the hope that 
this reality will remain stable.
Where the EU is in clear need of a stronger legitimacy for and foundation 
of its authority, pluralism is, therefore, incapable of providing these. Instead 
it removes what foundations we thought we had. The thinner, rational and 
rather optimistic alternative foundations it offers, be they procedural, val-
ue based or advanced forms of multiple citizenship, also seem incapable 
of providing the legitimacy required. At least they are not doing so at the 
moment, even though there is no shortage of EU values. Conversely, plu-
ralist accounts of European integration may even contribute to an anti-EU 
sentiment. The enlightened picture pluralism paints can all too easily be 
perceived as, or turned into, an attack on national foundations. Some of the 
optimism underlying these alternatives, furthermore, especially where reli-
77 Cf Keating (2006), 201.
78 See the bridging attempts by Kumm and Maduro discussed in chapter 8, section 6.
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ance is based on overarching values, may even conflict with the epistemo-
logical scepticism underlying the pluralist approach itself: Where does the 
substantive supremacy of these values come from, where hierarchy itself is 
anathema?
At the same time the fact that we might not like some of its outcomes does 
not in itself prove that pluralism is wrong. For if hierarchy has indeed 
become factually impossible in our new global order, undermining the 
intelligibility of sovereignty as a prescriptive concept, we would need to 
accept that reality. The weak alternatives suggested by pluralism would not, 
in themselves, undermine the problem identified, but would only deepen 
our predicament.
Fortunately, the pluralist approach may be far more compatible with 
sovereignty than generally thought. Several of its key aims and values may 
even be better achieved by combining it with a confederal notion of sov-
ereignty. A conclusion that, if correct, also means that pluralism might be 
more compatible than it seems with accepting some ultimate foundation, as 
long as it does not undermine factual plurality and the valuable processes 
this plurality allows in daily reality.79
5.3 The plural reality of confederal sovereignty
Just as statism, pluralism implicitly engages with an external notion of 
sovereignty. It derives part of its strength from the way it deconstructs this 
prominent concept. Yet as set out above external sovereignty is the wrong 
concept to challenge. The process of European integration can best be 
understood from an internal conception of sovereignty. The pluralist cri-
tique on external sovereignty only reaffirms this suggestion. Illustrating 
how the EU undermines external sovereignty does not, therefore, proof that 
sovereignty should be scrapped from EU discourse altogether.
Once approached from a confederal perspective, furthermore, it becomes 
apparent that the core phenomena pluralism aims to describe and explain – 
multiple related, yet not hierarchically organized centres of political author-
ity and the occurrence of authority conflicts between them for which the 
system offers no solution – do not intrinsically conflict with internal sover-
eignty. The plural reality within most states clearly illustrates this point.
79 Note in this regard also that it is in such daily practice that habits are formed (in the Aris-
totelian sense). In that regard the moral strand of pluralism, hoping to educate people 
and build tolerance through dialogue and interaction, is served by daily dialogue, but is 
not undermined by the existence of an ultimate hierarchy in exceptional cases.
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From the internal perspective, after all, the possibility of a conflict within 
a constitutional or legal system – that is the fact that there is no definitive 
solution for such a conflict within the system– does not prove that there is 
no sovereign. Rather it is a logical and expected consequence where human 
intelligence tries to device any system, let alone a complex one for dividing 
and checking public authority.
Prior to joining the EU, Member States did not have flawless hierarchies 
either.80 To give only some examples: Before the judicature act of 1873, 
England had two parallel court systems, the Common Law Courts and the 
Courts of Equity, with no common court of last instance. Until 1783 there 
was no mechanism within the legal system to solve a conflict between these 
two courts. In the Netherlands we see something comparable, albeit less 
dramatic, where the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) and the Council of State 
(De Raad van State) may come to conflicting outcomes, without any judicial 
mechanism to resolve the conflict. The Spanish, French and Belgian systems 
provide further examples of different courts, supreme within their respec-
tive jurisdictions, who inter alia disagree on the status of EU law in their 
national legal system.81 Federate systems are another case in point where 
uncertainty and political struggle over the delineation of powers is even 
purposely built in to the system.
A more fundamental example, however, can be found in such common and 
fundamental constitutional doctrines as the separation of powers or checks 
and balances. The entire logic of these doctrines is premised on the hope that 
powers will control and block each other. They purposely create the pos-
sibility of a stalemate that cannot be solved within the system, and thereby 
protect the internal sovereign. Were a system really to deadlock, after all, 
the only remaining option would be to go back to the people, the ultimate 
source of authority. 82
80 This follows a more general pattern of sometimes applying demands and requirement to 
the EU that are not even met by the most well developed Member State.
81 France does have the institution of the‘Tribunal des confl its’, which consists of members 
of the Conseil d'État and the Cour de cassation and aims to resolve confl icts of competence 
between both high Courts. This body does not, however, remove the plurality in the 
French judicial system, as the diverging French case law on the effect of European Law in 
the French legal order has aptly demonstrated.
82 One example that has become acutely relevant with the war against terror(ism), is the 
tension between the executive power to declare war, declare an emergency and secure 
security with the obligation of the judiciary and the legislator to safeguard rights and 
procedures. On the one hand a level of comity is required, yet the executive cannot be 
limitless.
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The sole existence of multiple centres of authority that may irreconcil-
ably conflict, therefore, does not mean that there is no more sovereign, but 
only that the system of delegation is not flawless, or that such conflict was 
deemed desirable.83
In the case of the EU the system for the delegation of sovereign author-
ity now includes an external, non-statal entity.84 No ready blueprint exists 
for such a constitutional structure.85 Much of the structure, furthermore, has 
been made up along the way, often in response to crises. Even more often 
decisions were based on a compromise between conflicting, or confused, 
preferences for the finalité of the EU. What coherent theory, after all, would 
model a constitution after an asymmetrical temple, or use a ‘hidden’ pillar, 
only somewhat understandable to experts if they manage to simultaneously 
keep in mind all earlier Treaties?86 It should not come as a surprise, there-
fore, that the EU system contains many gaps, overlaps and uncertainties, 
especially when compared to the tried and tested schemes of delegation 
found within national systems.
Rather than making it obsolete, therefore, the EU, and the experiment in 
delegation it comprises, increases the role and need for sovereignty. The new 
found appeal of referenda only confirms this, as the need is increasingly felt 
to consult with the people directly where the system itself no longer pro-
vides an answer, or must be redesigned in some part.87
Even if factually and descriptively correct, therefore, pluralism does not 
lead to a necessary rejection of internal sovereignty. It only raises the ques-
tion what level of pluralism is still bearable within internal sovereignty, and 
83 In addition, post-modernism cannot just begin at the border: Either sovereignty has nev-
er been plausible, also not within the state, meaning the EU cannot have brought any 
fundamental changes in this respect. In this sense the debate mirrors that of internal sov-
ereignty against internal pluralism such as the type developed by Laski. See in this 
respect also the criticism of Schmitt, which can today also be scaled up to the EU level: 
‘That is the pluralism of his theory of state (…) its entire ingenuity is directed against 
earlier exaggerations of the state, against its majesty and its personality, against its claim 
to posses the monopoly of the highest unity, (…). Schmitt (2007), 44.
84 Cf John P. McCormick, ‘Fear, Technology, and the State: Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, and the 
Revival of Hobbes in Weimar and National Socialist Germany’ 22 Political Theory (1994), 
641. This is also not so much of a problem once one accepts that the state was only a tool, 
an instrument to certain objectives, and not the goal itself.
85 Cf the warning by Van Roermund. The delegation that takes place outside the state can 
also not refer to, or rely on, the (more) strongly perceived objectives of ‘shared co-opera-
tive activity’ within the national polities. As a result the shared discourse authorizing 
authority claims is much more fragile: ‘I would call this deferred (rather than late) sove-
reignty, because such shared co-operative activity is a precarious equilibrium that contin-
ues to exist only by virtue of meeting the Bratman parameters when push comes to 
shove.’ Van Roermund (2006), 53. The resulting danger that the system will break down 
in times of crisis must be taken seriously, but are hopefully addressed by the modifi ca-
tions and proposals discussed in part I and III.
86 Dougan (2008), 617 et seq.
87 See the proposals in chapter 12, section 4 and 5 below.
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how we could manage the pros and contras of pluralism using the tools that 
have been developed within national constitutional systems.
This deprives pluralism of one of its main claims, as it is the obvious 
descriptive truth of pluralism that underlies much of it credibility. At the 
same time an internal conception may also strengthen the pluralist cause. 
It may allow for a stronger foundation than the thin and perhaps overly 
civilized alternatives for sovereignty it has come up with so far, yet with-
out having to accept some form of overall linear hierarchy: the plural reality 
it values normatively may perhaps be combined with some form of ulti-
mate foundation. And in line with the pluralist intuition this basis is then 
not found in the state, but in the citizens, albeit not as rational and detached 
global citizens, but as sovereign member peoples acting through their states. 
As will be further developed below and in part III, the declining role of the 
state that pluralism rightly points out, can then also be fully accommodated 
under an internal conception of sovereignty.
5.4 Sub-conclusion: Where statism and pluralism meet?
Both statism and pluralism engage with an external conception of sover-
eignty. The apparent juxtaposition that these views land us in – sovereignty 
or integration– is linked to this external conception. Only where sovereignty 
is perceived as indivisible and absolute in the external sense are we required 
with statism to ‘defend’ the sovereign state, or with pluralism to exorcise 
sovereignty altogether. Both schools, therefore, lock our understanding of 
the EU into an unsuitable external paradigm. An external paradigm devel-
oped to abstract from the complexities of the internal constitutional system, 
and therefore incapable of accommodating the demands of democracy and 
legitimacy posed by the constitutional and confederal nature of the EU.
In a certain way this is good news. The conflict between statism and plural-
ism, and between integration and sovereignty, is not inherent and unavoid-
able. Once external sovereignty is replaced with a more suitable notion of 
confederal sovereignty this conflict is significantly softened, as are some of 
the unconvincing extremes in both approaches.
Most importantly for statism a confederal notion of sovereignty pro-
vides a sufficient level of protection for the member peoples and their states 
as primary entities within the constitutional system. These entities, there-
fore, also remain as foundations for public authority. The safeguarding of 
these entities, however, can now be based directly on the peoples, making 
it far more flexible and convincing than the external defence of the state. 
A more flexible basis that enables statism to accept a more plural reality in 
the EU, no longer tied to an absolute state, and enables the people to escape 
their conceptual entrapment in that state.
For pluralism confederal sovereignty may retain the plural reality, and 
the spirit of cooperation and dialogue it requires, yet at the same time pro-
vide it with a much needed but not too restrictive foundation. The delega-
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tion of sovereign powers necessary within confederal sovereignty allows 
more than enough space to divide and share authority and create a plu-
ral reality in the daily exercise of authority. As the system for delegation 
improves, furthermore, less direct appeals to the authority of the people, 
and to direct hierarchy, will be necessary. This confederal plural reality, 
however, does not have to challenge the ultimate authority of the people, 
and with it one of central tenets of democratic theory. Unlike external plu-
ralism, it can respect the limits laid down by internal statism, and rely on 
the sovereign foundation of the peoples where a conflict cannot be solved 
by dialogue alone.
These conclusion free the way to further develop our notion of confederal 
sovereignty. It also brings us to the second central aim of this thesis. Can 
confederal sovereignty assist in creating a more stable yet still confederal 
basis for the EU?
6 Grounding the Union: A sufficient popular foundation 
for the EU
Part I outlined the growing gap between the authority demands of the EU’s 
federate superstructure and the authority capacity of the EU’s confeder-
al foundation. A problem that did not arise in the US, where the federate 
superstructure was based on the federate basis of a single American people. 
Yet, as also discussed in part I, this federate solution to close the gap is cur-
rently not available to the EU. A purely statist approach cannot provide a 
sufficient foundation either, as it must contain the authority of the EU with-
in the too narrow boundaries of an international organization. Pluralism 
cannot even accept the idea of a foundation itself, let alone provide one to 
the EU.
Confederal sovereignty may offer a way out of this conundrum. It can pro-
vide a subsidiary but sufficient popular foundation to the EU. A founda-
tion that is capable of carrying the EU’s federate superstructure, but can 
also respect the autonomy and elemental status the Member States need to 
retain in a confederal system. As a consequence, such a confederal founda-
tion can also combine a high level of operational heterarchy within an over-
arching confederal hierarchy.
Confederal sovereignty does so by establishing a direct but subsidiary link 
between the member peoples and the EU. The link is direct because the EU 
is directly incorporated into the national constitutional schemes via which 
the people delegate their sovereign authority. The explicit clauses in many 
Member State constitutions allowing delegation of sovereign powers to the 
EU underscore this fact. This link between the EU and the member peoples, 
therefore, is as direct as that between the member peoples and their respec-
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tive states, which also receive their authority from the people through the 
constitution.88 On this point, therefore, the EU and the Member States stand 
on an equal level, both receiving a certain amount of sovereignty authority 
directly from the people.
Yet, in true confederal style, the direct link between the EU and the member 
peoples remains subsidiary to, or conditional on, the relation between the 
member peoples and their respective states. As a result, the Member States 
also retain a certain principal, or primary, status themselves, as should be 
the case in a confederal system.
It is important to stress, however, that the terms subsidiary and prin-
cipal are used here in a specific and confederal meaning. To begin with, 
these terms certainly do not indicate that the Member States hold some 
form of higher or more real sovereign authority than the EU. As indicat-
ed above, both the EU and the Member States directly receive sovereign 
authority from the member peoples, and both do so at the constitutional 
level. Equally, as will be further discussed below, this principal link between 
the member peoples and their states does not mean that the states always 
trump the EU, or enjoy some form of inherent supremacy.89 Where the EU 
receives sovereign authority from the people, it equally receives the claim 
to final authority that comes with it. Lastly, it is also not claimed that this 
primary link between the member peoples and their states is a necessity or 
a constitutional constant for the EU. If they so desire, the member peoples 
could transfer their primary loyalty and political existence to the EU, for 
example by jointly creating a federate European state. The principal status 
of the Member States, therefore, is contingent, and derives from the will of 
the sovereign member peoples to remain sovereign.
What is claimed, however, is that in the current confederal reality in the EU, 
and for as long as the member peoples desire to keep the EU confederal at 
its core, the Member States retain a principal relationship to the member 
peoples, and through that relation a certain primary and protected status. 
Several factors combine to establish this relation and status. These factors 
relate to the nature of the EU confederal system set out in part I, and togeth-
er shape the direct but subsidiary popular foundation that confederal sover-
eignty can provide to the EU.
Firstly, there is what can be termed the existential, or home-base, factor. The 
Member States are intimately involved in the political existence, identity 
and self-government of the member peoples. The member peoples, at least 
for an important part, exist and act through their state and its institutions. 
88 Except for Cyprus, The Netherlands and Denmark that do not have an (explicit) popular 
internal sovereign.
89 See below section 8 on confederal primacy.
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As such the member peoples have their principal political existence at the 
national level, and not at the EU level.
This argument does not claim that a people can only exist in, or be cre-
ated by, a state. It also recognizes that some states contain more than one 
people, or that some people are spread out over multiple states. It is only 
claimed that, within the established states in the EU, a principal or existen-
tial relation between the member peoples and their states does generally 
exist.90 Even in those Member States that do not fully qualify as a nation-
state, a close relation exists between the existence and identity of the people 
and their state. A claim that is supported at the national level by the com-
mon reliance on popular sovereignty as the foundation of the state set out 
above, as well as by the many constitutional courts that recognize and pro-
tect such an existential relation between their people and their states.91
At the EU level, the existential importance of the national is, inter alia, evi-
dent in the derivative nature of EU citizenship, and in the explicit recogni-
tion and protection of national identity in Article 4(2) TEU. Similarly the 
preambles of the TEU and TFEU speak of the Member States and ‘their 
peoples’, and vice versa of the member peoples and ‘their states’, captur-
ing the close relation between both. The requirement of unanimity for 
amendment,92 and the right of a people to secede under Article 50 TEU 
further underscore the existential primacy of the national level.93 Within a 
state, after all, constitutional change generally does not require unanimity, 
and secession is far more problematic as well.94
In addition, the existential primacy of the national is borne out by a 
simple thought experiment. Were one to abolish the EU tomorrow, the dif-
ferent member peoples would continue to exist and act within their own 
states. The collapse of the EU would rob them of a substantial, but ultimate-
ly subsidiary and complementary status and identity. Were one to abolish 
the Member States tomorrow, however, political life would be far more 
disrupted, and it seems unlikely that the EU could step in as the new pri-
mary habitat of all member peoples. It seems more likely that new sub-units 
would be established, and that these would once again house the principal 
political existence of the different member peoples, even if these might not 
90 Here Belgium might form the exception that confi rms the rule, as there the EU might 
actually play a role in keeping the different ‘peoples’ within a single state.
91 See the discussion of judicial statism above in chapter 8, section 4.4, as well as the case 
law mentioned there. For particularly strong examples of this existential relation see the 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal in judgment K18/04 of 11 May 2005, EU Accession and 
K32/09 of 24 November 2010, Lisbon.
92 Art. 48 TEU. For a detailed overview of all procedures for amendment see chapter 2, sec-
tion 2.4.3.
93 Art. 50 TEU further stipulates that this right is to be exercised under the own constitutional 
requirements. Also see Art. 46(5), where the withdrawal from any permanent structured 
military cooperation is also foreseen.
94 Maduro (2005), 348.
342 Chapter 10
be identical to the current ones in all cases. So where the EU depends on the 
existence of the Member States, the Member States do not depend on the EU 
in the same manner.
This existential link between the member peoples and their states, and the 
principal status of the Member States that flows from it, conforms to the 
nature of a confederal system as set out in part I. It is part of the essence of a 
confederal system that the sub-units remain the principal hubs of legitima-
cy, political organization and identity, and the foundational political build-
ing blocks on which the central system is built. Again this does not mean 
that the EU must necessarily remain confederal, or that the EU could never 
establish a primary or existential link with the member peoples itself. It only 
means that, as long as the member peoples remain separate sovereign enti-
ties, their principal statal shells also retain a certain elemental status.
A second factor that underlies the principal status of the Member States is 
closely related to the existential factor. It could be labelled the default fac-
tor. The Member States remain the default option for delegation: all sov-
ereign authority not delegated to the EU, or other entities, remains with 
the states.95 This arrangement further indicates that these states remain the 
principal political shells of their member peoples and their authority. It fur-
ther relates to the fact that the member peoples only retain a certain level of 
unilateral control over the exercise of their sovereign authority within their 
states. As soon as authority is delegated to the EU, after all, it will be exer-
cised jointly, with no single member people controlling the way in which 
the EU will exercise the authority. Where a people considers a certain com-
petence as vital, for instance for its identity, it will generally prefer to keep 
that competence under unilateral control. This will, of course, not always 
be feasible, but nevertheless increases the chance that the national level will 
retain certain competences that are considered existential, further increasing 
its principal status.96
Thirdly, and again related to the existential factor, there is the fact that the 
Member States play a vital role in the functioning of the EU. The merged 
system of EU government was already discussed in part I.97 This merged 
system means that the EU would not be able to function without the pri-
mary institutions, legitimacy and political processes of the Member States. 
Equally, the member peoples would have no, or very limited means to act 
on the European level without their statal exoskeleton. Conversely, and 
95 Art. 5(2) TEU.
96 Note that this factor does not require one to establish a quantative or qualitative list of 
competences that must remain at the national level. Rather, as will be further explored in 
chapter 13, it calls for a rigorous national democratic process on which competences a 
member people itself wants to delegate.
97 See chapter 2, section 3.2.
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again in line with the confederal nature of the EU, the Member States are 
not dependent on the EU for the exercise of the sovereign authority del-
egated to them.
It in this sense, therefore, that under a confederal approach the Member 
States retain a principal and existential link with the member peoples.98 
And it is in this specific sense as well that the link between the people and 
the EU is qualified as subsidiary, since it does not equal, nor needs to equal, 
the more existential connection between the peoples and their respective 
states.
As stated, however, the subsidiary nature of this link in no way diminishes 
the direct link between the people and the EU, or the importance and poten-
cy of this link. Quite to the contrary, it is the subsidiary nature of this direct 
popular link that makes confederal sovereignty such an interesting con-
struct. For through its direct connection, confederal sovereignty provides 
the EU access to probably the only foundation strong enough to democrati-
cally support its federate superstructure: the sovereign member peoples. At 
the same time, the subsidiary nature of this connection means that it does 
not aspire to the supreme and principal status of a federate foundation, nor 
has to challenge the principal status of the Member States.
Equally, confederal sovereignty does not threaten the sovereignty or iden-
tity of the member peoples either. Rather it respects and reinforces it. The 
people are confirmed as the foundation of public authority both nationally 
and at the European level. Contrary to statism, they are not trapped in their 
states. Contrary to pluralism, no alternative source of authority than the 
people has to be developed. Popular sovereignty, a core construct of demo-
cratic theory and the peoples national status, does not have to be decon-
structed to legitimize the EU. As a consequence, confederal sovereignty 
would really allow the EU to be ‘an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe’99 A Union based on the sovereign peoples directly, who recipro-
cally share part of their sovereign authority in the EU.100
98 Cf. Weiler (2000), 57, where he states that, although there formally is a hierarchy of norms 
with EC law on top, ‘this is not rooted in a hierarchy of normative authority or in a hierar-
chy of power’.
99 Art. 1 TEU.
100 For the risk, and to a certain degree reality, that the Member States will usurp the central 
position of the people, as they wield power nationally, and for a discussion of how to 
avoid this risk, see the discussion on confederal democracy in part III.
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As indicated, such a confederal conception of sovereignty also fits with 
the explicit basis of the EU in delegation, and with the increasingly direct 
relation between the EU and the individual.101 Confederal sovereignty 
explains and justifies this link: as direct recipients of sovereign authority 
the EU should have a direct link with the member peoples. Yet it also shows 
why his link remains subsidiary to the one between the member peoples 
and their states, and why the EU should not even strive to change that fact 
by seeking a stronger foundation that would undermine either the Member 
States or the ultimate sovereignty of the member peoples.
6.1 Counter arguments: The people, really?
The direct link between the EU and the member peoples logically raises two 
objections. One relates to the initial delegation by the people, and the other 
to the situation after delegation. Both need to be addressed.
6.1.1 Statal instead of popular delegation
First, can one really claim that the people delegated authority to the EU? 
Is it not closer to reality to say that national governments, or even courts, 
have done so, and often without knowledge of the people or even against 
their wishes? Sadly, especially the first part of this claim may hold a painful 
truth, the consequences of which the EU is increasingly confronted with.102 
Indeed, important steps in the development of the EU were based on statal 
consent alone, or were driven by the internal (legal) dynamic of integration 
itself.103 At the same time this historical reality should not be overstated, and 
for the other part should be overcome.
6.1.2 Overstating the exclusion of the people
The exclusion of the people should firstly not be overstated in the sense 
that the actions of the Member States cannot be so easily disassociated from 
their peoples. The Member States, and their elected governments, represent 
the people and exercise their sovereign authority. As we saw, furthermore, 
101 Obviously this direct link to the people also allowed the Court to grant them benefi ts and 
‘create a pro-Community constituency of private individuals’. See A-M Burley and W. 
Mattli, ‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’, 47 International 
Organization (1993), 41.
102 See for example the German decision to join the EMU, and to admit Italy in the Eurozone. 
The German government did so without publicly acknowledging the serious risks this 
enterprise involved, even though the government had received clear warnings from dif-
ferent sides, and this clearly concerned a momentous decision. See S. Böll, C. Reiermann, 
M. Sauga and K. Wiegrefe, ‘Operation Self-Deceit: New Documents Shine Light on Euro 
Birth Defects’, in Der Spiegel Online, May 8, 2012, available via: http://www.spiegel.de/
international/europe/euro-struggles-can-be-traced-to-origins-of-common-currency-
a-831842.html.
103 Also see the discussion on the self-expanding effects of the federate superstructure in 
chapter 3, section 3.4.
345The Confederal Potential of ‘We the peoples’ 
several Member States have accepted constitutional clauses allowing del-
egation of sovereign powers to the EU. More importantly, the perceived lack 
of direct popular consent almost completely derives from the situation in 
the six original Member States, and ignores the increasing practice of direct 
popular consent since.
Germany, France,104 Italy and the Benelux countries105 started the EU 
without a referendum.106 They did so, however, at a time where the, then 
ECSC and EEC, were far less developed, and fitted more logically within 
the boundaries of an international organization. In line with the evolu-
tion of the EU, however, a clear trend has since then developed to acquire 
direct popular support before accession. In 1973 Denmark107 and Ireland108 
held referenda on their accession to the EU. The UK did not hold a refer-
endum immediately, but continued membership was supported in a 1975 
referendum by 67.2% of the votes.109 Greece, Spain and Portugal did not 
hold referenda on accession, yet as these countries had recently emerged 
from dictatorial regimes, membership of the EU was seen as an important 
step to achieve and secure democratic rule.110 In 1994 Austria and Finland 
did hold referenda on their 1995 accessions,111 as did Sweden.112 With the 
104 Since then France has, however, held three referenda. In 1972 68.32% of voters supported 
accession by the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland with a turnout of 60.24%. In 
1992 51.05% said yes to Maastricht, with a 69.7% turnout. The Constitutional Treaty was 
rejected by 54.68% of the vote in 2005, with 69.34% voting.
105 Luxemburg did hold a compulsory referendum in 2005 on the Constitutional Treaty, 
whereby 56,52% voted in favour of ratifi cation.
106 On 17 December 1952, however, the Netherlands did hold a pilot-referendum in the two 
municipalities of Delft and Bolsward. Based on the last elections, these were deemed rep-
resentative for the Netherlands as a whole. The people were asked to vote on the follow-
ing question ‘Do you think that the Peoples of Europe should henceforth jointly serve 
certain shared interests, and do you support to that end: a UNITED EUROPE under a 
UNITED GOVERNMENT and with a DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION to be laid 
down in a EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION?’ (My translation, capitals in original). Though 
voluntary and non-binding, turnout was high: 88,2% in Bolsward, and 74,8% in Delft. 
The outcome was a resounding yes: In Delft 93.1% voted in favour, in Bolsward it was 
96.6%. The 2005 Dutch referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, of course, showed a 
markedly different outcome, with 61.54% voting No.
107 63.4% of voters supported accession, with a turnout of 90.1%. Since then Denmark has 
held fi ve further referenda on EU issues, with varying results.
108 83.1% voted for accession, with a turnout of 70.9%. Since then Ireland has held six refer-
enda on subsequent treaties, four voting yes (including one overturning a previous ‘no’ 
to Nice) and two no to ratifi cation.
109 Turnout was 64%.
110 Spain did hold a referendum in 2005 on the Constitutional Treaty. 76,73% voted yes, turn-
out was 42,32%.
111 In Finland 56.9% voted for accession with a turnout of 74% (respectively 73.6% and 49.1% 
for the Aland Islands). A probably not symbolic 66.6% of Austrian voters supported 
accession, turnout being 81.3%.
112 52,8% supported accession. Turnout was 83,3%. In 2003 Sweden held another referen-
dum in which 55,9% voted against the introduction of the Euro, turnout being 82,6%.
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eastern enlargements referenda became the norm. The Czech Republic,113 
Estonia,114 Latvia,115 Lithuania,116 Hungary,117 Malta,118 Poland,119 Slova-
kia120 and Slovenia121 all asked and received direct popular support for 
accession. Cyprus was the only exception, relying on parliamentary ratifi-
cation alone. In 2007 Romania and Bulgaria did not organize referenda, yet 
this was largely because public support was so overwhelming it was not felt 
necessary. In a 2003 referendum in Romania, furthermore, 91.1% of voters 
supported the changes to the Romanian constitution required to accede to 
the EU. This was generally also seen as a referendum on accession itself. In 
2012 Croatia also held a referendum on accession, in which 66.27% of voters 
supported accession.122
All in all, strictly counting pre-accession referenda only, 14 out of 27 mem-
ber people directly voted in favour of accession. More realistically including 
Great Britain, Bulgaria and Romania in this list, the total comes to 17 out of 
27, or 63% of member peoples. Counting the ex-dictatorial regimes of Spain, 
Portugal and Greece, and the future member Croatia, one would come to 21 
out of 28, or 75%. In these cases (though with decreasing force) one could 
say that the delegation of sovereign powers to the EU can even be based on 
a direct delegation by the people, and not just by the states as representa-
tives.123 Most crucial in this overview, however, is the clear trend towards 
a direct consultation of the people. A trend that follows and supports the 
evolution of the EU into a constitutional confederal organization.
Overall, therefore, the so called exclusion of the people should not be over-
stated, and cannot be relied upon to reject the confederal perspective. At 
the same time there remain clear weaknesses and gaps in the direct delega-
tion of authority from the member peoples to the EU, also because often the 
EU has developed significantly after popular consent to membership was 
given. As in all constitutional systems, however, part of the function of a 
constitutional theory is to overcome such gaps.
113 77,33% voted in favour of accession, turnout was 55,21%.
114 66,83% in favour of accession, turnout was 64,06%.
115 67% in favour, turnout was 72,53%.
116 91,07% in favour, turnout was 63,37%.
117 83,76% in favour, turnout was 45,62%.
118 53,65% in favour, turnout was 91%.
119 77,45% in favour, turnout was 58,85%.
120 92,46% in favour, turnout was 52,15%.
121 89,61% in favour, turnout was 60,29%.
122 Turnout was, however, low at 44%.
123 It should be noted, however, that in many of these referenda no (super-)qualifi ed majori-
ty was reached, as is often required for constitutional changes.
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6.1.3 Overcoming past shortfalls in popular consultation
A confederal perspective can also be of value in overcoming these past short-
falls in popular consultation. Especially so in the six founding members 
that joined when referenda did not seem necessary. These shortfalls can 
be lamented, begrudged, and probably have been counterproductively 
ignored. At some point, however, a constitutional system must overcome 
such original sins. It must replace them with a positive narrative – and real-
ity – which justify them with retroactive effect.
The US again provides a prime example. The federate Constitution flatly 
violated the Articles of Confederation. Its ratification was fraught with bit-
ter disputes and involved quite some political handiwork above and below 
the belt. It was ultimately affirmed only by a civil war.124 Yet its norma-
tive, almost mythical status, as well as the democratic system it eventually 
produced,125 retroactively compensated for these points, at least for most 
US citizens.
Similarly the democratic shortfalls that have marred the establishment 
of the EU in the past can, per definition, never be undone. Yet they might 
be overcome by proving the ultimate attractiveness and usefulness of their 
outcomes. And this usefulness is not meant in a narrow output sense, as in 
lowering cell phone costs. The confederal perspective may provide a nor-
matively attractive understanding at a more fundamental level. An under-
standing in which member peoples are not robbed of their influence, but 
empowered to engage with a globalizing reality. That is, the original sins 
of the EU will have been worth it because they will increase the democratic 
control and influence of the people in the longer run.
This normative appeal of a confederal approach will be further developed 
below and in part III, but also leads us to the second objection against the 
direct link between the member peoples and the EU claimed by a confeder-
al approach: what remains of this direct link after power has been delegated 
to the EU?
6.2 Institutionalizing confederal sovereignty
In the US federate system the people delegated their sovereignty to the dif-
ferent governments. In turn they received back certain rights and a certain 
level of popular control as the electorate and pouvoir constituant. In this non-
sovereign capacity the people retained a level of control over the exercise 
of the sovereign authority they had delegated. As a result the direct link 
established between the people and their governments by the delegation of 
authority was further substantiated and translated in daily political reality.
124 See on the process of American federation below chapter 5.
125 Current malfunctions left aside for the moment.
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One must equally ask how the direct link that has been established 
between the EU and the member peoples has been translated and substanti-
ated into daily reality. For if this direct delegation is not counterbalanced by 
political control in some way, the EU remains open to the challenge that it 
is a one-way relation. One that takes sovereign authority from the people, 
perhaps even with their consent, yet subsequently exercises this authority 
without their further control or assent. Here the challenge shifts from the 
undemocratic transfer of authority to the undemocratic exercise of delegat-
ed authority. Additionally, if we do require effective and ongoing political 
control by the member peoples, does this not require an overarching statal 
system? A question that brings us back to the statist challenge to the EU?126
If the direct link between the EU and the member peoples would only 
amount to such one-sided surrenders of authority, confederal sovereignty 
would indeed be no more than a conceptual fig leave. A confederal concep-
tion of sovereignty, however, can precisely assist in structuring and insti-
tutionalizing this political link between the member peoples and the EU. 
Though a major challenge that can only be tentatively discussed in part III 
of this thesis, confederal sovereignty does so by directing our attention to 
the national constitutional level. There it points to ways in which the control 
of national electorates over the EU activities of their statal representatives 
can be improved, and ways in which the delegation of competences to the 
EU can be made an integral part of national democracy. Confederal sover-
eignty, therefore, is not just one way traffic where the member people lose 
competences and are brought under direct EU control in return for some 
free movement rights. As federate sovereignty, it can also support a political 
model where the member people receive active political influence in return 
for their sovereign authority.
6.3 Sub-conclusion: A direct and subsidiary link
A confederal conception of sovereignty can establish, justify and structure a 
direct but subsidiary link between the EU and the member peoples. The EU 
is directly endowed, at the constitutional level, with sovereign authority by 
the people. Although it might not always have been established in an ideal 
manner, and though the system for political control must be improved, a 
direct connection is thereby established between the EU and the member 
peoples. A connection that can form a stable and sufficient basis for EU 
authority, whilst respecting the principal and even existential status of the 
national level.
To further test and illustrate the potential of this confederal basis, and before 
further developing it in part III, three further advantages that flow from this 
126 See the statist views of Kirchof and Grimm set in chapter 8, section 4.1.
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direct link must first be discussed here as well: its explanatory value for the 
simultaneous fit and conflict between the EU and constitutionalism, its sug-
gestion of a confederal-style primacy for the EU, and its normative appeal 
for the evolution of democracy.
7 To constitute or not to constitute: Why does 
constitutionalism fit the EU?
Though it is based on treaties, is not a state, does not hold original kompe-
tenz-kompetenz, nor has a population of its own, constitutional language and 
concepts are increasingly applied to the EU.127 What is more, these have 
proven suitable and fruitful. 128 They are useful, for instance, in analyzing 
the entire institutional apparatus that is set up at the EU level, or to concep-
tualize the relation between the Member States and the EU. 129 At the same 
time, this constitutionalization has proven highly contentious. It arouses 
fears, for instance, of the EU claiming a normative foundation that is equal 
or even superior to that of the Member States. For statists as Kirchhof or 
Grimm, therefore, claiming the EU has a constitution in the true meaning 
of the word necessarily entails an attack on the sovereign state and national 
democracy.130
This tension between the treaty basis and the constitutional functioning of 
the EU came to a head with the Constitutional treaty.131 As the name itself 
already indicates, this document tried to straddle both elements, igniting a 
127 Weiler and De Búrca (2012), Von Bogdandy and Bast (2010), Von Bogdandy (2010b), 95, R. 
Barents, ‘The Precedence of EU Law from the perspective of Constitutional Pluralism’, 5 
European Constitutional Law Review (2009), 421, Maduro (2005), Walker (2002), 317, Tim-
mermans (2002), 1, Weiler (1999), or Pernice (1999), 703. This does of course not mean that 
approaching the EU from a constitutional perspective is new. See, for instance, already 
Stein (1981), 1, or F. Mancini, ‘The Making of a Constitution for Europe’ 26 CMLRev 
(1989), 595, or the ECJ itself recognizing / proclaiming the constitutional nature of the 
Treaties in Case 294/83 Les Verts.
128 Cf. also Maduro (2006), 504, expounding the vision of the Court of Justice: ‘The Court of 
Justice grounded the direct effect and supremacy of Community law in a direct relation 
between Community norms and the peoples of Europe. (…) Van Gend en Loos is, in effect, 
the declaration of independence of EU law with regard to he authority of the Member 
States. The Treaty is presented as much more than an agreement between States; it is an 
agreement between the peoples of Europe that established a direct relationship between 
EC law and those peoples.’
129 L. Besselink. Een samengestelde Europese constitutie/A composite European constitution (Euro-
pa Law Publishing 2007).
130 See supra chapter 8, section 4.1. Interestingly, on the other end of the spectrum the plural-
ist use of the term constitution often risks denaturizing it, as they cannot ground or 
accept the hierarchical claim that attaches to the concept of constitution.
131 For a much earlier discussion, however, see already E. Stein, ‘Towards Supremacy of 
Treaty-Constitution by judicial Fiat: On the margin of the Costa case’ 63 Michigan Law 
Review (1964-65), 491.
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heated debate. Was the Treaty actually a constitution, should the EU have a 
constitution, or did the EU perhaps already have a constitution, no matter 
what the Treaties called themselves?132
Obviously much of this debate centred around the different conceptions 
of constitution that exist. Some of these are ultra-thin, qualifying anything 
that establishes something, be it a golf club or a nation-state, as a constitu-
tion.133 Others are padded to the hilt with contested conceptions like nation, 
identity or Volk.134 Much of the tension underlying this debate, however, 
turned on the assumption that having a constitution implied statehood or 
ultimate sovereignty, and consequently involved cannibalizing the Member 
States.
Those in favour of a European constitution tended to decouple the idea of 
a constitution from a state. The fact that the Treaties function as a constitu-
tion for the EU, does not mean they overrule or degrade national constitu-
tions. Often such reasoning leads to the conclusion that the Treaties of Rome 
should already be considered a constitution.135 A line of reasoning support-
ed by the definition of the Treaties as the ‘basic constitutional charter’ by the 
ECJ. A legal fact providing an authority argument for any one looking for 
an easy exit in the big ‘C’ or small ‘c’ debate .136
These thinner notions have the advantage that they recognize the con-
stitutional functioning of the Treaties. They also square with the signifi-
cant authority granted and controlled by the Treaties. Yet they tend to be 
so thin that they cannot resolve the underlying questions on, for instance, 
the ultimate relation between national constitutions and the EU constitu-
tion. Neither do they engage with the legitimacy aspect of constitutions. For 
constitutions do often play a foundational role in justifying and grounding 
public authority, precisely because they rely on thicker normative notions. 
As a result such thinner notions may preserve the term constitution for EU 
use, but loose much of the terms usefulness.
A confederal perspective contributes to this discussion by showing how the 
Treaties may be of a constitutional nature without embodying or claiming 
132 Cf N. Walker, ‘Big ‘C’ or small ‘c’’ 12 European Law Journal (2006), 12, M. Andenas and 
J. Gardner, ‘Introduction: Can Europe have a Constitution?’ 12 King’s College Law Journal 
(2001), 1, P. Craig, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union’ 7 European 
Law Journal (2001), 125, or already J. Shaw ‘The Emergence of Postnational Constitution-
alism in the European Union, 6 Journal of European Public Policy (1999), 579.
133 For the golf club example see the contribution by former British foreign secretary Jack 
Straw, ‘A constitution for Europe’ in the Economist, 12 October 2002, who notably does 
not use a capital ‘C’.
134 See, for instance, Kirchof (2010), and Kirchof (1993).
135 Note the difference in Opinion 1/2009 made between treaties and founding treaties.
136 Case 294/83 Les Verts, par. 23, as confirmed in inter alia joined cases C-402/05 P & 
C-415/05P Kadi I. Also see N. Walker, ‘Big ‘C’ or small ‘c’’ 12 European Law Journal (2006), 
12.
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the original and ultimate power ascribed to constitutions by thicker concep-
tions. From the perspective of confederal sovereignty, after all, what hap-
pens is that sovereign powers are relegated from the Member States to the 
EU. As a result, the EU is incorporated into the internal scheme of delega-
tion that traditionally took place within the Member States alone.137 Instead 
of superimposing a new and higher constitutional order, the EU treaties 
became an integral part of multiple national constitutions, whilst also linking 
those constitutional systems to each other in an overarching confederal 
framework.138
Consequently the EU Treaties are not principal constitutions in the 
meaning just described. They lack the existential dimension, as they do 
not constitute the member peoples, and do not form their principal politi-
cal habitat. Rather the Treaties build on the existential basis of the principal 
national constitutions. They do, however, form an integral part of multiple 
national constitutions, and as such share in their constitutional nature and 
function. In that sense they are derived, or secondary, constitutions.139 A 
secondary nature that again becomes obvious when one considers that a 
dissolution of the EU constitution would not undermine the national consti-
tutions, whereas the EU constitution could not survive without the national 
ones.140
Based on this derived constitutional status, the Treaties do perform several 
functions of a constitution. They distributes public authority and provide 
procedures and safeguards for its use.141 The EU Treaties are, therefore, are 
constitutional in that important sense of the words that they form part of 
137 Cf also Schmitt (2008), 385: ‘The federation agreement is a contract of a particular type, a 
constitutional contract specifi cally. Its conclusion is an act of the constitution-making 
power. Its content is simultaneously the content of the federation constitution and a com-
ponent of the constitution of each Member State.’
138 In this regard already see Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L.: ‘By contrast with ordinary interna-
tional treaties, the EEC treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry into 
force of the treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which 
their courts are bound to apply.’
139 Cf also Chalmers: ‘Real power’ in the Union remains fi rmly with the national administra-
tions.’ Chalmers, Davies and Monti (2010), 187.
140 Cf Weiler noting that, different from national law, EU law is ‘not rooted in a hierarchy of 
normative authority or in a hierarchy of real power.’(Weiler (2000), 57 or Von Bogdandy 
(2010a), 39: ‘The dependence of the Union’s constitution on the Member States’ constitu-
tions is greater in law and in fact than that of a federal state in its constituent states. In 
terms of positive law, this results from, for instance, Article 6(2) and (3) EU or Article 48 
EU, and conceptually from the principle of dual legitimacy, which implies that the 
Union’s legitimacy depends on the legitimacy organised by the national constitutions.’
 On the power and authority of the national systems also see Loughlin (2006), 83 and 
Kumm (2012). Strongly emphasizing the secondary authority of a Member States, albeit 
from a very different approach, see P.L. Lindseth ‘Democratic Legitimacy and the Admin-
istrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community.’ 99 
Columbia Law Review (1999), 628, and Lindseth (2010), for instance 21 et seq.
141 Cf also Burgess (2009), 39.
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the network of legal rules established to delegate and control public author-
ity. To perform this function, however, they do not need to make the same 
normative claims as a national constitution. The subsidiary but direct link 
with the people set out above, together with the related incorporation of 
the Treaties in national constitutions, are sufficient to explain why consti-
tutional discourse is so suitable, and at least one of the necessary ones, in 
understanding and analyzing the EU and its founding Treaties.
The direct inclusion of the EU at the national constitutional level also helps 
to explain and circumscribe EU primacy. Especially so once it is combined 
with a further characteristic of the EU highlighted by the confederal per-
spective: the reciprocal nature of the extra-statal delegation by the sovereign 
member peoples of the EU.
8 The confederal primacy of EU law
The contested issue of primacy was already touched upon above. The ulti-
mate primacy of their respective constitutional charters is claimed by both 
the ECJ and most national courts.142 The resulting supremacy conundrum 
forms one of the beloved battlegrounds of EU law. At the same time the 
supremacy of EU law is generally accepted by these same national courts 
for day to day affairs.143 A daily reality which sharply contrasts with the 
intensity of the clash at the level of theory and principle.144
142 Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L., Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Case 106/77 Sim-
menthal, and for the national dimension Oppenheimer (1994) and (2003), and De Witte 
(2011).
143 See supra chapter 8 section 1, as well as Besselink (2007), 9. The degree to which national 
lower courts really respect primacy, consciously or not, remains one of the intriguing 
blank spots, and perhaps safely so for the overall image of EU law. For recent high level 
judgments clearly signaling respect for EU law see the Constitutional Chamber of the 
Supreme Court of Estonia, Opinion No. 3-4-1-3-06 of 11 May 2006 Euro Decision, Conseil 
d’Etat (France), 30 October 2009, Mme Perreux, (2009) Revue française de droit administra-
tif, 1125, overruling the notorious line adopted in Conseil d’Etat (France), 22 December 
1978, Cohn-Bendit 1 CML Rev (1980), 543, Conseil constitutionnel (France), Decision 2012-
653 DC of 9 August 2012, Fiscal Compact, or German Bundesverfassungsgericht BVerfGE 2 
BvR 2661/06 (2010) Honeywell.
144 See again also the difference between the reasoning and the outcome in BVerfGE, 2 BvE 
123,267, 2 BvE 2/08 (2009) Lissabon Urteil or a similar gap in the case law of the Polish 
Constitutional Court, for instance in its judgment of 11 May 2005, K18/04 on Polish mem-
bership of the EU or its judgment of 24 November 2010, K32/09 on The Treaty of Lisbon, and 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court, for instance in its Decision 143/2010 (VII. 14.) AB of 
12 July 2010 Lisbon Treaty. For an example where high fl ying principle did lead to a very 
real confl ict see the Czech Constitutional Court judgment of 31 January 2012, Landtova Pl. 
ÚS 5/12, whereas in its earlier judgments the Czech court had followed the same line of 
sharp and fi rm principles and supple application. See, for instance, its Decisions of 26 
November 2008 Lisbon I Pl. ÚS 19/08 and 3 November 2009, Lisbon II Pl. ÚS 29/09.
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A confederal perspective can at least reduce this supremacy conun-
drum. It allows us to distinguish the different bases, and therefore nature, 
of the national and EU supremacy claims. Once distinguished in this man-
ner, furthermore, these claims are not as conflicting or mutually exclusive as 
might be expected.
8.1 The narrow but ultimate normative primacy of the national constitution
National constitutional supremacy is based on the supreme normative 
authority attributed to the national constitution. In turn, this authority is 
based on the principal and existential link between a national constitution 
and a member people set out above. An existential link that endures as long 
as the member peoples desire to remain independent sovereign entities, and 
therefore to keep the EU confederal at its core. National constitutions are, 
therefore, intertwined with the people in a way that the EU constitution 
cannot be, and represent the full and ultimate sovereign authority of the 
people. Not incidentally, national constitutional courts point to the original 
authority (or kompetenz-kompetenz) of the national constitution, as contrasted 
to the derived authority of the EU.
This primacy claim on behalf of the national constitution quite simply 
makes sense. It is only fitting and logical that it is defended by national 
constitutional courts charged with upholding their national constitutions. 
It is also fully compatible with a confederal understanding of the EU, which 
expressly leaves ultimate authority with the members. But what is especial-
ly interesting is that such an ultimate primacy claim at the national level 
does not inherently conflict with the sort of confederal, or secondary, pri-
macy claimed by, and necessary for, the EU either. A confederal primacy 
that can be accommodated within the ultimate primacy that the national 
constitution must retain.
8.2 The weaker but broader claim of EU supremacy
As shown above the EU does not have a principal constitution, but does 
form part of multiple national constitutions. It receives sovereign preroga-
tives directly at the constitutional level. Already based on this constitutional 
level of delegation, the EU could claim some form of primacy over ‘ordi-
nary’ national legislation. Just as constitutional norms trump lower national 
legislation, so do EU norms that derive from a constitutional level delega-
tion to the EU. Such normal, or operational, primacy has also proven rela-
tively uncontroversial.
Yet a certain primacy for EU law is supported by two additional grounds as 
well. First, unlike Member States, the EU receives reciprocal grants of sov-
ereign authority from multiple member peoples. As a result where Member 
States only speak for one sovereign, the EU represents – one part of– many 
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sovereigns. This grants it another claim to a less intense but broader kind of 
primacy.
Second, these multiple grants are reciprocal. Each member people has 
delegated its parcel of authority in exchange for the delegation of similar 
authority to the EU by the other member peoples. These reciprocal dele-
gations, therefore, form part of a contract (or compact) between these sov-
ereigns, and thus are reinforced by the principle of pacta sunt servanda.145 
Interestingly, it was already accepted by Bodin that in principle even sov-
ereigns should honour their contracts. Or in other words, the contract has a 
certain kind of primacy over the sovereign.146 What is more, as Bodin also 
accepted, sovereigns can be bound by judicial interpretations and enforce-
ment of their contracts. Interpretation that will require the relevant Court to 
assess the scope of the obligation undertaken by the sovereign, and hence 
the scope of the contractual limitation of his sovereignty.
Interestingly, these different and mutually reinforcing bases for EU suprem-
acy – reciprocal, and contractual delegation of sovereign powers at the con-
stitutional level– can all be found in the case law of the Court of Justice. 
The Court, furthermore, has gladly used the opportunity this composite 
basis offers to combine two different canons for judicial interpretation. On 
the one hand the Court can rely on the canon for constitutional interpre-
tation. On the other hand it can also revert to the international law canon 
for the interpretation of treaties or contracts more generally. A combination 
which offers the ECJ an impressive array of options, and the ability to pick 
and choose from either the international or the constitutional depending on 
which fits or suits best. For instance the ECJ can combine principles as pacta 
sunt servanda and effectiveness.147 Nevertheless the Court’s defence of EU 
supremacy always remains within the confederal bandwidth, as the con-
federal inherently combines and merges the international and the constitu-
tional.
To begin with, the Court’s defence of EU primacy does not rest on any EU 
claim to ultimate normative authority. Rather in Costa v. E.N.E.L. the Court 
begins by stating that the EU legal order ‘became an integral part of the 
legal systems of the Member States’. A finding that supports the confederal 
picture of the EU being included in the national constitutional systems.148 
145 Cf the BVG in BVerfGE 2 BvR 2661/06 (2010) Honeywell, par. 53: ‘Article 23.1 of the Basic 
Law permits with the transfer of sovereign powers – if provided for and demanded by 
treaty – at the same time their direct exercise within the Member States’ legal systems. It 
hence contains a promise of effectiveness and implementation corresponding to the prima-
cy of application of Union law.’ (my emphases).
146 See chapter 9, section 3.1.
147 In a sense the rule of pacta sunt servanda can perhaps itself be understood as a rule of effec-
tiveness, being a condition sine qua non for effective social behavior.
148 Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L.
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In line with this approach the Court then stresses the transfer of sovereign 
authority from the Member States to the EU. The EU (EEC) holds ‘Real 
powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers 
from the states to the Community.’ A defence of EU primacy which follows 
the first limb of constitutional delegation and interpretation.
The ECJ then continues its defence of primacy with the second limb: the 
reciprocal and contractual nature of the Community:
‘The integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions which derive from the 
Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, make it impossible 
for the States, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure 
over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot therefore 
be inconsistent with that legal system . The executive force of community law cannot vary 
from one state to another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing 
the attainment of the objectives of the treaty (…).’
Supremacy is needed to safeguard the ‘obligations undertaken under the 
Treaty’. Effectiveness, which most national constitutions simply assume, 
still had to be created in the EU using such teleological treaty interpretation.
The primacy of EU law, therefore, does not derive from a claim that the EU 
has a higher normative force, or a more fundamental power than the Mem-
ber States. It derives from the constitutional nature of the powers delegated 
to the EU, the fact that the EU receives constitutional authority from multi-
ple member peoples on a basis of reciprocity, and the related notion of pacta 
sunt servanda.149 EU primacy, therefore, rest on a different basis than nation-
al supremacy. A basis which is subsidiary to national supreme authority, but 
nevertheless justifies an independent claim of supremacy over national law 
in most cases.
8.3 Confederal primacy: The peaceful coexistence of EU and national primacy
Starting from a confederal perspective, both the national and the EU claims 
to supremacy can be explained and supported. A conclusion that fits with 
the choice of most highest national courts to respect the supremacy of EU 
law over ‘ordinary’ national law but not over (core) constitutional law, and 
the intuition that this is not such an awkward idea. The different claims, 
furthermore, do not have to conflict, and if they do the outcome should gen-
erally be rather clear.
149 De Witte (1999), 183.
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As indicated national constitutional primacy is based on the ultimate and 
supreme authority of the sovereign people.150 Though more fundamental, 
it is therefore also more narrow, and largely concerned with preserving this 
ultimate authority and autonomy. It is consequently relatively untouched 
by EU supremacy at the operational level over non-existential issues.
The supremacy claimed by EU law is based on very different grounds, 
which provide the EU with a viable if not absolute claim to primacy. This 
confederal primacy of EU law, therefore, does not have to deny the ultimate 
supremacy of Member State constitutions and the sovereign people behind 
them. After all, part of the supremacy that the EU can claim is based on the 
same ultimate primacy of the sovereign people. Equally, the supremacy EU 
law does claim is not contrary to the confederal nature of the EU. Confed-
eral sovereignty, after all, entails the delegation of sovereign powers outside 
the state, and, therefore, such primacy claims at the confederal level. Again, 
both at the national and the EU level it is the same sovereignty of the people 
that ultimately is at work, and that demands recognition in the form of pri-
macy.
For most concrete cases this confederal distinction between forms and 
grounds of supremacy will provide an evident result. This is exemplified 
by the practical approach of national courts, including the BVG, to accept 
primacy of EU law over non-constitutional law, or even non-essential con-
stitutional law, in all cases except grievous examples of ultra vires action.151 
Conversely, the common sense that the EU should not violate (the core of) 
its members’ constitutions is now supported by art. 4(2) TEU.
The confederal approach does mean, however, that in the case of an ulti-
mate conflict the ultimate authority of the national constitution should 
prevail over the less fundamental confederal primacy of the EU. The exis-
tence of such a fundamental conflict, furthermore, will logically have to be 
ultimately determined and resolved by national highest courts. Here con-
federalism, therefore, ends up in the statist camp, as it does accept an ulti-
mate hierarchy, even though this hierarchy will more often than not remain 
latent. Fortunately this also means, however, that the confederal approach 
also remains in line with the current power and legitimacy reality as well.152
150 A distinction could be made here between the national constitutions which hold the sov-
ereign command of the Member People, and the states, which are also created by these 
constitutions or at least derive their competences from the constitution. In that sense 
states have attributed powers only as well. In relation to the concept of a ‘Verbund’, 
which also hinges on the continued normative independence and primacy of the mem-
bers, see Von Bogdandy (2000), 29.
151 See especially BVerfGE 2 BvR 2661/06 (2010) Honeywell par. 52-53.
152 A reality further underlined by the possibility of succession under art. 50 TEU, the use of 
which might perhaps even be demanded by a national supreme court.
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Obviously this ultimate national authority, and the power of national courts 
to wield it, creates the possibility of conflict and abuse. As an inherent effect 
of their judicial kompetenz-kompetenz, for instance, national courts could 
declare any part of EU law in violation of constitutional core values. But 
more importantly, honest disagreements could also arise. This risk, and one 
can debate its magnitude and acuteness, partially comes with the confederal 
nature of the EU, which requires cooperation between multiple sovereigns. 
In part such conflicts should be buffered by the political process and made 
unappealing by the substantive benefits of confederation. The law can only 
be there to support and accommodate integration, and cannot be its raison 
d’être.
At the same time, however, law itself may be of assistance in further 
pre-empting any risk of such primacy disputes arising. To this end, for 
instance, it could be suggested to formulate EU primacy as a principle and 
not as a rule. Within this principle conceptual space would then be freed 
to allow a balancing between EU primacy, which after all is a means and 
not an end, and national constitutional values.153 A suggestion that should 
not be mistaken, however, for a rejection of either the ultimate primacy of 
national constitutions or the secondary primacy of EU law in operation-
al matters, both of which can be logically traced and supported from the 
confederal structure of ultimate authority in the EU. Two constructs, fur-
thermore, that in many cases do not conflict, but do leave the eventual deci-
sion on the existence of conflict and on what to do in case of conflict at the 
national level.154
9 The normative appeal of confederal sovereignty
Potentially the most far-reaching advantage of confederal sovereignty is 
the positive normative understanding, or even ideal vision, of the EU it 
allows. An understanding where the EU is not an enemy of democracy, but 
an imperative for its survival in today’s world. An understanding where 
the EU can become a vehicle which allows the member peoples to escape 
the confines of their states and to project their authority outside its borders, 
153 See for an exploration of this option, and its fi t with the case law of the ECJ, Cuyvers 
(2011), 49 et seq.
154 Again see BVerfGE 2 BvR 2661/06 (2010) Honeywell, par. 57: ‘That in the borderline cases of 
possible transgression of competences on the part of the Union bodies – which are infre-
quent, as should be expected according to the institutional and procedural precautions of 
Union law – the constitutional and the Union law perspective do not completely harmonise, 
is due to the circumstance that the Member States of the European Union also remain the 
masters of the Treaties subsequent to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and that 
the threshold to the federal state was not crossed .The tensions, which are basically unavoidable 
according to this construction, are to be harmonised cooperatively in accordance with the 
European integration idea and relaxed through mutual consideration.’ (my italics).
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thereby reinforcing their ultimate authority and making it ‘globalization-
proof’.
The normative and democratic potential of confederal sovereignty derives 
from the direct link it establishes between the EU and the member peoples 
combined with two further insights. First, the federal insight that a people 
can be empowered by having multiple governments. Second, the confederal 
insight that these governments do not have to be part of a single state.
As in the US federation, the EU could be understood, and developed, as 
a rival champion for the people, and as a second venue for them to exer-
cise their authority. A rival champion that can check the existing statal one, 
which not incidentally is facing legitimacy problems itself, as the EU com-
petes with the Member States for the favour of the people.155 From such 
a perspective, the choice to delegate sovereign authority directly to the 
state and the EU can be seen as a safeguard for democracy, and a means of 
empowering the people. Unlike the US federation, furthermore, this second 
government of the peoples does not have the be part of a federate state. 
Confederalism, therefore, allows the federate benefit of multiple compet-
ing governments, but without the need for the member peoples to subsume 
themselves into a single sovereign people or a federate state. The member 
peoples are given a means to extend their reach beyond the state, and to 
check their own state, without having to sacrifice their ultimate indepen-
dence or authority.156
Under such a confederal, and admittedly normative, understanding the EU 
could make the vital shift from an external threat to national democracy to 
an internal solution for the democratic challenges of today’s world. A shift 
that would not just be rhetoric, but would form an actual part of the EU’s 
constitutional theory, as it pertains to the self-understanding and ultimate 
aim of the EU project. Again the prescriptive nature of sovereignty must 
be stressed here: Such vistas of confederal democracy purposefully contain 
prescriptive elements that still need to be realized, yet this does not make 
them any less real or relevant for current EU theory.
Of course here the problem occurs that, under a perfect application of popu-
lar sovereignty, the people must also be the original actors underlying the 
constitution. As in the US we prefer a (mythical) moment where the peo-
ple, as an actuality, constitute public authority. In such cases the timeline of 
authority overlaps with its conceptual foundation.
155 Elazar (2006), 29.
156 Although some restriction of ones own freedom (understood as liberty to do as one 
wants) will always be necessary for any form of effective cooperation.
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Yet in EU this has not happened.157 And considering the enduring irre-
vocability of time it cannot happen: We can never go back and create a (con-
federal) founding moment à la US. As discussed, however, it is essential to 
accept the prescriptive power of sovereignty to restore this lacuna.158 What 
can be seen as a hypocritical myth, twisting history to mask an elite coup, 
can also be welcomed as the necessary capacity of social constructs such as 
sovereignty to go back in time, and to provide a normative foundation for a 
historical fact. A necessary solution for the chicken and egg problem of self-
constitution.159
9.1 The importance of self-understanding for democratic legitimacy
A more appealing normative self-understanding of the EU is important for 
legitimacy in itself. For currently integration is often primarily justified as 
factually inevitable. Resisting it, therefore, betrays a form of naivety and 
other-worldliness automatically disqualifying one’s opinion for serious con-
sideration.
Yet even if integration is indeed factually inevitable, this does not auto-
matically make it normatively or emotionally acceptable for the member 
peoples. Finding the narrative that transforms the necessary into the desir-
able is a vital part of constitutional mythology and politics. It is an impor-
tant ingredient for generating legitimacy, as once again shown by the US 
experience. In the US the need to establish a more effective system for gov-
ernance needed to be translated into a more appealing and normatively 
convincing narrative as well. A narrative of democracy and federalism 
which, in its turn, ended up significantly influencing the political reality 
and eventual constitutional nature of the US.
The confederal approach, including its focus on internal and popular 
sovereignty, can provide such an attractive democratic narrative of the EU. 
One that might convince the people that they, as the internal sovereigns, are 
empowered by integration, and by convincing them in fact contributes to 
achieving that end.160
157 See, however, the overview of the significant direct popular support for accession 
described in chapter 10, section 6.1.2.
158 See also chapter 9, section 3.3. and 3.4. for this prescriptive potential and essence.
159 See in this regard also the analysis of this temporal trick in the ‘judicial’ constitution of 
the EU in Van Gend & Loos in H. Lindahl, ‘Acquiring a Community: The Acquis and the 
institution of European legal order’, 9 European Law Journal (2003), 433, 439 et seq.
160 Cf also Van Middelaar (2009), 294, 301 on the importance, and creative potential, of per-
ception for social and institutional facts, and admitting that any claim to represent the 
pouvoir constituant requires an element, or episode, of bluff.
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Creating such a convincing narrative is also important for the legitimacy 
of the national systems comprising the EU. For the longer national self-
understanding and political discourse cling to the notion, or desire, of an 
absolutely sovereign and omnipotent state, the bigger the discrepancy with 
reality will become. For though the inevitability of globalizing forces does 
not in itself create legitimacy for integration, it cannot be ignored either. 
The state is no longer able to singlehandedly determine outcomes on many 
issues that its citizens do wish to influence. Continued national promises 
that the state is able to determine these outcomes can, therefore, only lead to 
an increased disillusionment of the people in national politics: It can never 
deliver what it promises, nor can it ‘protect’ them from the outside world. 
By clinging to a myth of statal autarky, in other words, national systems are 
undermining their own long term legitimacy. Instead they need to embrace 
new venues and methods for serving the interests of their people, an they 
must endow these new venues with the legitimacy required to make them 
work.
A last benefit of a positive confederal narrative of the EU is that it bases 
the Member States and the EU on compatible normative foundations. Both will 
be based on internal and popular sovereignty. The EU can then link to the 
normative structure of the Member States, without needing a people of its 
own, or developing a competing basis for authority that might undermine 
the ultimate claim of the member peoples at the national level. Instead both 
the national and the EU level can be conceptualized as two complementary 
servants serving the same popular masters.
The direct link with the member peoples, therefore, opens a channel for the 
EU to ground its authority in these peoples. To actually connect itself with 
these fountains of popular authority, however, the EU should embrace a 
confederal narrative. A narrative that includes internal and popular sover-
eignty, and the democratic self-understanding that comes with it. A narra-
tive which allows the EU to be envisioned, developed, – and sold –, as a 
development to safeguard the sovereignty of the people and their demo-
cratic influence in a globalizing reality.
9.2 A confederal fairytale?
It can be objected that this picture from confederal sovereignty appears a 
very theoretical, normative, and abstract construct. And it is. It can equal-
ly be objected that this analysis requires a rather hopeful disposition, and 
some wishful thinking to boot. And in a sense it does. The confederal per-
spective purposefully includes an element of idealism, and is further based 
on the normative assumptions that authority should be based on the peo-
ple, and that it is valuable in itself to preserve the distinct member peoples 
in the EU.
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Against such understandable objections, however, it must first be replied 
that the idea of a sovereign people, or that of sovereignty in general, is high-
ly abstract and theoretical.161 Qualities that have not prevented these con-
structs from playing vital roles nationally over the past centuries. Second, 
to fully appreciate the potential of confederal sovereignty it is necessary to 
bear in mind its prescriptive nature. Sovereignty does not aim to simply 
describe a power reality. It prescribes the authority structure as it should 
be.162 Although it cannot deviate from reality too much, it does aim to steer 
reality, and to provide a normative framework to justify it.163 Confederal 
sovereignty can play such a prescriptive and legitimizing role for European 
integration. Besides justifying the current reality in the EU, it should act as 
a rudder and compass in developing or correcting the EU system to better 
conform to the confederal democratic ideal.
In that regard it is important that moving in the right direction, or even 
striving for the right goal, can already provide a certain level of legitimacy. 
Certainly for an ongoing project as the ‘ever closer’ Union, which is in need 
of a goal and positive dynamic. Even the US federate system was, and is, 
partially legitimized by a continued strive towards a future aim, towards an 
ever ‘more perfect Union’.164
At the same time these defences obviously remain rather theoretical as 
well, just as most of the advantages of confederal sovereignty set out above. 
Although at this point one can conclude that confederal sovereignty at least 
offers the possibility of a more normatively appealing understanding of 
the EU, namely as a democratic imperative to liberate democracy and the 
member peoples from the increasingly inadequate confines of the state, the 
question remains how to operationalize confederal sovereignty, and how to 
realize these benefits of a confederal approach.
Fully acknowledging the tendency of reality to spoil perfectly good 
theory, part III of this thesis will therefore apply the confederal approach 
outlined so far to two challenges of reality: how to implement confederal 
sovereignty constitutionally and institutionally, and how to respond to the 
EMU crisis from a confederal approach. Before engaging these challenges, 
however, let us first provide a concluding overview of part II.
161 Hinsley (1986), 156 et seq.
162 See chapter 9, section 3.3 and 3.4.
163 CF also Börzel and Risse (2000), 5.
164 See the preamble to the US Constitution, as well as the 2008 inauguration speech by 
Obama still hailing ‘A More Perfect Union’.

1 The possibility and possibilities of confederal sovereignty
Part II has established the prima facie feasibility and value of confederal 
sovereignty for the EU. Contrary to popular belief, European integration 
does not inherently conflict with sovereignty. The EU can be seen as a logi-
cal and attractive confederal evolution of internal and popular sovereignty. 
An evolution that emulates the federate evolution of sovereignty in Amer-
ica and holds the potential to help realign the national democratic process 
with a globalizing reality, liberate the sovereign member peoples from their 
entrapment in a declining state, and establish a direct if secondary popular 
foundation for the EU.
As a result a confederal conception of sovereignty can help meet the main 
challenge identified by part I: To close the increasing gap between the EU’s 
confederal basis and its expanding federate superstructure. Closing this 
gap is vital to sustain the modified confederal form developed by the EU. 
Without a sufficiently strong basis, the confederal experiment in the EU will 
in time be forced to federate, or to scale down its federate superstructure 
and take a step back into the unstable waters of traditional confederation or 
international organization.
To establish these conclusions, part II first introduced the contradiction gen-
erally assumed between sovereignty and integration, and the theoretical 
deadlocks that flow from this contradiction. It did so by setting out the key 
tenets of statism and pluralism, which represent two influential yet oppos-
ing approaches in the debate on sovereignty and the EU. Statism, as cham-
pioned by inter alia the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, postulates the 
sovereign state as the conditio sine qua non for democracy and viable govern-
ment. Integration must, therefore, remain within the limits required to pro-
tect the sovereign state. Pluralism, on the other hand, starts from the reality 
and desirability of far-reaching integration. Since sovereignty obstructs such 
real integration pluralism is forced to reject sovereignty altogether. Instead 
we should embrace a plural reality based on heterarchy, and rely on non-
hierarchical mechanisms to coordinate the different authority centres within 
this pluriverse. Between the convincing arguments of statism and plural-
ism, however, we seemed forced to abandon either sovereignty or real inte-
gration.
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Both schools seem to capture one half of EU integration, which simultane-
ously relies on its Member States and transcends them. At the same time 
both approaches also fall short, partially because of their inability to incor-
porate each others strong points. Statism, for instance, is forced to formulate 
to all kinds of sovereignty-based limits on integration. Limits that tend to 
be far too sweeping and static, and when applied honestly seem incapable 
of recognizing even the current reality of integration, let alone guiding its 
future development. Pluralism seems incapable of establishing any realistic 
foundation, even though it directly undermines the existing sovereign foun-
dations of authority at the European and the national level.
The sovereignty either/or both schools force us into, therefore, results in 
a rather unattractive deadlock, and certainly seems incapable of providing 
the flexible foundation required by a modified confederation as the EU.
To escape this stalemate between sovereignty and integration part II then 
returned to the concept of sovereignty itself. Chapter 9 provided a con-
ceptual and historical analysis of sovereignty. This analysis demonstrated 
how internal and external sovereignty form two distinct concepts with very 
different characteristics and histories, which have nevertheless become 
increasingly confused over time.
Internal sovereignty has always been concerned with regulating public 
authority within the polity. The internal sovereign was never absolute, not 
even under Bodin. Over time, furthermore, internal sovereignty has become 
increasingly flexible. Through the use of abstract sovereigns and consti-
tutions it eventually allowed total delegation and division of sovereign 
authority. The synthesis of popular sovereignty, democracy and federalism 
achieved in the US further increased this flexibility: By locating sovereignty 
in the people sovereign prerogatives could be freely divided over multiple 
governments.
External sovereignty, by contrast, only became possible after the inven-
tion of internal sovereignty. Only when there was an ‘internal’ could the 
‘external’ be created. As such external sovereignty is conceptually related 
to internal sovereignty. Yet at its core it forms a fully distinct concept that 
has also evolved into the opposite direction of internal sovereignty. To begin 
with external sovereignty does not concern itself with the key question of 
internal sovereignty, which is the organization of internal public authority. 
Instead internal sovereignty is simplified into the assumption that an abso-
lute internal sovereign exists, and that this internal sovereignty is repre-
sented by the external sovereign. Where, furthermore, internal sovereignty 
became increasingly flexible and interlinked with constitutionalism, democ-
racy and the people, external sovereignty moved towards an absolute, indi-
visible and statal sovereign. This is a powerful construct, which over time 
has come to dominate our understanding of sovereignty. As such it even 
eclipsed the internal sovereignty, which receded behind the increasingly 
seamless legal systems within the state.
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Based on this analysis of internal and external sovereignty it was then sug-
gested that the EU should be understood as a next step in the evolution 
of internal sovereignty. For where from the perspective of external sover-
eignty the EU indeed seems impossible to square with sovereignty, from an 
internal conception of sovereignty a far more logical and appealing picture 
emerges. One that fully fits with the confederal approach developed in part 
I and the evolution of internal sovereignty itself, and which reveals that it 
is not so much the EU and sovereignty that are colliding, yet the realm of 
internal and external sovereignty. A collision that causes some to reject the 
concept of sovereignty altogether, instead of returning to its primary and 
flexible internal core.
2 The fit and advantages of confederal sovereignty
Chapter 10 subsequently did return to this flexible core. It provided an out-
line of confederal sovereignty, its fit with EU law, and its different advan-
tages.
In line with the internal and popular elements explored in this thesis, 
this outline of confederal sovereignty took the different member peoples as 
the sovereign starting point. It is in these peoples that ultimate and primary 
sovereignty resides. What has then essentially happened with European 
integration is that these peoples have relocated some of their sovereign 
authority from their states to the external and non-statal entity that is the 
EU. They have done so, moreover, reciprocally and in a confederal union 
with other sovereign member peoples.
This is an important departure from the traditional Westphalian arrange-
ment, premised as it was on the state as the sole recipients of direct sov-
ereign authority and exclusive nexus of internal and external sovereignty. 
Confederal delegation outside the state undermines the absolute exter-
nal sovereignty of the Member States, as it propels the internal sovereign 
directly into the realm of the ‘external’. The difference between internal and 
external sovereignty is, therefore, no longer masked by the state, and the 
normatively primary internal can come into conflict with the conceptually 
more absolute external.
Nevertheless this departure does not create a conflict between European 
integration and internal sovereignty. Quite the opposite: It upgrades internal 
sovereignty and adapts it to the current global reality it needs to shape. The 
internally sovereign member peoples are once more placed at the basis of 
political authority, after their position had been increasingly eroded by the 
growing dominance of the externally sovereign state, and the decreasing rel-
evance of the internal in today’s interdependent world. Any statement that 
‘the EU conflicts with sovereignty’ therefore misses the point: integration fits 
logically within the federal evolution of internal and popular sovereignty, 
but empowers internal sovereignty at the expense of external sovereignty.
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In addition to its conceptual fit within sovereignty, furthermore, confed-
eral sovereignty also provides a strong legal, normative and evolutionary 
fit with the EU Treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice. Legally 
confederal sovereignty conforms to the foundation of the EU in the delega-
tion of sovereign powers, and not sovereignty itself, as also held by the ECJ. 
Normatively it shares the respect for democracy and self-determination on 
which the EU is founded. Evolutionary it explains and justifies the increas-
ing and intensifying relation between the EU and the individual.
Having established the overall feasibility and fit of confederal sovereignty 
chapter 10 subsequently demonstrated and explored several of its advan-
tages and uses for the EU. In line with the two core objectives of part II 
it was first shown how confederal sovereignty can reduce the apparent 
tension between sovereignty and integration and the untenable positions 
that this tension forces us into. To this end we returned to the opposing 
schools of statism and pluralism. It was illustrated how both rely on unsuit-
able notions of external sovereignty, and how this leads to the extreme and 
untenable positions discussed. Then it was shown how both schools might 
actually be strengthened by switching to a confederal conception of sover-
eignty.
Statists, for instance, can develop a stronger and more convincing under-
standing of sovereignty that is based on the normative authority of the 
people instead of the state. An understanding that will support current and 
future integration, yet also provides a more flexible and therefore viable 
defence against excessive integration. This in contrast to the current static 
and undemocratic defence of the sovereign state, which forms a conceptual 
and political dead end and traps the people and democracy in the state.
Pluralist, in their turn, may retain most of the cherished plurality in the day 
to day reality of the EU, but can nevertheless ground and safeguard this 
pluralism in the ultimate foundation of the people. A foundation that can 
intervene in the case of fundamental conflict, the Achilles heel of plural-
ism, but does not reduce the EU to a linear hierarchy. For under a confed-
eral approach neither the EU nor the Member States are to be ultimate or 
supreme authorities.
From a confederal perspective, therefore, not only the tension between sov-
ereignty and integration is reduced, but so is the tension between statism 
and pluralism. An outcome that may suggest at least a partial synthesis 
between the two approaches, and thereby allow the EU to benefit from the 
strong points in both.
Resolving the contradiction between sovereignty and integration is also 
instrumental for the second core objective of part II: Grounding the feder-
ate superstructure of the EU. Sovereignty stops being one of the obstacles 
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that integration needs to overcome. Instead sovereignty, with its enormous 
potential to legitimize and structure public authority, becomes available as 
part of the solution. It enables a direct if secondary link between the EU and 
the member peoples. Although the states remain their principal political 
habitat, the member peoples have directly included the EU in their constitu-
tional system for the delegation of sovereignty authority. The direct connec-
tion between the individual and the EU, for instance through citizenship the 
European Parliament or the direct effect of EU law, form a logical quid pro 
quo for this delegation. It is this link which opens up a path to a sufficiently 
stable yet still confederal basis for the EU in the sovereign member peoples. 
Even though it needs to be further developed and institutionalized, it offers 
the potential for direct though secondary popular legitimacy.
Such a confederal foundation in the sovereign member peoples, further-
more, has several additional advantages. To begin with it explains the rel-
evance of constitutionalism for the EU, even though it is not a state. The EU 
Treaties after all form an integral part of the national constitutional systems, 
fulfil the constitutional task of delegating and controlling sovereign author-
ity from the Member Peoples to the EU, and establish a confederal consti-
tutional bond between the members. At the same time the Treaties lack the 
normative primacy and intensity of national constitutions. The Treaties can, 
therefore, be seen as subsidiary or secondary constitutions. Labels aside, 
and comparative caveats applying, constitutional logic and theory can 
therefore be usefully applied to the EU Treaties.
Second, and linked to the constitutional nature of the EU Treaties, confed-
eral sovereignty can also help in reducing the supremacy conundrum. It 
allows us to distinguish between the narrow ultimate normative primacy of 
the national constitutions, and the broader operational primacy of EU law. 
This primacy of EU law is based on the mutually reinforcing bases of its 
constitutional nature, the fact that the EU holds sovereign authority from 
multiple member peoples at the same time, and the fact that these multiple 
delegations are reciprocal, and hence buffeted by the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, a classic limit on sovereignty.
Crucially the ultimate primacy retained by the national constitution 
is not incompatible with this secondary and confederal form of primacy 
demanded by the EU. Constitutional courts have demonstrated as much by 
consistently accepting the supremacy of EU law over non-existential nation-
al law. They just cannot accept any challenge to the ultimate authority of 
the national constitution. This is only logical and suitable in a confederal 
system, which also does not have to make this ultimate claim. Obviously 
this retains the potential for conflict between the national and EU level as to 
what constitutes an existential issue, and where national primacy therefore 
trumps EU primacy. Yet the existence of a zone of possible disagreement 
does not alter the fact that, outside this penumbra of doubt, the national 
and EU claim to supremacy are different and compatible. By allowing us 
368 Chapter 11
to distinguish between the primary national supremacy and secondary EU 
supremacy, therefore, confederal sovereignty softens the primacy conun-
drum, even if it cannot solve the potential for conflict inherent in a confed-
eral order.
Lastly, and vitally, it was shown how a confederal conception may offer a 
positive and normatively attractive narrative for the EU. One which casts 
the EU as a necessary tool for the sovereign peoples to escape the confines 
of their state, and to realign their influence with the global reality that needs 
governing. For what use is a purely national vote, no matter how ‘sover-
eign’ the state, where the national political decision it determines has no 
impact on reality? And how sovereign are a people really when they have 
no choice but to delegate all their authority to an increasingly absolute 
state?
From this perspective the EU can be understood as a crucial evolution in 
internal and popular sovereignty that safeguards democracy by updating it. 
Democracy 2.0 so to speak. Instead of a necessary evil that erodes the dem-
ocratic glory days of old, the EU can be envisioned as, and subsequently 
developed into, the entity that saves popular sovereignty and democratic 
control from globalisation. It becomes a democratic imperative that empow-
ers the people, whereas the rejection of confederal integration equals a 
refusal to evolve, which historically is a path to extinction only.
Obviously this last advantage of confederal sovereignty contains a sig-
nificant prescriptive element, and does certainly not describe current popu-
lar sentiments. Yet precisely this element of idealism is also in line with the 
prescriptive nature of internal sovereignty outlined in chapter 9. Just as the 
federate conception of sovereignty provided a positive democratic narra-
tive for the US, so a confederal conception of sovereignty may provide one 
for the EU. A narrative that may help realize the democratic potential of a 
modified confederation by providing direction and impetus for its future 
development, and allowing people to welcome it.
3 The confederal promise and challenge
Obviously the discussion of confederal sovereignty here has been selective. 
Even within the limited points discussed more research and analysis is pos-
sible and necessary. It is, therefore, most certainly not claimed that anything 
close to a solution, or even a full conception of confederal sovereignty, has 
been developed. What has been illustrated, however, is the prima facie fea-
sibility and potential of the confederal perspective, and how the notions of 
internal and popular sovereignty may be part of any more complete confed-
eral conception of sovereignty.
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Yet the potential held by the confederal form must still largely be real-
ized. The purposefully abstract confederal construct developed in this the-
sis must be translated, operationalised and institutionalized. In a sense it 
forms an artificial skeleton which needs to be supported by constitutional 
and institutional muscles and tendons, and especially but most complexly, 
brought to life by some political spirit.
It flows from the nature of confederalism that the confederal potential 
must be primarily realized at the national level. How to do so requires far 
more study and specific knowledge, also of the different national constitu-
tional systems, than can be provided here. Accepting these limitations part 
III will nevertheless apply the central findings of this thesis to two key chal-
lenges of reality, for it is there that constitutional theory should aim to con-
tribute.
First part III will engage with the dilemma of adapting the democratic 
process itself to a confederal reality. For it is in the area of democracy – and 
therefore the political spirit required to bring the EU constitutional frame-
work to life – that a fundamental weakness still lies. One which needs to be 
addressed for the long term stability of a confederal union, and to substan-
tiate the direct link between the EU and the member peoples established 
in part II. To this end, part III will analyze the capacity of the confederal 
perspective to adapt the focus and content of the democratic process – both 
at the European and at the national level– to a confederal organization of 
public authority. A potential that flows precisely from rediscovering the 
people as the ultimate locus of political authority, at least at the conceptual 
constitutional level.
Second, and as a final challenge, the confederal approach developed in this 
thesis will be applied to the EMU crisis. To what extent can the Euro cri-
sis be explained from a confederal perspective, and even more tentatively, 
what would be a proper confederal response?

Part III
Towards a democratic 
union of sovereign 
member peoples: 
Application and 
Conclusions

1 Applying confederalism: The democratic process and 
the EMU crisis
So how do we put the confederal approach into practice? It is with this task 
in mind that part III turns to the application of the confederal approach to 
two central challenges posed by that nemesis of theory: Reality.
The first challenge this chapter engages is the need to adapt the democratic 
process to a confederal distribution of sovereign authority. How to make 
sure that the people can indeed extend their democratic control beyond the 
state, and fulfil the confederal potential for a positive democratic narrative 
set out above? For it is of little use to establish a confederal-conceptual bond 
between the EU and the sovereign member peoples if this bond is not prop-
erly institutionalized and operationalized within the democratic process.
The second challenge is provided by the EMU crisis. Chapter 13 applies the 
confederal approach to this crisis, which literally strikes at the EU’s con-
federal core by simultaneously pressuring several of the confederal Achil-
les heels identified in part I. As such the value of understanding the EMU 
crisis as a perfect confederal storm will be illustrated, and some confederal 
responses will be explored.
If possible these two challenges lead us into even more complex territory 
than the contested terrain we have already crossed. The EMU crisis, for 
example, is constantly developing, and raises several political and economic 
questions on which precious little agreement exists. The concept of democ-
racy, or the best way to achieve and maintain democratic government, have 
been contested since inception, and this contestation might even be part of 
their essence.
The ideas and suggestions developed below are, therefore, to be consid-
ered as highly tentative and exploratory. A caveat that applies most of all to 
some of the concrete proposals made, which primarily serve as instruments 
of exposition: they illustrate the general confederal approach suggested, and 
some of the ways and directions in which the confederal approach might be 
constructively developed in the future. As such they may also serve as an 
inspiration for further research, that could go far deeper into the required 
detail of particular confederal applications. The suggestions made below, 
therefore, certainly do not intend to provide any complete or even sufficient 
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answers to the challenges identified. They are fully conscious of the shifting 
and complex reality they engage, and the sacrifice of analytical purity this 
sortie into actuality entails. A cost, however, that is deemed acceptable to 
test and explore the potential contributions of the confederal approach to 
the current challenges facing the Union and its member peoples. For it is 
in such bridges between theory and reality that constitutional theory must 
eventually prove its worth, even if it entails the risk of falling into the very 
fissure it hopes to span.
2 A confederal evolution of the democratic process
Our first challenge in a sense reflects the central challenge posed by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and the statist camp more generally: How to 
retain a sufficient democratic process whilst delegating significant sover-
eign authority outside the state, and therefore outside the full control of the 
national democratic system?
To help meet this challenge this chapter first establishes its confederal 
root cause. Instead of the declining power of the state, a confederal anal-
ysis points to the inadequate incorporation of European integration at the 
national level, and the resulting inability of the member peoples to control 
the sovereign powers they have delegated via the national democratic pro-
cess (section 3). Subsequently, building on the ideas developed in part I and 
II, some tentative proposals will be developed to improve this incorporation 
at the national level, and establish a national political process that allows for 
democratic control over EU affairs (section 4). Section 5 then explores how 
some changes at the EU level might support this confederal evolution of the 
national democratic process, before section 6 provides a brief conclusion, 
and we continue to the challenge of the EMU crisis in the next chapter.
3 Confederal causes: The lack of a national process to control
Statists rightly point out that the democratic woes of the EU relate to the 
declining and changing role of the state.1 Yet from a confederal perspective 
this decline of the state is only a symptom, and not the root cause.
If we once again start our analysis from the member peoples instead 
of from the member states, another more fundamental challenge becomes 
apparent: The fact that the extensive delegation of sovereign authority out-
side the state has not yet been properly translated into the national constitu-
tional level. As a result no sufficient national mechanisms have been created 
to allow the member people democratic control over the powers they have 
1 See chapter 8, section 4.3.
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delegated to the EU, or over the way their own national institutions behave 
at the EU level.
Two related issues have to be appreciated and further analyzed in this 
regard. First, how the delegation of sovereign authority to the EU means 
that no single national democratic system has full control any longer over 
the exercise of this authority. As such no single national democratic process 
can fully determine the political outcome in these delegated fields, causing 
these processes lose some of their traditional content. And what is the point 
of a political process if it cannot determine outcomes?
Second, there is the important new role which integration has bestowed 
on national institutions as representatives and guardians of outsourced 
power. A role which has not yet been properly integrated into the national 
constitutional system or democratic process. Yet it is precisely this new role 
for national institutions that might be valuable in providing new content 
and meaning to the national democratic process, and to help establish a 
stronger link between the national electorate and the EU. Let us look at both 
issues in some more detail.
3.1 The democratic disconnect: An irrelevant national democratic process?
As discussed, part of the genius of the American evolution in popular sov-
ereignty lay in its capacity to dovetail sovereignty with democracy and fed-
eralism. By encasing the popular sovereign in a single state, furthermore, 
it was ensured that the pouvoir constitué overlapped with the pouvoir con-
stituant. In other words, the sovereign people delegated power to the state, 
which was in turn controlled by the people, albeit not in their role as sov-
ereign but in their role as the electorate. In this way a double democratic 
legitimacy was achieved.
First, power derived from the people, and the people could alter the delega-
tion of powers if they so desired. They could do so either by instigating a 
constitutional amendment, or more radically, by going outside the system 
of the existing constitution and, as the pouvoir constituant, establish a new 
constitution altogether.2
Second, within the system established by the Constitution, the people 
controlled the exercise of the power they had delegated as the electorate. 
At least to the degree that elections equal control, the people could thereby 
determine the use of these powers, or at least sanction this use afterwards. 
2 Cf. the power of the German people to do so as recognized in BVerfGE, 2 BvE 123,267, 
2 BvE 2/08 (2009) Lissabon Urteil par 228, as well as the beautiful discussion of such 
events by J. Finnis, ‘Revolutions and Continuity of Law’, in: A. Simpson (ed), Oxford 
Essays in Jurisprudence, Second Series Clarendon Press 1973, 44 et seq.
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Importantly, the EU affects both these links between the people and the 
authority they have delegated.
First the powers of the EU still derive from the member peoples, at least 
under the confederal approach developed above. If they choose to do so, 
furthermore, the people can reclaim all powers delegated.3 As we saw in 
part I, however, national constitutional legislators cannot themselves amend 
EU treaties or determine the scope of the powers delegated to the EU. Such 
changes require unanimous assent from all other sovereign member peo-
ples or the ECJ. At the same time the EU treaties do form an integral part 
of national constitutions.4 As a result, the member peoples have lost full 
control over one part of their own constitutional structure, except for the 
extreme, and perhaps unrealistic, option of leaving altogether. Although the 
people remain the original holders and delegators of power, therefore, they 
have lost the (relative) control that constitutional amendment offers.
The EU also impacts on the second link, i.e. the power that the people retain 
as the electorate. After all, before European integration, the state, however 
composed, held a virtual monopoly of all delegated sovereign powers. As 
a result, the entire machinery of exercising and controlling these powers 
was developed within the state as well, and could rely on the coherence this 
brought.5
Outsourcing sovereign powers to the EU changes this picture. The exer-
cise of authority is no longer fully controlled by the system developed with-
in the national state. As rightly pointed out by the statists, this also means 
that the national democratic process no longer fully controls the exercise of 
these delegated powers.6 At the same time the member peoples have not 
received an equivalent democratic control at the European level. At this EU 
level they only represent one of many voices. Unlike in the US, therefore, 
the people, as electorate, no longer directly control all the power they del-
egate as sovereigns. They have lost final control over a large and increas-
ing chunk of sovereign competences that derive from them, or at least their 
control at the EU level does not match the level of control they have over 
authority that is delegated to the state.7 The result seems a democratic dis-
connect between the people and their authority.
Of course one could argue that the aggregated EU powers are in the end 
democratically controlled by the representatives of the member peoples 
jointly, as well as by the European Parliament. Yet this deceptive statement 
3 Art. 50 TEU. See more elaborately chapter 2, section 2.5.3.
4 See chapter 10, section 7.
5 See chapter 9, section 6.3 and 7.2.
6 See chapter 8, section 4.
7 Of course the level of actual control within the national system should not be exaggerated 
either, yet clearly exceeds the situation pre-delegation.
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fails to distinguish between two meanings of the term democratic control. 
For on the one hand, there is indeed the fact that all individuals who exer-
cise power in the EU are under some form of democratic control: Political 
power in the EU is not wielded by unelected despots. A true but relative-
ly irrelevant conclusion, as the same would be true if we delegated all EU 
authority to the Swiss.
The second meaning of democratic control compares the amount of control 
a people has at the EU level with the control they would have over a purely 
national competence. Clearly, under this more relevant standard, the elec-
torate has lost some control. From this perspective the fact that the ministers 
and MEP’s that have a say over your future have all been democratically 
elected by other member peoples is – apparently– of little relevance or com-
fort to most citizens.8 Expecting the Bulgarian people to feel as represented 
by a Danish minister or a Spanish MEP as by a Bulgarian representative 
implicitly assumes precisely the federate bond between member peoples 
that is lacking in a confederal system.
From the confederal perspective, which starts from the member peoples, 
a loss of democratic control over the exercise of authority does, therefore, 
occur once a power is delegated to the EU. A loss, furthermore, that occurs 
even where unanimity is required for the exercise of this competence. For 
though a requirement of unanimity prevents the initial use of the com-
petence against one’s will, it still removes the national capacity to decide 
on the positive use of a competence. In addition, once legislation has been 
adopted, changing that legislation will again require unanimity, reducing 
the capacity of a member people to effectuate a change.9 Consequently a 
veto may offer some level of control as long as no action has been taken 
at the EU level. But once the competence has been used the veto tends to 
reduce the political capacity of a single national electorate to change the EU 
measure. The root causes of the democratic challenge, therefore, go deeper 
than just qualified majority.10
8 Cf also Von Bogdandy (2000), 50, concluding that the EU still relies on the national sys-
tems for primary democratic legitimization.
9 What is more, where a shared competence is concerned the Member States will be pre-
empted from acting nationally as well, whereas any remaining national competences will 
have to respect the action taken at the EU level. Where a competence has been delegated 
as an exclusive EU competence, furthermore, Member States will not be able to act at all, 
and therefore become fully dependent on agreement at the EU level for action to be tak-
en.
10 Here the BVG, therefore, is mistaken where it deems the requirements of German demo-
cratic control satisfi ed where unanimity is required. See BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993) Maastricht 
Urteil and BVerfGE, 2 BvE 123,267, 2 BvE 2/08 (2009) Lissabon Urteil.
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This mismatch between the powers delegated by the people and the con-
trolling capacity of the national democratic process is problematic, and con-
tributes to the much debated democratic deficit of the EU.11 It also leads to 
a conundrum: EU integration is so far-reaching that it undermines national 
democratic control. Yet it is not far-reaching enough to establish full demo-
cratic control at the EU level. As with sovereignty, somewhere in the process 
of integration, democracy seems to have left the building.
To a certain extent such a mismatch between delegated powers and the dif-
ferent constituent powers should simply be accepted. It is the price to be 
paid for desiring far-reaching cooperation without creating a European peo-
ple and giving up one’s national sovereignty. For retaining this sovereign 
position means relying on reciprocally delegating powers, and therefore 
shared central government.
It must also be recognized that, even without the EU, national elec-
torates would have lost the de facto capability to determine outcomes in 
many of the fields now under EU control.12 Globalization has undermined 
any such power in areas such as economic policy, trade, environment and 
security.13 The Swiss example is illustrative here: Staying outside the formal 
decision-making process of integration does not protect national autarky, 
but only limits your voice in decisions that will ultimately control your own 
actions anyway.14
Lastly, it must also not be overlooked that even full federation would not 
increase the actual controlling influence of the different member peoples. Just as 
the influence of the Virginians or the New Yorkers at the federate level did 
not equal their control within their respective states, so the influence of the 
Belgian or Slovak people on the use of EU authority would not be increased 
by European federation. Federation would, therefore, not repair the loss of 
control outlined above. Federation would only declare this loss to be demo-
cratic, as these groups would have become part of one European people. 
A declaration that would ring hollow as long as it does not represent social 
reality.15
11 Cf also J. Tully, ‘The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison with the Ideals of Consti-
tutional Democracy’, 65 Modern Law Review (2002), 204.
12 Craig (1999), 26.
13 Also see W. Wessels, ‘The Modern West-European State and the European Union: Demo-
cratic Erosion or a New Kind of Polity?’, in: S. Andersen and K. Eliassen (eds), The Euro-
pean Union: How Democratic is It? (Sage 1996), 84 et seq.
14 I am grateful to Professor Christa Tobler, who is uniquely qualifi ed to assess this dynam-
ic, for her thoughts on this topic.
15 Cf also Tully (2002), 204.
379A confederal evolution of the democratic process 
Nevertheless, the current loss of control is more than can be accepted, whilst 
EU authority is still increasing. Moreover, the EU should help to regain 
democratic control over the invisible hands now pushing national govern-
ments around.16 It should not, therefore, sacrifice democracy to the aim of 
simply establishing some control at all.
Yet how to address this gap between the constituent power and actual 
democratic control? How to democratically substantiate the direct but sub-
sidiary link between the EU and the sovereign member peoples?17
One response, which might be perceived as pro-integration, would be to try 
and close the gap at the EU level. Such a response would entail creating a 
European democratic system that could compensate the democratic control 
lost nationally. As we saw however, an equivalent democratic control at the 
EU level would require fully federating in the sense of creating one sover-
eign European people, and would only solve the loss of control by a mem-
ber people in name. As discussed, this is not a viable, desirable, or necessary 
option, and certainly does not fit with the current confederal reality in the 
EU.18
Consequently, the EU should not even attempt to create the primary demo-
cratic control required at the European level. The EU would position itself 
as a rival to the very same national political authority its confederal founda-
tion relies upon. Indeed the failure of the ‘Constitutional’ Treaty, and the 
apprehensive reactions it inspired at the national level, demonstrate this all 
too clear.
As we also saw, however, the statist solution of retaining all powers that 
should be controlled by a democratic process at the national level is not fea-
sible either.19 Such an approach leads to a defensive and inflexible position 
that traps the democratic process in the state. It tries to shut out global reali-
ties rather than addressing them. But if neither retaining powers at the statal 
level nor democratizing the EU seem feasible, what to do? A question which 
16 See for the importance of integration in this regard Habermas (2001) and Habermas 
(1996).
17 See chapter 10, section 6 for a discussion of this link.
18 Compare in this regard also the, perhaps abrasive and cynical, but also realistic confi -
dence of Mitterrand and Andreotti in the primacy of their own national legitimacy over 
that of the European Parliament. Mitterrand, talking to Major, stated that the European 
Parliament would not be legitimate ‘in a hundred years’ and that ‘The Commission is 
zero, the Parliament is zero, zero and zero is zero’, or Andreotti, who referred to the Euro-
pean Parliament as a ‘demagogic’ concession to federalist rhetoric. Obviously these state-
ments are extreme, and deny the very real link that does lie between the member peoples 
and the EU. Nevertheless they do capture the ultimate political confi dence, which befi ts a 
confederation, of the primary national political order. (Both quoted in Van Middelaar 
(2009), 169, my translation.
19 See chapter 10, section 4.3.
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leads to the second issue indicated above: The new roles and functions that 
national institutions have acquired due to integration, and the failure to 
properly translate these into the national constitutional systems.
3.2 The unconstitutionalized double role of the state
As discussed in part I, the EU does not have a separate representational 
system of its own. Instead, the merged EU system largely utilizes Member 
State institutions.20 Accordingly these national institutions have acquired 
important new tasks and powers due to integration. They now wield the 
power that has been received at the EU level, and that gives a voice in deter-
mining how the aggregated competences of the EU will be applied.
The national constitutional and institutional structures, however, have not 
been designed with these new tasks and powers in mind.21 Most were either 
established, or have evolved, under a situation of near statal monopoly on 
public authority. Nor have these systems been redesigned to incorporate the 
confederal reality of the EU.22 For example the relation between the two dif-
ferent roles – that of exercising national powers and controlling the ones 
delegated to the EU– is generally not well developed or institutionalized. 
Quite the opposite: Generally, EU responsibilities have simply been grafted 
on to an existing national institution without any changes to its organiza-
tion, imbedding, or its electoral control.23
20 See chapter 2, section 3.2.3.
21 M. Claes, The National Constitutional Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart Publishing 
2006), 189.
22 There are signifi cant differences between Member States as to how within the existing 
system control over EU delegation has been incorporated. The Danish parliament, for 
instance, plays a very active role through its existing powers of control over the govern-
ment. Equally the British parliament also applies close scrutiny, where other parliaments 
do not. For the Netherlands see, for instance, the report by the Council of State on the 
consequences of the EU for Dutch state institution (Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005–
2006, 29 993, nr. 27), The report by the Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regereingsbeleid 
(WRR) of 5 June 2007 on ‘Europe in the Netherlands’ and the fi nal report of the Dutch 
Commission of State on the Dutch Constitution of 12 November 2010, especially part III. 
The argument here does not deny the differences in the Member States nor the progress 
made within some systems. The argument is that the changes caused by the EU require 
more formalized and explicit constitutional and institutional responses.
23 Obviously this is also due to the fact that the Treaties link certain powers directly to the 
national function. The point, however, is that the national constitutions have often not 
yet, or at least not yet more fundamentally, internalized or incorporated these EU pow-
ers. In this regard Maduro also rightly points out that one of the main impacts of the EU 
on competences is not a shift from national to EU competences, but: ‘Frequently what 
changes is the balance of representation and participation between different national 
actors in the defi nition of a certain policy and not so much the European or national char-
acter of the policies. (…) Strategic Europeanisation alters the national actors that domi-
nate certain policies and in this way represents a difference challenge to sovereignty.’ 
(Maduro (2006), 520.
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Consequently, the confederal foundation of the EU, which must necessarily 
rest on the national constitutional structures of its members, has not been 
refitted for its task. This rather remarkable fact has several problematic 
consequences. To begin with, it distorts the pre-existing institutional and 
political balance within national constitutions, which was calibrated for a 
monopoly position of the state. This distortion is especially acute where the 
impact of the delegation is asymmetrical on the different national institu-
tions. The relative empowerment of the executive and the bureaucracy by 
European integration are well known in this regard.24
Even more fundamentally, however, the effects of European integration 
have also not been translated into the national systems for acquiring, exer-
cising and accounting for political power.25 As a consequence, the national 
constitutional system, and the political process it structures, do not suffi-
ciently take into account the crucial importance of the EU and the significant 
authority that is wielded at the EU level, also by national representatives.
No special offices, for instance, have been created to deal with the 
national dimension of integration, nor has the national electoral systems 
been changed to take account of EU membership. Political power is won 
in general national elections, and these elections are logically dominated 
by national issues. No separate system for awarding and controlling the 
EU dimension of national competences exists, nor is the EU very relevant 
to acquire national political power.26 As a result there also cannot be a full 
national democratic process on EU issues: There simply are no national EU 
elections to win or EU powers to conquer. Instead EU power is included 
in the spoils of national political victory, like a complimentary cookie with 
your coffee.
This system might perhaps have been a logical approach in the early days 
of integration, but has become increasingly unworkable with the growing 
relevance of the EU. The cookie is reaching rather epic proportions, and 
cannot remain complimentary. Politicians should be forced to fight for this 
power, and through such contests allow the member people to influence the 
way this power is used. After all, as long as politicians can only acquire and 
maintain political power in elections primarily geared towards national top-
ics, we should not be surprised at politicians hiding or selectively repre-
senting their European record, refusing to explain or take responsibility for 
unpopular European measures, or even to invest in educating the electorate 
on EU issues.
24 Craig (1999), 24 or Weiler, Haltern and Mayer (1995), 32.
25 See on the importance for a matching system of accountability also Keating (2006), 206.
26 See for a discussion of this point, including a comparative perspective to the US, chapter 
5, section 2.
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The continuing, and often decried, failure of the national political debate to 
include EU affairs can, therefore, be linked to the relative lack of incentives 
to do so, and the lacking incorporation of European integration in national 
constitutional systems.27 It poses a significant risk for the hollowing out of 
the national democratic process, and thereby the confederal foundation of 
the EU.28 As long as national politics is not incentivized to incorporate EU 
issues, one should conclude, in a variation on the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
that the value of a national vote is undermined: For what use is a vote on an 
irrelevant national competence? And what use is my vote if I cannot use it 
to directly indicate my EU preferences? If my national vote does not carry 
some real EU impact, I have truly lost part of its value.29
To create a confederal democratic process, therefore, the constitutional sys-
tems of Member States should be better adapted to their new functioning 
within a confederal constitutional system. For even though many constitu-
tions contain explicit clauses recognizing the constitutional importance of 
EU membership,30 this confederal reality demands more far-reaching adap-
tation at the national level than has been realized so far.31
3.3 The missing national link in confederal democracy
As the preceding analysis shows, the real challenge for a viable confederal 
democratic process in the EU is twofold. First, to deal with the loss of ulti-
mate control on political outcomes suffered by the member peoples, and the 
loss of traditional political content this causes. Second, to better incorporate 
the reality of European integration into national constitutional and demo-
cratic structures.
27 See in this regard also the repeated attempts by national constitutional courts to draft 
national parliament into the EU discourse, as for instance discussed in D. Piquani, ‘Argu-
ments for a Holistic Approach in European Constitutionalism: What Role for National 
Institutions in Avoiding Constitutional Confl icts between National Constitutions and EU 
Law’ 8 European Constitutional Law Review (2012), 493, and Cuyvers (2011a).
28 See also S. Andersen and T. Burns, ‘The European Union and the Erosion of Parliamen-
tary Democracy: A Study of Post-Parliamentary Governance’, in: S. Andersen and K. Eli-
assen (eds), The European Union: How Democratic is It? (Sage 1996), chapter 13.
29 BVerfGE, 2 BvE 123,267, 2 BvE 2/08 (2009) Lissabon Urteil, for instance paras. 218, 226, 244 
and 246, as well as BVerfGE 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10 and 2 BvR 1099/10 (2011) Euro 
Rescue Package, par. 98.
30 See for example art. 34 of the Belgian Constitution, art. 88 of the French Constitution, art. 
23 of the German Basic Law, art. 11 of the Italian constitution, art. 90 of the Polish Consti-
tution, or art. 93ff of the Spanish constitution, all authorizing delegation to the EU. As 
further discussed below, however, they do not suffi ciently adapt their own systems to 
this delegation.
31 See also on this need to adapt the national level to support EU powers Lindseth (2010), 
for instance, 12-14.
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As will be illustrated below it is this second challenge that might also hold 
part of the answer to the confederal democratic conundrum. By better incor-
porating EU integration into national constitutional systems and democratic 
processes, one could envision a more confederal notion of what democratic 
control and legitimacy should entail.
4 Building blocks of a confederal democracy
Fully accepting the objections that can be raised to any such presumptu-
ous exercise, and reiterating their primary function as tools of exposition, 
this next section proffers two confederal suggestions to meet the democratic 
challenges set out above.32 First, how the delegation of authority could pro-
vide an alternative substance for the national democratic process. Second, 
how to better institutionalize and embed EU integration at the national con-
stitutional level, and create the incentives required to establish a national 
political process on such delegation of authority.33 Though these sugges-
tions will inevitably fall short, if only as this is not the place to fully develop 
them, they clarify and illustrate the kind of confederal exercise suggested, 
and the direction in which further research may look for further confederal 
solutions.
4.1 Building blocks: Delegation as democratic substance
The first suggestion points to the potential of delegation to provide new sub-
stance for national democracy.34 Both decisions on whether authority should 
be delegated to the EU and decisions on how to exercise and control author-
ity once it has been delegated should be developed into important content 
32 In that regard it also responds to the challenge of Bellamy that ‘Instead, attention should 
be focused on improving the EU’s mixed constitution in ways that further enhance the 
reciprocal interaction and dialogues between its multiple demoi and levels of gover-
nance.’ It does so, however, within the concept of sovereignty, and not of pre-sovereignty. 
More generally it is believed that the benefi ts his republican notion of ‘pre-sovereignty’ is 
designed to achieve can be better secured in a confederal model, which provides both 
dialogue and necessary stability. See Bellamy, (2006), 189.
33 Here a solution, therefore, is sought in improving the system of representation. An option 
believed to be more promising and realistic than a more radical shift towards participa-
tion as the basis for legitimacy. See for such a proposal J. Cohen and C. Sabel, ‘Directly-
Deliberative Polyarchy’, 3 European Law Review (1997), 313. The benefi t of staying within 
the scheme of representation, thereby, is that there actually are stable and self-constituted 
units to represent.
34 Cf also Van Middelaar (2009), 398: ‘De opdracht aan de gezamenlijkheid is de stemmen 
van dit oude publiek – eerste de parlementen, dan de kiezers daarachter – in de Europese 
democratie te laten meeklinken. Dit is niet eenvoudig, maar veel keuze hebben de lid-
staten niet.’ Also see the (Schmittian) question that Huysmans correctly links to transna-
tionalism when he talks about the ‘(..) re-emergence of the question of the political: that 
is, where, and what is politics?’ Huysmans (2006), 216.
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for national democracy. These decisions can then replace some of the sub-
stance of national democracy that is lost due to integration, allowing the 
content of the democratic process to evolve along confederal lines as well.
This suggestion refocuses part of the national democratic process on the 
new role and powers that national institutions have acquired due to EU 
cooperation. After all, these roles and powers more than deserve democrat-
ic scrutiny, and can provide new and important substance for democratic 
debate.35 New substance that could also alleviate the fears of inter alia the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht that the national political process might be reduced 
to insignificance by integration. New substance that nevertheless remains 
on the national level, and thereby also avoids the many obstacles statists 
have identified for fully fledged democracy at the European level.36 Instead 
of trying to create a primary democratic process at the EU level, this new 
substance utilizes the national democratic system, and relies on the precon-
ditions for democracy that pertain in the national context.
The ways in which delegation can be transformed into new substance for 
national democracy are many and depend on a multitude of national fac-
tors. At the core of any suggestion, however, should be the objective of 
ensuring that the national democratic process engages with two questions. 
First, which authority should be delegated to the EU. Should, for example, 
the EU regulate banks, social security, cross-border crime, healthcare, social 
housing, environmental pollution or coordinate defence and external pol-
icy? And if so, to what level and in what way? And if authority on these 
issues is not delegated, what scope is realistically left for national policy?
Second, how should national representatives operate at the EU level? 
Here a national process can never determine the outcome of a political deci-
sion at the EU level, but this does not mean that such decisions provide no 
substance for democratic debate. Especially not if the decision to delegate 
a certain power has first been democratically debated and decided as well: 
The electorate might care more for the use of a European competence if they 
themselves have supported delegating this competence to the EU level. 
With time and practice, furthermore, both the electorate and the political 
operators will become more informed and adept at discussing and deciding 
such decisions on delegation and EU manoeuvring.
Surely these questions deserve democratic debate, and surely they contain 
sufficient substance for such debate. At the same time such political debate 
on delegation can only take place where there are suitable procedures and 
fora, and they will only take place where there are sufficient incentives. 
35 Cf, coming from a republican angle, Craig (1999), 40.
36 See in particular the statist critiques set out above in chapter 8, section 4, and especially 
the variant of Kirchhof (2010), 736 and Grimm (1995), 296.
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From the confederal perspective, two complementary developments are, 
therefore, necessary as well to allow a confederal democratic process to 
develop and function, namely the national institutionalization of EU del-
egation, and the corresponding flexibilization of delegation at the EU level.
4.2 Three guidelines for the national institutionalization of integration
So how to remedy the current lack of constitutional and institutional 
embedding of European integration at the national level, and how to create 
the necessary incentives to ensure that delegation and the use of delegated 
powers become politicized?37
Clearly any solutions on this point must heavily depend on the specifics 
of the national constitution involved. Imposing one uniform system would 
also go against the confederal nature of the EU, certainly as the required 
modifications concern vital political issues. The often intense battles over 
voting rights, voting districts, campaign finance or voting systems in gen-
eral attest to the difficulty in changing such authority-allocating rules and 
the fundamental importance they carry for a constitutional system.
Nevertheless, three general guidelines or guiding principles could be for-
mulated. Guidelines which contribute to creating an institutional home base 
for European integration at the national level, and providing the member 
peoples with a national handle on integration as a starting point for politici-
zation and confederal democratization.
In line with the confederal approach, a first principle should be to 
ensure the fit of any institutional modifications with the national sys-
tem and its unique characteristics. Ideally the modifications would build 
on existing institutions and their specific roles within the national system, 
which could then be refocused or amplified to take European integration 
into account.
Second, the primary aim of any modifications should be to create an insti-
tutional nexus for EU issues to which a national political process can attach 
itself. European integration should have a visible location and place in the 
national system where political battles can be fought. This requires that suf-
ficient and real EU related competences are bundled in this institutional 
nexus, and that sufficient ‘events’ such as elections, important decisions 
and public procedures are created to allow for real political debate over 
these competences. These elements are absolutely vital: One simply cannot 
expect a political process to develop if there is no real power to fight over, 
37 Cf in this regard also the intuition of Van Midellaar that, by introducing a blocking power 
for national parliaments in the passerelles, they in a sense also become part of the EU 
pouvoir constitué, a role which fi ts in the confederal model of popular sovereignty, yet 
needs to rest on a national constitutional mandate. Van Midellaar (2009), 180. Further see 
on this issue Besselink (2007), 17 et seq.
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or if there are no venues to fight in. We need both a prize and an arena, 
and instead of blaming national politicians for not politicizing the EU on 
their own accord, we should create the constitutional sticks and carrots that 
would allow them to do so.
Thirdly, and closely related to this second guideline, control of this EU nex-
us should remain indispensable for the exercise of national political power. 
EU related powers should not be separated from the exercise of national 
authority, to the extent this is even possible. The objective must be to align 
and merge the national and the EU process, and to allow the EU political 
process to share in the energy and vitality of the national one. In addition to 
granting real powers to this EU nexus, the overall control of national gov-
ernment should therefore require control of the EU nexus as well.
By interlacing the national and EU in this manner, EU affairs are inject-
ed into the primary national political process. Acquiring and maintaining 
control of government will require winning at least one election that is pri-
marily concerned with EU affairs, and thereby forces and rewards those 
striving for political power to establish a coherent and balanced narrative 
that encompasses both the national and the EU dimension. It allows the 
people to choose which of these narratives they prefer.
Of course these guidelines are far from conclusive or complete, yet they do 
capture what should be the primary focus of modifications intended to reca-
librate national constitutional systems to their life in a confederal system. To 
further illustrate these guidelines it is useful to briefly, and again highly ten-
tatively, provide one concrete example of how they might be implemented 
in a national system through the establishment of EU senates.
4.2.1 EU senates
In line with the first guiding principle the idea of EU senates starts from the 
different national equivalents of senates, such as the House of Lords, the 
Bundesrat, the Dutch First Chamber (Eerste Kamer), the Polish Senat or the 
Senado de España. Alternatively, for the 12 Member States that do not have 
an upper house, a larger modification would be required, or another public 
body, such as a council of state, could be upgraded to a level where it could 
function as a democratic EU nexus.38 The central suggestion is to transform 
these senates into the required EU nexus by increasing their profiles as EU 
chambers.
Starting from these senates is logical since the primary national chambers 
cannot be transformed into EU chambers, and because precisely these 
national chambers are in need of an EU counterweight. Senates also tend 
38 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Slovakia and Sweden do not have upper houses.
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to have a certain aptitude for technical and legal EU affairs. This aptitude of 
upper chambers as EU nexus seems at least to be confirmed by the way in 
which some of them, like the House of Lords, have already started to play 
an increasing role in their national EU policy.39 Such scrutiny, however, still 
depends on the use of pre-existing powers. It is not institutionally embed-
ded or supported, for instance, via special powers or procedures, let alone 
that such EU roles have been incorporated into the electoral system, or oth-
er mechanisms to acquire political power.
Starting from the national senates also creates a logical confederal mirror 
image of a federate system. Where in a federate system primary control of 
the central government lies at the federate level, in a confederal system this 
control lies at the national level. A confederation should then rely on mul-
tiple national senates instead of one federate senate at the central level, as it 
is on the national level that primary political authority remains.40
4.2.2 Competences
In line with the second guideline, such EU senates should receive serious 
EU related competences. These competences should provide these cham-
bers with real political power worth fighting over, or at least provide them 
with the constitutional tools to conquer this power nationally. In addition, 
by concentrating multiple EU powers in one body, a clear and visible hub 
for EU affairs will be created nationally.
Obviously the precise powers of such chambers should depend on the spe-
cific national context, but several possibilities can be envisioned. To begin 
with, these chambers could receive the exclusive power, or even obligation, 
to mandate the EU activities of national representatives such as ministers. 
The EU senate should determine which votes are important, provide bind-
ing voting instructions, and receive the capacity to sanction ministers that 
do not loyally ask for or follow instructions.41 In this manner, EU decisions 
could be politicized nationally. Similarly, the EU senate could be empow-
ered to hear and instruct other high ranking representatives at the EU level, 
including members of COREPER I and II, or the different committees.
39 See, for example, the impressive reports on the Lisbon Treaty: House of Lords, European 
Union Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment (London, HL, 10th Report, 
session 2007-08, 2008).
40 In those Member States that already have a federate system nationally this suggestion 
would have the additional benefi t of better incorporating the different regions into the 
process of integration, countering the current risk that European integration undermines 
the national federate system.
41 Compare in this regard also the confederal habit under the Articles of Confederation to 
provide delegates to Congress with written instructions.
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In addition, these EU chambers could receive the power, to the exclusion 
of the ‘national chamber’, to make EU appointments such as the European 
Commissioner. The national senates jointly could then appoint EU positions 
such as the President of the European Council, the President of the Com-
mission, or the EU Ombudsperson. Going even further far-reaching, these 
senates could receive the power to instruct or elect the members of the Euro-
pean Parliament, or receive double mandates themselves.42 This option, of 
course, faces the objection that it removes the direct link between the citizen 
and the European Parliament. Yet in practice it may strengthen this bond, 
as creating a link between the European Parliament and a national chamber 
might bring the European Parliament closer to national citizens as well.
Most fundamentally, the EU senate could receive specific budgetary pow-
ers, the classic root of all parliamentary power. These powers could include 
approving the EU budget, instructing the national representatives to make 
specific budgetary proposals at the EU level, determining the way in which 
EU subsidies are used nationally (earmarking), or the method of collecting 
and financing EU obligations. More far reaching, EU chambers could also 
receive special powers in the national budget, for instance in relation to EU 
budgetary rules. Again much will depend on the specifics of such powers, 
which hide more than one devil, but the general objective should be to con-
nect the EU chambers to this ultimate parliamentary power source.
Lastly, such EU senates could be interconnected, and receive certain joint 
powers at the EU level. For example, members of the respective senates 
could be awarded observer status in other national senates or at the Euro-
pean Parliament (where double mandates are not adopted). In addition, a 
certain number of senates could jointly receive a right of initiative at the EU 
level, or even receive the power to table Treaty amendments.
Clearly these are only some possibilities, and it will be for each national sys-
tem to decide which particular competences to grant, and how to design 
each specific competence. What is crucial, however, is that a critical mass of 
competences is granted, and that these EU chambers become directly elect-
ed in separate elections, so that their use of these powers becomes subject 
to direct political contestation. There should be an open political process to 
compete for these powers, so that a political discourse can develop, political 
parties are forced and enabled to develop a constructive, or at least coher-
42 At least some of the traditional arguments against double mandates would not apply to 
such specifi c forms of mandating, and they would have the automatic benefi t of linking 
the European Parliament to national politics, and ensuring that national political decision 
making would be better informed. See in this regard also the practice of the double man-
date in the beginning of European integration under art. 20 ECSC, which dovetailed very 
nicely with the confederal conception of sovereignty. The Assembly was: ‘composed of 
representatives of the peoples of the Member States of the Community.’
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ent, vision on the EU, and the member people can choose which one they 
like best.
4.2.3 Prerequisites for national control
Lastly, and in line with our third guideline, EU senates are easily linked to 
the exercise of national power. Control of the Dutch senate, for instance, is 
necessary to securely govern in the Netherlands. Retaining control of the 
senate is, therefore, required to secure effective national political power, and 
to realize one’s national agenda. In a similar fashion the consent of EU sen-
ates could be made a prerequisite for all, or a selection of, national legisla-
tion, including the budget.
As soon as control of the EU senate becomes necessary for national con-
trol, political actors are further incentivized to acquire control of the senate. 
This stimulates them to develop, promote and explain their positions on EU 
integration, even if only during elections for the EU senate. After all, los-
ing a majority in the EU chamber would endanger the national agenda, and 
thereby what shall and should remain the primary focus of national politi-
cians in a confederal Europe: National political power.
As a result of the interlinking between national and EU chambers the ener-
gy of the national political process is partially diverted to EU affairs, which 
helps to politicize the EU, and develop a confederal democratic process. For 
the EU will only become politicized where this is necessary to win and exer-
cise national power.43
Through this democratic process the member peoples will then be 
enabled to exercise democratic control on EU affairs at their own national 
levels. Via EU senates, and the options developed and propagated by the 
different political actors to acquire control of these senates, they can indi-
cate their preference on the delegation of authority to the EU, and the use 
of authority that has been delegated. As a result their national vote will 
acquire more impact on EU affairs, and become more valuable because of it.
4.2.4 Conclusions EU Senates
Clearly, these proposals are highly underdeveloped, limited to only one 
option, and merrily gloss over a host of problems and challenges. For exam-
ple, granting such far-reaching powers to a second chamber will have a sig-
nificant impact on the overall balance of powers and the dynamics within 
a constitutional and political system. It rides roughshod over complex and 
finely attuned national systems and conventions, and may cause all kinds of 
new problems, such as stalemates between the national and the EU cham-
43 A thesis also supported by our US example. As we saw, after all, one of the key political 
reasons for supporting the move towards a US federation was the need for the former 
elites to regain political power. In other words, the drive for a federation was linked to, 
and fuelled by, clear political interests. See above chapter 5, section 2 and 3.
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bers, or deadlock at the EU level because of purely national politics being 
played out in EU senates. Equally, the separation between national and EU 
powers may not be as logical as implied.
The limited objective here, however, was merely to illustrate the direction in 
which confederal solutions could be sought to address the democratic gap 
outlined earlier. In line with the confederal approach developed here, these 
solutions should be primarily sought at the national level, and the establish-
ment of national senates is one particular option in this regard that could be 
further explored. At the same time the focus on the national level does not 
mean that no improvements could be made at the EU level to support the 
development of a confederal democratic process.
5 EU contributions to confederal democracy
This next section zooms in on two possibilities for the EU to support a con-
federal democratic process at the national level. First, it considers how the 
EU may help to create the political space required for national politics to 
engage with delegation as new substance. Second, it discusses some ways 
in which the EU can stimulate and support a confederal evolution of the 
national democratic process, including the gradual development of an obli-
gation under EU law for Member States to realign their national constitu-
tions with certain requirements of confederal democracy.
5.1 Political space: De-constitutionalization at the EU level
National politicization of the EU requires the possibility for normal, non-con-
stitutional politics on EU matters. As far as the exercise of EU voting rights 
is concerned, this is not a problem. The national political process can fully 
determine the way a national representative will utilize the national voting 
rights, or any other EU influence for that matter.
When it comes to the actual delegation of powers, however, the situa-
tion is more problematic. This delegation is largely contained in the Treaties. 
As has been abundantly proven by now, these Treaties are hard to change. 
In addition, the question which powers have been delegated is ultimately 
determined by the Court of Justice, whose case law is entrenched by the 
same veto that protects the Treaties.
Rather than a flexible ebband flow pattern, visible in federal systems,44 dele-
gation to the EU thereby acquires a one-off ‘give them a finger lose the whole 
hand’ character. The fact that delegation is part of a constitutional process, 
44 Elazar (2006), Burgess (2006), or Watts (1999), even though the trend line is generally 
upwards towards more central powers.
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is ultimately determined by a legal process and logic,45 and this one way 
dynamic of delegation makes ordinary day-to-day politics concerning del-
egation almost impossible. For example, it becomes difficult to take back cer-
tain competences, or to arrive at a politically desirable but legally impossible 
compromise on which powers to delegate and which to retain. It also creates 
a general fear and distrust of further delegation. A fear that radiates from 
the Lisbon treaty, which almost seems to equate delegation with amputa-
tion, and abounds with repetitive and legally superfluous subsidiarity state-
ments.46
Two options to make delegation more flexible, and more of a two-way 
street, can be envisaged. One alternative would be to  make changing the 
Treaties easier. An option that, though in a very limited way, is pursued by 
the Lisbon Treaty.47 Nevertheless this option does not seem feasible on any 
significant scale. Real flexibilization of the amendment procedure can only 
take place by removing the requirement of unanimity. A move that would 
undermine the ultimate control of the different member peoples on delega-
tion of powers, and therefore be a major step in creating a federate union.
The confederal nature of the EU, it seems, would be better served by anoth-
er route. One which would reduce the need for Treaty change, and open the 
process of delegation up to more daily politics. This second option involves 
relocating competences and prohibitions from primary to secondary law, 
which is far easier to amend.
Relocating part of the allocation of competences from primary law to sec-
ondary law, and opening them up for politics, would also seem logical in 
itself, certainly for a more established EU. Which constitution, after all, 
contains a full set of rules on free movement that subsequently interfere 
with social issues such as labour rights or social security?48 Which consti-
tution contains the rules on agriculture, fisheries and tourism? Removing 
such issues from the Treaty, and organizing them via secondary legislation, 
would make it easier to alter and adapt these delegations of authority. Such 
changes will still require at least a qualified majority, and convincing the 
Commission, yet they at least make it more feasible to establish a national 
political debate on these issues, and to make delegation a continuous politi-
cal process instead of a one-off event.
45 See above chapter 2, section 4.2.3 and chapter 3, section 2.4.3. on the expansive and 
entrenching effect of legal logic on this point.
46 Cf. typically the repetition in art. 5(2), 6(1) and (2), 48(2) TEU, Protocol 2 on the applica-
tion of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and art. 51(2) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Also see Dougan (2008), 617 et seq.
47 See chapter 2, section 2.4.3. for a detailed overview.
48 The counter argument that normal constitutions do not need to remove national borders 
and barriers is acknowledged, but does not undermine the point being made.
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Clearly, making it easier to take away competences from the EU creates the 
risk that the EU will be gradually dismantled, or rapidly cut to size in times 
of anti-EU sentiment.49 Besides the safeguards in the Treaty and the general 
principles underlying the legal order, however, such a risk is the inevitable 
price for a truly political and democratic process, and therefore democratic 
legitimacy. For only if there are real decisions to be made, can a political 
process develop.
5.2 Guiding and compelling national democratic evolution
In addition to de-constitutionalizing delegation, the EU could also stimu-
late and support the confederal evolution of the national democratic process 
within its Member States. Several options can be envisioned in this regard, 
in addition to soft-law and non-binding guidelines.
To begin with, the criteria for accession as set out in Copenhagen and 
Madrid could be further developed to take these confederal insights into 
account.50 These criteria could provide further guidelines on how the nation-
al democratic process is to be adapted to its inclusion in a confederal sys-
tem. Yet the biggest challenge does not lie with new members but with the 
existing ones. Fortunately, even though the EU does not have the leverage 
provided by conditionality, and even though it should be very mindful of 
the primary legitimacy of the national constitutional systems, it could also 
play a post-accession role.
For the Treaties contain clear obligations for the Member States to respect 
and promote democracy. Article 1 TEU, for instance, requires decisions to be 
taken ‘as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen’. Article 
2 founds the EU on ‘democracy’, whereas article 10(1) bases ‘the functioning 
of the Union’ on ‘representative democracy’. An EU right for EU citizens to 
have sufficient national democratic influence could also be read in article 
10(2) and (3), which hold that ‘Heads of State or Government and ‘govern-
ments’ are ‘themselves democratically accountable either to their national 
Parliaments, or to their citizens’, and that ‘every citizen shall have the right 
to participate in the democratic life of the Union.’
These Treaty inspirations could be further supported by the duty of sincere 
cooperation. Article 4(3) TEU requires Member States to ‘take any appropri-
ate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations 
49 Here an EU chamber, the political powers and interests of which are aligned with that of 
the EU, could also provide vital stability and countervailing force.
50 These now require that ‘the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guar-
anteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities (…). On the practical application see Kochenov (2008) and Smith (2003), 105 et 
seq.
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arising out of the Treaties’, and to ‘facilitate the achievement of the Union's 
tasks and refrain from any measure
which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives.’ As 
indicated above, the creation of a sufficiently stable confederal foundation 
is vital for the viability of the EU, and creating this foundation requires a 
confederal democratic process to substantiate the direct constitutional bond 
between the EU and the member peoples. In addition, as demonstrated 
in part I, stable member states are essential for a confederal system in any 
event.51 Ensuring this national stability, which includes establishing a suffi-
cient national democratic process, could therefore also be considered a legal 
obligation arising from the duty of sincere cooperation.
Considering the vital importance of the stability of its Member States, 
the EU would also be more than justified in supporting and guiding the 
required evolution of the national democratic process. Taking into account 
the relative impotence of confederal systems to engage in direct and pro-
longed conflict with their members, it is also important that the EU does 
so pre-emptively, and before open conflicts arise.52 The EU would be fur-
ther justified in undertaking action in this field by its direct responsibility 
towards the EU citizens.53 As indicated above, the Treaties guarantee these 
citizens democratic government. And although the Treaties do not go as 
far as the US Constitution, which allows central intervention in the States 
to ‘guarantee a republican form of government’, art 7 TEU does provide at 
least a starting point for EU action in this field.54
Although the EU would more logically act through non-binding sugges-
tions and best-practices, and though the EU could never directly amend 
the primary national constitutions itself, some basis might therefore also 
be developed for binding legal action at the EU level. The infringement 
proceedings against Hungary provide one example of this possible devel-
opment, although, as indicated, the EU would ideally act before such con-
frontations become necessary.55
In this regard one could even imagine a more far-reaching development 
whereby EU law would grant a directly effective right to EU citizens to an 
effective democratic influence on EU affairs at the national level. This devel-
opment could follow the logic of the Rewe case law. In these cases the Court 
of Justice held that the effectiveness of EU law also requires effective national
51 See chapter 4, section 3.4.
52 Idem.
53 See on the evolution of this direct bond above, chapter 10, section 3.3.
54 Art. 7 TEU refers to serious breaches of the values in art. 2 TEU, which include democra-
cy.
55 See Press release IP/12/24 of 17/01/2012, and C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary [2012] 
nyr.
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remedies, including state liability.56 In a similar vein, it could be held that 
the democratic rights that the Treaties grant to EU citizens require effective 
democratic remedies, also at the national level. Whilst obviously recogniz-
ing a very broad national procedural autonomy, Member States could, for 
instance, be obligated to guarantee an equivalent and effective influence 
via the national democratic process on EU decisions. Alternatively Member 
State liability could be established where no such equivalent and effective 
national democratic remedies exist.57
Clearly such an individual action remains highly theoretical at the moment.58 
They do form a nice illustration, however, of the potential of the confederal 
bond between the EU and its citizens. In addition, they provide an appeal-
ing symmetry with the logic of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Where the Ger-
man Court fears that integration might undermine national democracy, 
the Court of Justice could answer by turning EU law in an instrument to 
strengthen national democracy. This could lead to a similar dynamic as with 
the Solange cases and the subsequent development of fundamental rights 
in the case law of the ECJ.59 The Court of Justice could then join the national 
constitutional courts in their current quest to improve the national demo-
cratic and political process as far as European integration is concerned.60
6 Conclusion: The democratic potential of confederal rule
Regional integration removes a significant amount of authority from direct 
national democratic control by the sovereign member peoples. By delegat-
ing sovereign powers to shared central rule, they necessarily give up exclu-
sive control over the application of this authority. This loss of control, which 
is not compensated by equivalent control at the EU level, can logically be 
perceived as a threat to democracy.
56 Case 33/76 Rewe, and inter alia C-213/89 Factortame, C-479/93 Francovich [1995] ECR 
I-3843, C-46/93 and C-84/93 Brasserie du pêcheur [1996] ECR I-1029, C-453/99 Courage and 
Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, and C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz. For the clear limits of this logic 
also see C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, and for its uncertainties and complexities M. 
Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice (Hart Publishing 2004), 25 et seq.
57 A fi nding that obviously would have quite an impact seeing how a similar compensation 
could then be claimed by all individuals affected.
58 The vagueness of the democratic right, furthermore, could also form an obstacle to direct 
effect, at least where the Court so desires.
59 See the evolution running through case 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491, case 11/70 Internatio-
nale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe [1998] ECR I-8417, 
C-112/00 Schmidberger, and Joined cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P Kadi I. For an attempt 
to discern some patterns in the relation between the BVG and the ECJ see Payadeh (2010).
60 See chapter 8 section 4.4. as well as Piquani (2012).
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Yet, from a confederal perspective, such delegation also provides valu-
able new content for national democracy, and allows it to evolve alongside 
the confederal and globalizing reality it needs to control. To capitalize on 
this potential, however, the national democratic process should be struc-
tured and institutionalized properly. The new double role of the state in del-
egating authority to the EU and exercising the EU powers received in return 
should become part of national democratic substance. This requires anchor-
ing and controlling the exercise of these national powers in the national con-
stitutional and institutional structures.
In a confederal system like the EU this structure must logically form a 
mirror image of a federate system. To illustrate this logic, it has been shown 
how one potential way forward would be to anchor this new EU content of 
national democracy in EU senates, which would be based on independent 
and EU focussed elections. In addition, several modifications at the EU level 
could assist and guide the confederal evolution of national democracy. For 
example the delegation of competences could partially be relocated to sec-
ondary law, and the EU could actively step in by providing guidelines and 
incentives for Member States to modify their constitutional systems. More 
far reaching, one could even envision legally binding rules on a minimum 
of confederal democracy that should be guaranteed at the national level.
These suggestions, even if underdeveloped, do illustrate how the confeder-
al form can be a means of safeguarding democratic control in a globalizing 
world by expanding the reach of democratic control outside the confines 
of the state, and thereby creating new content for an evolved democratic 
process. A potential that builds on the direct link between the EU and the 
member peoples enabled by confederal sovereignty, and fully utilizes the 
democratic potential of this link.
Having established at least this potential for a confederal evolution of the 
democratic process, we turn to the second challenge for the confederal 
approach: The EMU crisis.

1 A perfect confederal storm?
Obviously, this chapter cannot provide a complete picture of the multi-
faceted and ongoing financial crisis that is facing the EU and the world at 
large. A fortiori, it does not hope to provide anything close to a full solu-
tion. Considering the complexity and speed of developments, including the 
unpredictable reactions by that unimaginable amount of interactions jointly 
known as ‘the market’, any form of prediction is intrinsically presumptu-
ous. Our excursion into this financial crisis, therefore, must be highly mind-
ful of these limitations, including the very real chance that some of the 
assumptions it relies on will be radically changed in the near future.
Fortunately, the primary aim of applying the confederal prism to the 
financial crises is also not to predict. Instead, the goal is to illustrate the 
explanatory value of the confederal approach for grasping some of the con-
stitutional roots of the crises, and the directions in which confederal solu-
tions might be sought. Nevertheless, even this limited exercise requires 
a real engagement with the crisis. This at least entails formulating what 
confederalism has to say about the crisis and what a suitable confederal 
response would look like.
Before applying our confederal approach to the sovereign debt and EMU 
crises, a brief historical overview is in order, starting from the banking crisis 
that kick-started both crises, and eventually lead to the different measures 
that have so far been taken to combat the crises (section 2). Subsequently 
section 3 illustrates how the crises logically fit with, and flow from, the 
confederal weaknesses identified in part I. Once these confederal problems 
have been set out we turn to some potential confederal cures in section 4. 
Building on the strong points of the modified confederal form and the con-
federal conception of sovereignty developed in part II, some directions for 
confederal solutions to the crises are suggested, and some confederal pit-
falls demarcated, after which section 5 ends with a brief conclusion.
2 A tale of three crises
The banking crisis, now conventionally linked with the fall of Lehman 
Brothers on 15 September 2008, was a costly one for most Member States. 
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Large rescue packages were required to prevent banks, and entire financial 
systems, from collapsing. As a result the financial position of many Member 
States was weakened, which contributed to and aggravated the sovereign 
debt crisis.
This second crisis erupted in January 2010 when Greece, ‘correcting’ its ear-
lier reports, announced a deficit of 12.7%, and a debt of over 120% of GDP. 
1 After this announcement, interest rates on its sovereign debt rose quickly. 
This further deteriorated its financial position, but also increased pressure 
on the Euro.2 As Member States continued to disagree on what measures 
to take, the crisis deepened and spread. The interest rates of other Member 
States such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain came under increasing pressure 
as well. Fear of a domino effect arose. The sovereign debt crisis, for instance 
in the case of a sovereign default, could hit the banks and pension funds 
in all Member States. Yet these financial institutions were still reeling from 
the banking crisis, and would, therefore, require public support if faced 
with further losses. And, to finish the downward spiral, this public support 
would further increase public debt and lead to further increases in inter-
est rates, potentially pushing large but weakened Member States like Spain 
over the edge as well. In other words the ‘Greek’ crisis was threatening all 
Member State economies.
Despite its general unpopularity in most Member States, and despite doubts 
as to the legality of aid to Greece under art. 125 TFEU, 3 an aid package of 
€110 billion was agreed on 2 May 2010.4 As the markets proved thoroughly 
unimpressed, a much larger temporary emergency fund of €500 billion was 
then quickly established to back up distressed sovereign debt.5 Providing 
1 See generally, and including a warning for a ‘true and severe European Union Crisis’ 
which ‘goes far beyond earlier diffi culties of the integration process.’, M. Ruffert, ‘The 
European Debt Crisis and European Law’ 48 CMLRev (2011), 1777-78.
2 Greek interest rates dropped sharply after accession to the EMU, coming close to the rate 
paid by Germany. In itself a clear indication that the markets were not taking art. 125 
TFEU seriously. In the beginning of 2008 for instance, Greece paid just over 4%. After the 
eruption of the crisis rates skyrocketed again, for instance reaching more than 19% in 
September 2011.
3 See J.V. Louis, ‘The No-bailout Clause and Rescue Packages’, 47 CMLRev (2010), 984 et 
seq. and V. Borger, ‘De eurocrisis als katalysator voor het Europese noodfonds en het 
toekomstig permanent stabilisatiemechanisme’, 59 SEW (2011), 211.
4 Of this package €30 billion was provided by the IMF, the remaining €80 billion by Euro-
zone Members utilizing a system of bilateral loans. As of April 2012, the last formal Com-
mission fi gures available to the author, 73 billion of these funds had been disbursed. Also 
see the ‘Statement by President Van Rompuy following the Eurogroup agreement on 
Greece’ Brussels, 2 May 2010, PCE 80/10. Further see Louis (2010), 971. The facility has 
been reduced by 2.7 billion, furthermore, after Ireland and Portugal stepped down.
5 €60 billion of this sum is provided by the EU itself, the other €440 billion being guaran-
teed by the Member States.
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external backbone, credibility and money, the IMF participated in this fund 
for another €250 billion, bringing its total capacity up to €750 billion.6
Both the inception and the nature of this temporary fund were rather 
extraordinary. The system eventually adopted was drafted within 48 hours, 
as it had to be finished before the Tokyo exchange opened for trade on the 
9th of May.7 At €15,625 billion per hour, this probably qualifies as some kind 
of record.8 In addition, the peculiar nature of the fund reflects the challenge 
the crisis formed, and forms, for the EU.
The fund had two elements. On the one hand there was the European 
Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM). This mechanism formed the EU side 
of the fund. Based on Article 122(2) TFEU it could guarantee up to €60 bil-
lion.9 It was open to all Member States, including those not participating 
in the Euro.10 The second, and largest, element was the European Finan-
cial Stability Facility (EFSF).11 The facility is based on an intergovernmental 
agreement between the members of the Euro-zone. It is not based on an EU 
decision and does not form part of the EU itself.12 The ESFF is a private 
corporate entity, a ‘Special Purpose Vehicle’ established for three years as a 
‘société anonyme’ under Luxembourg law.13 This private corporate entity, 
in turn, operates under its own statute and another private law agreement 
between the Member States involved and the ESFS. This agreement is gov-
erned by English law.14 Backed by guarantees of the participating Member 
States, the EFSF is authorized to raise up to € 440 billion.15
6 Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Euro Area Member States 
Meeting within the Council of the European Union, Brussels, 10 May 2010, 9614/10, 
ECOFIN 265, UEM 179.
7 Based on presentations by parties directly involved at the LLX (Leiden Law Exchange) 
round table on the EMU crisis on 11 February 2011. Chatham House rules applied.
8 Or as Ruffert calls it ‘perhaps the most dramatic week-end in EU history’ Ruffert (2011), 
1779.
9 As of April 2012 the EFSM had committed €22.5 billion for Ireland, and €26 billion for 
Portugal of which respectively €18.4 and €15.6 billion had been disbursed. Remaining 
capacity was, therefore, €11.5 billion.
10 Council Regulation 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 Establishing a European fi nancial stabilisa-
tion mechanism OJ (2011) L 118/1.
11 Although the permanent stability mechanism (ESM) became operational as of 8 October 
2012 (see further below), the EFSF will remain in operation until 30 June 2013. During this 
time it will run in parallel with the ESM.
12 Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Euro Area Member States 
Meeting within the Council of the European Union, Brussels, 10 May 2010, 9614/10, 
ECOFIN 265, UEM 179.
13 Council Document 9614/10 of 10 May 2010.
14 Framework agreement between the euro area Member States and the EFSF, 7 June 2010 
(www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm. See Borger (2011), 208-209.
15 As of April 2012 the EFSF had committed a total of €189.4 billion of which €62.5 billion 
had already been disbursed. It further covered an unused Greek loan facility of 24.4 bil-
lion. Consequently it had a capacity of €275 billion left.
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Interestingly the initial proposal of the Commission, at the beginning of this 
48-hour period, had been to bring the fund fully within the framework of 
the EU, and to largely place it under the control of the Commission itself.16 
The Member States, however, went to considerable length to keep the EFSF, 
and with it the bulk of the money, outside the EU framework. At the same 
time, and to complicate the resulting picture further, the Member States 
agreed that ‘the Commission will be allowed to be tasked by the euro area 
in this context’, and indeed important powers were given to the Commis-
sion.17 As a result the Commission, as an EU institution, received a role in 
a non-EU body designed to rescue a monetary Union at the centre of Euro-
pean integration itself.18
Both Ireland (€85 billion)19 and Portugal (up to €79.1 billion)20 received 
financial assistance under this temporary scheme.21 With the situation in 
Greece remaining highly precarious, furthermore, agreement on a second 
Greek aid package of up to €130 billion was reached on 21 July 2011.22 
16 See the proposal of 9 May 2010 for a Council Regulation establishing a European fi nan-
cial stabilization mechanism (COM (2010) 2010 fi nal). This fund would contain €500 bil-
lion, €440 billion being guaranteed by the Eurozone Members.
17 Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Euro Area Member States 
Meeting within the Council of the European Union, Brussels, 10 May 2010, 9614/10, 
ECOFIN 265, UEM 179.
18 Such an ‘external’ role of the Commission was already accepted by the Court of Justice in 
joined cases C-181/91 and C-248/91 Bangladesh [1993] ECR I-3685 and C-316/91 Lomé 
[1994] ECR I-625. It has now been explicitly confi rmed in C-370/12 Pringle [2012]. For a 
discussion of this use of EU institutions see V. Borger and A. Cuyvers, ‘Het Verdrag 
inzake Stabiliteit, Coördinatie en Bestuur in de Economische en Monetaire Unie: de juri-
dische en constitutionele complicaties van de eurocrisis.’ 60 Tijdschrift voor Europees en 
Economisch Recht (SEW), (2012), 370 et seq.
19 As of March 2012 the IMF had committed €22.5 billion (€19.4 billion disbursed). €17.7 bil-
lion was committed to Ireland from the EFSF (€9.4 billion disbursed), and €22.5 billion 
from the EFSM (€18.4 billion disbursed). €3.8 billion had been bilaterally committed by 
the UK (€2 billion disbursed), €0.6 billion by Sweden (€0.2 billion disbursed), €0.4 billion 
by Denmark (€0.1 billion disbursed) and €17.5 billion by Ireland itself (€17.5 billion also 
disbursed).
20 As of December 2010 €27.1 billion was committed by the IMF of which €22.1 billion had 
been disbursed. €52 billion was committed by the EU, of which €26 billion was commit-
ted from the EFSF, and the other €26 billion from the EFSM (€41.1 billion disbursed in 
total).
21 For the Irish package, which also includes bilateral contributions from the United King-
dom, Sweden and Denmark and funding from the IMF, see the Statement by the Euro-
group and ECOFIN Ministers of 28 February and the Council implementing decision of 7 
December 2010 on granting Union fi nancial assistance to Ireland, 17211/1/10 Rev 1, 
ECOFIN 796, OJ [2010] L 30/34. For Portugal, which aid includes funds from the EU/
EFSM, the EFSF and the IMF, see the statement of the Council, Brussels, 17 May 2011 
10231/11.
22 Of this sum up to €101 billion was guaranteed by the EU, and up to €28 billion by the 
IMF.
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The details of this program were further outlined in the next months, and 
included a significant ‘voluntary’ contribution from the private sector.23 On 
June 9th 2012, agreement was reached on an ESM aid package of up to a 
maximum of €130 billion for Spain and its banks.24 On 25 June 2012 Cyprus 
also requested aid, primarily to recapitalize its banks. After initial opposi-
tion, an aid package of €10 billion was finally established on 12 April 2013.25
During the crisis, furthermore, the European Central Bank also played a 
vital role, largely by acquiring bonds from distressed member states, and 
eventually expressing its total commitment to upholding the euro, inter alia 
through its ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ program.26
2.1 A permanent stability mechanism
In light of the ongoing crisis, and based on a report by a special task force 
lead by Herman van Rompuy,27 plans were then developed to replace 
these temporary rescue mechanisms with a permanent ‘European Stability 
Mechanism’ (ESM).28 Unlike the temporary measures such a permanent 
23 Statement by the Heads of State or Government of the Euro area and EU institutions. 
Brussels, 21 July 2011. Agreement with a suffi cient percentage of the private creditors was 
fi nally reached through the IFF on February 21. Private creditors will forgive 53.5 percent 
of their principal. In addition they exchange their remaining debt for new Greek govern-
ment bonds and notes from the European Financial Stability Facility with lower interest 
and longer duration. Also see the Statement by Commission Vice-President Olli Rehn on 
private sector participation in the second Greek programme, Brussels, 9 March 2012, 
MEMO/12/174.
24 Interestingly this package did not contain an IMF contribution, and also lacked an auster-
ity package similar to the ones imposed on the other aid recipients, and above all Greece. 
So far €100 billion has been committed by the ESM, and €41.4 billion has been disbursed.
25 €9 billion of this sum was committed from the ESM, €1 billion was committed by the IMF. 
The conditions for this bailout included the forfeiting of all deposits over €100.000 in the 
Cyprus Popular Bank (or Laiki) and a large part of these uninsured deposits in the Bank 
of Cyprus as well. This after an earlier plan to levy all uninsured deposits had met heavy 
criticism, was rejected by the Cypriot Parliament, and was withdrawn. The Cypriot Par-
liament accepted this second package on 30 April 2013, the German Bundestag did so on 
18 April 2013.
26 See for instance Decision (2010/281/EU) of the European Central Bank of 14 May 2010 
establishing a securities market program OJ [2010] L 124/8, and further ECB/2009/16 , 
ECB/2009/16, ECB/2010/5, and ECB/2011/18. Further see the ECB Press releases ‘Tech-
nical features of Outright Monetary Transactions’, Frankfurt, 6 September 2012 and ‘Mea-
sures to preserve collateral availability’, Frankfurt, 6 September 2012. For a discussion on 
the legality of these actions see zie M. Seidel, ‘Der Ankauf nicht markt – und börsenän-
giger Staatsanleihen, namentlich Griechenlands, durch die Europäische Zentralbank und 
durch nationale Zentralbanken – rechtlig nur fragwürdig oder Rechtsverstoss?’, 14 
EuZW (2010), 521 and C.H. Herrmann, ‘EZB-Programm für die Kapitalmärkte verstösst 
nicht gegen die Verträge – Erwiderung auf Martin Seidel’, 17 EuZW (2010), 645.
27 Final report of the Task Force to the European Council of 21 October 2010, 15302/10, 
ECOFIN 649.
28 European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 28-29 October 2010, EUCO 25/1/10, para. 2.
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fund apparently did require a Treaty amendment, or at least the prospect 
of one.29 In another far-reaching step, Member States agreed on such an 
amendment of article 136 TFEU in December 2010.30 By utilizing the new 
‘simplified’ amendment procedure of article 48(6) TEU, and emphasizing 
the ‘surgical’ nature of this amendment, a re-enactment of the Lisbon dra-
ma was to be prevented.31 The amendment entered into force belatedly on 
1 May 2013 after the Czech Republic finalized its ratification process..32
Anticipating the eventual entry into force of the amendment, however, the 
ESM treaty was already signed on July 11th 2011. Before becoming opera-
tional, however, both the anticipated amendment of article 136 TFEU and 
the ESM Treaty had to jump through quite a number of legal hoops, or per-
haps more accurately forced others to do so. One major hurdle was cleared 
when the German Bundesverfassungsgericht found the ESM in conformity 
with the German Constitution.33 The second major hurdle was lowered and 
subsequently overcome in Pringle.34
29 Doubting the legality of the temporary measures, especially under art. 125 TFEU, also see 
Ruffert (2011), 1785 et seq, or H. Kube and E. Reimer, ‘Grenzen des Europäischen Stabi-
lisierungsmechanismus’ NJW (2010), 1913.
30 European Council Conclusions, Brussels 16-17 December 2010, EUCO 30/10, par.1-2, and 
European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 (2011/199/EU) amending Article 136 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism 
for Member States whose currency is the euro OJ (2011) L 91/1. The proposed new art. 
136(3) TFEU reads: ‘The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stabil-
ity mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area 
as a whole. The granting of any required fi nancial assistance under the mechanism will 
be made subject to strict conditionality.’ Also see the European Council Conclusions of 4 
February 2011, EUCO 2/11, especially annex I, as well as the declaration following the 
extraordinary meeting of the European Council on 11 March 2011, 11/3/2011, EUCO 
7/1/11 and the statement after the meeting of heads of state or government of the Euro 
area on 21 July 2011.
31 This despite the fact that art. 48(6) still requires full ratifi cation by all Member States and 
their parliaments. Even under the ordinary amendment procedure, furthermore, the 
European Council may decide, by a qualifi ed majority, not to convene a convention (art. 
48(3) TEU), although the role of the European Parliament is larger in the ordinary proce-
dure.
32 Art. 2 of European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 (2011/199/EU). The amendment 
was approved by the Czech Senate on 25/04/2012 and by the Chamber of Deputies on 
5/06/2012, but long held up by the refusal of President Klaus to sign it.
33 BverGE 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 
be 6/12 (2012) ESM Treaty. See also the cooperative approach by the Estonian Riigikohus 
in its Constitutional Judgment 3-4-1-6-12 of 12 July 2012, ESM Treaty.
34 C-370/12 Pringle. See for a thorough and highly enlightening discussion V. Borger, 'The 
ESM and the European Court's Predicament in Pringle' , 14 German Law Journal (2013), 
113.
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Following these judicial fiats the ESM became operational on 8 October 
2012.35 It has been initially concluded between the seventeen Euro area 
countries, but is open to non-Euro area members for ad-hoc participation. 
It creates a permanent fund with in principle a maximum capacity of €750 
billion.36 The aim of the fund is to guarantee financial support to members 
in distress where such support is ‘indispensable to safeguard the financial 
stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States.’37 By doing 
so, under strict conditionality, the fund is intended to increase the trust of 
the markets in the sovereign debt of the Euro area.
2.2 Of six-packs, duo-packs and plus-pacts
The establishment of such a permanent fund is nevertheless only one ele-
ment in a larger attempt to address the structural problems behind the 
sovereign debt and EMU crises.38 Already at its inception several experts 
warned that there was a dangerous imbalance between the comprehensive 
Monetary Union and the far more limited Economic Union that accompa-
nies it.39 Existing mechanisms such as the original Stability and Growth 
Pact have failed to remedy this imbalance, as the EMU crisis has made 
abundantly clear.40 Consequently, one major question has become how to 
strengthen the overall system so that emergency funds will become unnec-
essary. A veritable flurry of legislative activity has resulted.
35 Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Brussels, February 2 2012 T/ESM 
2012/en 1, art. 38.
36 €500 billion of this sum is provided by the participating states, and the IMF has agreed to 
a maximum contribution of €250 billion. Under art. 8 the maximum authorised capital 
stock is €700 billion. In March of 2012 the 17 ministers of finance of the ESM states 
announced that the capacity of the fund would actually be €800 billion, yet this sum also 
includes all previous aid to Greece, Ireland and Portugal.
37 Idem, Preamble section. 6, art. 3.
38 On this imbalance see among many others, F. Snyder, ‘EMU revisited: Are we making a 
constitution? What constitution are we making?’, in: P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds), The 
Evolution of EU Law 1st ed. (OUP 1999), 449 et seq, as well as the newer version, F. Snyder, 
‘EMU – Integration and Differentiation: Metaphor for European Union’, in: P. Craig and 
G. De Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011), 687 et seq.
39 See for instance the insightful analysis by A. Szász, De Euro. Politieke achtergronden van de 
wording van een munt (Mets en Schilts 2001) (although the live version is greatly recom-
mended). Also see J-V. Louis, ‘The Economic and Monetary Union: Law and Institutions’, 
41 CMLR (2004), 1075 and F. F. Ambtenbrink and J. de Haan, ‘Reforming the Stability and 
Growth Pact’, 31 European Law Review (2006), 402 et seq.
40 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam. 17 
June 1997. (97/C 236/01) and art. 121 and 126 TFEU and Council Regulation 1467/97 of 7 
July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive defi cit pro-
cedure OJ (1997) L 209/6 as amended by Regulation 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 OJ (2005) 
L 174/5. On the failure and need to strengthen the EMU also see J-V. Louis, ‘The Review 
of the Stability and Growth Pact’, 43 CMLRev (2006), 104 and F. Ambtenbrink, ‘Naar een 
effectievere economische governance in de Europese Unie’ 59 SEW (2011), 433.
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First several proposals to address this imbalance were developed, including 
by the Commission and the Special Taskforce headed by Council President 
Van Rompuy.41 These led to the adoption of the so called six-pack, which 
includes mechanisms to improve both the preventative and the corrective 
arm of the Stability and Growth Pact and to improve economic conver-
gence.42 One of the central innovations in this new legislation is the pos-
sibility to impose a sanction by reversed qualified majority. Following a 
recommendation of the Commission, a sanction must be imposed, except 
where a qualified majority of the Council decides not to impose a sanction.43
Second, an additional ‘duo-pack’ with further measures has been adopt-
ed as well, and entered into force on May 30 2013. This package aims to 
further enhance the coordination and surveillance of budgetary processes.44
Third, and building on the Europe 2020 framework,45 a Euro+ Pact was 
signed between the 17 Euro area members and 6 non-Euro area members.46 
The pact intensifies economic coordination for competitiveness and conver-
gence, also in areas of national competence, and is integrated into the Euro-
pean semester.
More was nevertheless deemed necessary to adequately prop up the Mone-
tary Union. The further measures envisioned, however, did not prove feasible 
within the existing Treaty framework. Nor was further EU Treaty amendment 
41 Final report of the Task Force to the European Council of 21 October 2010, 15302/10, 
ECOFIN 649. Also see European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 21 July 2011.
42 Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area 
OJ (2011) L 306/ 1, Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeco-
nomic imbalances in the euro area OJ (2011) L 306/8, Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary posi-
tions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ (2001) L 306/12, 
Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances OJ (2001) 
L 306/25, Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regula-
tion (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive 
defi cit procedure, OJ (2011) L 306/33, and Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 
2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States OJ (2011) L 306/41.
43 See art. 4, 5, and 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011.
44 See Regulation 472/2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of 
Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious diffi culties with 
respect to their fi nancial stability, OJ (2013) L140/1 and Regulation 473/2013 on common 
provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correc-
tion of excessive defi cit of the Member States in the euro area, OJ (2013) L 140/11.
45 Communication from the Commission on Europe 2020, Brussels, 3 March 2010, 
COM(2010) 2020 fi nal.
46 Conclusions of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro area, Brussels, 11 March 
2011. These six non – Euro area members are Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland and Romania.
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possible, mostly due to a British veto.47 As a result, and highly interesting 
from the confederal perspective, a more intergovernmental route was chosen.
2.3 A new outer circle of EU law: The TSCG
On 2 March 2012, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in 
the Economic and Monetary Union was signed between 25 Members States, 
excluding the UK and the Czech Republic (the SCG treaty).48 Formally this 
is a separate Treaty, established outside the EU framework. At the same 
time it is intimately connected with EU law.49 Not only is it explicitly aimed 
at strengthening the EMU, it also incorporates multiple EU obligations, 
employs several EU institutions, and is highly mindful, at least in word, of 
the duty of sincere cooperation.50 Most far reaching, the SCG Treaty envi-
sions the incorporation of its own substance into the legal framework of the 
EU within a period of five years after entry into force.51
The SCG Treaty easily justifies a separate study in its own right.52 The most 
interesting themes for our purpose are its dual relation to the EU frame-
work, already mentioned above, and the inclusion of the so-called ‘Gold-
en Rule.’ Starting point for this Golden Rule is that parties are obligated 
to have a balanced budget or run a surplus.53 A national mechanism must 
47 Two options for a primary law solution were on the table. First, to use art. 126(14) TFEU 
to amend Protocol No. 12 on the excessive budget procedure. Second, going for an 
amendment of the Treaty, either though the ordinary amendment procedure of art. 48 
TEU, or through one of the simplifi ed alternatives in that provision. In the end the inter-
governmental approach won the day, this in no small part due to the UK’s demands to 
protect the interest of the UK’s fi nancial sector in the City, and its related veto of any pri-
mary law solution.
48 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, 
Brussels 2 March 2012, T/SCG/en, Preamble.
49 For a discussion of this Treaty, and the suggestion that this may be the start of a new form 
of EU law that holds quite some potential, see Borger and Cuyvers (2012), 370. Further see 
the French Conseil constitutionnel, Decision 2012-653 DC of 9 August 2012, Fiscal Compact.
50 See, for instance, SCG Treaty art. 1(1), 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 13. Also see Editorial 
Comments ‘Some thoughts concerning the Draft Treaty on a Reinforced Economic Union’ 
49 CMLRev (2012), 5.
51 SCG treaty, art. 16. A fact that also refl ects the initial desire, inter alia by Germany and 
France, to choose a primary law solution.
52 Its relation to, and conformity with EU law, for instance, deserve further attention, as do 
its broader implications for the constitutional nature and future development of the EU, 
including the question how to incorporate this Treaty into EU law. On these points see P. 
Craig, ‘The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: principle, politics and prag-
matism’, 37 European Law Review (2012), 231, as well as the interestingly confl icting evi-
dence given by Paul Craig and Michael Dougan to the European Scrutiny Committee of 
the House of Commons. House of Commons – European Scrutiny Committee, Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance: impact on the rule of law (62nd report, 27 March 
2012). Further developing the more positive line of Dougan see Borger and Cuyvers (2012).
53 SCG Treaty art. 3(1)(a) and (b). See art. (3)(1)(c) and (d) for some softening around the 
edges.
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be created to correct any deficit that might nevertheless occur. In the event 
of an excessive deficit this mechanism must be triggered automatically.54 
This national mechanism must, furthermore, follow the common principles 
established by the Commission.55 The Court of Justice, acting under art. 273 
TFEU, can be invited to rule on whether a Contracting Party has correctly 
implemented this obligation.56 It is the nature of this mechanism that is of 
special relevance here:
‘The rules set out in paragraph 1 shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting Par-
ties at the latest one year after the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of bind-
ing force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be 
fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes. The Contract-
ing Parties shall put in place at national level the correction mechanism referred to in para-
graph 1(e) on the basis of common principles to be proposed by the European Commission, con-
cerning in particular the nature, size and time-frame of the corrective action to be 
undertaken, also in the case of exceptional circumstances, and the role and independence 
of the institutions responsible at national level for monitoring compliance with the rules 
set out in paragraph 1. Such correction mechanism shall fully respect the prerogatives of 
national Parliaments.’57
As will be discussed further below, both the creation of the SCG Treaty and 
this Golden Rule fit with the confederal perspective developed in this the-
sis. Both also contain some important confederal strengths and weakness-
es. Before returning to our confederal application, however, we must first 
outline the last batch of measures and proposals developed to reinforce the 
Economic and Monetary Union.
2.4 From Banking Unions to a ‘deeply’ ‘genuine’ EMU
Considering the importance of a stable financial system for overcoming the 
current crisis and preventing future ones, a new supervision architecture 
for the financial sector was established.58 More far-reaching measures were 
54 SCG Treaty art. 3(1)(e). Note that this obligation, and hence the Golden Rule, only con-
cerns the defi cit, and not the debt ratio.  SCG Treaty art. 3(1)(e).
55 See art. 3(2) TSCG, and for the guidelines themselves the communication from the Com-
mission of 20 June2012 on the Common principles on national fi scal correction mecha-
nisms, COM(2012) 342 fi nal.
56 SCG Treaty art. 8. For a discussion of the actual nature and effect of any ruling by the 
Court of Justice, and the standard it should apply, see Borger and Cuyvers (2012).
57 SCG treaty art. 3(2).
58 See for an assessment of this need the de Larosière report of 25 February 2009, available 
at: http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf?27c60c4c7ddf5
de635cbd4d8be381c0c. This new system consists of the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB), the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pen-
sions Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the Joint Committee of 
the European Supervisory Authorities, and the relevant national authorities. More 
restrictive norms for capital requirements for banks, investment fi rms and insurance 
companies have also been set.
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nevertheless considered necessary,59 which lead to the discussion of a full 
‘Banking Union’.60 This Banking Union is to be based on a ‘Single Super-
visory Mechanism’ (SSM) under the auspices of the ECB,61 and is currently 
set to also include a ‘Single Resolution Mechanism’ (SRM).62 The ESM can 
then be envisioned as a back stop to these mechanisms.
Incorporating these ideas for a Banking Union, more comprehensive blue-
prints for a more stable EMU have subsequently been presented as well. On 
24 October 2012 the European Parliament published its relatively ignored 
recommendation ‘Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union’.63 
More attention was paid to the Commission’s ‘blueprint for a deep and gen-
uine Economic and Monetary Union’ launched on 30 November 2012,64 and 
especially to the Van Rompuy plan entitled ‘Towards a Genuine Economic 
and Monetary Union’ that was presented shortly afterwards on 5 December 
2012.65
The Van Rompuy plan matches the Commission’s blueprint on many 
points. Yet as could be expected, it is less far reaching on several important 
points, such as the introduction of Euro bills, binding control over national 
budgets and deeper political integration, or in the longer term allowing the 
59 See in this regard also the Green Paper on Stability Bonds, nibbling around the edges of 
the much debated ‘Euro bonds’ (Green Paper on the feasibility of introducing Stability 
Bonds – COM(2011)818 fi nal).
60 Also see the Commission communication of 12 September 2012 on ‘A Roadmap towards 
a Banking Union’, COM(2012) 510 fi nal, and the European Council Conclusions of 18 
October 2012.
61 See the Commission Proposal of 12 September 2012 for a Council Regulation conferring 
specifi c tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions, COM(2012) 511 fi nal, 2012/0242 (CNS).
62 See, including this suggestion on an SRM from the European Council, the Commission 
communication of 12 September 2012 ‘Roadmap towards a Banking Union’ COM(2012) 
510 fi nal, fi nding that: ‘Further steps are needed to tackle the specifi c risks within the 
Euro Area, where pooled monetary responsibilities have spurred close economic and 
fi nancial integration and increased the possibility of cross-border spill-over effects in the 
event of bank crises, and to break the link between sovereign debt and bank debt and the 
vicious circle which has led to over €4.5 trillion of taxpayers money being used to rescue 
banks in the EU.’ And that ‘mere coordination is not enough, in particular in the context 
of a single currency and that there is a need for common decision-making.’
63 European Parliament, Plenary Session, A7-0339/2012, RR\917057EN.doc.
64 COM(2012) 777 fi nal.
65 Van Rompuy had been invited to submit such a plan by the European Council in June 
2012 It has been expressly drafted ‘In close collaboration with Barroso, Juncker, and 
Draghi, and expressly refers to the Commission blueprint. Available at: http://www.con-
silium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf.
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EU to generate revenue through taxation.66 Differences that apparently dis-
tinguish a ‘genuine’ EMU from a ‘deep and genuine’ EMU.67
During the European Council summit of 13 and 14 December 2012 the Van 
Rompuy plan was discussed, relieved of its most daunting teeth, and trans-
formed into a ‘Roadmap for the completion of EMU’.68 This roadmap largely 
focuses on implementing and effectuating existing legislation and treaties, 
as well as on creating more effective supervision on the financial sector. The 
‘immediate priority’, for example, is to ‘complete and implement the frame-
work for stronger economic governance, including the ‘six-pack’, the TSCG 
and the ‘two-pack’, and to create a ‘more integrated financial framework’ 
including the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’.69 The European Council fur-
ther ‘urges’ the establishment of ‘a Recovery and Resolution Directive’ and 
a ‘Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive’ and to enable the ESM to ‘recapi-
talize banks directly’ so as to ‘break the vicious circle between banks and 
sovereigns.’70 Van Rompuy also received the assignment to draft another 
‘Roadmap’ to be presented at the European Council summit in June 2013. 
Not wholly unconnected to the entrée of Mr. Hollande, this roadmap must 
focus on ensuring ‘economic growth, competitiveness in the global context 
and employment in the EU’, and thereby act as a kind of social counterpart 
to the focus on budgetary discipline so far.71
None of the more far-reaching plans of the European Parliament, the Com-
mission or Van Rompuy, therefore, made it directly into the European 
Council conclusions. At the same time, the conclusions do state that the 
process of completing the EMU, which requires ‘deeper integration’, ‘will 
begin’ with these measures, implying that further measures will be taken 
in the future.72 Many of the more far-reaching proposals will undoubtedly 
66 Cf the statement on p. 5 on the Van Rompuy plan that, regarding further and deeper inte-
gration, the Commission’s Blueprint offers ‘a basis for debate’. The plan does stress, how-
ever, the need for a central fi scal capacity, and the ability to borrow and ‘common debt 
issuance without resorting to the mutualisation of sovereign debt’ (p. 12.).
67 The transformative objectives of the Commission proposal become especially evident 
where it describes the ultimately desired outcome and ‘solution’ on page 40: ‘In contrast, 
that problem would no longer arise in a full fi scal and economic union which would itself 
dispose of a substantial central budget, the resources for which would be derived, in due 
part, from a targeted, autonomous power of taxation and from the possibility to issue the EU's 
own sovereign debt, concomitant with a large-scale pooling of sovereignty over the conduct of 
economic policy at EU level. The European Parliament would then have reinforced powers 
to co-legislate on such autonomous taxation and provide the necessary democratic scru-
tiny for all decisions taken by the EU's executive. (My italics).
68 See the European Council conclusions on completing EMU of 14 December 2012, EUCO 
205/12.
69 Idem, paras. 5-7.
70 Idem, paras. 8 and 10.
71 Idem, point 12.
72 Idem, introduction.
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resurface in this process, as solutions to the current structural imbalance 
will have to be found. At the moment, however, they have not yet been 
embraced by the European Council, which seems rather unwilling to make 
any real leaps of faith just yet.73
Taking stock of the developments since 2008, therefore, one can conclude 
that many measures have been adopted or are in the pipeline. Many of 
these measures would not even have been imaginable several years ago. At 
the same time the sovereign debt and EMU crises, as well as the debate on 
how to solve them, are still on-going, with several of the real fundamental 
decisions still ahead, and with multiple pundits continuing to suggest this 
thesis might end up as a work of legal history disturbingly soon.
This ongoing debate and uncertainty, coupled with the multifaceted nature 
and complexity of the crises already mentioned, might argue against any 
attempt to analyse the EMU phenomenon, or at least against doing so 
before it can be approached with the much needed wisdom of hindsight. 
Precisely because it is ongoing, however, and precisely because it funda-
mentally challenges the constitutional framework of the EU, it is interest-
ing to see how this crisis should be understood and approached from the 
confederal prism developed above. For what use are theoretical rudders 
that only work in calm waters, and what better means than crises to test the 
limits of a constitutional system? The caveats set out above, however, obvi-
ously intensify as we shift from description to analysis.
3 The EMU crises: Confederal diseases?
So what light, if any, can our confederal prism shine on the many questions 
that these crises, and the responses to them so far, raise. Why, for instance, 
did this crises hit so hard, and why is it so difficult to overcome? But con-
versely, why has the EU survived so far, and where should it go from here? 
It is suggested that the three general propositions on the constitutional 
framework of the EU outlined in Part I –its internal focus, incorporation of 
federate modifications, and rule by law – can be of direct use here in outlin-
ing some confederal ‘diseases’ of the EU constitution that contribute to the 
crises. Similarly, the confederal perspective, including the notion of confed-
eral sovereignty developed in part II, can indicate some directions in which 
to look for a cure, as well as some confederal pitfalls that should be avoided 
in this search.
73 In contrast see the blueprint of the Commission openly pleading for ‘the necessary ele-
ments and the steps towards a full banking, economic, fi scal and political union.’ and the 
creation of ‘a new taxation power at the EU level, or a power to raise revenue by indebt-
ing itself on the markets’.COM(2012) 777 fi nal., 3 and 33.
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3.1 The internal focus and the momentum of self-deepening
To begin with, and in line with our first general proposition, the origins 
of the crisis fully fit with the internal and economic focus of the EU, and 
with the self-deepening federate competences that were granted to achieve 
them.74 Not incidentally the common currency was a crowning achievement 
in completing the internal market. This internal market logic and dynamic, 
of course combined with the other interest involved, was even so strong that 
it trumped clear warnings over creating a full Monetary Union without a 
sufficiently strong Economic Union.75 And indeed market integration was 
enhanced by the Monetary Union, as was the economic dependence of the 
Member States on this currency, the internal market, and therefore each 
other. In other words, the Monetary Union deepened the very same depen-
dence and economic interrelation that contributed to its own adoption.
Interestingly, this same dependence now plays an important role in weath-
ering the crisis. Market integration has created a powerful incentive for the 
Member States to protect the EMU. The cost of letting the Euro fail is uncer-
tain, but could be so high that it might better not be risked. As a result, it 
has so far been accepted that the Monetary Union has to be secured, even 
if it means saving Greece or other ‘sinners’ in the process. The grudging 
and tardy manner in which aid has so far been given only demonstrates just 
how loath the other Member States were to step in, and how large their self-
interest in saving the Euro must have been.76
Here the mechanism described in Part I – how the dependence on the inter-
nal market keeps pace with the level of integration – is clearly visible. An 
incentive that is now so strong that it forces political leaders to transfer bil-
lions of Euros to other Member States at a time when they already have to 
cut national budgets. Measures they then have to explain to their far from 
enthusiastic constituents, without any proper national foundation for doing 
so. It is difficult to imagine a traditional confederal system, with its exter-
nal and defence focus, ever providing such a strong incentive for contin-
ued cooperation and increasing investments, except in times of full out war. 
Here the inverted focus of the EU seems to have contributed to the survival 
of the Union.
The sheer power of this internal mechanism can, at the same time, also 
pose a risk. Especially once it is further enhanced by the increasing control 
74 See above chapter 3, section 2.4.3. and chapter 4, section 2.
75 Clearly many more (political) factors also contributed to the eventual establishment of 
the EMU. See Szász (2001), and Ambtenbrink and De Haan (2006).
76 See the very late reaction of the European Council fi rst only limited to supportive state-
ments. Only with a market crisis imminent was real action taken on May 9th 2010.
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of markets over governments that we seem to be witnessing.77 The direct 
response to the market in Europe on May 9th 2011 demonstrates the impres-
sive power of that market.
The far-reaching controls established, and the many increasingly radical 
suggestions on further economic integration aired during the crisis, some 
by very senior political figures, further illustrate the enormous impetus for 
cooperation and integration provided by the internal perspective. One of 
the most far-reaching was the suggestion to establish a full-blown European 
Economic Government with independent powers to sanction Member State 
governments.78 Suggestions that stand in stark contrast to the political sen-
timent so tangible still in Lisbon, with subsidiarity, less Europe and national 
identity as its rallying cries.79
These far-reaching proposals, however, make perfect sense from the logic 
of the (internal) market and economic integration.80 If one economically 
depends on a Monetary Union, and this Monetary Union requires shared 
economic government, then one should create it. But how far can, and 
should, one go in creating a full-blown Economic and Fiscal Union to match 
the Monetary one? Especially where the sentiment in most national elector-
ates has firmly remained in a sceptical mode towards increased European 
integration, or has deteriorated even further precisely due to the EMU cri-
sis? It will be those national electorates that many decision makers in the EU 
will have to convince or at least answer to, and whose support and legiti-
macy is so necessary for the long-term prospects of the EU.
Constitutionally, therefore, what we might be seeing is the internal market 
engine of the confederal system going dangerously fast, and potentially dis-
appearing over the horizon of its confederal foundation. Yet simultaneous-
ly, this internal market engine is becoming ever more central to sustaining 
the integration that has been achieved so far against (political) backlashes. 
Slowing it down might, therefore, threaten the whole European construct 
as well. In this way the confederal perspective fits with the broader feeling 
of the EU being trapped between a dangerous leap forward and an equally 
dangerous slide backwards. To complicate matters further, however, some 
of the other confederal problems discussed above are also brought into play 
by the crisis.
77 See also chapter 4, section 2.
78 See for instance the comments Merkel and Sarkozy on establishing an economic govern-
ment on 16 August 2011, or even more far reaching the earlier comments by German econ-
omy minister, Philipp Roesler on August 10, proposing an – unelected – 'stability coun-
cil' for EU. http://euobserver.com/19/113251 and http://euobserver.com/19/113327.
79 Dougan (2007).
80 Cf already the language in the Commission blueprint: ‘Over the longer term, the logic of 
aiming for a full banking union for all banks is compelling.’ (COM(2012) 777 fi nal., 30).
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3.2 Hitting the weak spots: Money
The debt and EMU crises precisely hit the weak spots in the confederal 
armour of the EU. Chinks that were discussed in relation to our second and 
third general proposition: The reliance of the EU on the rule by law and 
stable Member States, and the gap between the confederal basis and the fed-
erate superstructure of the EU.81
To start with, these crises concern money. As discussed in part I, the finan-
cial position of the EU is far better than that of the US Confederation, but 
only because the Member States pay their dues, and because the EU can 
make do with a very small percentage of GDP due to its regulatory nature. 
Like the US Confederation, however, the EU still lacks the authority and 
the legitimacy to conduct massive financial operations, particularly of a 
redistributive character. The amounts involved in the crisis far exceed this 
capacity.82 Not surprisingly, therefore, the financial crisis clearly reaffirmed 
the ultimate financial power of the Member States. Most noticeably we saw 
how the European Council stepped in and took control, sometimes almost 
relegating the Commission to a role as secretariat.83 An increased role for 
this confederal powerhouse is logical from the confederal perspective, as it 
must compensate the expanding federate element of the EMU.84 And even 
though these developments may further encapsulate the European Council 
within the federate superstructure of the EU, they also create the danger of 
over-compensation. The confederal elements may use the momentum avail-
able to undermine too much of the federate superstructure of the EU.85
81 See chapter 3, section 3 and 4.
82 See above. Certainly so when we also include the massive operations of the ECB so far. 
Though more screened from direct political responsibility, masked by technical complex-
ity, and of vital interest in preventing a further melt-down, these operations do concern, 
at the end of the day, very real money. See for instance Decision (2010/281/EU) of the 
European Central Bank of 14 May 2010 establishing a securities market program OJ 
[2010] L 124/8 as well as the Outright Monetary Transactions’ program.
83 Editorial Comments ‘An ever Mighty European Council’ 46 CMLRev (2009), 1383.
84 In fact the very development of the European Council, from its relative formalization in 
1974 under the initiative of Giscard d’Estaing, can of course be seen as a confederal coun-
terweight. Not incidentally it was the French interest that was served by a more direct 
political mechanism such as the one offered by the European Council.
85 Though no clear parallel can be proven, or causality shown, the comparison with the emp-
ty chair crisis of 1965-66 comes to mind. Not coincidentally, certainly not from the confed-
eral perspective, the crisis erupted in relation to two signifi cant federate modifi cations: the 
Court of Justice had just established direct effect and primacy (Van Gend & Loos and Costa 
v. E.N.E.L.) and under the rules of the EEC Treaty the Council of Ministers was about to 
move to QMV on some important fields. The confederal, statist counter-move by De 
Gaulle (partially) countered at least one of these developments through the Luxemburg 
Accords. Equally it was the Commission that suffered the greatest set-back in power, and 
the political institution of the Council that gained the most. In that regard the move by De 
Gaulle may have been a constructive one (in the longer run) in maintaining a certain over-
all balance. In any event this dynamic may be at work again, and too strong a resistance 
against the apparent need for confederal counterweights should not be rejected too easily.
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Such a shift towards a more fiscally oriented Union, therefore, forms a clear 
risk. It not just endangers EU effectiveness, but may also undermine the 
federate elements in the system, and may subjugate them to pure confed-
eral power in the fiscal field. In other words: Once the EU largely becomes 
about redistributing money directly instead of regulating a market, Member 
States, or their political leaders, may start putting their principal authority 
to use. They may increase control and re-confederalise more federate ele-
ments. Elements that, as we saw above, play an important role in stabilizing 
the overall EU system in the longer run. The clear power play by the Euro-
pean Council fits with such a scenario. The confederal nature of the ESM, 
and the intergovernmental SCG Treaty similarly follow this pattern, even 
though the inclusion of the EU institutions in these instruments also testi-
fies to the importance of a federate superstructure for the effectiveness of a 
confederal system.
Although no alternative solution to the path chosen so far may have been 
readily available, and though the risks flagged up here do not have to 
materialize, they are risks that should be taken into account, and of course 
already are being taken into account, for instance by the Commission. 86 The 
limited point here is that any attempt to deal with these risks might benefit 
from a confederal understanding, which includes placing individual events 
in the larger context of the balance between confederal and federate ele-
ments in the EU.87
3.3 Politics and conflict
In addition to the serious money involved, the crisis combined two further 
weak points of the confederal form: Politics and conflict.
To begin with, the crisis concerns a highly political area where law 
has so far played a secondary role at best. Budgetary decisions and public 
spending form the core of national politics, and are not often brought into 
the legal arena.88 As our second proposition pointed out, however, the EU 
largely governs through rule by law. A mechanism that only works where a 
field is subject to legal, or at least bureaucratic, scrutiny.
86 In the terms of Van Middelaar (2009), 42-43, some content of the ‘internal’ circle (de bin-
nensfeer) is transferred to the middle sphere, and/or, perhaps more worryingly, the mid-
dle sphere itself is drawn more towards the external sphere, at least in terms of self-
understanding and process.
87 Editorial Comments ‘Some thoughts concerning the Draft Treaty on a Reinforced Eco-
nomic Union’ 49 CMLRev (2012), 5 et seq.
88 See also recognizing this the Van Rompuy plan, page 16: ‘Decisions on national budgets 
are at the heart of Member States’ parliamentary democracies.’
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The spectacular failure of the stability and growth pact sadly makes the 
point.89 Forced to fall back on a truly confederal and political policing sys-
tem, the pact failed, and the Monetary Union was left out in the cold. 90 The 
clear limits of the restraining power of law in this political field, especially in 
times of crisis, further illustrates the point. Right or wrong, the precise mean-
ing of, for instance, Article 122(2) or 125 TFEU did not seem a primary con-
cern, or a concern at all, for political decision making during the crisis. Ruffert 
provides an illustrative quote by Lagarde, the then Minister of Finance of 
France, ‘We violated all the rules because we wanted to close ranks and real-
ly rescue the euro-zone.’91 And as a matter of fact, the Courts followed.92
The many creative experiments now ongoing with the ESM and SCG Trea-
ties, merrily blending EU law and intergovernmentalism, betray an equal 
pragmatic approach to law. Again we can remain agnostic here on the ulti-
mate correctness of this approach. The sole point made here is that such a 
clear shift to political decision making, and the subsequently reduced role 
for law, greatly reduce the capacity for the confederal rule by law. Yet (con-
federal) alternatives do not seem available either.
In addition, and partially as a result of its political nature, the crisis seems 
to force the EU to directly control, and come into conflict with, the Member 
States. It must do so, furthermore, on one of the most sensitive issues pos-
sible: The budget. Again, this challenges the EU in one of the major con-
federal weaknesses established above: The limited capacity of the centre to 
control Member States, or to pit itself against one or more Member States in 
a direct, non-legal confrontation.
Economic Union itself, in other words, seems to be a problematic area for 
the confederal rule by law on which the EU depends. Despite the clear fail-
ure of all previous attempts to have the confederal centre control its mem-
89 Whereby it should not be forgotten that the European Court of Justice also rejected the 
invitation to legally police the Stability and Growth Pact at the European level. See 
C-27/04 Commission v. Council (Stability and Growth Pact) [2004] ECR I-4829, and D. Dou-
kas, ‘The Frailty of the Stability and Growth Pact and the European Court of Justice: 
Much Ado About Nothing’ 32 LIEI (2005), 293.
90 In this regard a further blow to the rule by law should be noted, only this one at the EU 
level. This is the easy way in which the restraints of art. 125 TFEU were set aside by the 
European Council. Although the extreme conditions make this readily understandable, 
such deviations from the rule of law can have a very damaging long-term effect.
91 Ruffert (2011), 1788. Cf also Van Middelaar (2009), 160: ‘the political force that keeps 
everyone onboard simply is stronger than the legal logic.’ (my translation).
92 See especially C-370/12 Pringle, BVerfGE 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10 and 2 BvR 
1099/10 (2011) Euro Rescue Package, BverGE 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 
1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 be 6/12 (2012) ESM Treaty, Conseil constitu-
tionnel, Decision 2012-653 DC of 9 August 2012, Fiscal Compact, and Estonian Riigikohus 
(Constitutional Judgment 3-4-1-6-12 of 12 July 2012, ESM Treaty.
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bers, many of the solutions now proposed precisely force the EU further 
into such a controlling and conflicting role; a role highly unsuited for con-
federal systems.93 The EU, and specifically the Commission, are asked to 
police national politicians on an issue that lies at the heart of national poli-
tics. A job, and even a power, that the Commission should perhaps not wish 
to obtain. In that sense the path of the Golden Rule, which will be discussed 
below, might hold more of a promise for confederal rule, even if it is far 
from risk free.
3.4 The schism between confederal basis and federate superstructure
Lastly, and most importantly, part of the crisis may ultimately be said to 
have its roots in a schism between one element of the EU’s federate super-
structure that became too large, and the confederal basis that must support 
it. The strongly federate Monetary Union, which includes an independent 
European Central Bank with exclusive powers over all monetary policy,94 
was based on the completely confederal basis of an intergovernmental Eco-
nomic Union.95 A schism, furthermore, that reflects, and flows from, the 
more fundamental schism within the constitutional structure of the EU dis-
cussed above.
After all, there was a very good reason why a full Fiscal and Economic 
Union was not established together with the Monetary Union. Member 
States were not willing to surrender such a key element of their national 
political process to the EU, and rightly so.96 Not only do these powers 
belong at the principal level of the Member States, the EU also lacks the nor-
mative authority required to support such far-reaching powers.97
93 See chapter 4, section 3.4.
94 Notice in this regard also the enormous increase in the role and power of the ECB in this 
crisis. The ECB is required to inject the trillions of Euros required, yet for which national 
politicians cannot accept open political responsibility, and hence is signifi cantly empow-
ered and intrinsically politicized.
95 See on the federal nature of the monetary union already the language of the Werner rap-
port in 1969, par 30, explicitly calling the ECB federal ‘Considering the political structure 
of Community and the advantages of making existing central banks part of a new sys-
tem, the domestic and international monetary policy-making of the Community should 
be organized in a federal form, in what might be called a European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB).’
96 The necessity of further political integration was of course already seen at the time, and 
even proposed, leading to Maastricht. See the proposal for further political union made 
in the European Council of 1990 in Dublin (EC Bulletin 6-1990, 1.11). Also see R. Corbett, 
‘The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union’ 30 JCMS (1992), 271 and W. Buit-
er, ‘“The Sense and Nonsense of Maastricht” Revisited: What Have We Learnt about Sta-
bilization EMU? 44 JCMS (2006), 687.
97 See chapter 10, section 3.2., 8 and 9.
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As experience has shown, however, even the Monetary Union itself already 
taxed the legitimacy of the EU to a very high degree. Removing something 
as vital and sensitive as budgetary powers from the national political arena, 
and placing that power, or control over that power, at the EU level, there-
fore, should perhaps not be something the EU desires. At least not if it does 
not want to explode the already wide gap between foundation and super-
structure.98 Yet unlike in other areas, the existing schism between the Mon-
etary and the Economic Union already seems to have reached a critical level 
anyway. As a result the EU is confronted with the fundamental question of 
how to respond to such a constitutional challenge. Propelled by the inter-
nal dynamic of the market described above, it now appears faced with the 
choice between two potentially fatal evils: Either abandoning the Monetary 
Union or making a leap of faith, and a rather desperate one at that, for full 
Economic Union. It is to explore the outlines of an alternative confederal 
response to this dilemma that we turn to some of the confederal pitfalls and 
responses that can be developed to the crisis based on the work done so far.
4 Confederal pitfalls in responding to the crisis: 
Mind the gap…please
The analysis of the modified confederal system of the EU in part I revealed 
several inherent weak spots. As shown above, the Euro crisis simultane-
ously puts pressure on several of these. Responses to the crisis, however, 
should be very mindful of these weaknesses as well. They should take care 
not to aggravate existing weaknesses or base remedies on the weaker parts 
of the confederal basis. Two pitfalls that should be especially avoided are 
focused on here. First, the risk of exploding the federate superstructure in 
order to stabilize the EMU. Secondly, the related risk of subsequently try-
ing to create a sufficient democratic authority at the EU level to support this 
expanded superstructure. Both risks are usefully illustrated by the Commis-
sion’s blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU.
4.1 Exploding the federate superstructure
The first pitfall is to delegate too many new and far-reaching powers to the 
EU level, and thereby enlarge the already impressive federate superstruc-
ture of the EU outlined in part I. This pitfall is particularly dangerous as 
increasing central powers seems such a logical response. After all, the fun-
damental imbalance between the weak Economic Union and the federate 
98 Also see the warning by the German BvGH in this connection, who held that members of 
the Bundestag, carrying the primary political authority and responsibility ‘must remain in 
control of fundamental budget policy decisions.’ BVerfGE 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10 
and 2 BvR 1099/10 (2011) Euro Rescue Package.
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Monetary Union forms one of the structural causes of the entire crisis.99 
Elevating the economic leg of the EMU to the same federate level as the 
monetary leg would solve this imbalance.
In line with this logic, and its own institutional reflexes, the Commission 
strongly supports such further and deeper integration. A ‘significant addi-
tional transfer of political powers’ is necessary.100 A ‘full fiscal and economic 
union’ is the desired ‘final destination, it would involve a political union with 
adequate pooling of sovereignty with a central budget as its own fiscal capacity 
and a means of imposing budgetary and economic decisions on its members, 
under specific and well-defined circumstances.’101 Such deep integration 
would also entail the common issuance of debt, and eventually the right of 
the EU to tax individuals directly.102
These proposals would significantly expand the federate superstructure of 
the EU, both quantitatively and qualitatively. They even provide for a right 
to tax, one of the fundamental federate modifications adopted at Philadel-
phia, and allow the EU to directly interfere in the budgetary heart of nation-
al politics.
As we saw, however, the current federate superstructure is already writ-
ing cheques the confederal foundation is barely able to cash. In addition, it 
is precisely the federate market competences of the EU that have the ten-
dency to expand at the expense of the confederal elements in the EU Con-
stitution, and that by doing so helped to create the entire crisis in the first 
place. These new federate elements, furthermore, would concern exactly 
those areas, like money, politics, conflict and enforcement, where a confed-
eral system remains weak.
In other words, proposals to create a federate Economic Union expand the 
federate superstructure beyond what the confederal basis can carry, and 
would do so in some of the most dangerous and problematic areas imagin-
able for a confederation. Besides overburdening the confederal foundation 
of the EU, such an approach would force the confederal elements in the con-
stitutional system to fight back. The central role that the European Council 
has claimed during the Euro crisis was already noted above, and provides 
a clear illustration of this risk. Where the powers at the European level 
become so significant, and start to include vital political issues like the bud-
get and taxation, these political actors will quickly find ways to re-establish 
99 This assumption also underlies the proposals from the European Parliament, the Com-
mission Blueprint and the Van Rompuy Plan.
100 Commission ‘blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union.’ 
COM(2012) 777 fi nal, 11.Cf also page 11 (progressive pooling of sovereignty’ leading to ‘a 
deeply integrated economic and fi scal governance framework’.
101 Idem, 31.
102 Idem, 31, 33 and 40.
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control. As shown in part II, EU institutions will have no means of defeating 
the principal national authority and legitimacy of these actors once it is fully 
deployed. The net result might well be less central control than more, and a 
dangerous undermining of the entire federate superstructure on which the 
EU depends.103 The fall out of such a power struggle could also tarnish the 
rule by law and general culture of legal compliance and cooperation that 
the EU relies on.
4.2 Relocating democracy to the EU level
Obviously the parties suggesting such an expansion of the EU superstruc-
ture are well aware of these risks. Yet in line with their desire to expand the 
superstructure, their solution generally is to jump into the second confed-
eral pitfall as well by trying to establish the necessary democratic legitimacy 
for an expanded superstructure at the EU level.
Again, the proposals of the Commission provide a clear example. The 
choice to create a primary EU democracy to support deeper economic inte-
gration is already inherent in the two ‘basic principles’ the Commission for-
mulates:
‘First, in multilevel governance systems, accountability should be ensured at that level 
where the respective executive decision is taken, whilst taking due account of the level where 
the decision has an impact. Second, in developing EMU as in European integration gener-
ally, the level of democratic legitimacy always needs to remain commensurate with the degree 
of transfer of sovereignty from Member States to the European level.’ Consequently it is the 
European Parliament ‘that primarily needs to ensure democratic accountability (…).’104
It is still acknowledged that ‘the role of national parliaments will always 
remain crucial in ensuring legitimacy (…)’. Yet it is not exactly clear what 
this crucial role entails because it is the European Parliament that must pro-
vide the real legitimacy at the EU level.105 For this legitimacy ‘requires a 
parliamentary assembly representatively composed in which votes can be 
taken. The European Parliament, and only it, is that assembly for the EU and 
hence for the euro.’106
103 See above chapter 3, section 6.
104 Commission ‘blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union.’ 
COM(2012) 777 fi nal, 35.
105 Cf in this regard also the almost mystical statement in art. 3(2) TSCG that the required 
correction mechanisms ‘shall fully respect the prerogatives of national Parliaments’, even 
though they must guarantee that the defi cit does not become excessive.
106 Commission blueprint, 35.
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Yet it fails to be seen, or demonstrated, how the European Parliament will 
provide this legitimacy. A gap illustrated by the interesting claim that 
the ‘Lisbon Treaty has perfected the EU's unique model of supranational 
democracy’.107 A somewhat optimistic assessment of the current legitimacy 
of the EU and the European Parliament. This assessment is also immediate-
ly contradicted by the second half of this sentence, which finds that this per-
fect system ‘in principle set[s] an appropriate level of democratic legitimacy 
in regard of today's EU competences.’108 In practice, however, the European 
Parliament seems incapable of generating sufficient legitimacy to even sup-
port the current federate superstructure, let alone a greatly expanded one.
As demonstrated in part II, it is also impossible for the European Parliament 
to do so in the confederal authority structure of the EU. Unlike in a federate 
system there simply is no supreme central authority to represent at the EU 
level, and to draw legitimacy from.109 The national parliaments therefore 
remain the principal representative bodies of the different sovereign mem-
ber people.
Because there is no sufficient central authority to represent or legiti-
mize such far-reaching central powers, it also comes as no surprise that the 
Commission struggles to concretize and substantiate the strengthened role 
of the European Parliament or the legitimizing effect expected. Achieving 
further legitimacy will require ‘further reflections’ on the ‘EU’s model of 
democratic legitimacy’, despite its current perfection.110 Later on, only some 
less than convincing suggestions are made, for instance ensuring that the 
European Parliament is ‘more directly involved in the choice of the mul-
tiannual priorities of the Union’, that it is ‘regularly informed’ on adjust-
ment programmes, or the ‘possibility of adapting its internal organisation 
to a stronger EMU.’111 Nor does the suggestion to increase the control of 
the European Parliament over the new supervisory functions of the ECB 
seem likely to achieve the desired democratic result.112 As a result, we are 
left with the general need to ‘foster the emergence of a genuine European 
political sphere’.113 The same challenge the EU has been facing all along.
Besides their ineffectiveness, however, two more fundamental shortfalls 
undermine such attempts to establish primary democratic legitimacy at the 
EU level, at least as long as the member peoples want to retain a confederal 
Union and their individual sovereignty.
107 Idem, 35.
108 Idem, 35.
109 See chapter 4, section 4.
110 Commission blueprint, 35-36.
111 Idem, 37.
112 Idem, 39.
113 Idem, 37.
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To begin with, it diverts the focus from the national level, though it is 
there that confederal democratic legitimacy could perhaps be best sought. 
Instead of investing in the confederal evolution of the national democratic 
process, as suggested in chapter 12, attention remains focussed on the EU 
level.
Second, the attempts to create legitimacy at the EU level automatically 
challenge the principal legitimacy of the national democratic system. The 
implicit claim is that this national level can be supplanted by an EU process. 
As part II of this thesis demonstrated, this is impossible within a confed-
eral system.114 Such claims can, as a result, lead to dangerous conflicts, that 
might undermine the modified confederal model of the EU.
Essentially these challenges, jointly shaping the second confederal pitfall, 
all flow from the flawed assumption that ‘accountability should be ensured 
at that level where the respective executive decision is taken.’ As long as a 
confederal system is to be maintained, however, accountability on such vital 
points must be ensured at the level where the principal political authority 
lies: The national one. As demonstrated in part II and chapter 12 above, the 
solution then lies in connecting decisions at the EU level to this principal 
national authority through a confederal evolution of the national democrat-
ic process.
4.3 Only conquer what you can defend
Jointly, these two confederal pitfalls may balloon the federate superstruc-
ture without providing any additional democratic legitimacy to support 
it. What is more, the existing legitimacy that lies at the national level may 
be challenged and undermined. The confederal potential of a direct and 
democratic basis for EU authority outlined in part II is not realized, and the 
national democratic processes cannot evolve in a way that allows them to 
expand their control beyond the borders of the declining state. The respon-
sibility to develop effective budgetary controls that meet the requirements 
of the confederal centre, a task which could provide important content to 
a national democratic process on integration, is transferred to the central 
level.
In its turn the centre may be tempted to bite off far more authority than it 
can chew. Far-reaching authority to control national budgets may very well 
prove a Trojan horse, as the centre will be unable to provide the required 
legitimacy, and such authority may induce a countermove from the national 
114 Of course one could reply that a federate foundation should therefore be established, and 
this might also be the implicit hope underlying the Commission blueprint. As has been 
discussed in part II, however, such a shift is considered neither feasible nor desirable for 
the foreseeable future. Nor, furthermore, should it be realized through stealth or trying to 
establish a fait accompli, which would be an extremely risky and undemocratic strategy.
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political actors that the EU centre will not be able to repulse. Conquering 
ground now that some Member States are in disarray might be easy and 
tempting, but defending such conquests will be impossible, and future 
withdrawal will be costly.
The next section therefore attempts to provide a confederal contribution 
to this key challenge, and to the sustained group effort that will be required 
to tackle it.
5 Confederal cures?
For, in addition to highlighting some of the causes and pitfalls, and with the 
caveats set out above, the confederal prism might also help by indicating 
some alternative directions for solutions, at least at the constitutional level. 
Solutions that avoid some of the main weaknesses in the modified confed-
eral system of the EU, and instead try to build on its particular strengths.
To this end two suggestions will be discussed here. First, establishing the 
checks on national economic discipline at the national level, and bringing 
them under more effective secondary EU control. Second, relying on auto-
maticity, rather than any form of political decision making at the European 
level in enforcing Member State obligations.
Both of these suggestions concern the narrow issues of enforcing eco-
nomic coordination and budgetary control. The lack of effective enforce-
ment is one of the key weaknesses of the EMU, but of course not the only 
one. Consequently, even if the proposed approaches might be effective, 
they would not address other structural problems of the Euro such as the 
disparity in the balance of payments or the different level of competitive-
ness between Member States economies. Nevertheless improving the effec-
tiveness on this point may go some way to softening the unattractive and 
seemingly impossible choice between either a federate ‘E’, or no ‘M’. It may 
strengthen the economic limb of the EMU without transferring impossible 
amounts of federate powers to the EU. In addition, if the underlying logic 
and approach are correct, it may also be of use in addressing some of the 
other structural problems facing the EMU.
5.1 Designing confederal checks at the national level
As indicated above, switching to a full Economic and Fiscal Union seems 
out of the question. Aside from the fact that such a measure would likely 
not make it through public consultations at the moment, it might very well 
tax EU and national legitimacy beyond its breaking point. The more logical 
approach from the confederal perspective would seem to stop burdening 
the confederal level with enforcement tasks, and instead look for a solution 
at the national level, where the principal authority, the financial power, and 
the spending problem lies.
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A ‘Schuldenbremse’ forms one example of the kind of rule that could be 
adopted at the national level. Budgetary rules of this kind were already 
included in the Swiss Constitution in 2002 and the German Constitution in 
2009115 Poland has also constitutionally capped its public debt to three fifths 
of GDP, 116 and a similar proposal was accepted by the Spanish Senate in 
2011.117
Now the precise functioning of such rules and budgetary control pro-
cedures should be left to the national democratic process, but they should 
take the limits set by the EU into account. The national rules should be 
developed with the aim of ensuring these limitations, but must do so at the 
national level. With such national rules in place the EU could then revert to 
its confederal rule by law; it could connect with these national rules and sys-
tems of control, and influence their application and interpretation. Rather 
than pitting itself against its Member States in a field where the EU does not 
have a hope of trumping them, the EU could then work with the Member 
States, or at least their legal systems, to fortify their own national measures.
The benefits of such an approach are perhaps best illustrated by the absur-
dity of their opposites, such as the plan of Dutch Prime Minister Rutte to 
turn indebted Member States into EU wards under direct control of a Euro-
pean Commissioner.118 The focus of the EU should be to stimulate Member 
States to take appropriate national measures, not to superimpose itself as 
a higher level of economic government.119 As demonstrated in part I, it is 
vital that a confederation is based on stable and responsible states, instead 
of trying to increase its powers to control unstable ones.120
115 Art. 115(2) of the German Basic Law now provides that revenue and expenditure must be 
balances, which is the case if not more than 0.35% of GDP has been borrowed. In excep-
tional circumstances a larger defi cit may be allowed. The Länder will not be allowed to 
run any defi cit at all. Under the transitional scheme of art. 143(d) of the Basic Law, how-
ever, the 0.35% limit will only bindingly apply to the Federal Government in 2016, and to 
the Länder in 2020. Italy and Austria have similarly included debt brakes.
116 Art. 216(5) of the Polish Constitution. Instead of such substantive caps one could also 
think of more procedural or transparency requirements.
117 Under this amendment, proposed by Zapatero on August 23 of 2011, the Spanish govern-
ment will not be allowed to run a defi cit of over 0.40% of GDP, and is under a constitu-
tional obligation to reduce the defi cit to under 60% of GDP. The amendment has not yet 
been passed.
118 See the letter of the Dutch Government to the Second Chamber of Parliament of Septem-
ber 7th 2011, co-signed by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of 
Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation and the State Secretary of foreign affairs 
(i.e. not the Minister for Foreign Affairs). Ref 3106274.
119 For future members of the Euro zone, and even future Members of the EU such measures 
can, of course, be turned into accession requirements. See in this regard chapter 17 of the 
negotiation framework for the accession of Montenegro.
120 See chapter 4, section 3.4.
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The ‘Golden Rule’ now incorporated in the SCG Treaty, which was inspired 
by the German and Swiss Schuldenbremse, and was coincidentally incorpo-
rated after this proposal was first formulated in this thesis, follows this con-
federal logic.121 It effectively utilizes several important confederal tools.
First, it legalizes budgetary decisions. An obligation is created for Member 
States to bring their national budget procedure under national legal control. 
As we saw, this is an initial requirement to open a field up for confederal 
rule by law.122
Second, it subsequently relies on the Member States’ own control mecha-
nisms and enforcement capacity to self-police these budgetary limits. Pri-
mary enforcement, therefore, lies with the Member State. This also allows 
for a broader variety of controls and sanctions than the inevitable fines, and 
allows the mechanism to be more tailored to the specific national system it 
needs to keep in check.
Third, instead of being the primary enforcer, the Commission, acting out-
side the framework of the EU Treaties, is given the task of setting the stan-
dards that the national control mechanism should conform with.123 In the 
same vein the Court of Justice, acting under Article 273 TFU, is not asked to 
rule directly on the national budgets, but on the national mechanisms estab-
lished.124 The confederal institutions are, therefore, used for second-level 
norm setting and enforcement in a highly legal manner, a task to which they 
are more suited than direct enforcement on politically sensitive fields.
Fourth, as the TSCG cannot rely on the supremacy that EU law claims, it 
contains the direct obligation to constitutionally elevate the Golden Rule, 
or at least to give it an equivalent status. A status that would guarantee, 
as much as legally possible, its effectiveness within the national legal 
orders.125 As such, the legal supremacy required for effective national bud-
getary control is derived from the primary authority and legitimacy of the 
national constitution, and not from the broader but weaker supremacy of 
EU law.126
121 Clearly not implying any form of causality whatsoever.
122 See chapter 4, section 3.1.
123 See art. 3(2) TSCG, and for the guidelines themselves the communication from the Com-
mission of 20 June2012 on the Common principles on national fi scal correction mecha-
nisms, COM(2012) 342 fi nal.
124 For the indirect review of budgets this could give rise to via the logic of effectiveness see 
Borger and Cuyvers (2012).
125 See also chapter 3, section 4 on the rule by law and the reliance of the Member States 
themselves on the rule of law.
126 See chapter 10, section 8.
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The entire approach and logic underlying the Golden Rule, therefore, con-
forms with the confederal rule by law approach described earlier, and 
therefore with the most effective enforcement mechanism available to a con-
federal system. Consequently, if constituted effectively, a Golden Rule can 
make do with the relatively light footprint the rule by law approach leaves 
in general. In turn this means that the federate superstructure of the EU can 
remain lighter, and a further widening of the gap between superstructure 
and foundation is prevented.
Two more general confederal benefits, therefore, also flow from this 
approach. To begin with, the Golden Rule anchors the EMU, and therefore 
part of the internal market, in the national constitutions. Second, and related, 
it also relocates part of the burden and responsibility for the EMU onto the 
national systems. It will not just be ‘Brussels’ demanding budget cuts, but 
national institutions and national judges. And it will be the national demo-
cratic process in which the debate over the necessity of such measures will 
take place, and where the crucial specifics of the Golden Rule will be decided.
At the same time, the Golden Rule system also knows clear risks and costs. 
To begin with such national measures share in the confederal risk of over-
legalizing areas that should be largely left in the hands of politics. A proper 
balance should, therefore, be found between European (legal) controls on 
spending and national political discretion to decide on spending. In this 
regard the rather open phrase that the Golden Rule ‘(…) shall fully respect 
the prerogatives of national Parliaments’ may ring a bit hollow: How to 
curb parliamentary spending power without limiting their prerogatives? 
Again, however, this balance should also become part of the national demo-
cratic process.
Much will also depend on the specifics of the clauses adapted, and the 
constitutional practice that develops around them. If national control 
mechanisms fail to be generally effective, which seems to be a real risk in 
several Member States, the secondary enforcement by the Commission and 
the Court of Justice will de facto revert to a primary role anyway.127
127 Regarding the interpretation, application and effectiveness of these national control 
mechanisms, furthermore, the interaction between such (constitutional) norms and EU 
law should be duly considered, certainly where such a Golden Rule is indeed to be incor-
porated from the TSCG into EU law proper. Although it cannot be explored here, these 
questions at least deserve to be fl agged. For because national budgetary control mecha-
nisms will then formally implement EU law, such national norms would have to comply 
with EU law, or at least be interpreted in conformity with EU law to the extent possible. 
The complete supremacy claimed by EU law, furthermore, combined with the potential 
direct effect of clearly worded European debt limits, could have far-reaching effects. The 
question could even be raised to what extent Member States would be forced to create 
legal remedies to enforce such rights and obligations. In other words, when bringing the 
budget under the EU rule by law, all the principles, doctrines and effects that accompany 
that rule by law make their entree as well.
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Most fundamentally, however, the very same anchoring in national insti-
tutions and constitutions that forms the strength of the Golden Rule also 
forms an important risk. As we saw earlier, the EU already seems to be eat-
ing into the legitimacy of national institutions.128 Asking them to take on 
another heavy task, and one that will remain of a clear ‘external’ signature, 
might be placing too big a burden on them as well, at least in their present 
status.129 Even where sufficient national measures will be taken in all Mem-
ber States, it will still be necessary, therefore, to increase the legitimacy, or 
‘carrying weight’ of the confederal basis of the EU at the national level more 
generally.
As a result, the success of a Golden Rule will also depend on an 
improved confederal foundation for the EU more generally, and therefore 
on a confederal evolution of the national democratic process as outlined in 
part II and chapter 12. The member peoples should not just be empowered 
to engage in the precise formulation and modalities of the Golden Rule, 
but in a national democratic process on the EU more generally. Once such 
a national process is in place, after all, the electorate can also be properly 
informed about the necessity of a Golden Rule, and weigh the overall ben-
efits, both national and European, against the likely costs. A debate can then 
also be had on the best way to structure such a Golden Rule, and what kind 
of exceptions and flexibility should be included. This opens up the field for 
national tailor-made solutions and creativity. One could imagine a more pro-
cedural mechanisms, for instance requiring new elections or a referendum 
on cuts where an excessive deficit occurs. Alternatively legal limits might be 
buffeted by political incentives, such as an automatic increase in income tax-
es and VAT where an excessive deficit is projected. Creating such a debate 
about the modalities and costs and benefits will also help the desired sense 
of EU solidarity to develop on the basis of enlightened self interest, at least if 
the assumptions underlying such rules are correct.130 A Golden Rule can, in 
other words, form an important part of a confederal democratic process, but 
also needs to be grounded in precisely such a process.
5.2 The alternative of automaticity
One confederal alternative to national control mechanisms might be the 
inclusion of automatic sanctions at the EU level. This might be a counterin-
tuitive suggestion, as automatic sanctions are generally seen as a far-reach-
ing limitation of Member State control. Constitutionally, however, it can be 
argued that such automatic sanctions actually remain fully confederal in the 
sense that they are simply another method for the Member States to police 
128 See chapter 4, section 3.5.
129 Where a new national institution is created, as is not unlikely given the wording of the 
SCG Treaty, furthermore, this new institution will not have any existing legitimacy to fall 
back on, and might be perceived even more as a European Fremdkörper.
130 See also the Van Rompuy plan, page 14.
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themselves. The only difference with national sanctions would be that they 
are using the EU level to police themselves more effectively.
The imposition of an automatic, predefined fine, after all, would not so 
much be the application of an EU competence. It would be the execution 
of a direct and clear will of the Member State itself to be sanctioned when 
violating a certain rule. Especially where interpretation and application are 
relatively clear, this would be comparatively unproblematic, and would not 
require the EU claiming the normative authority to overrule or sanction the 
Member States in the area of public spending (at least not formally so, pub-
lic perception will of course be a different matter altogether).
Automatic sanctions also reduce the political dimension, at least at the EU 
level, of imposing sanctions, and keep the imposition of sanctions within 
the legal domain. A domain that is much more amenable to confederal 
rule. In this sense the use of automatic sanctions could be compared to the 
important role played by negative integration more generally.131 It could 
remove the need for political decision making, thereby removing the poten-
tial for political deadlock, provide a clear base line, and allow the legal insti-
tutions involved to gradually develop an Acquis that might guide and spur 
future decision making. Even more than with national sanctions, however, 
and as with negative integration in general, such automatic sanctions also 
raise issues of legitimacy, and also require a stronger confederal foundation.
6 A confederal course to weather a perfect confederal storm
The sovereign debt and EMU crises formed the second challenge and whet-
stone for the confederal approach developed in this thesis. Based on the 
findings above it can be concluded that a confederal approach can indeed 
provide useful insights and guidance.
First of all, it helps to reveal the confederal roots of the sovereign debt and 
EMU crises. As was shown, these crises precisely hit the major weak spots 
of the modified confederal system identified in part I. They were caused 
by a self-propelling federate superstructure that challenged the normative 
primacy of the national level and forced the EU into fields for which its con-
federal system is particularly unsuited: Money, politics, conflict and direct 
enforcement. A confederal approach hence helps to increase our under-
standing of why these crises arose, and why they form such a challenge to 
the EU.
131 See chapter 3, section 3.1.
427The Sovereign Debt and EMU crises: A perfect confederal storm? 
Second, such improved understanding allows us to identify several pitfalls 
that should be avoided in the current struggle to combat the ongoing cri-
ses. Two understandable temptations should be resisted in particular: First, 
burdening the EU with a full-blown federate economic union, and then to, 
secondly, try and establish a federate democratic process at the EU level 
capable of supporting this expanded federate superstructure.
Both responses would be based on a deceptive logic, and would fail to 
grasp and respect the confederal nature of the EU. As a result they could 
widen the already dangerous gap between the EU’s confederal founda-
tion and its federate superstructure, without providing anywhere near the 
required level of democratic legitimacy. Equally, they would risk challeng-
ing the ultimate foundation of confederal authority in the sovereign mem-
ber peoples.
Consequently, such centralizing responses to the crisis might lead to 
dangerous confederal readjustments in the entire EU system. In addition 
they might overburden the confederal foundation far beyond its maximum 
carrying capacity. Either way, such aggressive centralizing responses might 
win the battle to stabilize the EMU in the short run, but they would lose the 
war for a stable and democratic European Union in the long run. A conclu-
sion that can be visualized by imagining the European Commission actu-
ally trying to restrain the German, French, Spanish or Polish parliaments 
and governments in an open conflict over the national budget, and doing so 
in the face of an overwhelming national electoral support not to give in to 
Brussels. A looe-lose situation for integration.
Third, and taking into account these pitfalls, a confederal approach points 
to some more promising solutions. In line with the modified confederal 
system of the EU, the focus should shift to the national level, and to ways 
of linking a more effective economic union to the primary authority of the 
member people. In line with the earlier conclusions on a confederal evo-
lution of national democracy, effective budgetary checks should be estab-
lished at the national level. Guided by its confederal obligations the national 
democratic process should be challenged and allowed to create effective 
control mechanisms, preferably at the constitutional level. Such national 
mechanisms should fit with the national system, and find a proper balance 
between the different interests involved. Clearly the result will not be as 
tight or unified as under a completely centralized system, and failures may 
occur. Yet a sufficient level of effectiveness might be possible, and any lim-
its on effectiveness must also be accepted as the price to pay for respect-
ing national identity and democracy, and the long term stability this would 
bring to the EU and its EMU on the whole.
A further potential benefit of such a confederal approach would be its con-
tribution to the necessary confederal evolution of the national democratic 
process. Determining how and to what extent a Golden Rule should be 
incorporated in the national constitutional system provides important new 
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substance for such a political process, and also forces this process to engage 
with European integration. Whats more, by relying on national processes 
and mechanisms for enforcement, the EU can revert to the subsidiary role 
for which the confederal form is generally best suited.
Combining these insights, it is important that the political energy and 
opportunity provided by the crises is used wisely. Where possible it could 
be channelled into improving the confederal foundation of the EU in the 
national constitutional and democratic systems. In this way the leverage 
provided by the crises could be partially used to improve the stability of 
the national systems, both in terms of economic discipline and in terms of 
promoting a confederal democratic process more generally. For it is on the 
stability of these national systems, and their capacity to provide democratic 
legitimacy for European integration, that the EU largely depends. Hence 
it is important that the temptation is resisted to use the crises to further 
expand the federate superstructure of the EU, and to achieve short-term 
results. Instead, a long term investment in the confederal foundation of the 
EU might pay substantially higher and more sustainable dividends.
1 The challenging potential of European integration
The European Union is rearranging the rule of a continent. Increasing 
amounts of public authority are transferred from the Member States to the 
European level. Authority that is no longer under the exclusive control of 
national political systems, and further removed from their legitimacy cre-
ating mechanisms. Remaining national competences are more often than 
not affected by European norms, or become increasingly irrelevant due to 
globalization. The gravity pull and internal dynamics of integration, fur-
thermore, are far from exhausted, as the increasing EU control over national 
budgets and economic policy illustrates. We are, in other words, in the mid-
dle of a major experiment in government.
Reorganizing government on such a grand scale offers great opportunities. 
Certainly at a time where the scope and structure of government needs to 
be realigned with the reality that needs governing. Tremendous challenges, 
however, accompany such change as well. Meeting these challenges is also 
becoming increasingly urgent. For the EU is not just a theoretical exercise. It 
is a life test, which carries immediate responsibilities. More than five hun-
dred million people find themselves citizens of a still ongoing and ever-
expanding experiment. They wonder how the EU will compensate for the 
national political and constitutional arrangements it has uprooted. And it 
appears they are becoming somewhat impatient. Not unreasonably so, one 
might add. After more than fifty years of relatively blind trust, the EU is still 
under construction; its nature and intended destination still unknown.
Meanwhile, existing constitutional and legal theory struggle to catch up. 
Considering the magnitude and speed of developments, furthermore, the 
ongoing pursuit of the EU is often guided by the understandable assump-
tion that, to comprehend the EU, we need a completely new theory of politi-
cal and constitutional organization. Brave new thinking beyond the statal 
framework and existing concepts seems called for.
This thesis, however, took a different approach in its attempt to help recap-
ture the EU. Rather then burning our theoretical bridges behind us, it aimed 
to reconnect the EU to two classic and powerful, yet thoroughly unfashion-
able constructs: confederalism and sovereignty. Instead of forcing the EU 
to overcome history, these two constructs were used to connect the EU to 
existing theory, human experience, and the normative force they contain. 
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Two constructs, therefore, that could form part of a constructive confeder-
al theory of the EU that builds on and improves existing structures, rather 
than spending most of its energy on demolishing them.
The findings above have demonstrated the prima facie potential of confed-
eralism and sovereignty to contribute to such a constructive constitution-
al theory of the EU, and to a positive and democratic narrative for the EU 
more generally. The EU can indeed be usefully understood as a modified 
confederal system, and can be grounded on a confederal conception of pop-
ular sovereignty. Jointly, these constructs help to conceptualize a descrip-
tively useful and normatively attractive confederal middle ground for the 
EU to rest on. A constitutional middle ground which can embrace a plural 
reality within the EU, yet without surrendering its necessary foundation in 
the sovereign member peoples and the national democratic process. One 
which actually shows how the EU can be conceived, and hence developed 
into, a necessary update of democratic government that protects the author-
ity of the people from irrelevance in a global age. An update that empowers 
them to go beyond their nation state whilst retaining it as an existential safe 
haven, and to create a government of the peoples and for the peoples out-
side the state.
The confederal approach developed, furthermore, also helps to dissolve 
several theoretical deadlocks that currently obstruct our understanding of 
the EU and its peculiar strengths and weaknesses. Sovereignty and integra-
tion stop being an either/or, plurality and hierarchy stop being intrinsical-
ly incompatible, and the EU does not have to deny or erode the ultimate 
authority of the sovereign member people or the principal status of their 
Member States. Although much work remains, the path towards a more 
constructive and symbiotic understanding of the EU as a logical and attrac-
tive confederal evolution of public authority has thereby been demon-
strated. A path that fits with the reality and necessity of a Neo-Westphalian 
world where states must surrender their near monopoly on public author-
ity but nevertheless remain of central importance, and where increasing 
demands of democracy have to be reconciled with decreasing national pow-
er and factual interdependence.
2 Confederalism and the EU: The modified confederation as a 
model
To support these conclusions, part I first returned to the rich notion of con-
federation: The classic label for a constitutional union between entities that 
each retain their ultimate authority and independence.1 A Union therefore, 
1 For more detailed conclusions on part I see chapter 6.
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that goes beyond the ‘intergovernmental’, certainly is ‘supranational’, but 
falls short of statehood or federation.
By comparing the EU against the concrete example of the US Confederation 
and its evolution into a federate state it was shown how the EU has retained 
a fully confederal foundation, yet reinforced and burdened this foundation 
with a federalized superstructure.
For on the one hand, the EU has not incorporated any of the founda-
tional modifications that together grounded the American transition to a 
federation. The EU does not create a single European people, is not allowed 
to tax directly or use force, the Treaties cannot be amended by majority and 
secession is allowed. On this foundational level, therefore, the EU remains 
wholly confederal.
On the other hand, the EU does claim supremacy and direct effect, utilizes a 
federate doctrine of attributed powers, wields significant powers to regulate 
commerce, and incorporates a supreme federate court with a final say on 
the interpretation of the Treaties. Jointly these federate modifications form 
an innovative and crucial federate superstructure. They help to understand 
how the EU remains confederal at its heart, yet is also federate in some 
sense. In addition, this federate superstructure modifies the classic confed-
eral system in several important ways, which helps to better understand 
the evolution and functioning of the particular EU system. Jointly, the com-
parative findings of part I thereby supported three key findings on the EU 
constitutional framework.
2.1 Three comparative key findings
First, the EU can best be understood as an inverted confederation. Contrary to 
the US confederation, it has an internal and economic focus, not an exter-
nal and military one. This provides the EU with a far more continuous and 
stable basis for confederal cooperation than the traditional external focus: 
In the marketplace there are no times of peace. What is more, the impetus 
for continued cooperation provided by an internal market also has the cru-
cial capacity to keep pace with integration. The deeper economic integration 
becomes, the higher the benefits of cooperation and the costs of a break-
down become as well. A finding that helps to explain the remarkable stabil-
ity of the EU for a confederal system, and its capacity so far to overcome 
significant crises. The sheer limitless of the economy and the market, how-
ever, also explain the complexities in circumscribing the scope of EU inte-
gration. An unlimited market should not result in an unlimited EU.
Second, the EU rests on a confederal basis, but has both reinforced and bur-
dened this basis with a federate superstructure. It has included several of 
the federate constitutional elements which made the US federation more 
effective, yet without incorporating the foundational elements which sup-
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ported these elements in the US, such as a single people or a separate feder-
ate government.
This federate superstructure further explains the remarkable stability 
and effectiveness of the EU. It protects the EU against several of the classic 
confederal weaknesses. At the same time it also explains some of its main 
weaknesses, including the EU’s continuous quest for legitimacy. After all, a 
clear gap exists between the authority capacity of the confederal foundation 
and the authority demand of the federate superstructure. A constitutional 
imbalance that, as discussed, resembles armouring a car without increasing 
its engine capacity.
Third, the EU has used these federate modifications to develop a truly con-
federal rule by law. Not incidentally almost all of the federate modifications 
identified concern law and the legal system. This method of governing 
builds on the capacity of the administrative and legal systems of the mod-
ern welfare state to self-police. A vital mechanism, as it reduces the need for 
the EU to enforce, and thus reduces stress on several classic Achilles heels of 
confederal systems: Money, conflict and enforcement. A conclusion, there-
fore, that also helps to further understand the vital role of law for Euro-
pean integration, as well as why the EU has achieved a level of stability 
and effectiveness that most classic confederal systems could only dream 
of. Here modified confederalism really does form an impire of law. At the 
same time, it also exposes some major weaknesses of the modified confed-
eral form, including its reliance on stable Member States and national legal 
systems, its limited capacity to control non-legal domains, or to engage in 
direct political conflict where a conflict escalates from the legal to the politi-
cal domain.
Jointly, these confederal findings provide a high explanatory power for 
many of the well-known strengths and weaknesses of the EU system. 
Additionally, they identify some less obvious ones, which might be better 
exploited or will provide future problems if not attended to. The primary 
risk identified, however, is the growing schism between the confederal basis 
and the gradually expanding federate superstructure of the EU. A schism 
that increasingly taxes the confederal foundation of the EU, and should be 
addressed before it threatens the viability of the entire system.
2.2 Three confederal key conclusions
Based on these confederal findings, three central conclusions were drawn. 
First, the confederal prism provides a suitable and instructive prism to 
approach the EU with. It can explain and accommodate its pluralist char-
acteristics, as well as the ultimate hierarchy of its member peoples in their 
states. It also contributes to understanding the continuous expansion of EU 
integration, which can partially be explained as a process whereby the fed-
erate superstructure, not sufficiently contained by the confederal basis, self-
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expanded. At the same time the federate superstructure also allowed the EU 
to survive several deep crises where traditional confederations would likely 
have failed.
Second, many of the familiar EU weaknesses are so hard to address because 
they are linked to the very modifications that protect the EU against the tra-
ditional confederal weaknesses. A catch–22 results, for by weakening the 
federate modifications underlying some of the EU woes, such as the ever-
expanding internal market, even worse systemic risks may return in their 
place. Instead of removing these federate modifications, therefore, further 
modifications within the confederal system as a whole are required. These 
need to take into account, however, all the outer limits inherent in the con-
federal form. Confederal overstretch, that is burdening the confederal foun-
dation of the EU beyond its carrying capacity, will only deepen the problems 
of the EU in the longer run, and therefore harm its long-term viability.
Third, and related to this second conclusion, the EU is in fact approaching, 
or perhaps already overstepping, the limits of its current framework. The 
gap between the federate superstructure and the confederal foundation has 
become dangerously large. This puts a high level of strain on the legitima-
cy of the EU, but also on the national institutions that carry integration at 
the statal level. As legitimacy and trust are already in short supply in the 
political arena today, bridging this gap must become a priority for politics 
and theory alike. An exercise to which a confederal approach to the EU can 
again contribute, both by providing a better understanding of the risks, and 
by identifying different means to address them.
2.3 The lack of federate driving forces
To complement this substantive comparison, part I also considered the pro-
cess of American federation. Though based on a selective sample, this anal-
ysis showed how several of the key procedural components that drove and 
enabled federation in the US are lacking in the EU. Most important in this 
regard is the reversed elite structure in the EU. In the US several pre-inde-
pendence elites saw federation as their way back to political power. In the 
EU the national elites depend on their national power bases, and therefore 
will not weaken these in favour of EU integration: Not enough actors would 
gain more power from federation than from maintaining the status quo. The 
national democratic and elite structure in the EU, therefore, prevents rather 
than propels a federate shift in political authority, and cements the confed-
eral authority structure of the EU.
In addition, it was shown how the primary normative argument generally 
used to defend federation – making the EU more democratic – is largely 
based on  confusion between having a central normative authority and how 
this authority is represented. For federation simply does not equate with 
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democracy. In several important respects, American federation should be 
seen as a check on democracy, or even as an anti-democratic coup intended 
to reign in the overly democratic states, and return authority to an ordered 
central system.
Consequently, these process elements only confirmed both the improbabil-
ity of European federation, at least in the foreseeable future, and the norma-
tive risks that federation would entail. As such, they confirm the necessity 
of finding confederal solutions to the woes and weaknesses of the EU.
A conclusion which also leads to the second key challenge of this thesis: 
How to create a confederal basis strong enough to carry a significant feder-
ate superstructure? A challenge that, as shown in part II, should build on 
the specific strengths of the EU’s confederal foundation, yet avoid its inher-
ent weaknesses. A worthwile challenge, however. If found, such modifica-
tions would open up the confederal form as a highly interesting model for 
a globalizing reality, one where the federal capacity to combine unity and 
diversity should be taken to the next (confederal) level. It was to address 
this challenge that part II engaged with the second central concept in this 
thesis: sovereignty and the potential evolution towards a confederal con-
ception of sovereignty. An evolution that should emulate the federate evo-
lution of sovereignty in the US, and enable the sovereign member peoples 
to reassert their position both at the national and at the EU level.
3 A confederal evolution of sovereignty
Inspired by the federate evolution of sovereignty in the US, part II subse-
quently established the potential of such a confederal conception of sover-
eignty. A conception that enables a direct and popular foundation for the EU 
in the sovereign member peoples, and thereby prevents the need for the EU 
to choose between federating or taking a step back into the unstable waters 
of traditional confederation. Sovereignty, in other words, is part of the solu-
tion for creating a stable and democratic EU, not part of the problem.
To support these findings, part II developed two necessary, though not 
sufficient, definitional elements of a confederal conception of sovereign-
ty, being internal and popular sovereignty. It subsequently illustrated their 
capacity to overcome the apparent contradiction between sovereignty and 
integration suggested by the current theoretical framework, and the statist-
pluralist divide that shapes it.
3.1 The conceptual fit of confederal sovereignty
First, it was shown how a confederal conception logically fits with the con-
cept of sovereignty and its evolution over time. A fit that became apparent 
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once the increasingly confused concepts of internal and external sovereign-
ty were separated, and the EU was approached from the conceptually and 
normatively more fundamental concept of internal sovereignty alone.
For, as was demonstrated, internal sovereignty does not conflict with the 
division of sovereign authority that integration entails. Within the logic of 
internal sovereignty, sovereign prerogatives are perfectly capable of being 
divided over multiple levels and governments. This even more so after the 
popular and federate innovations to internal sovereignty, as developed in 
the US, are taken into account.
As was then further demonstrated, it is only the concept of external 
sovereignty that conflicts with integration. For where internal sovereignty 
became increasingly flexible, external sovereignty evolved towards an abso-
lute, indivisible and statal sovereign. A powerful construct, which over time 
has wrongly come to dominate our understanding of sovereignty, eclipsing 
the concept of internal sovereignty. Yet external sovereignty is intrinsically 
unsuited to understanding an entity like the EU, and ultimately remains 
secondary to internal sovereignty, which it must assume.
Consequently, it was shown that European integration, with its dividing 
and sharing of far-reaching public authority outside the Member States, 
does not conflict with sovereignty as such. Rather it forms a logical and nec-
essary confederal evolution of internal and popular sovereignty. One that 
reasserts the control of the normatively primary internal sovereign over the 
external sovereign, or more plainly put, of the people over their states. A 
conclusion that can also be normatively welcomed, as the external sover-
eign had become increasingly dominant, in theory and in fact, even though 
it is inherently less democratic and certainly less suited to order an interde-
pendent and interconnected reality.
3.2 De-complicating reality
Based on this conceptual analysis, it was then demonstrated how the EU 
can indeed be understood as a further confederal evolution of internal sov-
ereignty. Instead of delegating all their sovereign powers to a single state, 
the member peoples now delegate part of their sovereign authority direct-
ly to an external, non-statal entity. Moreover, they do so reciprocally in a 
confederal union with other sovereign member peoples. This development 
forms an important modification of the traditional Westphalian arrange-
ment, but it does not deviate from the basic structure or logic of internal 
sovereignty. As such, it also presents a far more logical, if less spectacular, 
picture of the EU: Instead of seeing the EU as a radical break from all that 
came before it, the EU can be understood as a gradual evolution of sover-
eignty and confederal organization. It becomes a logical, if not necessary or 
inevitable, development in the exercise of public authority.
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The analysis from internal sovereignty also provides an important legal, 
normative and evolutionary fit with the realities within the EU. Legally it 
fits with the basis of the EU in attribution, and the case law of the Court of 
Justice on this point. Normatively it provides a crucial fit with the national 
authority structures in the Member States, almost all of which explicitly rec-
ognize the sovereign authority of the people. Evolutionarily it fits with the 
direct but secondary bond that is being increasingly established between the 
EU and its citizens. In addition to this overall fit, a confederal conception of 
sovereignty was also shown to provide several further distinct advantages 
for a constitutional theory of the EU.
3.3 Advantages of confederal sovereignty: From technocratic frog to 
democratic prince
First of all, building on the conceptual analysis above, it has been shown 
how a confederal conception of sovereignty can dissolve the commonly 
assumed incompatibility between sovereignty and integration, and there-
by the clash between statism and pluralism that largely derives from this 
contradiction. What is more, once approached from an internal and confed-
eral conception of sovereignty, both statism and pluralism can actually be 
strengthened, relieved of some of their less convincing purist streaks, and 
made more compatible with each other.
For example, the member peoples can retain ultimate sovereignty, and 
they can hence intervene in the case of fundamental conflict between the 
EU and a Member State. Yet this does not reduce the daily reality in the EU 
to a linear hierarchy. For neither the EU, nor the Member States turn out to 
be ultimate authorities, but the member peoples. So in the relation between 
the EU and the Member States a high level of fundamental heterarchy 
can remain. With sovereign hierarchy in place as the necessary hierarchi-
cal exception (statism), heterarchy can remain the daily reality between the 
Member States and the EU (pluralism).
Second, and as a result of this reconciliation between sovereignty and inte-
gration, sovereignty stops being one of the obstacles that the EU needs to 
overcome. Instead, sovereignty, with all its potential to legitimize and struc-
ture authority, becomes available as a building block for a constructive 
constitutional theory of the EU. A conclusion that leads to the second key 
advantage of confederal sovereignty: Its capacity to provide the sufficient 
confederal foundation required to support the federate superstructure of 
the EU.
For as was shown, with the help of confederal sovereignty the EU is 
enabled to establish a direct, if subsidiary, link between itself and the sover-
eign member peoples. A link which explains and substantiates the increas-
ingly direct connection between the individual and the EU. Even though 
it needs to be further developed and institutionalized, this link opens up a 
path to a sufficiently stable, yet still confederal basis for the EU in the sover-
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eign member peoples, and with it the potential for direct, though secondary, 
popular legitimacy.
In addition, it was shown how confederal sovereignty dovetails with the 
contested issues of EU constitutionalism and the conflicts surrounding 
primacy. From a confederal perspective, the EU Treaties can logically be 
understood as secondary constitutions. They partake in the constitutional 
structures of the Member States, fulfil the constitutional task of dividing 
and controlling sovereign authority, and derive additional and uniquely 
confederal authority from the multitude of sovereign mandates simultane-
ously held. At the same time, the Treaties lack the existential dimension and 
intensity of national constitutions, which form the principal political shells 
of the sovereign member peoples.
This conclusion also allows us to distinguish between the ultimate nor-
mative primacy of national constitutions, and the secondary, though broad, 
primacy of EU law. The confederal primacy of EU law is based on several 
mutually reinforcing bases, such as its constitutional nature, the principle 
of pacta sunt servanda, and the possession of multiple reciprocal delegations 
of authority. National systems can generally accept these arguments, and 
hence the supremacy of EU law in daily operational practice. They can just 
not accept an EU claim to ultimate normative authority, which the EU fortu-
nately does not have to make.
The distinction between the different types of supremacy enabled by con-
federal sovereignty, therefore, explains the seemingly conflicting supremacy 
claims at the national and the EU level. It further demonstrates how both 
claims are based on different, and largely compatible grounds, which allow 
a broad and powerful operational primacy to the EU, but retain an ultimate 
primacy for the national constitution. In the case of a conflict, furthermore, 
the risk of which cannot be completely eliminated, the sovereign people 
now provide a sovereign back stop.
Lastly, and also crucially in light of the challenges raised by part I, it was 
demonstrated how a confederal conception assists in developing a positive 
normative and democratic narrative for the EU. It conceptualizes the EU 
as an evolution in internal and popular sovereignty necessary to safeguard 
democracy in a globalizing world. Member peoples are empowered to 
escape the confines of their states. Even though their states remain, in con-
federal style, their principal habitats, extra-statal delegation should be seen 
as a democratic imperative and popular empowerment. Its rejection would 
be a refusal to evolve, historically a path to extinction only.
Consequently the EU can be construed as the ‘saviour’ of popular sov-
ereignty and democratic control over globalisation. Confederal organization 
can thereby be seen as the current optimum between self-rule and the coop-
eration necessary to remain relevant.
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4 Confederal tests and application: Democracy and 
the EMU crisis
Parts I and II therefore established the prima facie feasibility and attractive-
ness of confederalism and a confederal conception of sovereignty for the 
EU. Constructs, furthermore, that could clearly be of value for the EU in 
some of its most problematic dimensions. At the same time the potential 
held by the confederal form must, to a large extent, still be translated, oper-
ationalized and institutionalized. The confederal link between the member 
peoples and the EU needs to become a democratic reality and a political 
actuality. A democratic reality, however, that in keeping with its confederal 
basis must retain its principal existence at the national level. To further test 
and illustrate this potential of confederalism, part III subsequently applied 
the confederal approach to two major challenges: Reconciling integration 
with national democracy, and the sovereign debt and EMU crises.
4.1 A confederal evolution of the national democratic process
Concerning the potential for a confederal evolution of the democratic pro-
cess, chapter 12 first illustrated the confederal root causes of the current 
democratic deficit. Root causes which were found not to lie in the decline of 
the state or limited representation at the EU level, but in the failure to insti-
tutionalize the reality of confederal integration at the national constitutional 
level. Three guiding principles were then formulated that could guide a 
better national embedding of European integration, and to allow a national 
democratic process to develop and exert control over a confederal applica-
tion of public authority. To illustrate these principles and their underlying 
confederal logic they were combined into one concrete suggestion: the cre-
ation of EU senates within the Member States. These senates which would 
be directly elected at the national level, would not incidentally form the 
mirror image of a central federate senate. These bodies could be developed 
into the required political and institutional nexus to which a national politi-
cal process on EU matters could attach itself. An aim for which they need 
to fit within the national system, receive a critical mass of EU powers but 
also remain necessary to the exercise of national political authority. In this 
manner, EU senates could provide both the prize and the arena required for 
a much needed national political fight over the EU at the national level, and 
hence the chance for the member peoples to pick their political champions 
and democratically engage with European integration. The EU could then 
revert to a confederal role of supporting and guiding the national institu-
tionalization of confederal democracy, for instance by creating guidelines 
and minimum requirements. A role which it should in any event claim with 
more vigour in the future, both to protect its own confederal foundation in 
the member peoples, but especially to guarantee its citizens the democratic 
control, also at the national level, they are entitled to under the Treaties.
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4.2 A confederal answer to the sovereign debt and EMU crises
Lastly, the confederal approach was applied to the sovereign debt and EMU 
crises. It was first shown how, from the confederal perspective, these crises 
can be logically understood as a perfect confederal storm. First of all, these 
crises logically flow from the fault lines between the confederal foundation 
and the federate superstructure of the EU. They clearly illustrate the risk 
that a gradually expanding federate superstructure poses for the EU, as well 
as just how powerful an incentive for continued cooperation is generated by 
the inverted focus of the EU. For equally remarkable as the development of 
these crises is the confederal determination to overcome them so far.
In addition, it was shown how these crises simultaneously hit several of 
the EU’s confederal Achilles heels, including money, politics, enforcement 
and direct conflict. The crises are thereby forcing the EU beyond a rule by 
law and onto the stage of high politics and direct conflict. A stage for which 
it is poorly suited.
Appreciating these confederal root causes, and placing the crises in their 
confederal context, also revealed two major pitfalls that should be taken 
into account when responding to the crises. First of all, the EU should guard 
against a federate overreaction to the EMU crises. An overreaction, for 
instance, in the form of creating a fully federate economic union with far-
reaching authority over the budgets of its members, and therefore over the 
political will of its member peoples. Such a move could enlarge the feder-
ate superstructure far beyond the carrying capacity of the confederal foun-
dation. Equally, the EU should refrain from trying to establish the primary 
democratic legitimacy that would be required for any such far-reaching 
powers at the EU level. An attempt that would not only be likely to fail, 
but would also threaten the very national democratic authority on which 
the EU largely depends. An attempt, therefore, that would also be likely to 
evoke a confederal countermove that could re-confederalize the federate 
superstructure, which would equally threaten the modified confederal sys-
tem developed in the EU so far.
Instead, it was argued that the EU should consider a more balanced confed-
eral response to the crises. Such a confederal response logically focuses on 
the national constitutional level, and leaves it up to the national democratic 
process to establish the necessary safeguards for a responsible economic 
policy that meets the confederal obligations of the member peoples. One 
option would be to establish national debt brakes, but part of the power of a 
confederal response would be its capacity to allow for measures that are tai-
lored to the different national systems. The energy and leverage of the crises 
should, therefore, be utilized to establish such national mechanisms, and to 
improve the national democratic systems along the confederal lines set out 
in chapter 12 more generally.
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5 Strengths and weaknesses of confederalism
Overall, therefore, the confederal perspective developed in this thesis holds 
much of value for a constitutional theory of the EU. It provides a logical 
fit with the EU, placed as it is between a ‘normal’ international organiza-
tion and a federation. As a result it also holds a strong explanatory power, 
both for the strengths and the weaknesses of the EU. Especially the dynam-
ic between the confederal foundation and the federate superstructure is 
instrumental in this regard.
The explanatory fit and value of the confederal approach also provides a 
concrete framework when considering future developments in the EU. It 
not just sheds light on the weak points that must be addressed, but also on 
the strengths and opportunities within the confederal form that should be 
relied upon to do so. Instead of entering conceptual and constitutional no 
man's land whenever we engage the EU, we can rely on past experiments, 
albeit with all the caveats that come with such comparative exercises. Sug-
gesting modifications to the EU may start to feel less like operating on E.T, 
where one would have no idea if our understanding of human medicine has 
any use, or might only pose a tremendous risk when applied. Instead, the 
EU can be brought closer to earth by identifying those parts that can useful-
ly be described and understood from existing knowledge and categories. As 
a flexible approach, furthermore, confederal insights can be readily applied 
to other more general theories of the EU, for instance those defending a 
hybrid understanding of the EU, or notions of composite constitutionalism.
At the same time, a confederal understanding of the EU also brings several 
weaknesses and threats to the fore. To start with, it points to the growing 
schism between the authority capacity of the EU’s confederal foundation 
and the increasing authority demands of the federate superstructure. This 
superstructure is largely linked to the internal market, which is itself 
expanding and knows little inherent limits. The federate force of this super-
structure, furthermore, means it cannot easily be contained by the con-
federal foundation. Consequently, there is a real risk of the superstructure 
exceeding a critical size, the precise boundary or threshold of which is hard 
to predict. Both controlling this superstructure, and strengthening the con-
federal foundation along the lines set out above are, therefore, necessary.
A necessity which, unfortunately, leads to a second central weakness. 
The continuing failure up till now to realize the democratic and constructive 
potential of the confederal form. For whilst the federate superstructure was 
increasing, the necessary confederal foundations have not been sufficiently 
strengthened at the national level. Neither the national constitutional or 
institutional structure, nor the national democratic process were sufficiently 
adapted. With the passing of time, however, several of the traditional nor-
mative foundations of the EU, such as fear (and German guilt) of war, desire 
for peace, hopes of prosperity or fear of the Russians, which carried part of 
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the federate superstructure so far, have decreased in force. In its place, and 
unopposed by strong confederal foundations, a certain resentment against 
the EU has been gradually building. Resentment which is now being effec-
tively cultivated politically to acquire national political power.
In other words, the rather unique constitutional grace period following 
world war II, further supported by the enormous economic growth the EU 
experienced over the past decades, has not been used to set in place a more 
lasting national foundation for the EU. Unfortunately this means that this 
more lasting foundation must now be erected, and urgently so, under far 
less ideal circumstances, including a severe economic crisis. A major chal-
lenge and risk for the confederal model.
The risk of increasingly unstable and uncooperative Member States, and 
the resulting threat of a breakdown in the rule by law, can amplify another 
inherent risk for a confederal system, such as the imbalance in actual power 
between the members and the potential for unregulated power play.
In a federation, after all, the differences between the constituent parts 
are taken into account in an institutional compromise. In the US the more 
populous states, for instance, were awarded more votes in the House of 
Representatives, whereas equality between states was respected in the 
Senate. Differences in size, population or power are further neutralized by 
the creation of one overarching federate people, which possesses greater 
authority than even the largest Member State. In the EU this last safeguard 
is absent. There is no overarching authority, so smaller Member States are 
protected by the rules of the Treaty, and therefore (the rule of) law, alone.
Consequently, if large Member States such as France, Spain, Poland, or 
especially Germany were to become unstable, or for other reasons would 
start to ignore EU rules and predominantly rely on (political) force, the con-
federal system of the EU would be seriously challenged as well. This is not 
to ignore the reality of political power, which of course has always played 
a role within the EU, but only to indicate the risks for a confederal system 
where the rule of law would be undermined. Besides strengthening the 
confederal basis and respect for the rule of law within each Member State, 
however, such power imbalances are hard to address for a confederal sys-
tem. One alternative would be to take another leave from the US federalists, 
and to allow different factions within each Member State to cooperate with 
factions in other states, for instance via the confederal senates proposed. 
This to break up the political power of larger states into several, sometimes 
opposing, factions. Although such a scheme would require far more study, 
it could be seen as a next step in confederal democracy as well, allowing the 
sovereign peoples to interact and form mutual coalitions. Even so, however, 
the imbalance of power between Member States will remain a risk factor 
from the confederal perspective.
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6 Towards a democratic confederal union of sovereign member 
peoples, or the confederal come back!
Several challenges, therefore, face the confederal experiment of the EU. At 
the same time, the strengths and opportunities offered by the modified con-
federal form may well be capable of meeting these challenges, especially 
once combined with a more developed conception of confederal sovereign-
ty. What is more, the normative and democratic potential of the modified 
confederal form certainly makes it worth our while to try.
As such a confederal theory of the EU deserves to be developed further, 
either separately or as part of a broader and more encompassing theory. 
Now that proof of principle has been provided, the EU could, for instance, 
be compared against further (con)federal systems, and specific means 
of strengthening the national basis of the EU confederal system can be 
explored based on experiences in different con(federal) systems.
An improved understanding of the modified confederal form is also of 
interest for the organization of extra-statal authority more generally. For the 
EU is only one polity in which the organization of public authority must be 
realigned with reality. The modified confederal form, as developed within 
the EU, provides a powerful tool for such exercises. What is more, it has 
the unique advantage over federate or statist approaches that it allows sov-
ereign member peoples to simultaneously participate in multiple forms of 
extra-statal cooperation: As long as the centre of sovereign gravity remains 
with the member peoples, nothing stands in the way of delegating authority 
to multiple external entities at different levels and with different objectives, 
as long as the national constitutional system is kept up to date with these 
different delegations.
For now, however, it suffices to conclude that confederalism does allow a 
constructive and attractive understanding of the EU. Although it needs to 
be further developed, the EU can be usefully understood as a confederal 
union of sovereign member peoples, both as a reality and as an aspiration. 
As a result, our neo-Westphalian reality may indeed be the perfect time for 
a veritable confederal comeback. A time when this ugly duckling of consti-
tutional theory can finally come into its own, and provide a constitutional 
model for effective and democratic government in a globalizing world.
Summary
Executive summary
This thesis explores a conception of the EU as a modified confederal sys-
tem of sovereign member peoples and their states. A confederal conception 
which demonstrates how, contrary to popular belief, European integration 
does not conflict with sovereignty or democracy. For, properly conceived 
and constituted, the EU reasserts the sovereignty of the member peoples, 
and liberates national democracy from the confines of the state.
To this end, this thesis reconnects the EU to two classic constructs of consti-
tutional theory: confederalism and sovereignty. Two powerful but unfash-
ionable constructs whose joint potential for European integration remains 
largely unexplored and undervalued. The primary instrument to explore 
this potential is comparative. The EU is contrasted with the rather unknown 
but rich example of the American Articles of Confederation, and their evo-
lution into the now famous American federate system. A comparison with 
the confederal roots of the United States which is revealing for both confed-
eralism and sovereignty, and illustrates the potential of linking both for a 
constructive constitutional theory of the EU. A theory which does not have 
to overcome history and the statal system it has created, but connects with 
it. A theory, therefore, that may help to recapture the EU and the increasing 
authority it wields, both in theory and in practise.
The thesis is subdivided in three parts. Part I addresses confederalism. It 
demonstrates how the constitutional system of the EU combines a confed-
eral foundation with a federate superstructure, and explores the particular 
strengths, weaknesses and limits of this modified confederal system. Part 
II discusses sovereignty. It first demonstrates how the EU forms a logical 
confederal evolution of popular sovereignty, and how European integra-
tion does not conflict with sovereignty. Subsequently, it shows how the con-
cept of confederal sovereignty equally helps to dispel the presumed conflict 
between statism and pluralism, how it respects and conciliates national 
and EU claims to supremacy, and how it allows a confederal evolution of 
national democracy, which updates democracy to the global reality it is to 
control. Part III applies the findings of Part I and II to the EMU crisis and 
the challenge of establishing an effective democratic foundation for the EU 
at the national level. An application which demonstrates the concrete and 
attractive contributions a confederal approach can make to addressing some 
of the core challenges facing the EU.
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Part I: the (con)federal cocktail
Part I of the thesis concerns confederalism, and the question if the EU 
should be understood as confederal or not. Using the American Confedera-
tion and the current US Federation as concrete benchmarks, it first estab-
lishes a ‘comparative grid’ of sixteen constitutional markers. These markers 
are derived from the key constitutional modifications, which together con-
stituted the American transition from a confederation to a federation, and 
can hence be used to trace the relative position of the EU between the US 
confederation and the US federation.
Based on a point by point comparison on these sixteen markers, chapter 2 
finds that the EU remains on the confederal side of the equation for eight of 
them (No single people, no use of force, no direct taxation, no amendment 
by majority, secession allowed, use of a merged government, the executive, 
and the representational scheme). On five markers the EU scores as feder-
ate, or at least predominantly so (Supremacy, direct effect, broad doctrine 
of attribution and implied powers, internal commerce competences, and a 
central judiciary). On three markers the EU is qualified as mixed (objectives, 
external powers, and the legislature). Here the EU wholly blends the con-
federal and the federate, conforms to neither, or equally to both.
Importantly, this comparison demonstrates that the EU has not incorporat-
ed any of the five truly foundational modifications that underlay US federa-
tion. As far as its foundation is concerned, therefore, the EU has remained 
fully confederal. Most of the five federate modifications that have been 
taken over, on the other hand, concern legal infrastructure and competences. 
These include the -mutually reinforcing- federate modifications of suprem-
acy, direct effect, attribution, and the internal market competences. Many 
of these modifications were made possible by the institutional modification 
of a central court with the competence to rule on the interpretation of the 
Treaty. These findings are summarized in the table below:
Category Modification US CF Blended US Fed.
Institutional 16 Judiciary
15 Executive
14 Legislature
13 Representation 
Competences 12 Internal / commerce comps
11 War and external comps
10 Doctrine of attribution 
9 Specific objectives
Structural 8 Direct effect
7 Supremacy
6 Separate or merged gov
Fundamentals 5 Enlargement / secession
4 Amendment by majority
3 Taxation
2 Use of force
1 Single people
8 3 5
US CF Blended US Fed.
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Chapters 3 and 4 aggregate the results of this comparison into three central 
analytical propositions on the modified confederal nature of the EU. First, 
how the EU forms an inverted confederation, which has reversed the tradi-
tional confederal focus from the external to the internal. Second, how the 
EU has modified the traditional confederal form by reinforcing and burdening 
its confederal basis with a partially federalized superstructure. Third, how this 
inverted and adapted structure heavily relies on a rule by law, and therefore on 
the very stable legal and administrative systems of its Member States. Sub-
sequently, these chapters explore and demonstrate the explanatory power 
of these propositions: All three help to understand the particular strengths 
and weaknesses of the modified confederal system of the EU.
Chapter 3 thereby sets out for each proposition, and the modifications 
underlying it, how they have helped to strengthen the EU’s constitutional 
set-up. After all, confederal systems are not exactly known for their longev-
ity, but normally seem to rival the Panda bear in their determination to go 
extinct. Hence, it must be wondered how the EU has managed to survive 
and thrive so far, and it becomes vital to grasp the constitutional factors 
contributing to this success. Both to build on them in the future, and to pre-
vent future changes from (accidentally) undermining the very factors that 
support confederal stability.
To this end chapter 3 returns to the brilliant analysis by Madison of the 
flaws and weaknesses of confederations, which directly informed the dis-
cussion in Philadelphia. It is shown how the federate modifications in the 
EU system have indeed addressed several of the flaws in the conventional 
confederal form.
To begin with, the EU suffers far less from a lack of power and energy 
in the centre, and a lack of compliance in the states, the primary confed-
eral weaknesses identified by Madison. Here the inverted focus of the EU 
created a more effective, constant and self-deepening impetus to cooperate, 
which provided more ‘energy’ to the centre and ensured that the self-inter-
est of Member States in cooperating kept pace with the demands of deepen-
ing integration. Simply put, an internal and economic focus appears to be 
a much better power source for a confederation than external policy and 
defence.
In addition, a broad array of purposefully interpreted competences 
allowed this energized centre to act. Effective negative integration manned 
the fort and shocked the system back into action where the centre was nev-
ertheless immobile. A mechanism that enabled the EU to survive periods 
of crisis and stagnation that would have toppled most traditional confed-
erations. Rule by law over stable states, furthermore, significantly increased 
compliance, and reduced the need for the EU to create effective central 
enforcement. Although far from perfect, the general energy, robustness 
and compliance within the EU thereby is far higher than anything Madison 
could probably have ever envisioned in a confederal system.
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A second weaknesses concerned weak finances. Here as well the EU is in 
much better shape, even though it was not granted the right to tax. Rather, 
due to better compliance and the rule by law, the Member States simply pay 
their share, even if the ‘net payers’ do so increasingly grudgingly. In addi-
tion, the rule by law, and the regulatory focus of the EU also means that it 
does not need that big an income, at least not in relative terms. As a result 
the EU reduces the stress on its confederal system for collecting revenue.
Madison’s third woe, the unstable states that made up the Confederation, 
also troubles the EU, but to a lesser degree. More contextual providence 
than actual modification, the relative stability of the Member States has 
removed some of the stressors on the confederal basis of the EU.
The fourth confederal weakness concerns the general lack of internal com-
petences of confederations. Again, this problem has to a large extent been 
addressed through several federate modifications, especially the grant of 
explicit internal market competences to the EU, and the broad doctrine for 
determining competences as developed by the federate Court of Justice. 
In fact, the EU now has such far-reaching market powers that the problem 
has rather become the absence of non-market competences, which now seem 
necessary to flank and counterbalance the market ones, as well as a lack of 
external competences to project the authority of the EU externally.
The last major flaw Madison noted was the inability of confederations to 
amend their own shortcomings. The modified system of the EU at least 
reduces this weakness. Formal amendment, in line with its confederal basis, 
still requires unanimity. Yet the EU system has enough internal flexibility to 
adapt through judicial interpretation and political compromise. In addition, 
the internal focus, negative integration as developed by the Court of Justice, 
and the relative stability of the Member States have helped in achieving sev-
eral important formal Treaty amendments. Compared to the US Confedera-
tion, therefore the EU system is far more flexible and adaptable, although 
future challenges await, and recent attempts at major Treaty changes do not 
bode well.
Scoring the EU against the archetypal weaknesses of the (American) Confed-
eration, chapter 3 therefore shows how the EU has been able to contain, or at 
least soften, most of them. It did so by incorporating a mix of federate modi-
fications and utilizing its very different context. The cumulative increases in 
effectiveness and stability these modifications have brought may well have 
impressed a Madison, and perhaps even surpass the expectations that some 
founding fathers had of the federate system at Philadelphia.
At the same time, a free lunch is rare, even in constitutional theory. Can one 
simply place a federate superstructure atop a confederal basis, or is this the 
constitutional equivalent of armouring a deux chevaux with six inch steel plates?
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Chapter 4 therefore analyses the flaws and inherent weaknesses retained by 
the modified confederal form, as well as the new problems that flow from 
the federate modifications in the EU system. These weaknesses and risks 
deserve to be explored as they assist in better understanding the problems 
facing the EU, and the limits that remain inherent in modified confederal 
forms. As chapter 4 demonstrates, furthermore, several well-known ail-
ments of the EU may be partially understood as logical consequences of its 
modified (con)federal set-up.
The self-deepening of the EU’s inverted focus, for example, might lead 
the EU to unsustainable levels of integration and federalisation: the internal 
power source of the EU sometimes seems to powerful, and not very ame-
nable to legal containment. The tendency of the federate elements in the EU 
system to increase in relative weight and importance vis-à-vis their confed-
eral counterparts only reinforces this dynamic. This tendency, furthermore, 
also explains the risk for (federate) market objectives to trample on (confed-
eral) non-market objectives. Elements that also help to better understand 
the evolution of the EU constitutional system more generally. In addition, 
a rule by law may be no match for direct political challenges, may actually 
undermine the political dimension needed to sustain EU integration, and 
in any event depends on several preconditions that may not hold. In addi-
tion, a rule by law is inherently unsuited to control fields that are not, or 
not fully, amenable to legal control, such as budgets or foreign policy. Most 
fundamentally, however, the growing schism between the federate super-
structure and the confederal foundation of the EU puts an increasing strain 
on the overall constitutional structure of the EU and its legitimacy. After all, 
the confederal foundation of the EU is asked to legitimise an ever increasing 
federate superstructure. All in all these are serious challenges that need to 
be addressed or at least taken into account in the future development of the 
EU.
Before exploring some potential suggestions and solutions to these chal-
lenges in part II and III, however, chapter 5 first turns to a second crucial, 
and so far unexplored dimension, of the confederal comparison: The process 
of American federation. A better grasp of this process not only sheds light 
on the nature of (con)federal systems and the European modifications. It 
also provides some concrete foundation for debates over whether Europe 
could or should ‘federate’, and if so how.
Chapter 5 thereby discusses four process elements that are of particular rel-
evance for the EU. First and foremost, it arrives at the vital conclusion that 
the national democratic and elite structure in the EU prevents rather than 
propels European federation. In the US, federation was largely conceived, 
promoted, and realized by powerful national elites that had lost their hold 
on the state legislatures after independence from Great Britain. Federation, 
and ensuring control over the new central government to be created, was 
seen by these cross-state elites as the only way to regain political power. 
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In the EU, however, there is no critical mass of unified elites that stand to 
benefit from federation. There are no sufficient (political) elites that derive 
their power from the EU, or ultimately aim to derive such power from the 
EU within the time span of their (political) future. What is more, this elite 
structure is consolidated rather than challenged by the confederal organiza-
tion of political power in the EU, which protects and empowers the current 
national elites. Federate ideals for the EU, therefore, face an uphill battle.
The second process element discussed in chapter 5 deflates the dem-
ocratic myth of American federalism, as it unearths the anti-democratic 
nature and objectives of US federation. For in fact, one could describe 
American federation as an anti-democratic revolution. It was emphatically 
not intended to increase democracy, but to decrease the radical democracy 
that had developed in the states after independence. These anti-democratic 
objectives behind American federation should be taken into account when 
contemplating a federate Europe, especially when the stated objective is 
democratization. For federation is not the same as democratization, even though 
the founding fathers have done a truly impressive PR-job in linking both 
concepts. The democratic level of any federate polity will depend on how 
the federate system is developed, and not on federation as such. In any 
event the democratic weight and autonomy of the individual member peo-
ples will be reduced by federation. Rallying cries for European federation, 
furthermore, will have to honestly acknowledge that federation carries an 
inherent aristocratic tendency.
In addition to these two central procedural issues, chapter 5 discusses sev-
eral more practical lessons that might be learned from the US process. To 
begin with it points out the benefits of the US procedures for drafting and 
ratifying the federate constitution. This procedure combined confidential 
dialogue and drafting, and therefore space for honest compromise and 
changes of view, with a rigorous public debate of the eventual texts adopt-
ed. A system that seems to lead to better results than the current EU system 
for amendment. An almost complete mirror image, which envisions a high-
ly public and visible drafting process, which complicates compromise and 
changing positions, to be followed by parliamentary ratification, especially 
where referenda are deemed too risky.
In addition, the EU could benefit from the concept of attached amend-
ments as developed in the US, as well as from the focus on aemulatio over 
innovatio. For, to a very large extent, the new American constitution built on, 
and even copy-pasted, existing materials. We should abandon the romantic 
myth, therefore, that new constitutions can be devised in the abstract, from 
scratch, and without using existing concepts and theories, if only one just 
has enough smart people. What the US process learns, in fact, is that the best 
change lies in practical yet well thought through and informed, emulation.
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Part II: confederal sovereignty
Part II engages the second core construct of this thesis: Sovereignty. It dem-
onstrates how sovereignty does not inherently conflict with European inte-
gration. Rather, the EU forms a logical confederal evolution of sovereignty. 
What is more, a confederal conception of sovereignty can be instrumental 
in addressing the confederal challenges identified in part I, in overcoming 
some of the current deadlocks in EU theory, and developing a constructive 
constitutional theory of the EU. This because confederal sovereignty can 
provide a sufficiently stable, legitimate, and flexible basis for EU author-
ity without undermining the Member States as primary centres of public 
authority or the member peoples as independent and sovereign entities.
To explore this potential, and after chapter 7 has introduced these objectives 
and the potential benefits of confederal sovereignty in more detail, chap-
ter 8 first sets out the apparent conflict between sovereignty and European 
integration. It does so by discussing the statist and pluralist schools, two 
of the currently most dominant schools on EU integration, which perfectly 
represent the presumed clash between sovereignty and integration. For the 
moment one supports a meaningful notion of sovereignty, as statists like the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht do, one is seemingly forced to establish and defend 
all kinds of untenable limits to integration. Rejecting sovereignty altogeth-
er in a plural embrace of integration, however, also leaves one with some 
rather fundamental gaps and problems. For once the anti-hierarchical genie 
is out of the lamp, it is hard to prevent it from spiriting away all formal hier-
archy, authority or legitimacy. As a result, statism increasingly struggles to 
accommodate the current realities of integration within a statal framework. 
Vice versa, pluralism struggles to relate its claims to the existing, and still 
vital, statal system or any other form of foundation for that matter. As a 
result it remains rather ethereal and academic, lacking the capacity to solve 
conflicts or carry much weight. Consequently, we seem trapped in an unat-
tractive dichotomy: Statism or pluralism, established theory or tabula rasa, 
sovereignty or the EU.
To escape this dead end, chapter 9 returns to a conceptual analysis of sov-
ereignty itself. Looking behind the simplistic myth of absolute sovereignty, 
it first demonstrates how internal and external sovereignty are two distinct, 
albeit related, concepts, which have become increasingly confused over 
time. It does so by tracing the development of internal and external sov-
ereignty through five different stages of their historical development and 
conceptual entanglement. These five stages include the development of sov-
ereignty by Bodin and especially the federal evolution of internal sovereign-
ty which underlay US federation, and which allowed internal sovereignty 
to be divided over multiple governments.
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Based on this conceptual analysis of sovereignty, chapter 9 draws three core 
conclusions. First, it concludes that European integration does not conflict 
with sovereignty as such. The EU fully fits with the concept of internal sov-
ereignty and its tradition of constitutionally dividing powers over multiple 
actors. The common assumption that the EU conflicts with sovereignty is 
based on unsuitable notions of external sovereignty, and the absolute myths 
that surround them. Such absolute external concept of sovereignty, logical-
ly, cannot accommodate the EU, and hence lead to the false contradiction 
between sovereignty and integration. Fortunately, such external notions are 
also irrelevant for a proper understanding of the EU, which forms a confed-
eral, and hence constitutional, system, and should therefore be approached 
from internal sovereignty, just like national constitutions.
Second, chapter 9 concludes that a confederal notion of sovereignty forms 
a logical evolution of internal sovereignty. The evolution of internal sover-
eignty is one of increasing abstraction and delegation. The ‘federate twist’ in 
popular sovereignty, as invented in the US, has even enabled the division of 
sovereign powers over multiple governments. Confederal sovereignty takes 
this federate evolution of sovereignty one step further. It incorporates extra-
statal, and even non-statal, entities into the national constitutional frame-
work for the delegation of sovereign powers. As a result the state loses some 
of its sovereign competences, but the people do not lose their sovereignty.
Third, chapter 9 shows how a confederal evolution of sovereignty also fits 
with the prescriptive nature of internal sovereignty. Just as in the US, it can 
therefore be used to indicate how public authority should be organized and 
legitimated, and to subsequently help create that desired reality for the EU.
Combining these conclusions, chapter 9 subsequently shows how the EU 
should not be understood as a clash between sovereignty and integration, 
but as a clash between internal and external sovereignty. In the confederal 
system of the EU, the organizing principles of internal sovereignty are being 
applied in what was previously considered part of the ‘external’ domain: 
The relation between the Member States. As a result, the state no longer 
forms a complete barrier and controlling nexus between the internal and 
the external domain. Instead, the internal sovereign (the peoples) openly 
challenges the external sovereign (the state). The traditional conceptual 
framework, which sees internal and external sovereignty as part of the same 
concept, cannot explain this collision. As a result, this traditional frame-
work falsely forces one to choose between integration or sovereignty, and 
between the EU or the Member State. A false choice, which also underlies 
the juxtaposition described in chapter 8 between statist defenders of sover-
eignty and pluralist defenders of integration.
In reality, however, we are not witnessing the decline of sovereignty as 
such, and sovereignty is not anathema to integration. Rather, we are wit-
nessing a relative decline of external sovereignty, and a relative ascendance 
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of internal sovereignty. This confederal ascent of internal sovereignty, fur-
thermore, holds great potential for supporting and organizing far-reaching 
integration between states.
Chapter 10 further unpacks confederal sovereignty, and explores its explan-
atory and normative potential for the EU. It starts with an introductory 
overview of confederal sovereignty, and its fit with the EU Treaties and the 
case law of the European Court of Justice. Subsequently, the idea of con-
federal sovereignty is further developed and tested by examining several 
potential advantages. To begin with, chapter 10 further discusses the poten-
tial of confederal sovereignty to reduce the misconceived contradiction 
between sovereignty and integration, and with it the conflict between stat-
ism and pluralism. A confederal approach can thereby combine the different 
strengths of both schools, inter alia allowing for a high degree of plural-
ism within an overarching confederal hierarchy. Next, and even more fun-
damentally, it discusses the capacity of confederal sovereignty to provide 
a more stable, potent, and democratic confederal foundation for the EU, 
which might be able to support the increasing federate superstructure of 
the EU outlined in part I. A foundation which also fits with the concept and 
evolution of EU citizenship as developed by the Court of Justice.
In addition to these two primary points, chapter 10 also examines three 
further and mutually related benefits of confederal sovereignty. First, how 
it explains the fit between constitutionalism and European integration. Sec-
ond, the potential of confederal sovereignty to conceptualize a distinctly 
confederal form of supremacy for EU law. A form of primacy which grants 
a sufficient operational primacy to EU law, without undermining a narrow 
but ultimate supremacy of national constitutions. Lastly, but certainly not 
least, the capacity of confederal sovereignty to create a normatively attrac-
tive narrative of and for the EU. A narrative that builds on the potential of 
the EU to modify and improve the national democratic process, and make it 
‘globalization-proof’.
Chapter 11 provides a summary of part II, and concludes that the EU can be 
understood as a crucial evolution in internal and popular sovereignty that 
safeguards democracy by updating it. Democracy 2.0 so to speak. Instead 
of a necessary evil that erodes the democratic glory days of old, the EU can 
be envisioned as, and subsequently developed into, an entity that saves 
popular sovereignty and democratic control from globalisation. It becomes 
a democratic imperative that empowers the people, whereas the rejection 
of confederal integration equals a refusal to evolve, which historically is a 
path to extinction only. At the same time, chapter 11 also recognizes that 
the potential held by the confederal form must still largely be realized. The 
confederal construct developed in this thesis must be translated, operation-
alised, and institutionalized, especially at the national level that remains 
primary in a confederation. How to do so requires far more study than can 
be done in this thesis, but part III takes some limited and highly tentative 
steps in this direction.
452 Summary
Part III: application and conclusions
Fully acknowledging the tendency of reality to spoil perfectly good theory, 
part III therefore applies the confederal approach developed in part I and II 
to two challenges of reality: Supranational democracy and the EMU crisis.
Chapter 12 explores a confederal response to the challenge of democracy 
beyond the state. Here our confederal analysis first points to the inadequate 
incorporation of European integration at the national level as the root of the 
problem. The national constitutional structures of the member states have 
not been sufficiently refitted for life in a confederal system. This rather 
remarkable fact has several problematic consequences. To begin with, EU 
membership now distorts the pre-existing institutional and political balance 
within national constitutions, which was calibrated for a monopoly posi-
tion of the state. Even more fundamentally, however, the effects of Euro-
pean integration have also not been translated into the national systems for 
acquiring, exercising and accounting for political power. As a result, there also 
cannot be a full national democratic process on EU issues: There simply are 
no national EU elections to win or EU powers to conquer. Instead, EU pow-
er is included in the spoils of national political victory, like a complimentary 
cookie with your coffee.
To create a confederal democratic process, therefore, the constitutional sys-
tems of Member States should be better adapted to their new functioning 
within a confederal constitutional system. Here, chapter 12 first suggests 
that decisions on whether authority should be delegated to the EU and deci-
sions on how to exercise and control authority once it has been delegated, 
should be developed into important new content for the national demo-
cratic process. Second, chapter 12 provides three general guidelines on how 
to remedy the current lack of constitutional and institutional imbedding of 
European integration at the national level, and to create the necessary incen-
tives to ensure that delegation and the use of delegated powers become 
politicized. The first principle requires the fit of any institutional modifica-
tions with the relevant national system and its unique characteristics. The 
second principle requires the creation of an institutional nexus for EU issues 
to which a national political process can attach itself. This requires that suf-
ficient and real EU related competences are bundled in this institutional 
nexus, and that sufficient ‘events’ such as elections, important decisions, 
and public procedures are created to allow for real political debate over 
these competences.
The third principle is that control of this EU nexus should remain indis-
pensable for the exercise of national political power. The objective must be 
to align and merge the national and the EU process, and to allow the EU 
political process to share in the energy and vitality of the national one.
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To illustrate these guidelines and the logic behind them, chapter 12 further 
suggests one concrete, if highly tentative, way to implement these guide-
lines: The creation of EU senates, which would be based on independent and 
EU focussed elections, and would provide a national democratic platform 
for European integration. In addition to such national solutions, chapter 12 
suggests several flanking measures at the EU level, which could assist and 
guide the confederal evolution of national democracy. For example, the del-
egation of competences could partially be relocated to secondary law, and 
the EU could actively step in by providing guidelines and incentives for 
Member States to adapt their constitutional systems to the confederal reality 
they find themselves in.
Chapter 13 subsequently engages the second challenge: The EMU and sov-
ereign debt crises. It first provides a brief historical overview of the different 
crises and the responses so far. Subsequently, it discusses some confederal 
causes, confederal risks, and potential confederal cures for the crises.
As to confederal causes, chapter 13 first shows how the crises logically fit 
with, and flow from, the confederal weaknesses identified in part I. To begin 
with, the origins of the crisis fit with the internal and economic focus of the 
EU, and with the self-deepening federate competences that were granted 
to pursue this focus. The internal logic and dynamic of economic integra-
tion created a push for monetary union, and once established, a powerful 
incentive to maintain it. At the same time the confederal foundation was not 
capable of establishing a real economic union, let alone a political one. The 
resulting schism between a confederal economic union and a federate mon-
etary union reflects, and flows from, the more fundamental schism between 
the confederal foundation and the federate superstructure discussed in part 
I. Constitutionally, therefore, what we might be seeing is the internal market 
engine of the confederal system going dangerously fast, and potentially dis-
appearing over the horizon of its confederal foundation. Yet simultaneously 
this internal market engine is becoming ever more central to sustaining the 
integration that has been achieved so far against (political) backlashes. Slow-
ing it down might, therefore, threaten the whole European construct as well. 
In this way the confederal perspective fits with the broader feeling of the EU 
being trapped between a dangerous leap forward and an equally dangerous 
slide backwards.
In addition, the debt and EMU crises precisely hit the weak spots in the 
confederal armour of the EU: Money, politics, and direct conflict. In addi-
tion to the serious money involved, the crises concern budgets: A highly 
political area where law has, and can, play a secondary role at best. A fact 
sadly borne out by the spectacular failure of the stability and growth pact. 
In addition, and partially as a result of its political nature, the crises forced 
the EU to directly control, and come into conflict with, the Member States, 
and to do so on the very sensitive issue of the budget. Like the situation in 
Hungary, this challenges the EU in one of the major confederal weaknesses, 
the limited capacity of the centre to engage into a direct political conflict 
with its Member States.
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Chapter 13 subsequently warns that, in our desire to combat the crises, we 
should be mindful of the inherent limits of the confederal form. Two con-
federal pitfalls, which are illustrated based on the Commission and Van 
Rompuy Blueprints, should be especially avoided. First, the risk of explod-
ing the federate superstructure in order to stabilize the EMU, which would 
overburden the confederal foundation of the EU, and undermine its long 
term viability. Second, there is the related risk of subsequently trying to cre-
ate a sufficient democratic authority at the EU level to support this expanded 
superstructure. Such attempts are not only doomed to fail as long as the EU 
retains its confederal foundation, they will also be counterproductive and 
will destroy far more legitimacy than they will create. Far-reaching authori-
ty to control national budgets may, therefore, very well prove a Trojan horse 
for the EU, as the centre will be unable to provide the required legitimacy, 
and such authority will induce a countermove from the national political 
actors that the EU centre will not be able to repulse.
Lastly, chapter 13 then explores two confederal answers to the crises, which 
are designed to avoid some of the main weaknesses in the modified confed-
eral system of the EU, and instead try to build on its particular strengths. 
First and foremost, it is proposed to establish the checks on national eco-
nomic discipline at the national level, and to bring them under more effec-
tive but confederal EU control. In addition, such confederal mechanism 
should rely on automaticity, rather than any form of political decision 
making at the European level, which would reduce stress on the political 
process, and respect national autonomy more. Primary responsibility, and 
the required space to tailor mechanisms to the national system, are left to 
the Member States, whilst the confederal institutions are used for second-
level norm setting and enforcement in a highly legal manner, a tasks for 
which they are more suited than direct enforcement on politically sensitive 
fields. Here the ‘golden rule’ as currently laid down in the Treaty on Stabil-
ity, Coordination and Governance, forms a good starting point, even though 
further confederal modifications must be made to this system.
Combining these insights, it becomes vital that the political energy and 
opportunity provided by the crises is used to improve the confederal foun-
dation of the EU in the national constitutional and democratic systems, 
and not for a federate power grab. For it is on the stability of these national 
systems, and their capacity to provide democratic legitimacy for European 
integration, that the EU largely depends, and a long term investment in the 
confederal foundation of the EU will, therefore, pay substantially higher 
and more sustainable dividends than short-term federate responses.
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Lastly, chapter 14 summarizes the key findings of this thesis, and provides 
an overall conclusion. Confederalism and popular sovereignty do allow a 
constructive and attractive understanding of the EU. Although it needs to 
be further developed, the EU can be usefully understood as a confederal 
union of sovereign member peoples, both as a reality and as an aspiration. 
As a result, our neo-Westphalian reality may indeed be the perfect time for 
a veritable confederal comeback. A time where this ugly duckling of consti-
tutional theory can finally come into its own, and provide a constitutional 
model for effective and democratic government in a globalizing world.

Executive summary
Dit proefschrift ontwikkelt een conceptie van de EU als een gemodificeerde 
confederale unie van soevereine lid-volkeren en hun staten. Een confederale 
conceptie die aantoont dat, anders dan tegenwoordig vaak wordt aangeno-
men, Europese integratie niet in strijd is met soevereiniteit of democratie. 
Sterker nog, mist juist begrepen en constitutioneel vormgegeven, kan de EU 
de soevereiniteit van de lid-volkeren herwinnen, en de nationale democra-
tie bevrijden uit de steeds beperkendere staat.
Voor de ontwikkeling van deze conceptie keert dit proefschrift terug naar 
twee klassieke concepten uit de constitutionele theorie die onterecht ver-
dwenen zijn uit het discours over de EU. Twee fundamentele maar uit de 
mode geraakte concepten, wier gezamenlijke potentieel voor ons begrip 
van Europese integratie daarom grotendeels onderschat en ondergewaar-
deerd is gebleven. Het primaire instrument om deze potentie te ontginnen 
is de rechtsvergelijking. De Europese Unie wordt vergeleken met het rela-
tief onbekende, maar zeer rijke voorbeeld van de Amerikaanse confedera-
tie (The Articles of Confederation) en hun evolutie tot de inmiddels beroemde 
Amerikaanse federatie. Deze vergelijking met de confederale wortels van 
de Verenigde Staten is verhelderend voor zowel confederalisme als soeve-
reiniteit en illustreert de potentie van een combinatie van beide concepten 
voor een constructieve constitutionele theorie van de EU. Een constitutio-
nele theorie die niet het einde van de geschiedenis hoeft aan te tonen, noch 
de huidige staten hoeft te overwinnen, maar die kan aansluiten en voort-
bouwen op de bestaande werkelijkheid in Europa. Een theorie, derhalve, 
die kan helpen om de EU, en de toenemende autoriteit die de EU uitoefent, 
weer te ankeren en in te kaderen, zowel in theorie als in de praktijk.
Dit proefschrift is onderverdeeld in drie delen. Deel I gaat in op confede-
ralisme. Het toont aan hoe het constitutionele systeem van de EU bestaat 
uit een confederale basis die is versterkt met een federale ‘bovenbouw’, en 
onderzoekt vervolgens de sterke punten, zwakke punten en grenzen van 
een dergelijk gemodificeerd confederaal systeem. Deel II betreft soeverei-
niteit. Dit deel toont eerst aan hoe de EU gezien moet worden als een logi-
sche confederale evolutie van volkssoevereiniteit (popular sovereignty), en 
waarom Europese integratie derhalve niet in strijd komt met soevereiniteit. 
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Vervolgens toont deel II aan hoe een confederale conceptie van soevereini-
teit de schijnbare tegenstelling tussen statism en pluralism op kan heffen en 
de nationale en Europese claims betreffende voorrang kan respecteren en 
verzoenen. Ook maakt deze conceptie een cruciale confederale evolutie van 
de nationale democratie mogelijk, en kan deze de nationale democratie toe-
rusten voor de globale werkelijkheid die zij moet controleren. Deel III past 
de bevindingen van deel I en II toe op de Euro crisis en de uitdaging om 
de Unie te voorzien van een effectief democratisch fundament op nationaal 
niveau. Twee toepassingen die de concrete en overtuigende bijdragen tonen 
die een confederale benadering van de Unie kan leveren.
Deel I: De (con)federale cocktail
Deel I van dit proefschrift ziet op confederalisme, en op de vraag of de EU 
begrepen kan worden als confederatie. Om deze vraag te beantwoorden, 
worden eerst de concrete voorbeelden van de Amerikaanse confederatie en 
de huidige Amerikaanse federatie gebruikt om een matrix van 16 constitu-
tionele vergelijkingspunten (markers) te maken. Deze punten voor vergelij-
king zijn gebaseerd op de cruciale constitutionele modificaties die tezamen 
de Amerikaanse transitie van een confederatie naar een federatie vormga-
ven. Als gevolg stellen zij ons in staat om de EU relatief te positioneren ten 
opzichte van de Amerikaanse confederatie en de Amerikaanse federatie, en, 
daarmee beter te plaatsen op het spectrum tussen confederatie en federatie 
meer in het algemeen.
Op basis van een puntsgewijze vergelijking toont hoofdstuk 2 aan dat de 
EU voor acht van deze zestien markers volledig in het confederale spec-
trum blijft, te weten: geen EU demos, geen recht op gebruik geweld, geen 
directe belastingen, geen constitutionele wijziging bij meerderheid, uittre-
den is toegestaan, gebruik van een gemengde overheid, de opzet van de 
executieve macht, en het vertegenwoordigende systeem. Op vijf punten valt 
de EU (overwegend) in het federatieve spectrum, te weten: voorrang van 
het Unierecht, directe werking van het Unierecht, brede doctrine voor het 
bepalen van bevoegdheden, expliciete bevoegdheden voor het reguleren 
van het interne economische verkeer en een federaal hooggerechtshof. Op 
drie punten moet de Unie gekwalificeerd worden als gemengd, te weten 
qua doelstellingen, externe bevoegdheden en de structuur van de wetge-
vende macht.
Van bijzonder belang is dat deze vergelijking laat zien dat de EU geen enke-
le van de vijf waarlijk fundamentele modificaties heeft overgenomen die de 
Amerikaanse federatie fundeerden. Op dit funderende niveau is de Unie 
derhalve volledig confederaal gebleven. De vijf federale modificaties die 
wel zijn overgenomen betreffen bovendien alle de juridische infrastruc-
tuur en de bevoegdheden van de Unie. Deze federale infrastructuur omvat 
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onder andere de –elkaar versterkende – federale modificaties inzake voor-
rang, direct effect, attributie en interne markt bevoegdheden. Modificaties 
die voor een belangrijk deel weer mogelijk werden door de institutionele 
modificatie van een centraal hooggerechtshof met de bevoegdheid te oorde-
len over de uitleg, en daarmee grenzen van, de verdragen. Deze bevindin-
gen zijn in onderstaande tabel samengevat:
Category Modification US CF Blended US Fed.
Institutional 16 Judiciary
15 Executive
14 Legislature
13 Representation 
Competences 12 Internal / commerce comps
11 War and external comps
10 Doctrine of attribution 
9 Specific objectives
Structural 8 Direct effect
7 Supremacy
6 Separate or merged gov
Fundamentals 5 Enlargement / secession
4 Amendment by majority
3 Taxation
2 Use of force
1 Single people
8 3 5
US CF Blended US Fed.
Hoofdstukken 3 en 4 aggregeren vervolgens de resultaten van deze ver-
gelijking in drie algemene analytische proposities over de gemodificeerde 
confederale aard van de EU. Ten eerste, dat de Unie een geïnverteerde con-
federatie is die de traditionele externe focus van confederaties heeft inge-
wisseld voor een interne en economische focus. Ten tweede, dat de EU de 
traditionele confederale opzet heeft gemodificeerd door de eigen confederale 
basis te versterken en te belasten met een deels federatieve bovenbouw. De derde 
propositie stelt dat dit geïnverteerde en gemodificeerde confederale bestel 
van de EU sterk leunt op een rule by law, en daarmee op de zeer stabiele 
rechtssystemen en bureaucratische structuren van de lidstaten. Vervolgens 
wordt de verklarende kracht van deze drie proposities nader onderzocht en 
onderbouwd: alle drie dragen zij bij aan een beter begrip van de specifieke 
sterktes en zwaktes van het gemodificeerde confederale bestel van de EU.
Hoofdstuk 3 ziet daarbij op de versterkingen van het bestel. Voor ieder van 
de drie proposities, en de specifieke modificaties die eraan ten grondslag 
liggen, wordt nader bekeken hoe deze de constitutionele structuur van de 
Unie hebben versterkt. Immers, confederale systemen staan nu niet bepaald 
bekend om hun overlevingsvermogen. Zij lijken eerder, als de pandaberen 
onder de constituties, een zekere aandrang te hebben tot uitsterven. Als 
gevolg is het van groot belang om de constitutionele factoren te isoleren en 
begrijpen die aan het relatieve succes van de EU bijgedragen, en die tot nu 
toe hebben geleid tot verdergaande integratie in plaats van desintegratie. 
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Dit zowel om in de toekomst verder te kunnen bouwen op deze succes-
factoren, als om te voorkomen dat deze factoren bij toekomstige wijzigingen 
in het bestel (per ongeluk) ondergraven zouden worden.
Met dit doel voor ogen keert hoofdstuk 3 terug naar de briljante analyse 
van Madison over de gebreken van confederale systemen. Een analyse die 
bovendien een centrale rol speelde in de beraadslagingen in Philadelphia. 
Op basis van deze analyse toont dit hoofdstuk aan hoe de federale modifi-
caties in de constitutionele structuur van de Unie inderdaad meerdere van 
de klassieke confederale gebreken hebben ondervangen, en als gevolg een 
sterk verbeterd confederaal bestel in het leven hebben geroepen.
Om te beginnen wordt de Unie minder geplaagd door een gebrek aan 
autoriteit of ‘energie’ op het centrale niveau. Ook heeft de Unie veel min-
der last van een gebrekkige naleving door de lidstaten. Dit waren volgens 
Madison juist de twee primaire gebreken van confederale systemen. Op dit 
punt toont de analyse in hoofdstuk 3 aan dat de geïnverteerde focus van 
de EU en dus de focus op markt in plaats van defensie, een meer effectieve, 
constante en zichzelf verdiepende prikkel geeft aan de lidstaten om samen 
te werken en de confederale samenwerking tot een succes te maken. Deze 
interne focus levert daarmee meer ‘energie’ voor de EU om te handelen. 
Bovendien zorgt deze interne en economische focus ervoor dat lidstaten een 
evident eigenbelang hebben bij een effectieve confederatie en dus bij loya-
le samenwerking, en dat dit belang van lidstaten gelijke tred houdt met de 
eisen die steeds verdergaande integratie stelt. Naarmate de interne markt 
groeit en meer voordelen biedt, wordt het ook belangijker onderdeel van 
die markt te blijven, en wordt de eigen economie steeds afhankelijker van 
die markt. Een interne markt lijkt daarmee eenvoudigweg een betere ener-
giebron voor confederaties dan extern beleid en defensie.
Een indrukwekkend scala aan breed geïnterpreteerde bevoegdheden 
stelt de Unie vervolgens in staat om deze energie in wetgeving om te zet-
ten. Effectieve negatieve integratie, gehandhaafd door het federale Hof van 
Justitie, beschermt eenmaal bereikte integratie en houdt het proces van inte-
gratie in beweging waar het politieke proces even stilvalt. Een mechanisme 
waardoor de Unie, beter dan klassieke confederaties, perioden van crisis 
kan overleven Het gebruik van een rule by law, in combinatie met de stabiele 
en geoliede rechtssystemen en bureaucratische apparaten van de lidstaten, 
verhoogt de nationale naleving van Unierecht aanzienlijk, en vermindert 
daarmee de noodzaak voor centrale handhaving door de EU. Hoewel verre 
van perfect of compleet, kan de EU als gevolg van deze modificaties dus 
beschikken over een centrale energie, robuustheid en een niveau van nale-
ving dat Madison waarschijnlijk nooit voor mogelijk had gehouden in een 
confederaal systeem.
Een tweede confederale zwakte betrof financiën. Ook op dit vlak functio-
neert de Unie relatief goed, ook al heeft de Unie niet de bevoegdheid gekre-
gen om directe belastingen te heffen. Anders dan in de meeste confederaties, 
en mede gezien de goede naleving en de rule by law, betalen lidstaten
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in de EU echter wel gewoon de eigen bijdrage, al doen de nettobetalers dit 
met steeds frissere tegenzin. De rule by law en de regulatoire focus van de 
EU betekenen bovendien dat de EU ook maar een relatief laag percentage 
van het BNP nodig heeft om te functioneren. Dit zeker in vergelijking met 
de kosten voor het garanderen van een effectieve defensie, of het percentage 
van het BNP dat de lidstaten controleren. Als gevolg kan de Unie makkelij-
ker inkomen genereren, en verlaagt het tegelijkertijd de behoefte aan confe-
derale inkomsten.
De EU lijdt ook minder aan Madisons derde confederale euvel, instabiele 
staten die het centrum tot handhaving en confrontatie dwingen. Hoewel 
meer contextuele voorzienigheid dan constitutionele modificatie, is het zo 
dat de Unie door de relatieve stabiliteit van de lidstaten tot nu toe gevrij-
waard is van de noodzaak al te direct in te grijpen in onstabiele lidstaten, 
en daarmee van dit soort ernstige bedreigingen voor het confederale bestel.
De vierde confederale zwakte betrof het gebrek aan interne bevoegdheden 
van confederaties, en dan met name het gebrek aan bevoegdheden om de 
handel tussen de lidstaten te reguleren. Wederom is dit confederale gebrek 
in de EU in belangrijke mate verholpen door verschillende federale modi-
ficaties. Dit met name door de expliciete en vergaande bevoegdheden van 
de EU om de interne markt te reguleren, welke weer zeer ruim worden 
uitgelegd door het federale Hof van Justitie. De Unie heeft nu zelfs zulke 
vergaande bevoegdheden rondom de interne markt dat juist het relatieve 
gebrek aan niet-markt gerelateerde bevoegdheden een probleem lijkt te 
worden, net als het gebrek aan algemene externe bevoegdheden om de 
intern gecreëerde macht ook extern te projecteren.
Het laatste centrale gebrek dat Madison in confederaties ontwaarde was 
het onvermogen om de eigen tekortkomingen op te lossen, in het bijzon-
der door het amenderen van de confederale constitutie. Het gemodificeerde 
confederale systeem van de EU heeft ook dit confederale gebrek voor een 
belangrijk deel weten te omzeilen. Formele amendering van de verdragen 
vereist natuurlijk nog steeds unanimiteit. Tegelijkertijd beschikt het EU 
systeem over een dermate interne flexibiliteit dat deze formele belemme-
ring minder beperkend werkt. Met name door de soepele en teleologische 
interpretatie van de verdragen door het Hof van Justitie kan de Unie zich 
vergaand ontwikkelen binnen de bestaande verdragen. Daarnaast hebben 
de interne focus op de interne markt, samen met de steeds verdergaande 
negatieve integratie middels de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie, ook 
bijgedragen aan verschillende cruciale verdragswijzigingen. In vergelijking 
met de Amerikaanse confederatie is het constitutionele systeem van de EU 
daarom veel flexibeler en aanpasbaar, hoewel hier nog grote uitdagingen 
wachten en de recente ervaringen met verdragswijzigingen niet bepaald 
hoopvol stemmen.
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Door op deze wijze de EU af te zetten tegen de archetypische gebreken van 
de confederatie, toont hoofdstuk 3 aan hoe de EU in staat is gebleken om de 
meeste van deze gebreken te ondervangen, of in ieder geval de gevolgen 
ervan te verzachten. De Unie heeft dit vooral gedaan door verschillende 
federale modificaties te incorporeren, en door gebruik te maken van de rela-
tief gunstige context. Het cumulatieve positieve effect van deze modificaties 
op de effectiviteit en stabiliteit van de Unie zouden indruk moeten maken 
op een Madison, en overtreffen wellicht zelfs de verwachtingen die veel van 
de founding fathers hadden van het federale systeem dat zij ontwierpen in 
Philadelphia.
Tegelijkertijd is een ‘free lunch’ zeldzaam, zelfs in de constitutionele theo-
rie. Kan men nu gewoon een federale bovenbouw op een confederale basis 
schroeven, of is dit het constitutionele equivalent van een met staalplaat 
bepantserde deux chevaux? Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert daarom de beperkingen 
en inherente zwaktes die het gemodificeerde confederale bestel van de Unie 
heeft behouden, alsmede de nieuwe problemen die door de verschillende 
federale modificaties zijn gecreëerd. Begrip van deze zwaktes is noodzake-
lijk voor goed inzicht in de grenzen en beperkingen die inherent blijven aan 
de confederale vorm, en voor een beter besef van de risico’s en uitdagingen 
die het bestel van de Unie nog te wachten staan. Zoals hoofdstuk 4 boven-
dien aantoont, kunnen ook veel van de reeds bekende problemen van de 
EU verklaard en begrepen worden als logische gevolgen van de gemodifi-
ceerde confederale structuur van de Unie.
Om te beginnen zet het vliegwieleffect van de interne markt de Unie 
bijvoorbeeld vaak aan tot veel te vergaande integratie of federalisering: de 
interne krachtbron van de Unie lijkt soms te sterk, en ook moeilijk juridisch 
in te dammen. Een dynamiek die alleen maar versterkt wordt door neiging 
van de federale elementen in de bovenbouw van de Unie om te blijven ver-
breden en verdiepen, dit vaak ten koste van hun confederale tegenhangers. 
Een proces dat ook de neiging verklaart van (federaal vormgegeven) mark 
gerelateerde doelen om een loopje te nemen met (confederaal geregelde) 
sociale of andere niet-markt gerelateerde doelen, en daarmee mede een logi-
sche verklaring geeft voor de typische constitutionele evolutie van de EU 
meer in het algemeen.
De afhankelijkheid van de Unie van een rule by law creëert ook ver-
schillende zwaktes. Zo kan een rule by law moeilijk omgaan met een directe 
politieke uitdaging, kan een excessief vertrouwen op het recht de politieke 
dimensie ondermijnen, terwijl deze wel noodzakelijk is voor de legitima-
tie van integratie op langere termijn, en is een rule by law weer afhankelijk 
van bepaalde randvoorwaarden, zoals stabiele staten, waaraan wellicht niet 
altijd voldaan zal zijn. Bovendien is een rule by law inherent ongeschikt voor 
terreinen die zich niet of nauwelijks lenen voor juridische controle, zoals het 
bepalen van het budget of buitenlands beleid. De Unie heeft dan ook evi-
dent problemen met het reguleren van dit soort terreinen.
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De meest fundamentele en bedreigende zwakte van het gemodificeerde 
confederale systeem ligt echter in het toenemende gat tussen de federale 
bovenbouw en de confederale basis van de EU. De confederale fundering 
van de Unie moet immers een steeds grotere federale bovenbouw dragen en 
legitimeren, en kan daarbij zelf niet de toevlucht nemen tot federale modi-
ficaties. Dit toenemende gat legt een zware last op de constitutionele struc-
tuur van de Unie en de lidstaten en bedreigt de legitimiteit van beide.
Naast evidente versterkingen leidt de gemodificeerde confederale struc-
tuur van de Unie daarom ook tot serieuze problemen. Deze problemen zul-
len geadresseerd moeten worden voor de lange termijn houdbaarheid van 
Europese integratie. Daarnaast moeten de verschillende inherente zwaktes 
en beperkingen van het confederale bestel in het algemeen goed in het oog 
gehouden worden bij de verdere ontwikkeling van de Unie.
Alvorens in deel II nader in te gaan op mogelijke confederale antwoorden 
op deze uitdagingen en problemen, kijkt hoofdstuk 5 echter eerst nog naar 
een tweede essentiële, en tot nu toe nog nauwelijks onderzochte, dimensie 
van de confederale vergelijking: het proces van federatie in de VS. Een beter 
begrip van dit proces is op zich al verhelderend voor de aard van (con)fede-
rale systemen en de Europese modificatie daarvan. Daarnaast biedt het ook 
enkele concrete aanknopingspunten voor de vraag of Europa nu wel of niet 
zou moeten federeren, en zo ja, hoe dit dan zou moeten verlopen.
Hoofdstuk 5 bespreekt in dit verband vier proceselementen die met name 
relevant zijn voor de EU. De eerste en belangrijkste bevinding hierbij is 
dat, anders dan in de VS, in Europa de structuur van nationale elites en 
democratische systemen juist in de weg staan aan Europese federatie. In 
de VS werd de federatie voor een belangrijk deel ontworpen, publiek ver-
kocht en verdedigd, en uiteindelijk gerealiseerd door invloedrijke elites die 
hun grip op de statelijke politiek hadden verloren na onafhankelijkheid 
van Groot Brittannië. Deze interstatelijke elites zagen het creëren van een 
centrale federale overheid, waar zij vervolgens weer controle over konden 
verkrijgen, als de enige manier om hun politieke macht te heroveren op de 
nieuwe democratische elites in de staten. In de EU, daarentegen, bestaat er 
geen kritische massa van eensgezinde nationale elites die gebaat zouden 
zijn bij Europese federatie. Er zijn eenvoudigweg niet afdoende (politieke) 
elites die hun macht via de EU verkrijgen, of die hopen dergelijke macht 
nog tijdens hun politieke bestaan via de EU te veroveren. Bovendien wordt 
deze nationaal georiënteerde elitestructuur juist geconsolideerd door de 
confederale organisatie van politieke autoriteit in de EU. Deze organisatie 
beschermt en versterkt immers de huidige nationale elites, die Europese 
autoriteit verkrijgen als bonus bij nationaal politiek succes. Anders dan in 
de VS moeten ambities voor een Europese federatie dan de huidige elite 
structuur overwinnen, en kunnen zij niet meeliften op de wens van mach-
tige elites om de politieke macht te heroveren.
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Het tweede procedurele element dat hoofdstuk 5 bespreekt ontkracht 
de democratische mythe die de Amerikaanse federatie omringt, en toont 
de antidemocratische aard en doelen van deze federatie. In werkelijkheid 
kan men de Amerikaanse federatie zelfs kwalificeren als een antidemocrati-
sche revolutie. De federatie was namelijk nadrukkelijk niet bedoeld om de 
democratie verder te bevorderen, maar om paal en perk te stellen aan de 
radicale en directe democratie die na de onafhankelijkheid was ontstaan in 
de meeste staten. Deze antidemocratische doelen achter de keuze voor een 
Amerikaanse federatie moeten ook goed voor ogen worden gehouden bij 
het overwegen van een Europese federatie, met name waar het doel van 
deze federatie zou zijn om de democratie te bevorderen. Federaliseren staat 
namelijk niet gelijk aan democratiseren, ook al zijn de founding fathers er indruk-
wekkend goed in geslaagd beide concepten in het publieke debat aan elkaar 
te koppelen. In werkelijkheid zal het democratische gehalte van een bestel 
echter afhangen van hoe het federale systeem is vormgegeven, en niet de 
federale vorm als zodanig. In ieder geval moet daarbij ook erkend wor-
den dat het democratische gewicht en de autonomie van de verschillende 
lid-volkeren juist zal worden beperkt door een federatie. Daarnaast zullen 
oproepen tot een Europese federatie ook eerlijk moeten erkennen dat fede-
ratie juist een inherent aristocratische ondertoon heeft. Een ondertoon die 
niet onverenigbaar is met moderne opvattingen over democratie, maar wel 
moet worden toegegeven en gerechtvaardigd.
Naast deze twee fundamentele procedurele elementen gaat hoofdstuk 5 
ook in op enkele meer praktische lessen die getrokken kunnen worden uit 
het Amerikaanse proces. Om te beginnen wijst dit hoofdstuk op de voorde-
len van de Amerikaanse procedure voor het ontwerpen en ratificeren van 
de federale grondwet. Deze procedure combineerde een vertrouwelijke en 
besloten dialoog tijdens het ontwerpen met een intens publiek debat nadat 
de definitieve tekst van de grondwet was aangenomen. Een systeem dat tot 
betere resultaten lijkt te komen dan het huidige EU systeem voor wijziging 
van de verdragen. Dit systeem vormt bijna het spiegelbeeld van het Ameri-
kaanse. Het combineert een zeer publieke en high profile procedure voor het 
opstellen van verdragswijzigingen, dat in de weg staat aan constructieve 
compromissen, met een veel meer gesloten en minder publieke ratificatie 
middels parlementaire goedkeuring, waarbij referenda vaak te riskant blij-
ken.
Mede in dit verband zou de Unie ook haar voordeel kunnen doen met 
het idee van ‘attached amendments’ zoals ontwikkeld in de VS, net als met 
de Amerikaanse nadruk op aemulatio in plaats van innovatio. Onderkend 
moet worden dat de Amerikaanse federale grondwet in de praktijk sterk 
voortbouwde op bestaande grondwetten en materialen, en delen hiervan 
zelfs volledig overnam. Wij moeten daarom de romantische mythe ver-
werpen, die deels in de VS is ontwikkeld om de federatie aan het volk te 
verkopen, dat nieuwe grondwetten in abstracto en uit het niets ontwikkeld 
kunnen worden, en dat zij geheel afstand kunnen doen van bestaande con-
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cepten, structuren en theorieën, tenminste als men maar genoeg slimme 
mensen bij elkaar zet (of zelf slim genoeg is). Wat de werkelijkheid van het 
Amerikaanse proces juist leert is dat de beste resultaten bereikt worden 
met pragmatische, maar goed doordachte en onderbouwde emulatie van 
bestaande praktijken, en niet met radicale innovatie.
Deel II: Confederale soevereiniteit
Deel II ziet op het tweede kernconcept van dit proefschrift: soevereiniteit. 
Dit deel toont aan dat soevereiniteit niet inherent strijdig is met Europese 
integratie, maar juist een logische evolutie van soevereiniteit vormt. Een 
confederale conceptie van soevereiniteit levert bovendien een cruciaal 
instrument om de in deel I geïdentificeerde confederale zwaktes op te van-
gen, enkele huidige theoretische impasses te doorbreken, en meer in het 
algemeen een constructieve constitutionele theorie voor de Unie te ontwik-
kelen. Confederale soevereiniteit kan namelijk een afdoende stabiele, legi-
tieme en flexibele basis bieden voor de autoriteit van de EU. Het kan dit 
bovendien bieden zonder de primaire publieke autoriteit van de lidstaten te 
betwisten en zonder soevereiniteit van de lid-volkeren te ondermijnen.
Hoofdstuk 7 geeft een nadere introductie van de doelen van deel II, teza-
men met een overzicht van de verschillende voordelen die een confederale 
conceptie van soevereiniteit de Unie kan bieden. Vervolgens zet hoofdstuk 
8 het schijnbare conflict tussen soevereiniteit en Europese integratie uiteen. 
Deze uitganspositie – Europa en soevereiniteit gaan niet samen– wordt 
beschreven aan de hand van de statism en pluralism, twee van de momenteel 
meest invloedrijke kampen in de bestudering van de EU. De onenigheid 
tussen deze kampen, en de schijnbare onverenigbaarheid van de posities 
die zij innemen, vat de veronderstelde botsing tussen soevereiniteit en 
integratie, alsmede de argumenten die daarvoor doorgaans worden aange-
voerd, perfect samen. Want zodra men soevereiniteit serieus neemt, zoals 
onder andere het Bundesverfassungsgericht doet, dan lijkt het inderdaad 
noodzakelijk om allerhande onhoudbare en irreële grenzen te stellen aan 
integratie. Zodra men echter soevereiniteit geheel verwerpt, in een plura-
listische omarming van integratie, loopt men ook tegen meerdere funda-
mentele problemen op. Want zodra het concept van hiërarchie zelf wordt 
opgegeven, blijkt het lastig om nog enige basis te vinden voor essentiële 
zaken als autoriteit, gezag, of legitimiteit. Als gevolg van deze tekortkomin-
gen blijkt statism niet eens in staat om de huidige werkelijkheid in de EU 
nog te vatten, laat staan dat het de toekomstige integratie nog kan accom-
moderen. Vice versa slaagt pluralisme er niet in om de blijvende fundamen-
tele rol van staten, soevereiniteit en hiërarchie in de EU te incorporeren. Om 
die reden blijft pluralisme te vluchtig en theoretisch, en mist het de kracht 
en capaciteit om een geloofwaardig en robuust alternatief voor de state-
lijke werkelijkheid te bieden. Daar beide kampen er wel in slagen elkaar 
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te ondermijnen, maar geen van beide volledig overtuigt, lijken we vast te 
zitten in een weinig aantrekkelijke of vruchtbare tegenstelling: statsim of 
pluralisme, gevestigde maar tekortschietende theorieën of onacceptabele en 
onverantwoorde tabula rasa, soevereiniteit of de EU.
Om deze onvruchtbare impasse te ontsnappen, keert hoofdstuk 9 terug 
naar het concept soevereiniteit zelf: wat houdt dit concept nu echt in, en 
hoe verhoudt het zich tot integratie? Met dit doel kijkt hoofdstuk 9 achter 
de simplistische mythes omtrent de absoluutheid van soevereiniteit naar de 
conceptuele evolutie van soevereiniteit zelf. Deze analyse toont ten eerste 
aan hoe interne en externe soevereiniteit twee gerelateerde maar geheel ver-
schillende concepten zijn, die in de loop der tijd steeds meer verward zijn 
geraakt. Om dit te staven worden interne en externe soevereiniteit gevolgd 
door vijf stadia van hun historische ontwikkeling en conceptuele verwar-
ring. Deze vijf stadia omvatten onder andere de ontwikkeling van soeve-
reiniteit door Bodin, en de federale evolutie van interne soevereiniteit in de 
VS; een evolutie die de Amerikaanse federatie mogelijk maakte door soeve-
reine bevoegdheden te verdelen over meerdere overheden.
Op basis van deze conceptuele analyse, en het daaruit volgende onder-
scheid tussen interne en externe soevereiniteit, komt hoofdstuk 9 vervol-
gens tot drie kernconclusies. Als eerste is Europese integratie niet inherent 
strijdig met soevereiniteit als zodanig. De EU past juist naadloos binnen het 
concept van interne soevereiniteit en de wijze waarop binnen interne soeve-
reiniteit bevoegdheden constitutioneel worden verdeeld over verschillende 
actoren. De platitude dat de EU conflicteert met soevereiniteit is dan ook 
gebaseerd op ongeschikte en onterecht toegepaste concepties van externe 
soevereiniteit, en de absolute mythes die externe soevereiniteit omringen. 
Zulke simplistische en absolute concepties van externe soevereiniteit kun-
nen Europese integratie vanzelfsprekend niet accommoderen en leiden 
dus tot een valse tegenstelling tussen soevereiniteit en integratie. Gelukkig 
zijn dergelijke externe en absolute concepties van soevereiniteit ook geheel 
irrelevant voor een juist begrip van de Europese integratie. De EU vormt 
immers een confederaal en constitutioneel systeem, en moet dientengevolge 
benaderd worden vanuit interne soevereiniteitsconcepties, net zoals natio-
nale constituties niet benaderd worden vanuit externe soevereiniteit maar 
vanuit interne soevereiniteit.
Ten tweede laat hoofdstuk 9 zien dat een specifieke confederale conceptie 
van soevereiniteit een logische evolutie vormt van interne en volkssoeve-
reiniteit. De evolutie van interne soevereiniteit is er een van steeds toene-
mende abstractie en delegatie. De ‘federal twist’ in volkssoevereiniteit, zoals 
ontwikkeld in de VS, maakte het zelfs mogelijk om soevereine bevoegdhe-
den, namens het volk, te verdelen over meerdere overheden. Confederale 
soevereiniteit vormt nu de volgende ontwikkeling in deze federale evolu-
tie van soevereiniteit, en betrekt buiten-statelijke en niet-statelijke actoren 
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in het nationale constitutionele systeem voor de delegatie van soevereine 
bevoegdheden. Het volk delegeert niet meer alle macht binnen de staat, 
maar deels ook buiten de staat, waarmee de staat aan soevereine bevoegd-
heden inboet, maar het volk de soevereiniteit nog steeds niet verliest.
Ten derde toont hoofdstuk 9 aan hoe deze confederale evolutie van soeve-
reiniteit ook aansluit bij de prescriptieve aard van interne soevereiniteit. Net 
als in de VS kan een confederaal concept van soevereiniteit dan ook mede 
worden gebruikt om aan te geven hoe de publieke autoriteit in de EU geor-
ganiseerd en gelegitimeerd zou moeten worden, en om deze gewenste situ-
atie vervolgens tot stand te brengen.
Op basis van deze drie conclusies toont hoofdstuk 9 als laatste aan dat de 
EU dus niet begrepen moet worden als een botsing van soevereiniteit en 
integratie, maar als een botsing van interne en externe soevereiniteit. In de 
confederale constitutie van de EU wordt de logica van interne soevereiniteit 
toegepast op wat tot voor kort werd beschouwd als het ‘externe’ domein: 
de relatie tussen de lidstaten. De consequentie hiervan is dat de staat niet 
langer een totale barrière en exclusieve nexus vormt tussen het interne en 
het externe domein. De interne soeverein, die zowel conceptueel als norma-
tief primair is, daagt daardoor direct de externe soeverein uit: in plaats van 
opgehokt te blijven in de staat handelt het volk nu buiten de grenzen. Het 
traditionele conceptuele kader, dat interne en externe soevereiniteit ziet als 
twee kanten van dezelfde medaille, kan deze confrontatie tussen interne en 
externe soevereiniteit niet verklaren. Als gevolg lijken wij onder dit traditi-
onele kader genoodzaakt om te kiezen tussen integratie en soevereiniteit, 
en tussen de EU of de lidstaten. Een valse tegenstelling die ook mede de 
onenigheid tussen statism en pluralisme onderligt die werd beschreven in 
hoofdstuk 8.
In werkelijkheid vormt de EU niet het einde van soevereiniteit, en is 
soevereiniteit ook niet anathema voor integratie. In plaats daarvan zien wij 
een relatieve terugtred van externe soevereiniteit, en een relatieve opkomst 
van interne soevereiniteit. Deze groeiende rol voor interne soevereiniteit 
biedt een enorm potentieel voor het creëren en structureren van vergaande 
maar democratische integratie tussen staten. Bovendien lijdt interne soeve-
reiniteit ook veel minder aan de absolute en ondemocratische trekken die 
soevereiniteit als zodanig vaak verweten worden.
Hoofdstuk 10 werkt het concept van confederale soevereiniteit vervolgens 
verder uit en verkent de verklarende kracht en normatieve potentie van dit 
concept voor de EU. Het hoofdstuk begint met een inleidend overzicht van 
confederale soevereiniteit en laat zien hoe dit concept aansluit bij de EU 
verdragen en de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie. Vervolgens worden 
enkele mogelijk voordelen van confederale soevereiniteit verder ontwikkeld 
en getoetst. Om te beginnen gaat hoofdstuk 10 nader in op de potentie van 
confederale soevereiniteit om de valse tegenstelling tussen soevereiniteit en 
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integratie op te heffen, net als de daaraan gerelateerde tegenstelling tussen 
statism en pluralisme. Een confederale benadering van de EU kan hierdoor 
de verschillende sterke punten van beide scholen combineren, zoals een 
hoge mate van praktische heterachie binnen een overkoepelende confede-
rale hiërarchie.
Daarnaast, en nog fundamenteler, toont hoofdstuk 10 hoe confederale 
soevereiniteit de weg opent naar een meer stabiele, robuuste, en democra-
tische basis voor de EU. Een basis die in staat zou zijn om de reeds in deel 
I besproken federale bovenbouw van de Unie te dragen en te legitimeren. 
Een basis die bovendien geheel aansluit bij het Unieburgerschap en de wijze 
waarop dit concept door het Hof van Justitie is ontwikkeld.
Vervolgens gaat hoofdstuk 10 in op drie verdere en onderling gerelateerde 
voordelen van confederale soevereiniteit. Ten eerste hoe een dergelijke con-
ceptie verklaart waarom het constitutionele discours zo relevant is voor de 
EU, terwijl de EU toch gebaseerd blijft op verdragen. Ten tweede stelt con-
federale soevereiniteit ons in staat om een confederale vorm van voorrang voor 
het Unierecht te conceptualiseren. Een vorm die een afdoende operationele 
voorrang van het Unierecht op nationaal recht kan erkennen, zonder dat 
het hiervoor de beperkte maar ultieme voorrang van nationale constituties 
hoeft te verwerpen. Als laatste, maar zeker niet als minste voordeel, kan 
confederale soevereiniteit bijdragen aan een normatief aantrekkelijk narratief 
van en voor de EU. Een narratief dat voortbouwt op het potentieel van de 
Unie om het nationale democratische te bevrijden uit de staat, en daarmee 
‘globalisation proof’ te maken.
Hoofdstuk 11 bevat een samenvatting van deel II. Het concludeert dat de 
EU inderdaad begrepen kan worden als een cruciale evolutie van interne en 
volkssoevereiniteit. Een evolutie die de nationale democratie juist beschermt 
door haar te moderniseren en toe te rusten voor een globaliserende werke-
lijkheid: Democratie 2.0 zeg maar. De EU verwordt als gevolg tot een demo-
cratische noodzaak die de lid-volkeren hun soevereiniteit kan teruggeven. 
De afwijzing van confederale integratie wordt hiermee ontmaskerd als een 
bescherming van de staat ten koste van de volkssoevereiniteit en als een irra-
tionele weigering ons bestel aan te passen aan een veranderende werkelijk-
heid.
Tegelijkertijd erkent hoofdstuk 11 dat het potentieel van de confe-
derale vorm voor een belangrijk deel nog gerealiseerd moet worden. Het 
confederale concept dat in dit proefschrift is ontwikkeld moet nog geope-
rationaliseerd en geïnstitutionaliseerd worden, met name op het nationale 
constitutioneel niveau dat primair blijft in een confederaal bestel. Hoe dit te 
realiseren vormt een enorme uitdaging, en vergt meer onderzoek dan in het 
bestek van dit proefschrift verricht kan worden. Deel III van het proefschrift 
neemt echter al een klein, en hoogst tentatief, voorschot op dit noodzake-
lijke vervolgonderzoek.
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Deel III: Toepassing en conclusies
Ondanks de vervelende neiging van de werkelijkheid om geweldige the-
orieën te verpesten, past deel III de bevindingen in deel I en II toe op twee 
actuele uitdagingen voor de EU: supranationale democratie en de Euro cri-
sis.
Hoofdstuk 12 verkent de confederale mogelijkheden voor effectieve demo-
cratie buiten de staat. Hier wijst een confederale analyse allereerst naar de 
gebrekkige incorporatie van Europese integratie op het nationale niveau als de 
wortel van het democratische probleem. De nationale constitutionele struc-
turen van de lidstaten zijn niet afdoende aangepast aan hun nieuwe positie 
in een confederaal systeem. Dit nogal opmerkelijke feit heeft verschillende 
problematische consequenties. Om te beginnen verstoort EU lidmaatschap 
momenteel de vooraf bestaande institutionele en politieke balans van de 
nationale constituties. Deze waren immers gekalibreerd voor een situ-
atie waarin de staat een monopolie had op de uitoefening van soevereine 
bevoegdheden. Een nog fundamenteler probleem is dat Europese integratie 
ook niet verdisconteerd is in de nationale mechanismen voor het verkrij-
gen, uitoefenen, of verantwoording afleggen voor het gebruik van politieke 
macht. Het logische gevolg hiervan is dat er ook geen nationaal democratisch 
proces kan ontstaan over Europese vraagstukken. Er zijn eenvoudigweg geen 
nationale EU verkiezingen om te winnen, of Europese bevoegdheden die 
apart nationaal veroverd moeten worden. In plaats daarvan zijn Europese 
bevoegdheden een bijvangst van nationaal politiek succes, een soort gratis 
Europees koekje bij de nationaal verdiende koffie.
Om een confederaal democratisch proces te creëren hoeft het Europees 
Parlement dus niet nog meer macht te krijgen, maar zijn nationale verbete-
ringen nodig. De nationale constitutionele systemen moeten beter worden 
aangepast aan hun functioneren in een confederaal systeem. In dit verband 
stelt hoofdstuk 12 dan ook als eerste voor dat beslissingen over of te dele-
geren, hoeveel te delegeren, en hoe Europese bevoegdheden aan te wenden, 
ontwikkeld moeten worden als belangrijke nieuwe inhoud voor het nati-
onale democratische proces. Nationale politieke discussies moeten deels 
gaan draaien om deze vragen, wat weer betekent dat nationale politici ook 
de prikkels moeten krijgen om deze vragen effectief te politiseren. Constitu-
tionele theorie zelf kan er immers niet voor zorgen dat mensen over Europa 
gaan praten, maar kan wel een politiek systeem creëren waarin politici hier-
toe verleid worden dit proces op gang te brengen.
Hoofdstuk 12 formuleert vervolgens drie algemene richtsnoeren die 
kunnen bijdragen aan dit overkoepelende doel: het verbeteren van de con-
stitutionele en institutionele verankering van Europese integratie op het 
nationale niveau, waaronder het creëren van de noodzakelijke prikkels en 
beloningen voor het politiseren van EU vraagstukken.
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Het eerste richtsnoer betreft maatwerk: iedere constitutionele modificatie 
moet aansluiten bij de unieke structuur en eigenschappen van het nationale 
systeem. De Unie kan hier dus wel overkoepelende suggesties of best prac-
tices leveren, maar zeker niet uniformeren. Het tweede richtsnoer vereist de 
oprichting van een institutionele nexus voor EU vraagstukken op nationaal 
niveau. Nationale politieke processen over EU vraagstukken kunnen zich 
dan hechten aan, en plaatsvinden binnen, deze nexus. De oprichting van 
een dergelijke nexus vereist ook dat er afdoende en serieuze EU gerelateer-
de competenties gebundeld moeten worden in deze nexus: voor een serieus 
politiek proces moet er ook serieuze macht te behalen zijn. Bovendien moe-
ten er afdoende ‘gebeurtenissen’ plaatsvinden binnen deze nexus, zoals ver-
kiezingen, concrete beslissingen en publieke procedures, opdat er een reëel 
politiek debat over de toepassing van EU competenties kan ontstaan.
Het derde richtsnoer stelt dat de politieke controle over deze nationale 
EU nexus onontbeerlijk moet blijven voor de uitoefening van de –immers 
primaire– nationale politieke macht. Het doel daarbij is om het nationale en 
het EU proces op één lijn te krijgen en aan elkaar te koppelen: het nationale 
politieke proces omtrent EU vragen moet immers delen in, en gestimuleerd 
worden door, de energie en vitaliteit van het primaire nationale proces.
Om deze richtsnoeren te illustreren, ontwikkelt hoofdstuk 12 het zeer ten-
tatieve voorstel van EU Senaten. Deze senaten zouden beschikken over ver-
gaande EU competenties maar ook noodzakelijk zijn voor de aanname van 
nationale wetten, zouden gebaseerd zijn op onafhankelijke en op de EU 
geconcentreerde verkiezingen, en zouden daarmee een nationaal platform 
creëren voor politisering van Europese integratie. In aanvulling op deze 
voorstellen suggereert hoofdstuk 12 ook nog enkele flankerende maatre-
gelen op het Europese niveau, die de nationale verankering van Europese 
integratie zouden kunnen ondersteunen. Zo kan de delegatie van bevoegd-
heden aan de EU meer plaatsvinden middels secundaire wetgeving. Dit zou 
meer politieke besluitvorming mogelijk maken in de EU senaten dan bij 
delegatie via primair recht. Daarnaast kan de Unie actiever betrokken zijn 
bij het stimuleren en begeleiden van nationale constitutionele modificaties.
Hoofdstuk 13 richt zich vervolgens op de tweede confederale uitdaging: de 
Euro crisis. Het hoofdstuk geeft eerst een kort overzicht van de verschil-
lende crises die achter dit label schuilgaan, en de acties die tot nu toe zijn 
ondernomen om deze crises te bestrijden. Vervolgens bespreekt het hoofd-
stuk achtereenvolgend enkele confederale oorzaken confederale risico’s, en 
potentiele confederale antwoorden op deze crises.
Wat betreft de confederale oorzaken laat hoofdstuk 13 eerst zien hoe 
de Eurocrisis logisch volgt uit de verschillende confederale zwaktes die 
beschreven zijn in deel I. Om te beginnen liggen de oorzaken van de crisis 
mede bij de interne en economische focus van de EU, alsmede bij de zelf-
verdiepende federale marktbevoegdheden van de Unie. De eigen logica en 
dynamiek van economische integratie zette aan tot de ontwikkeling van 
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een monetaire unie, en hielp deze in stand te houden. Tegelijkertijd was 
de confederale basis van de EU niet bij machte om een volwaardige econo-
mische unie te creëren, laat staan een politieke unie. De resulterende kloof 
tussen een confederale economische unie en een federale monetaire unie is 
een van de centrale oorzaken van de Euro crisis. Maar deze kloof vormt 
ook een logische reflectie van de meer fundamentele kloof tussen de con-
federale basis van de EU en de federale bovenbouw. Vanuit een constituti-
oneel perspectief lijkt het er derhalve op dat de interne markt ‘motor’ van 
het Europese confederale systeem te snel gaat, en niet langer gedragen of 
afgeremd kan worden door de confederale basis. Maar tegelijkertijd is het 
juist de diepe afhankelijkheid van de inmiddels gerealiseerde integratie die 
de EU momenteel lijkt te dragen. Het afremmen of terugschroeven van de 
interne markt zou daarom de gehele Europese integratie kunnen ondergra-
ven. Op deze manier verklaart een confederaal perspectief mede het breder 
ervaren gevoel dat de Eurocrisis de EU klem zet tussen aan de ene kant een 
zeer riskante federale sprong voorwaarts, en aan de andere kant een even 
gevaarlijke desintegratie.
De Eurocrisis treft de EU bovendien ook precies op enkele van de zwak-
ste plekken in het confederale pantser: geld, politiek en conflict. Want naast 
de grote bedragen waar het in de crisis om gaat betreft de crisis meer in het 
algemeen het nationale budgetrecht. Dit is nu bij uitstek een hoogst gevoe-
lig politiek terrein waar recht op zijn best een secundaire rol kan spelen. 
Een feit dat helaas nogal hardhandig aangetoond is door het spectaculaire 
mislukken van het groei- en stabiliteitspact. Bovendien, en deels vanwege 
deze politieke aard van het budgetrecht, dwingt de crisis de EU om direct in 
conflict te komen met lidstaten op deze hoogst gevoelige politieke terreinen. 
Net als de situatie in Hongarije raakt dit aan één van de centrale confede-
rale achilleshielen: de gebrekkige capaciteit van het confederale centrum om 
een direct politiek conflict aan te gaan met een of meerdere lidstaten.
Hoofdstuk 13 wijst er vervolgens op dat, juist gezien het grote verlangen de 
crisis snel te overwinnen, de inherente beperkingen van het gemodificeerde 
confederale bestel van de EU wel in acht moeten worden genomen. Twee 
confederale valkuilen, welke geïllustreerd worden aan de hand van de Com-
missie en Van Rompuy ‘blauwdrukken’, moeten met name vermeden wor-
den. Ten eerste is daar het risico dat, in overhaaste pogingen om de EMU 
te stabiliseren, de federale bovenbouw van de Unie enorm word uitgebreid. 
Dit zou de confederale basis van de EU (verder) overbelasten, en zou daar-
mee juist een bedreiging zijn voor de levensvatbaarheid van de Unie op de 
langere termijn. Ten tweede bestaat het gerelateerde risico dat vervolgens 
geprobeerd wordt om afdoende democratische legitimiteit te creëren voor 
deze uitgedijde federale bovenbouw op Europees niveau. Pogingen die niet 
alleen gedoemd zijn om te falen zolang de EU een confederale basis heeft, 
maar ook contraproductief zullen werken en meer legitimiteit zullen kosten 
dan opleveren. Een vergaande Europese bevoegdheid om nationale budge-
ten te controleren zou daarom een Trojaans paard kunnen blijken voor de EU
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Als laatste gaat hoofdstuk 13 in op twee mogelijke confederale antwoorden 
op de crisis. Deze zijn ontworpen om de inherente beperkingen en zwak-
tes in het gemodificeerde confederale systeem van de Unie te vermijden, en 
proberen daarentegen te bouwen op de sterke punten in dit systeem. Met 
name wordt voorgesteld om de controle op nationale begrotingen en econo-
misch beleid primair op het nationale niveau vorm te geven. Deze nationale 
controles moeten vervolgens onder een effectief maar secundair Europees 
toezicht komen. Dergelijke mechanismen zouden bovendien meer geba-
seerd moeten zijn op automatische sancties dan op politieke besluitvorming 
op Europees niveau. Hierdoor zou de noodzaak van directe handhaving 
door de EU worden verminderd, en wordt de nationale autonomie juist 
meer beschermd. Op deze wijze wordt immers de primaire verantwoorde-
lijkheid, en de noodzakelijke beslissingsruimte, voor het creëren van effec-
tieve en passende nationale controlemechanismen aan de lidstaten gelaten. 
De confederale instellingen worden daarentegen gebruikt voor secondaire 
normstelling en toezicht, taken waarvoor ze veel beter geschikt zijn dan 
directe politieke handhaving. De ‘Gouden Regel’, zoals opgenomen in het 
huidige Verdrag inzake Stabiliteit, Coördinatie en Bestuur in de Economi-
sche en Monetaire Unie (VSCB) vormt een goede basis voor deze benade-
ring, al zijn verdere confederale verbeteringen nog wel nodig.
Wanneer men deze inzichten uit hoofdstuk 13 combineert, is het van vitaal 
belang dat de politieke energie van de Eurocrisis wordt gebruikt om de con-
federale basis van de EU in de nationale constituties en democratische sys-
temen te verbeteren. In ieder geval moet vermeden worden dat deze crisis 
wordt gebruikt voor een federale Pyrrhus overwinning. Het is immers de 
stabiliteit van deze nationale systemen, en hun ongeëvenaarde capaciteit 
om democratische legitimiteit te genereren voor Europese integratie, waar-
van de Unie afhankelijk is. Een lange termijn investering in deze nationale 
wortels van het Europese succes lijkt daarmee het beste antwoord op de 
Eurocrisis, zeker op de langer termijn.
Hoofdstuk 14 geeft als laatste een overzicht van de kernbevindingen van 
het proefschrift, en formuleert enkele algemene conclusies. Zo bieden con-
federalisme en volkssoevereiniteit een constructieve en vruchtbare basis 
voor de bestudering van de EU. Hoewel dit concept nader onderzocht, uit-
gewerkt en getoetst moet worden, kan de EU inderdaad begrepen worden 
als een confederale unie van soevereine lid-volkeren, zowel qua beschrij-
ving als qua aspiratie. As gevolg biedt onze neo-Westfaalse werkelijkheid 
wellicht de ideale kans voor een confederale comeback. Een werkelijkheid 
waarin het lelijke eendje van de constitutionele theorie eindelijk tot wasdom 
kan komen, en een effectief en democratisch constitutioneel model kan leve-
ren voor een globaliserende wereld.
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